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Abstract 
Digital and advanced biomedical technologies alter the ways in which human beings 
communicate and construct paradigms about how individuals function, singly (and 
biologically) and in social groups. Taking this broad statement to be applicable to dance 
practice it is to be (or may be) assumed that the use of technology alters the multiple 
processes of choreographing, performing and watching (experiencing) dance. The notion 
of `change' here is called into question, as are the philosophical concepts of `human 
beings', `experience' and `dance'. 
The philosophy of Wittgenstein suggests strategies for laying foundations for 
understanding and removing the confusing and contentious issues that the marriage of 
dance and technology raises for those attempting to write about and express these 
practices. 
The conceptual frameworks on which Western societies, cultures, philosophies and, most 
importantly, languages are built are long held and `invisibly' ingrained in linguistic 
practices. Wittgenstein urges that human beings who use language in and across a wide 
range of contexts should interrogate their utterances for sense in order to divest them of 
nonsensical metaphysical and conceptual connections or connotations. 
Drawing on Nietzsche, modem and postmodern philosophers, post-philosophy theorists, 
and using Wittgenstein as a constant commentator in the writing, this thesis prompts and 
allows the reader (dancer, writer, thinker) to re-examine the relationships between human 
beings, dance, language, communication, writing/reading and technology. It incorporates 
a range of writing styles and sources to collapse the distinctions between traditionally 
accepted and acceptable academic practices, foregrounding the reader and continuing to 
challenge ideas of `self, the `author' and the singular creative entity known as the `artist'. 
The thesis is constructed as a meta-theoretical (hyper)text using metaphor and mythology 
to analyse the processes of writing a thesis, while also investigating the possible concerns 
of practitioners and theorists of the new dance forms that technology could bring about. 
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Introduction 
The methodological framework, the system of methods and principles, upon which 
this thesis is constructed takes its form from a number of disciplines. This opening 
chapter describes the range of influences on the writing of the thesis, the rationale 
behind its form and the problems which the approaches taken prompt in writer and 
reader of such a thesis. The main `method' or approach is derived from reading the 
work of philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose influence is outlined below. Other 
key influences and areas of relevance are contextualized, such as the critical theories 
related to various aspects of new and digital technologies, and how these affect the 
way the (dancing) body, `consciousness' and `creativity' are conceptualized and 
discussed. In addition, the background of the writer and the positioning of the thesis 
are described to highlight the role of the personal in both `writing' and `reading', 
when an approach akin to that involved in intertextuality is used. It has been deemed 
necessary to use the first person in certain parts of this introduction, but `the writer 
(of this thesis)', for example, is used when the act of writing is under scrutiny. With 
regards to `the reader', I assumed that, predominantly, he or she could be anyone 
from a broad range of performance-related disciplines. Readers might be 
theoreticians, writers, critics, and practitioners, primarily dancers (as the opening 
quotation by Nietzsche implies), with an interest not necessarily in `philosophy' but 
in challenging their own conceptions of their art and the language they use in 
connection with it. 
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Opening Statement: The Shock of the Nu 
By early to mid-1999, research was leading me into areas of a disquieting nature. I 
had started off with the intention of looking at the relatively new practice of using 
biomedical technology in performance. I was interested in machines that work 
directly on, or in, or with, the body, either giving or receiving information or energy 
to and from the body, to be converted into action, information and most importantly 
for me, which constructed meaning in the people involved in the performance (as 
participants or spectators). I spoke with the artist Stelarc about his experiences and 
thoughts on the principles and practices of using, principally, electrical nerve 
stimulation devices to produce movement in his body. I experienced the use of such 
machines on my arm in a demonstration by Stelarc, and it was this moment that 
began the shift of my attention away from the practice to some of the theoretical 
concerns that, in my view, lay behind the way I was to describe the experience. The 
disquiet that I mentioned above came in the form of how to refer to myself in this 
context (and ultimately other situations). Similarly theories of a dancer's movement 
and its (their) meaning(s) came to the fore. In conversation with Stelarc it became 
clear that his rhetoric (talking of himself in performance as `The Body'; reference to 
the body as obsolete; placing the technologically modified body `between zombie and 
cyborg') was chosen carefully to be contentious and inflammatory, and not to 
describe a complete philosophy of a techno-body. The issue of the `self in relation to 
the body as affected by the technology of the last few decades (for example, advances 
in digital and communication technologies, non-intrusive biomedical imaging 
techniques, prosthetic devices and other medical procedures to enhance and improve 
life) became mixed with the problem of how to discuss dance in this shifting 
`technoscape'. But the problem did not end there. It seemed to have implications for 
how I was able to conceive of dance and its relation to `language'. In particular, 
experiential language (the language of description, the language of phenomenology) 
became problematic for me in the light of certain theories of language and cultural 
difference. The idea that dance is a language also presented itself as a contentious 
notion, one which prompted a shift in my own thinking about how and what dance 
`communicates', if anything at all. The idea of dance being (like) a language began to 
open up the other issues in ways to which I had hitherto been `blind'. I felt that many 
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other dance students also had a lack of awareness of these issues, and were satisfied 
to use a range of terms unquestioningly. This shows the need for research such as 
this which prompts questions into the discursive aspects of the discipline of dance 
studies. 
While seeking to find a working solution to a growing unease with the use of a 
number of words and terms in the `usual' vocabulary of dance-related practices 
(rehearsals, classes, writing and criticism, discussions of dance and meaning), I read 
a number of sources from a range of disciplines. I was led by these initial writings to 
new sources, often tangential, creating a sprawling mass of materials and ideas, with 
me as the developer of the nexus. The idea of a dialogic and nonlinear approach 
began to develop: a complex `system' using the materials in their own form, 
connected to the writings that they informed and inspired. The concept that any 
writing (the act and the product) is a combination of references and quotations, and 
for want of a better word, subjective responses to those texts, began to influence the 
strands of the thesis. Drawing on a range of antiphilosophical and literary texts led to 
a `poeticizing' of the material. This and the rejection of certain academic norms and 
values combined to produce the idea that any writing is in effect both a series of 
fictions, of mythologies, of hypotheses to which concepts of truth/falsity or proof/ 
disproof are not applicable, and a set of personal conjectures, which are given 
credence or authority according to the language and context in which they are 
written and framed. 
3 
Section One: A Shifting Intellectual Landscape, or Mille Plateaux 
This thesis is the product of, and a dialogue with, a series of shifts in philosophy and 
art that have taken place over the last one hundred and twenty years or so. At the end 
of the nineteenth century the seeds of postmodernism were sown by the German 
philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, whose work sought to critique and make sense of 
`modern existence' and the crises that this brought, not only for Nietzsche but "for 
everyone and no one" (Nietzsche 1969: from subtitle). His writings also suggest an 
intense loathing for the stagnant ideas which permeated his society and culture. His 
later work, written on the edge of madness, is a challenge to convention and 
categorization, mixing as it does biography, fiction, history and mythology with 
philosophy, theology and crude sociological analysis (for example, see Nietzsche 
1990). The influence of Nietzsche's writings on subsequent thought and creativity is 
partcicularly noticeable in the work of the modernist movements of the early 
twentieth century. The Futurists and the Expressionists took Nietzsche's work 
seriously and it directly influenced their attacks on the complacency of pre-World 
War One art audiences and consumers (see Tisdall and Bozzolla 1993 and Furness 
1973). Other major modernist movements had different precursors, such as the 
Surrealists who used the work of Sigmund Freud and Pierre Janet to unsettle the 
notions of art and life (see Brandon 1999). Freud's influence on the cultural and 
intellectual climate of the late twentieth century should be acknowledged as 
significant. These European art movements, and related and later groups such as the 
Bauhaus, rejected and reflected their socio-political and cultural context in various 
ways (polemical, theoretical, artistic). 
In the First World War the modernists fought different battles according to their 
ethos, some pro-war, some anti-war, some driven to fight despite conflicting 
attitudes to war or due to personal compulsions to push themselves to the limit of 
human experience by facing death on a daily basis. The First World War, the Great 
War, could be seen as the pivotal event in modernism and the beginning of the end 
of the modernist era. The First World War led into another series of artistic and 
philosophical shifts, and brought about the rise of modern totalitarianism (which, in 
the case of Nazism and Fascism, was to distort to its own ends the writings of 
4 
Nietzsche). Alongside this, modernist philosophy, in the areas of logic and 
linguistics, developing from the work of Frege, Russell, de Saussure and others (for 
example, see Baghramian (ed) 1999 and Tait (ed) 1997, for introductions to this 
work), was beginning to place an emphasis on the structures and systems of 
language. It is in this vein that Wittgenstein wrote his wartime text Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus (1961), which prompted the Vienna Circle of Logical 
Positivists to apply scientific analysis techniques to philosophical problems. 
However, this was a serious misreading of the Tractatus and of Wittgenstein's 
method, borne out by the author's own responses to the Circle's approach. It was 
apparent to the Circle that Wittgenstein was more like an `artist', a `poet', than the 
kind of analytical yet metaphysical philosopher they considered him to be (for 
example, see Monk 1990). 
By 1922 the peak of modernism in the literary arts, it is said, had arrived, with the 
publication of Eliot's The Waste Land, Rilke's Sonnets to Orpheus and Joyce's 
Ulysses (and coincidentally the same year that the Tractatus was published in 
English; also, see Josipovici (ed) 1976). Reading these works required a scholarly 
knowledge of previous works, and arguably they paved the way for theories of 
intertextuality and, paradoxically, the death of the author. Alongside these literary 
challenges to form (and meaning) came the dramatic developments that would lead 
to the existential theatre of Sartre and Beckett. But it was also the Second World 
War which provoked questions of received notions of existence and what it `means' 
to be human. The experiences of thinkers and writers during the war underlie their 
subsequent works, if often in an obscure way. Particularly in the works of Beckett, as 
Perloff (1996) suggests, it is possible to see the unravelling of language as a coherent 
means of communication. In Beckett's theatre pieces (and novels), philosophical 
concerns are both hinted at and, in a sense, ignored in the `un-dramatic' dialogues 
and scenarios. In parallel with these works after World War Two, which can be seen 
as marking the shift from modernism to postmodernism (although not clearly 
defined and usually not considered in these terms), the later work of Wittgenstein 
(begun before the war and equally obscure at times) puts these linguistic and 
philosophical concerns into other terms based on a critique of traditional 
philosophical methods. 
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Other developments in philosophy and linguistics were taking place in the United 
States of America - the work of Dewey on culture and pragmatism (1958), the work 
of Whorf on language (1956) - and elsewhere - the work of Bakhtin's circle (in 
particular that of Volosinov (1986)) and Vygotsky (1986) in the Soviet Union - 
which can be said to share similar theoretical and philosophical concerns to the 
works of Wittgenstein. When read alongside a work such as the Philosophical 
Investigations (1953), these writers' works offer alternative yet comparable 
suggestions on the functioning of language (and culture) in the occidental world of 
the middle of the twentieth century. For example, Whorf s work on cross-cultural 
language differences suggested the effects that these differences have on speakers' 
descriptions and notions of `reality'. His writings, which have been variously read 
and misread (for example, see Halliday and Martin 1993, and Pinker 1994), provide 
links between linguistics and quantum physics and ideas of relativity. Like 
Wittgenstein and Whorf, the post-Einsteinian physicists are aware that grammar and 
terminology can affect our world as much as the world affects our grammar and 
terminology. From the 1930s, quantum physicists such as Bohr, Heisenberg and 
Bohm, debated whether or not atoms actually exist as `things' or whether they are 
only useful as words and ways to describe observations and the resulting algorithms 
(see Davies and Gribbin 1992). 
Twentieth century science has been influenced by and influenced philosophy and the 
changing attitudes of late modernist and postmodernist theorists in a number of 
areas. The rapid mechanization of warfare (and genocide), the atomic bomb, the 
development of genetics and medical procedures such as transplants and in vitro 
fertilization have prompted scientists to address questions of ethics (see Sperry 
1983). In the 1990s a number of science and ethics organisations were set up around 
the globe, for example, the European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies was set up in December 1997 by the European Commission to succeed 
the Group of Advisers on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnologies (1991-1997). 
The exploration of space and the universe have given rise to a vast number of 
suppositions about our origins and `destiny', or theories of spacetime and 
absoluteness. The aforementioned field of quantum physics has provided new 
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paradigms for describing the universe in terms of chaos and nonlinearity, 
randomness and anti-everythings. It is tempting for many to apply these terms to 
human activities and behaviour, both in the study and the practice of them. The 
language of science has also come under increasing investigation, prompting 
reevaluations of scientific practice, techniques, results and their dissemination. The 
rise of popular science texts and the selling of science as directly `meaningful' to 
people's everyday lives can be seen from a number of viewpoints, ranging from the 
reduction of science's authority to its embracing of new modes of discourse. Related 
areas in which this is particularly marked and relevant are the cognitive and neuro- 
sciences (see below). Linked to these human-based sciences are the burgeoning 
fields of computing, artificial intelligence and robotics. The developments in these 
areas pose questions about `consciousness' and `intelligence' (human and machine), 
`emotion', `communication' and `mind'. Debates continue as to the nature (form, 
existence) of the human `mind' and they evolve from each of these different 
disciplines to provide different `solutions'. Each of them can be granted a 
philosophical tag, and each can be taken as it stands and applied to any theoretical or 
practical (or practical-theoretical) investigation. 
As the sciences were developing according to theories of the quantum universe and 
the role of DNA in life formation, the philosophy of language was turning its 
attention to the subject of `mind'. For example, Ryle made a pointed criticism of 
Cartesian philosophy in 1949, and four years later (as Watson and Crick were 
publishing their discoveries of the double helix of DNA), Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations was published posthumously. His works on psychology 
were not to be published for many years, and they cannot be said to have had a great 
influence on the philosophy and sciences of `mind', but his published and word-of- 
mouth work on language caused some debate in philosophical circles, prompting a 
shift in ideas of `meaning' (not universally accepted it must be noted) towards anti- 
realist and meaning-as-use theories. The shift brings to the fore the relationship of 
words and language to the world and (self-)knowledge. The various paradigm shifts 
in the sciences (as theorized by Kuhn in 1962) point to the ways in which languages 
(natural and specialized, expert or scientific, in particular) change, therefore causing 
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change in how humans perceive, conceive and describe `the (physical) world': 
simply stated, Newton's world was different, in a sense, to Einstein's. The same, yet 
different. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the links between the philosophies of mind and language 
became more pronounced, with writers such as Davidson (for example, see 
Davidson 1984) and Searle (1969) beginning to publish their works on both subjects. 
In 1967 a publication edited by Rorty (1967) explored `the linguistic turn' in 
philosophy, the same year as Davidson's `Truth and Meaning' (in Davidson 1984) 
and, incidentally, Derrida's L'Ecriture et la difference. By the late 1970s and early 
1980s writings such as those by Dennett (see below), Churchland (1988; first 
published in 1984) and Rorty offered a range of (frequently conflicting) ideas as to 
the importance of philosophy in answering questions of `mind', `conscious 
intelligence', `meaning' and `truth'. The ideas of Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature (1980; first published in 1979) and some later writings suggest that 
philosophy has reached the end of its usefulness in these matters. However, his 
proclamations ironically kept philosophical discussions fuelled, making his `end of 
philosophy' rhetorical rather than actual. In parallel with these debates in philosophy 
the work of the poststructuralists, such as Derrida, was aimed at challenging similar 
concerns in textual (literary, anthropological, semiotic) analysis. Both Rorty and 
Derrida (1976, for example) can be said to be highlighting the paradoxes inherent in 
and created by their work. 
In a different sphere of theoretical debate, the links between human beings and 
technology were explored from the points of view of scientists, cultural historians 
and philosophers. With the rapid development of the computer in the 1940s and 
1950s, and in the work of Alan Turing and Norbert Wiener, there came a shift in 
how machines were perceived. The suggestion that machines might develop a form 
of intelligence or consciousness led to notions that they could either, positively, 
enhance human beings, and assist us in understanding our own thought processes, or 
negatively, in the extreme, threaten humanity's existence. Into the 1960s the 
relationships between humans, as physical and socio-cultural beings, and machines 
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were theorized in light of the space race and Cold War. The seminal writing on the 
`cybernetic organism' by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline (originally published in 
1960; see Gray (ed) 1995) provides a hypothetical basis for extraterrestrial survival 
by augmenting human beings with drugs and machines. At the same time, Marshall 
McLuhan, coming from a literary studies background, was developing his ideas on 
global media and technology as an extension of human beings' abilities and 
capabilities. McLuhan continued to write until his death, removing the distinction 
between so-called `high' and `low' culture in a postmodernist vein (see Grosswiler 
1998), and laying the foundations, on the ground prepared by writers such as 
Teilhard de Chardin and Walter Benjamin (1973), for the addressing of issues 
stemming from technologically-mediated culture. This work has been taken up by, 
among others, Jean Baudrillard (1983), Donna Haraway (1991), Arthur Kroker 
(Kroker and Kroker 1996) and Pierre Levy (1997), and can be detected in many 
writings on multimedia and information technologies. 
In the last fifty years, alongside the cultural analysts and philosophers concerned 
with new technology, an increasing number of neurologists and psychologists using 
technology (analogously and practically) as a means to describe the brain and 
behaviour (a trend which took off in the 1950s following Wiener and Turing) have 
emerged. Many of the early theories were dualistic and based on adapted versions of 
popular Western models of self and mental processes, using machine metaphors to 
describe the `mind' (as they had been previously used to describe the `body', for 
example, in the post-Descartes work Man a Machine by Julien Offray de La Mettrie 
(1912; first published as L'homme machine in 1748)). More recently, cognitive 
scientists and neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio (1995) and Daniel Dennett 
have challenged the Cartesian conception of the `mind'. Dennett's work, in 
particular, stretches the imagination when he writes about artificial life, conscious 
robots and the concept of a technologically-dissociated `self. There have also been 
moves towards `software models of mind', creating what Dennett characterizes as 
`virtual machines' (for example, see Dennett 1998), and connectionist models of 
memory and cognition. Another new area of psychology, called cyberpsychology, 
was born out of the "tense relationships between classic and alternative cybernetics, 
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and between the histories of art, science and technology" (Gordo-Lopez and Parker 
1999: 5). It characterizes well the merging of disciplines, drawing on, and seeing no 
differentiation between, a range of sources in an attempt "to reinstate accounts of 
bodies, politics and technologies in the discipline of psychology" (Gordo-Lopez and 
Parker 1999: back cover). 
One final area of influence comes from a range of performance-related theorists and 
practitioners, who in their own ways could be seen as the `theatrical' equivalent to 
Rorty's edifying revolutionary philosophers. Late-modernist and early-postmodernist 
performance activities helped to re-shape the fields of theatre, dance and 
performance art. In the last thirty years or so, postmodern performance has become 
an alternative to traditional theatre. Many of the more recent examples (see the 
collection of influences and precursors below) include and use in their works the 
notions of paradox, contradiction, ambiguity, self-referencing and irony, which are 
frequently cited as postmodern strategies. Performance theory has become an 
academic discipline in its own right (due, in part, to writers such as Richard 
Schechner, for example, see Schechner 1985 and Schechner and Appel (eds) 1990; 
see Carlson 1996 and Auslander 1997, for overviews), seeing `performance' as 
distinct from `theatre', and leaking into everyday activities (and vice versa). It should 
be noted that the term `performance' also causes many debates, and it would be 
inappropriate to enter into them now (see States 1996 for an overview). 
The ways in which postmodern performance makers treat their source materials are 
perhaps related to the earlier Dadaist notions of equality and destruction and 
creation, `cutting and pasting' a range of texts to generate new texts (see Melzer 
1994). Deconstructionist techniques break apart existing texts and emphasize their 
socio-political aspects, often in a disturbing way using parody and pastiche which 
comes close to enforcing the doctrines being challenged. The tools of what could be 
called `intertextuality' (for example, the referencing, citing and including pastiches 
of other works) are also deliberately utilised to draw comparisons and direct the 
audience to certain connections, or allowing the audience to generate their own. As 
in poststructuralist literary criticism, the distinctions between performer/director 
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('author') and audience ('reader') shift in postmodern performance, and notions of 
`expression', `meaning' and `communication' are destabilized. Even the term 
`performance' is unsettled in postmodern performances, with `performers' playing 
themselves, or not performing at all. Technology, of one sort or another, has become 
increasingly integral to postmodern performance, from video screens and 
microphones to more advanced digital projections, intelligent stages with performer 
controlled effects, or live webstreaming of sound and video and telematic 
technologies linking performers and audiences across time and space. (On the use of 
technology in performance, and related theories, see, for example, Birringer 1991 
and 1998. ) With the increasing use of digital technologies the performer is 
sometimes even removed from the performance, except perhaps as a trace, a code, an 
algorithm, an avatar. 
The historical development of performance in the latter half of the twentieth century 
would require a considerable exposition. There are many different areas and lines of 
development, with many crossovers. What follows here is an account of a selected 
collection of individuals and groups who have all, to a greater or lesser extent, 
informed the practical and theoretical development that has led to this thesis. It is not 
all-inclusive, but represents a personal selection of seminal and influential artists as 
perceived by the researcher. There are of course many omissions, but the following 
account suggests the range of performance `styles' and modes that would need to be 
referenced if a more thorough overview of antecedents was constructed. 
It begins and ends with two seemingly very different individuals, who are related in 
certain ways (I argue), even if their approaches appear unconnected. The list lacks 
explanation and expansion, because to describe the work of these artists and why 
they are influential would be an unnecessary exposition. The set of influences 
includes: theatre writers Antonin Artaud and Samuel Beckett, and contemporary 
playwright Martin Crimp; theatre directors Bertolt Brecht, Peter Brook, Jerzy 
Grotowski, Robert Wilson, Jan Fabre, Robert Lepage; groups such as the Judson 
Church Dance Group, Pina Bausch's Tanztheater Wuppertal, Wooster Group, 
Forced Entertainment, DV8, Saburo Teshigawara's Karas, Charleroi Danses/Plan K; 
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video artists Bill Viola and Gary Hill; and performers Tatsumi Hijikata, Spalding 
Gray and Stelarc. The notable omission from the collection comes in the areas of 
digital and virtual performance, with the exception of Stelarc. It is perhaps a little 
too early to ascertain the `importance' of many of the artists creating this kind of 
work, and no one besides Stelarc has markedly transformed my thinking or inspired 
me through their work. However, it should be noted that there are a number of dance 
companies whose use of technology is remarkable: Merce Cunningham's company 
and its use of LifeForms animation software; William Forsythe's Frankfurt Ballet's 
use of Michael Saup's Binary Ballistic Ballet (1994-5), an interactive choreography 
system in which audio-signals are transformed into abstract shapes (by a computer) 
which are then constructed into a dance pattern on stage by a dancer (Eidos: Telos, 
1995); companies such as Palindrome, Troika Ranch and Electronic Dance Theatre 
which use these technologies in their performances, mainly as a means of triggering 
MIDI signals for sound or lighting. 
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Section Two: How this Thesis Proceeds and Why or `Push the envelope, watch it bend' 
In the light of all these possible influences the question `Why Wittgenstein? ' may be 
asked. Wittingly on his part and due to the posthumous collation and publication of 
his notes and in the light of postmodern approaches to the `nature' and forms of 
philosophical writing, Wittgenstein's work expresses well and epitomizes notions of 
the 21 s` century cultural world. In this fragmented cultural environment, the 
formation of the `person' is a complex process involving (if not centred around) 
language use. It is the use(s) of language in different human environments that to 
some extent shapes and defines the (human) world. It is Wittgenstein's focus on 
language (grammars, logics), and the problems that stem from the contradictory 
ways in which words function when used by different people in different contexts, 
that prompts the attempts in this thesis to examine words by presenting them in 
different modes: as poetry (printed and if read aloud, aural), as stories, as 
philosophizing, as `academic' writing, as reported speech, as notes for speeches, as 
`unreadable' (either being non-English or overlapping, often to the point of total 
illegibility). The different writing styles (including fonts, character sizes, layouts) 
contained in the one binding, as the metaphor is described in the thesis, represent (as 
it were) the person writing, the person dancing, the person in the world. Wittgenstein 
uses the word `Mensch' (translated as `person' or `human being') in his writings to 
refer to that particular thing that can be referred to using different categories of 
grammar and language in different contexts. 
In this formulation, the human being, the person, is not a composite of mind and 
body (two `substances'), but something to which mental and physical terms can be 
applied for different purposes in different circumstances. This is the strategy used in the 
thesis, and one of the key adjustments urged on the thinking of dance students and 
practitioners as they use language in their daily and (so-called) extra-daily business. 
The reasons for this are not to prevent people from using certain words and terms, 
but to be aware of the place, and the far from neutral, `nature' of language. The 
choice of words is important and problematic when the people with whom you are 
conversing share your natural language but have different conceptions of humanity. 
(This is related to the problems of `understanding' outlined below. ) The ways in 
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which we talk about something affect our so-called `views' of the world: if someone 
says they are a body, this implies something different to someone who says they 
have a body, or any other such sentence on a similar theme. The ways in which we 
`view' the world are affected by the ways in which language has developed to 
describe our experiences: we can imagine a `form of life' (culture, group, context) 
that uses terms which may seem counterintuitive or alien to us (take, for example, 
Rorty's Antipodeans; see Rorty 1980), and they might view the world or 
`themselves' as totally different to how we do. It is also possible to imagine a 
different set (or sets) of academic conventions, an evolution of writing that is 
different to that which exists now. 
A related example (linked also to the notion of paradigm shifts referred to above) is 
highlighted by the allusions running through the thesis to the philosopher Descartes 
being outmoded. A reason for saying this is because I don't `understand' him. I don't 
`understand' him because my linguistic-cultural-theological context is different to 
Descartes's and his constructs are not apparently useful to me. For example, his 
insistence on and inclusion of God's place in the workings of human beings is not 
something I can subscribe to at a fundamental level. His division of the human being 
into parts (substances, one of which is immaterial) is another unacceptable and 
unnecessary standpoint, unconvincing from an agnostic or atheistic point of view. 
Neither is his method of philosophizing convincing to me: he introspects and I 
would rather `extrospect', that is, consider how problematic issues are created by and 
related to human activities and actions that can be observed or heard or otherwise 
sensed by another person, and placed in relation to wider cultural activities-a form 
of externalism, it might be said. 
The problems of philosophizing (the methods) that Wittgenstein identifies in his work 
are allied to the problems of Philosophy (the traditions), and his attempts at removing 
the traditional defining aspects of philosophy was and still is quite radical, in that it 
demands an ambivalent way of dealing with the questions and issues of human 
experience. On the one hand it requires that these questions are asked in such a way 
that they do not confound the philosopher further, and on the other it suggests that 
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the answers to these questions are not answers at all, they are merely more questions 
waiting to be asked. The problem with philosophy is that it seeks to answer (all of 
the) questions, but cannot do so because the questions are not answerable. What 
Wittgenstein proposes is that we should ask questions only in order to clear away 
problems, not to generate more. Furthermore, Wittgenstein's philosophy is at first 
glance `philosophical' in a more traditional sense, despite his later refusal to 
construct arguments, favouring a piecemeal approach using short sections examining 
a point, perhaps linked but not always, to the sections connected in space and time to 
them-the relationships to hypertextuality start at this observation. Yet it prevents 
traditional reading. This was of relevance to the writing of the thesis in that it 
suggests one sort of reading, yet requires another (or others). Theories lead to more 
theories or counter-theories; examinations and explorations read as someone's 
statement of fact can lead to a misguided debate, in Wittgenstein's writings and in 
this thesis, and what may seem like a theory, a hypothesis, is rather an examination 
of a problem. In Wittgensteinian forms of philosophizing what may seem like an 
assertion, or a statement of rigid opinion, should not necessarily be thought of as 
such. As is the case in this thesis, to say something is a particular type of thing (a 
poem, a dance) or to say that a particular type of thing is such-and-such (giving a 
definition of `poetry' or `dance') follows Rorty's observation of Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger's position of "decrying the notion of having a view, while avoiding 
having a view about having views" (1980: 371). When something is presented from 
this standpoint, the person "might just be saying something-participating in a 
conversation rather than contributing to an inquiry" (Rorty 1980: 371; italics in 
original). 
What transpires is that there is a problem with asking questions without giving 
answers and anticipating that the reader will pick up on the way that the thesis is 
intended to be read, particularly when the issue of author's (artist's, dancer's) 
intention is under scrutiny and being proffered as merely one factor in the 
interpretation of a text. The emphasis is on the range of elements that go into making 
the meaning(s) of a work (there are potentially some different notions implied in 
using the word `work' instead of `text', here the two are used interchangeably), with 
the suggestion that regardless of what the author thinks their work means and what 
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references they deliberately place in the work (either overtly or concealed), another 
person, the reader, will only be able to identify in the work what they are aware of. 
This thesis suggests, more than anything else, a `story', a `myth' (the word `theory' 
is inappropriate in this instance) of `meaning-making', with a stress on the rule that 
`there is no meaning except that which is made'. It could be argued that a text is 
meaningless until it comes into contact with a reader, a person. The more 
`experiences' a person has, the more meanings they are able to make, that is, the 
wider range of possible connections (links in a network (neural? )) available to them. 
The reader as meaning-maker (interpretations) is at least on a par with the author as 
meaning-maker (intentions), but the two of them are necessary for anything to have 
meaning. 
Other main influences on my perspective are sceptical meta-philosophers such as 
Nietzsche and Rorty, who dissuade us from accepting without question the results of 
foundationalist philosophy. Certain viewpoints of these writers are apposite to 
expressing my own experience of a secular world: chaotic, technological, 
supersaturated with information and theories, and fractured in terms of `self, yet 
somehow bound together in the conception of 'myself'. Additionally, these writers 
were chosen as a justification for subverting some of the conventions of academic 
thought and writing in particular. The fabric of diverse `styles' within the thesis is an 
attempt to represent the world and experience of the researcher. The use of different 
registers and conventions, often slipping into the colloquial, is contrived so that the 
academic register is shown as one of many ways of describing experience, and not 
always the most appropriate. 
The metaphor of the `voice' in the thesis is played with to the extreme of it being 
`more' than multi-vocal and in a sense voiceless. The reasoning behind this was to 
demonstrate the range of influences and how these are reworked in works of art and 
theory. The `voices' are not clearly defined and are more akin to the use of fragments 
of text and parodies of other texts in late-twentieth century performance and poetry. 
It allows me to combine the ideas with the form of expression in a conterminous 
manner. The use of different sources is allied to the notion of `form of life', and more 
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particularly, the `language games' (instead of `voice') of these different `forms of 
life'. So, the constantly shifting `voice' in the thesis, the collision and compression of 
these `voices' within a single yet multifaceted work `represents' the nonhierarchical 
interplay of `language games' as they cross from one `form of life' to another. 
The `failure' of the thesis to stay within the rigidities of academic writing is a 
statement of the writer's dissatisfaction with academic prose conventions. It is also an 
assertion that these other ways of writing also have a place within the discourses of 
academia, just as practice-based research in the arts have a relevance and importance 
in the processes of advanced research and its final presentation and dissemination. 
Philosophical and academic writings take many forms, utilize many stylistic 
conventions and can confuse readers who are not au fait with the terms, history and 
approaches of the discipline and subject matter. This is arguably unavoidable in a 
world in which the currency of ideas has changed so many times, and in recent years 
the rate of change has accelerated making it increasingly difficult to stay on top of 
developments in any given area. The researcher is always playing `catch up' and it is 
often difficult to remember or justify how and why certain sources and influences 
were found and used. This thesis reflects the problems of research in an area which 
branches off into a wide range of other areas: for example, dance and performance 
studies, technology, computer science, quantum physics, aesthetics, hermeneutics, 
philosophy of consciousness, psychoanalysis and phenomenology, epistemology, 
linguistics and linguistic philosophy, evolutionary theories, cognitive science, and 
critical theory. 
This writer is interested in opening up the processes of writing, which is what, it 
could be said, a lot of so-called postmodern writing does, just as postmodern 
performance can be said to lay bare the devices of theatre (as its modernist 
predecessors did). It is like `alienating' the reader to invite them to think about the 
reading more, and not just about what is being said. This thesis is about `reading' - 
interpretation - and our relationship to dance, the dance-text, and in particular recent 
technologically-mediated forms of dance which challenge our concepts of `body' and 
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`self. But it is impossible to contain the dance-text in a book-an analogous method 
of `representation' has been attempted: dance as words (or vice versa). The 
`intention' of the writer of this thesis, the challenge I chose to accept, was to use 
words as a choreographer might use movements to evoke their ideas, in order to 
explore the oft-stated notion that `dance is like language'. This thesis is an attempt to 
flag up the differences and similarities between words, language and the processes 
of choreography. It does this by using words in place of physical movements, 
showing that words `function' in one set of ways, and movements `work' in another 
set of ways (cf. Foster 1995 and Ulmer 1994). This, the most complicated, yet 
crucial, aspect of the thesis requires that the reader enter into the work as they might 
a multimedia performance space; the technologies of the page and the printed (and 
spoken) word standing in for computer screens, video monitors and sound system. 
The layers of text(s) highlight and mimic the multimodality of a contemporary 
performance, and the role of `interaction' in the processes of performance. 
The analyses that form the thesis could be said to be like a dance piece that is a 
reaction to a selection of ideas, transformed into a performance of references to these 
ideas which is then open to analysis (interpretation) itself; the analysis is in a sense 
obscured by the mode of presentation, but is also part and parcel, indissociable from 
the presentation itself. Reference is made to the McLuhanesque notion of medium 
and message (see McLuhan 1964), although it is put to the test and used merely as a 
tool to question the attempt to blur the distinctions, while reinforcing the binary. This 
is often why evocation and allusion are used in the thesis: it is not only what can be 
`directly' said which is important, but the manner, the tone, the quality, the `taste' of 
how it is said. 
The simile `dance is like language' is a particularly difficult statement to explain for 
some of the reasons that have been alluded to above and below, notably the 
problematical defining of `language'. A Wittgensteinian would fall back on the idea 
that language is a rule governed activity just as, to use Wittgenstein's own analogy, a 
mathematical calculus is (an analogy which was only partly acceptable to 
Wittgenstein after he had reflected on it for a number of years; see Wittgenstein 1953 
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and Glock 1996). The roles of rules (in language usage and in dance practice), and 
the rules themselves, are often difficult to define. Some would say that these rules 
operate beneath or behind the user's conscious use of them, and that using, meaning 
and understanding an utterance (or movement) are based in the hidden processes. 
This is not the position pursued in this thesis. The use and understanding of an 
`utterance' (physical, vocal, written), and therefore the meaning of the so-called 
utterance, are dependent on the reaction (the response perhaps, but not always) of 
the person `receiving' (watching, hearing, reading) the utterance, and the way in 
which it is used by the utterer. This de-emphasises the idea that language acts to 
`express' any meaning or `internal' thoughts and feelings, and places the emphasis on 
language as a meaning-making `tool' (or set of tools). Wittgenstein uses this 
metaphor also to suggest the practical applications, the uses, to which language is 
put. 
The question of the person in isolation and `the private language argument' (as 
distinguished by Wittgenstein) comes into the frame at this point. If we suggest that a 
person acting in isolation cannot follow rules, as this is dependent on social 
interaction and consensus, does this also suggest that they cannot `mean' anything in 
or by their utterances? Is meaning-making only to be regarded as a social 
group-dependent activity? This is clearly not the case, but the person making 
meanings and the language utterance or artwork are generally situated within a social 
or cultural environment of sorts-otherwise the concepts of `language', `meaning', 
`art' and `communication' would be lacking and irrelevant. Take, for example, the 
person dancing in a room on their own, in this case a choreographer devising a new 
piece. What does it matter if rules are followed or not, if no-one else is there to 
respond? Any movement is `potential' material to the choreographer, regardless of 
what `style', `technique' or `vocabulary' they may be trained in. However, the 
dancer, even though on his or her own at that moment may be thinking forward to 
when the dance is performed in front of an audience-he or she is working within a 
socio-cultural framework. The dancer may be wanting or trying to guide the audience 
into making a particular set of meanings (the artist's intention), by using a limited 
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number of movements that the audience might recognise and `understand'. He or she 
will attempt to work according to rules, but to the rules that the dance community 
decrees. 
The choreographer may want to develop their own rules (their own vocabulary), but 
is this the same as inventing a verbal (or written) language? (This question is left 
hanging. ) There are other questions and issues raised here, for example, if a person is 
dancing in a room on their own (as often happens), does their dancing not have 
`meaning'? It can be said to `mean' something to them. It may mean to them a 
number of things, but here the word `mean' has a range of definitions/ 
interpretations. This is key. To say `I mean... ' is to play a language game, and it is 
related to the language game in which `she means... ' is a part, but they are not the 
same (see Wittgenstein PI 217e). This is the issue at stake: what does an `utterance' 
mean if nobody, except the `utterer', is there to `hear' it? One answer rests on an 
idea of `essential' meaning-an utterance means something inherently, by default 
almost, and this is what it means. Another answer is built on the idea that meaning 
comes from the further utterances given in response to the first utterance. (Note the 
use of metaphor which seems to elevate the latter above the former. ) 
As can be seen so far in the course of this introduction, writing in a way that 
acknowledges the diversity of languages and terminologies is fraught with problems. 
One method might be to ignore a group of related words and use one throughout (for 
example, `author' to stand in the place of `writer', `artist', `choreographer', `creator', 
or `programmer'), but this is to suggest that words are easily synonymized (an 
assumption that they are grammatically equivalent) and that it doesn't matter which 
word is used in a given situation. This is related to a recurring theme of the thesis: 
category mistakes or errors; notions of essentialism. The word `category' itself has 
had a shifting usage in philosophy, beyond the scope of this chapter to address. When 
a term (an `everyday' word) is used in another application (philosophy, for example) 
it can mislead-some people may exploit this. What Ryle and Wittgenstein urge is 
that the therapeutic application of philosophy should be to point out and undo the 
absurdities that arise from category mistakes. However, even the concept of category 
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mistakes implies the devising of these categories, the sorting of words into groups 
which can also cause problems. A key example of these issues is the use of the word 
`language' in relation to `dance'. The phrase `dance language' can be used to refer to 
the `style' (the word is used in full awareness of its vagueness) of a movement genre 
or technique, or to the words spoken in the teaching or discussion of a particular 
form of dance or dance in general. The term `movement vocabulary' is used to 
categorize the range of movements in a piece or (recognisably) similar pieces (with 
there being a number of evolving and overlapping `vocabularies'). The words 
`language' and `vocabulary' have been adopted to describe a range of activities, 
however, they do not `mean' the same as when they are used in other contexts, yet 
the `utterers' and `listeners' can make the mistake of taking them to have the same 
essential meaning, and connecting dance with notions of communication and 
transmission, syntax and grammar, its functioning like verbal and written language 
or its (undeniable) resemblance to non-verbal gestures (which are related to language 
use). 
Other examples of words which cause confusion in dance-related discussion are 
given or hinted at in the thesis, with such words as `energy', `quality', `impulse', 
`presence', `beautiful' and `with emotion' still being common in the discourses. The 
use of metaphor in dance-related discourse is often marred by confusion as to its role: 
as a tool to help dancers perform is one thing, but to assume it is a literal explanation 
of a process can be seen as a category mistake of sorts. In many dance discourses the 
vocabulary is sufficient to serve its purposes, but the traditional terms jar with the 
dance forms thrown up in the interactions with technology and an attempt to undefine 
[sic] the attitudes and dualities inherent in many languages. For example, the terms 
`inside' and `outside' present problems of usage and implication to the dancer in the 
field of new technologically-mediated performance: what does the distinction mean 
or really matter when the `source' of the movement is exogenous to the person? 
Other questions arise: If boundaries are blurred, is it still appropriate to talk of 
`boundaries'? What sense can be made of referring to a `virtual body'? Dance is 
based in space and time, but what happens to dance if the space is collapsed into two 
dimensions? Is there any difference between `digital dance', screen-based dance and 
21 
stop-motion or hand-drawn animation? If the body isn't human, but mechanical or a 
hybrid, is it `dance'? If the `meaning' of dance comes from the dancer, what happens 
when the dancer is removed from, or only a trace in, the work? These questions are 
not to be answered outright, and often it is not possible to answer them without 
resorting to a quasi-scientific or metaphysical set of terms. 
What then is `dance'? In the thesis it is a word that is used to `describe' a range of 
activities that cannot be bounded (defined) by creating a list. The `meaning' of a 
word is not fixed through time. Neither is the `meaning' of a work of art, which is 
surely obvious given the ever increasing range of re-readings of artworks. 
Wittgenstein's `family resemblance' concept (as referred to in the thesis) can be 
applied to any human practice that the reader thinks shares some sort of similarity to 
what they know of as `dance', and is accepted in their circle as `dance'. By this is 
meant that it is up to the reader to determine whether, according to their own 
experiences and uses of the word, a given activity can be called `dance' or not. Of 
course, this decision will be put to test by the form of life in which the meaning- 
maker is using the word (this is the idea of consensus in language). It must be stated, 
though, that there is in the thesis an underlying concern with `artistic' as opposed to 
`social' dance, and in particular dance that increases the size of the `dance family' 
through its use of technology. It is more about the language that is used in dance- 
related situations (rehearsal rooms, dance journals, dance studies classrooms, books 
about dance theory and practice) than it is about a specific product of dance practice. 
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Section Three: The Role of the Personal, or `I am Jack's memory' 
The role of the personal is complex in a thesis that challenges the notion of the 
dancer's emotion while dancing (or the author's intention while writing, or the 
painter's desires while painting) as being the main source of meaning in the 
interpretation of their actions. It does this by suggesting that meanings come from a 
combination of the experiences and knowledge of those in dialogue with each other, 
as it were, mediated by and through the work. These dialogues can also be conceived 
of in terms of being contextually located (and in some cases, contextually separated), 
from the `point of view' of all parties involved. 
To assist in explaining this I refer to my experience of reading the Foreword to a 
book by the chef Robert Carrier (1999). I was reminded of a chapter I had written for 
a book on dance and intertextuality (Garraghan 1999) in which I employed a food 
metaphor to describe making and analysing a dance piece. Also, I used to think of 
creating my own performance pieces as if inventing a recipe by putting different 
ingredients together to see if the tastes and textures would complement each other, 
and combine in a satisfactory way. But, of course, not everybody likes all different 
kinds of food, and some recipes would be disliked by certain people and loved by 
others. However, as I read Carrier it became possible that he was perhaps also 
describing what happens to the meanings of words, and to the artists' methods and 
the interpretations of works of art when he wrote that recipes change over time, 
reflecting current tastes and available ingredients. At the same time, mixed, 
`intertwingled' with these intellectual musings, I was reminded of our family visits to 
Hintlesham Hall, which as far as I could recall was once owned by Carrier (somehow 
we knew one of the chefs at the Hall but never ate in the restaurant, only in the staff 
quarters). I can still `see' the place, and `taste' the food. This also highlighted the 
importance of memories (of their past experiences) in meaning-making, and 
reinforced the idea of meanings being made, `existing', in a multidimensional 
relationship. But often it is not easy to highlight these connections so clearly. Is it 
enough to say that because they are part of my experience (past and present, as it 
were), they are part of the network of meaning, and as such an important part of that 
network? In a word, yes. A failure to recognize the personal experiences of the 
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reader in the meaning-making processes is to restrict the idea of meaning to just the 
input (intention) of the author (or whoever is creating the text)-the quotation from 
Barthes which precedes the thesis is illuminating and illuminated in these ideas, its 
relevance made clear as the role of references, of citations, in the construing of 
meaning through `reading' is highlighted. 
However, this should not be read to imply that the meaning of a text is then just the 
private `experiences' and processes of the person making that meaning (here used 
singularly to stand for the plural: `set of meanings, both made and potential'). It is 
only as part of a form of life, in a dialogue or multi-logue, that these meanings 
become `tested', as it were. This places the text and the persons involved in the 
discourses (meaning-making) in a social context, but one which is made up of `forms 
of life' and `language games' which `co-exist'. Once again the Wittgensteinian 
`private language argument' forces us to consider the person in isolation as a 
possible counterexample to this. The person in isolation is either assumed to be a 
language-user (aware of their language and its rules and the concept of meaning) or 
not a language-user in any shape or form, in which case they will lack the concept of 
meaning and any notion of the social use of language. 
It is the notion of `(my)self in performance' that is one of the key areas that the 
thesis addresses. This accounts for the pseudo-biographical and fictionalized real 
experiences that permeate the thesis. The idea that the `self (the person) can (or 
cannot) be separated from the acts of performing, writing, reading and making 
meaning is examined from a number of angles. However, it is not enough to say that 
there is always a `self involved in these processes, particularly when technologically- 
mediated art practices are considered (these include writing, painting and playing 
musical instruments). Dance as performed by human beings for other human beings, 
as a form of art and entertainment without any technology to enhance or alter the 
experience of dancing and watching dance, is an activity that seems to foster ideas of 
`true expression', `open emotion', `the real self on display' and `universal language'. 
Whatever the philosophical debates surrounding these ideas, when dance is 
transformed in some way by technology (from photography, film and video, to digital 
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animation, live web-streaming and machine-generated movements in a human body) 
some different issues emerge. Furthermore, these forms of dance present a challenge 
to concepts of self, expression and dance itself. Philip Auslander's chapter "`Just be 
your self': logocentrism and differance in performance theory' (1997: 28-38), 
demonstrates an application of Derrida to the notion of `self as logos in certain 
theories of acting and performance, which could also be applied to these concepts in 
(technologically-mediated) dance discourse. 
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Section Four: My Own Performance History, or In Limbo, Dancing 
In the thesis it was deemed necessary to shift the mode of writing, and it is necessary 
to do this again now, in order to describe my own history, as person, reader and 
performer. As suggested above, there are numerous influences on and experiences in 
what could be called my performance history. However, these do not have a 
straightforward separation from the rest of my life. It seems odd to me when I read 
about performance as `extra-daily activity' (cf. Barba and Savarese (eds) 1991), 
because if you are a performer it may well be a daily, everyday, ordinary activity-it 
is just something that you do. 
I have always been a voracious reader. I would arrive at my first school early and 
read. One of my early school pictures is of me sat at an open book. I was bored by 
reading the Janet and John stories so would supplement my reading diet with my 
mum's nursing handbooks: descriptions of diseases, anatomical diagrams, pictures 
of deformity and abnormality, physiological processes. These were mixed with 
books on warfare, history and whatever was around (which was not always very 
much). My imagination was the biggest book on the shelf and this was where I 
would do most of my reading, writing my own stories for myself, sometimes with 
others in role play, or for my brother at night when we should have been asleep. The 
world was extended; reality was a fiction in which my stuffed toys had personalities 
and voices, and I wasn't constrained by the usual constraints of gravity, atmosphere, 
society and myself. Reading and writing were natural for me, but they were more or 
less the same thing: as I read I was writing my own life alongside the wor(l)ds of 
others, trying to make sense of my place in relation to the thoughts of others, the 
experiences of others. 
In junior school I outstripped the spelling tests and was put on to `encyclopedia 
work', the exact processes and purposes of which are forgotten, but basically it 
involved finding definitions in a dictionary or encyclopedia. I enjoyed the quick pace 
with which I was able to jump from one word to another, one meaning to the next. I 
would do my own searching, allowing chance to find the words which would send me 
off to new undiscovered words and meanings. Travelling like this was good fun and 
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allowed me to expand my world in the space and silence of the classroom during 
spelling tests. Previously unrelated words became connected through me, through 
my journeys. Why wasn't the world so easy to connect up? 
When I was about ten my mother told me that my reality was not what I thought it 
was. Not in a philosophical sense, but in an actual sense. My sense of truth was 
shaken. When told that my father was not in fact my father, my world, my reality, 
my self was broken up, shattered, fragmented even more than I think I had 
experienced it before the revelation. What made this feeling of unreality worse was 
the `guilt' and secrecy that seemed attached to the details of my conception. My 
brothers and sister didn't know that I wasn't who I was. And neither did most people 
around me. Those others outside my immediate family who did know the truth were 
miles away, adding to my sense of dissociation. Also the story wasn't told 
completely to me, it had blank pages in it which I tried in vain to fill in with my own 
pieces of fiction. I had to create masks and evasive tactics for when questions about 
families, in particular fathers, came up. My quiet nature was reinforced, I had a 
reason to be silent; only in silence could I remain honest simply by not lying. I was 
performing all of the time. Unless, that is, we apply one of Schechner's various 
definitions of performance as being `restored' or `twice-behaved' behaviour (see 
Schechner and Appel (eds) 1990), which at a basic level would discount many forms 
of improvised performance from being called `performance'. 
I started performing as a child. (I think) I remember my role in a nativity play at 
primary school: the little drummer boy. We were allowed to wear our best clothes 
and my choice was for my thick, purple, scratchy woollen sweater. I had to walk 
around the principal characters in time to the music ("Come they told me, pa rum 
pum pum pum/A new born king to see, pa rum pum pum pum"), miming playing the 
drum. Other children had to join in behind me to form a snaking circle of little 
drummers in praise of the baby Jesus, or presumably, a doll representing him. I felt 
as though I was the most important role in the piece, as I had to lead the other children 
in a dance (of sorts)-my first choreography. The following year, perhaps, I was 
given the lead role in another play at Christmas time: father mouse. I stole the show 
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with my confident delivery and comic improvisations. From then on I felt as though 
I excelled on the stage, being able to connect with the audience and construct a 
character convincingly and completely. I was able to be myself on stage, as 
contradictory as that sounds. Ordinarily, and still, a quiet person, I hoped that by 
presenting all of the aspects of my personality on stage in the guise of other 
personae, I could make up for the normal me. Or rather I could make up the normal 
me. 
As I grew up with my fractured sense of self and constant (re-)inventing of self 
through not knowing who or what I was supposed to be, I became isolated and lost. I 
didn't feel fully born. I wanted perhaps to go back and be born again into a life that 
made sense in toto. The best I could do was to hang on to those parts that did make 
sense, those that were relevant to me, and spin a yarn of them, from which I could 
weave a life. But as before, the woven me was loose, holey, superficial and lacking 
completeness. Performing on a full-time basis was tiring and removed the need to do 
it formally (for a theatre audience), to a certain extent. I was still interested in the 
workings of the theatre, the performer, the actor, the director, but it was never a 
choice when it came to finding a career path. I tried to convince myself that the 
sciences were my calling, or in an attempt to discover who I was, perhaps psychology 
was my vocation. Maybe medicine, nearly nursing, for a while forensic science; the 
indecision was incapacitating. Everything was of interest, but not fulfilling enough 
to make it worth chasing. As with the words in the dictionary a decade or so before, 
the range of options was disparate but inter-linked simply by being part of my 
thinking processes. It took me another decade after making a decision to chose the 
performing arts as my main subject of study to try to fill in the gaps in my life. 
I like to make work that shatters and plays with the discrete (and perhaps discreet) 
preconceptions and expectations of an audience (or at least my preconceptions and 
expectations of who an audience might be). While researching and writing my thesis I 
made a few pieces of performance, to various levels of `completion' and for a number 
of purposes and audiences. The pieces ranged from entirely video-based work to live 
multimedia performance to masked physical theatre. In . my own work I 
favour 
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combining and layering texts and sources, and making use of a diverse range of 
references mixed with fictional and autobiographical stories. Due to this, the 
response from people who see my work is often characterized by uncertainty as to 
the `truthfulness' of the work - does it refer to me? - and to how they are `meant' to 
interpret it. In the works that use technology (for example, live and recorded video, 
recorded soundtracks) mixed with live performance (mostly improvised, and in 
response to the audience or other elements of the piece), the question `how is the 
technology integrated into the piece? ' is asked by me during the devising process. 
The technology is sometimes integral to the piece, as in the case of the work-in- 
progress showing of FMS (1999) referred to in the thesis, and sometimes it is an 
adjunct to the live presence. One piece I performed in a gallery window (as part of a 
multimedia exhibition) on the campus of the University of Surrey, entitled MPD - 
Urban Tales for the Lost Generation (1999), although not described by me as an 
"`integrated' performance and video installation", was criticised/credited in a local 
newspaper with the following comments: 
it is lack of integration that is most apparent. The piece is fun, but 
unfocussed - there are many strands fighting for attention. Any synthesis 
between image, text and performance is virtually random and the performer 
himself seems - perhaps consciously - like a wounded soldier from his own 
private war with technology. There are precious few other hints of critique [... ] 
[The whole exhibition's] fetishisation of multimedia creates an art of accident, 
in which meaning is ephemeral and largely random. 
If there is any other depth concealed within its concern with process and 
surfaces, then perhaps it is only in the implicit commentary on the dislocated 
perceptions and reduced attention spans of the Playstation age. Clever, witty 
and very a la mode. 
(Wicks 1999: 21) 
If the remarks are critiqued in return it could be said that the commentator was 
unfocused and not the piece. The strands mentioned were synthesized in time and 
space, by virtue of being presented together-they were not combative towards each 
other. Something is either random, or it is not. Is it a good or a bad point that is 
being made to say I was `like a wounded soldier'? Or merely an interpretation? It is 
not clear what else could be done by a piece with many strands to give more hints for 
critique. Many of the points raised in the newspaper review highlight the difficulties 
in dealing with contemporary technological and multimedia work. This piece, for 
me, was about the use of chance, as my performance rested mostly on there being 
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someone outside of the window to react to, a situation beyond my control; it was 
about the `competing' elements of multimedia performance; it was about integration 
and lack of integration at the-same time, to replicate in microcosm the world around 
me; it was about the splitting of attention and focus, fragmenting experience and 
allowing the spectator-participant (`spect-actor' to appropriate Augusto Boat's term; 
see Boat 1992) to choose what they want to experience; it was about the irrelevance 
of surface and depth as concepts when talking about multimedia work; it was about 
dislocated perceptions and reduced attention spans, and had to be because I knew 
that most people would be on their way to somewhere else and just diverted by me 
for a short time; and it was about the problems of `meaning', the issue of `intention' 
and the de-fetishisation of technology. It was also about issues of interactivity (my 
interaction with the audience, and their interaction with me), and making the 
spectator a more active part of the performance, and conscious of their involvement. 
This last idea was brought about through the use of two `concealed' video cameras 
in my costume, which I could direct towards the audience in order that their image 
might be shown on the video monitors behind me as they sequenced through a 
number of inputs; furthermore, I was mimicking the actions of the people outside so 
that they could `see themselves' in my actions. I was there in place of a computer 
programmed and set up to capture motion of people and process the information so 
that it can be seen in the form of a virtual representation on a screen. 
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Section Five: Implications for Method, or Methods of Implication 
In the preceding sections, I have outlined the background and approaches underlying 
this thesis. The Opening Statement provides details of the development of the 
subject for the thesis, and how it came about through conversations and experiences 
in a number of contexts. The `style' of the thesis developed alongside these 
dialogues, and is situated in a lineage of previous artists and writers. The various 
theoretical antecedents were summarised in Section One, which charts a flow of 
ideas from the late-nineteenth century to the current day. Having given an idea as to 
the wider intellectual context, the influence of Wittgenstein is highlighted as being 
the major figure in the development of the thesis. In Section Two, his approach is 
examined and tied together with some other key thinkers. This section gives some 
clarification of the terms and concepts used in the thesis, and indicates the reasons 
why the particular approaches to presentation and writing style were taken. The use, 
in the thesis, of the term `Dance' and related words is also summed up in this 
section. Section Three indicates the relevance to the thesis, and its subject matter, of 
what could be called `the personal'. The concepts of `self and `meaning' are also 
demonstrated to be linked to one another, but these terms are not strictly defined 
here. As a knowledge of the writer's performance interests and experience was 
required, Section Four incorporates an summary of recent work with background 
biographical information to show how the various aspects of my life are interrelated. 
One piece made during the course of the research was used to illustrate how my 
performance techniques draw on similar themes and apply approaches akin to those 
of the thesis. 
This section suggests that the incorporation of a wide-range of thoughts and concepts 
into a thesis is possible using a method that veers towards the `performative'. The 
reasons for the presentation of the thesis came from the desire to show how 
technology impacts on, and can alter, the form and content of the products any 
human activity. The further (stylistic and theoretic) influences on the thesis's form 
are given to show how it is located within a broad history of works and approaches 
to the handling and presentation of cultural texts. 
One of the key ideas for how to approach the range of subject matter was suggested 
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by the concept of hypertext: a computer-based network of what are called `nodes' 
which are `texts' (be they words, images, movies, sounds, code-all digital or 
digitized; there is a spelling variant to refer to this: `techst') or fragments of text that 
can be linked in a variety of ways depending on who is doing the linking (for 
example, see Landow 1997; for related ideas see Bush 1945 and Nelson 1987). This 
system of connecting and navigating a large body of information is most commonly 
experienced when using the Internet and the World Wide Web. The appeal of this 
concept lay in the emphasis on the person doing the searching to construct a trail or 
pathway or series of pathways, even though the links are to a certain degree 
predefined by others (and even this can be disrupted by starting a new pathway that 
is related, but maybe not explicitly, to the previous pathway). The trail is linear only 
in the sense of `time as it is experienced', and because generally one link comes after 
another, but texts overlap, can be returned to, their flow can be broken by following 
a new link to a new text. On a computer the user (to employ computer science 
parlance, the `reader' to use the terminology of literary criticism, or the neologism 
`wreader' to imply a reader who is also a `writer' in hypertext-speak) could view (or 
listen to) more than one text at a time, allowing new connections and ideas to come 
from the combination of different materials. The notion of primacy of any one text is 
removed because the onus is on the user or reader to choose what they want to give 
most attention to at any given moment. Added to choices of text of the person doing 
the choosing are the other texts that impinge on the information they are most 
interested in: pop-up banners and adverts, background sounds, images that surround 
them, books open on their desk, the thought processes which present them with new 
ideas and references to things previously experienced. This leads back out into the 
`real world' of the user of hypertext, not allowing the hypertext system to be the only 
point of interest but allowing the person(al) to have a bearing on the working of 
hypertext (again, see Landow 1997). Also, this principle resonated with what I 
thought I knew about reader-response theories, the concept(s) of intertextuality and 
critiques of psychoanalysis. 
It may have been appropriate to construct and submit the thesis as a digital hypertext 
(a navigational collection of files, an expansive website or on a CD-ROM); however, 
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reverting to the print-on-paper form threw up a series of challenges and issues that 
are analogous to writing about dance, for example, `how to recreate the live dance 
experience? ' However, this question is `answered' in the thesis through the use of 
the analogical writings, and the shifts required in the multilinear reading 
environment. Also, the backwards reconfiguring of the hypertext concept into print 
(book) form echoes and prompts the following questions: How does the use of 
(digital) technology affect the creation and perception of live dance? What happens 
to the technologically-altered body in performance? Landow (1997) argues that 
hypertext challenges notions of authorial property and uniqueness, and the disruption 
of the printed page in the thesis highlights this challenge and combines it with a 
challenge to the dancer as owner of the meaning of their movements, particularly in 
light of virtual reality, digital animation and other cyber-applications. The 
`technologizing of the word' is used in place of the `technologizing of the body', 
with the related issues of fragmentation, form and function, focus, intentionality and 
authority applying to both. These issues, and the concept of hypertext, generate (a 
need for) new modes and outcomes of expression-physical, verbal and written. For 
example, Marshall Soules (2002) in his summary of these ideas as they relate to 
hypertext, performance and critical theory, writes, 
Lunenfeld notes the tendency in digital media towards strategies of 
compression, aphorism, and fragmentation, all within an `aesthetic of 
unfinish' ([Lunenfeld 2000: ] 124), and the mise-en-abyme is a `sleight of 
structural hand' to generate `an almost infinitely regressing series of mirror 
reflections' of the work's central concerns. The notion that digital art works 
are (transforming) mirrors is widespread; in many cases, the form of the work 
encapsulates the artist's vision of networked digital communication. 
In trying to order and structure the material in a way that was an attempt to show my 
`vision of networked digital communication', I examined a range of printed texts 
alongside their digital counterparts. Indeed, there are a number of (printed) 
publications which could be seen as precursors to this thesis. These other works seem 
to express or examine similar themes, or share similar approaches to the presentation 
of their material. With regards to the layout of the thesis, there are a number of 
printed texts which utilize a collage technique (see Wolfram 1975), or change the 
typographic styles for different reasons and effects. These texts include the work of 
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the Italian and Russian Futurists (see Lista 1977 and Compton 1978), and in 
particular Mayakovsky (1965); the Vorticist publication Blast, which was edited by 
Wyndham Lewis (see Lewis (ed) 1981 and Edwards 2000a and 2000b), who wrote, 
incidentally, in his `Wyndham Lewis Vortex No. 1: Art Vortex. Be Thyself : 
You must talk with two tongues, if you do not want to cause confusion. 
You must also learn, like a Circassian horseman, to change tongues in mid- 
career without falling to Earth. 
You must give the impression of two persuaders, standing each on a different 
hip - left hip, right hip - with four eyes vacillating concentrically at different 
angles upon the object chosen for subjugation. 
There is nothing so impressive as the number TWO. 
You must be a duet in everything. 
For, the Individual, the single object, and the isolated, is, you will admit, an absurdity. 
Why try and give the impression of a consistent and indivisible personality? 
(Blast No. 2,1981: 91) 
In direct relation to Blast, McLuhan's Counterblast (1970), also demonstrates the 
connections between typography and statement (political, aesthetic/artistic and the 
antitheses of the two). Avital Ronell's The Telephone Book (1989), was the key text 
in the development of the arrangement of the materials on the page, alongside a 
number of computer manuals and expert texts, most notably, Knuth (1979) and 
Goossens et al (1994). These deal with typesetting techniques and utilise a vast array 
of typefaces and layouts, with boxes, frames and tables breaking up the page, which 
is not always `portrait' but `landscape' too. This breaking up of the page (and the 
flow of the `text') is now common place in newspapers (arguably the seminal form 
of the fragmented printed page), magazines and journals of popular culture and art 
(for example, see Lane 1995-2000), and countless other publications in many fields. 
A number of analysts have pointed out the historical shifts in typography and printing 
techniques which have had a bearing on the `look' of manuscripts and the way they 
are to be read (for example, see Ong 1982). In academic writing the current and 
dominant vogue has evolved to suit the linear development of an argument (this can 
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be seen in any of the number of academic writing guides, although it must be stated 
that there are always exceptions and experimental attempts at writing `academic' 
texts in nonacademic modes), with the inclusion of most quotations being as 
inconspicuous as possible. All but longer quotations share the format of the new 
text, and if the writer sees fit, some quotations (the guiding conventions vary) are 
separated and maybe indented. However, this convention is played with in this thesis 
to give many of the quotations their own space, rather than being subsumed into the 
main text. This method was intended to present the quotations as being linked to, yet 
separate from, the other text, as satellites to the thesis, occupying a middle space 
between the thesis and their source. It was also designed to mimic the nodal structure 
of hypertext and the multiple windows which can be viewed at once on a computer 
screen. In a way, this was to explore the notion that when a new technology begins to 
supplant another, the old technology takes on the `form' of the new, its users attempt 
to transform it into a semblance of the developing technology. The attempts are not 
always `successful' because the old technology is not adaptable to the new ways of 
working, it does not fit. The contentious issues and concerns about writing abilities 
and proficiency are also put into the foreground when using the `new approaches' in 
conjunction with the `old technologies'. These issues also relate to dance as it 
becomes increasingly created with and through technology; the risk here though is 
that dance suffers from lack of `success' when `old approaches' are used in 
conjunction with the `new technologies'. 
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Section Six: A Resolution of the Problems, or `If you don't know where you are 
Doing all roads lead there' 
Taking all of these influences and converting them into the thesis Digital Dialogism: 
dance at the edge of language was an intellectual journey, a performance devising 
process, and exercise in adaptation and invention. The result, the resolution, the 
rendering, the rendezvous of these influences, is a `map without a territory' (taken 
from thesis, but based on a suggestion of Jean Baudrillard, see 1992). In 
hypertextuality, network outlines, diagrams and layouts act as maps for the hypertext 
designers, and occasionally the users. They show and assist in the design of the links 
between the nodes, the lexia, of text. Many writers have described the systems of 
links and nodes, link structures and meanings, and patterns (routes) that these links 
form (for example, see Trigg 1983 and Bernstein 1998). In Digital Dialogism it is 
possible to recognise some of the different patterns of links that Bernstein (1998) 
outlines, for example, Counterpoint and Montage, Mirrorworld and Tangle, Missing 
Link and Navigational Feint. Digital Dialogism can be started as a conventional text, 
on page "1" (as you will have done if you began with this Introduction), or at a 
number of suggested entry points (see Contents), or at any node (page) by opening 
the book at random (of course, this may take the reader to a page that seems like it is 
in the middle of a flow of text, and requires them to skip, backwards or forwards, to 
a more satisfactory `in-point'). This choice of how and where to begin is like the 
different ways in which hypertext networks can be encountered that is, not always 
at the `start', the table of contents, the directions for how the hypertext should be 
used, through trial-and-error and accident. 
There are other printed texts which (implicitly and explicitly) ask for, or even require, 
a nonlinear approach to their reading. Of course, any book can be `navigated' 
according to the reader's own devising, but some books have developed alternative 
methods of how the reader can move through the book to get the most out of the 
experience. The first explicit example of what has been called `ergodic' writing (see 
Aarseth 1997) to which I was exposed was the series of Fighting Fantasy books, 
which developed out of Role Playing Games (for example, Runequest, Tunnels and 
Trolls and Dungeons and Dragons; see Popp 2000). The first of these was The 
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Warlock of Firetop Mountain by Steve Jackson and Ian Livingstone, which was 
published in August 1982, by Puffin Books, Penguin's children's imprint, and is 
now being reprinted by Wizard Books. These books offer a character-based game 
which requires that the reader make decisions according to options in the text (which 
is divided into numbered sections, randomly distributed through the book to make 
linear reading difficult), or dependant on the results of dice throws or character 
attributes. However, it is not just gamebooks which give the reader a freer rein in the 
reading process, or at least, the suggestion of a free rein. Here are three examples to 
demonstrate the prior exploration in print form of nonlinear reading techniques. Our 
Fragmented World by Ronald Harvey (1988) is a selection of political, philosophical 
and personal observations which the `Foreword' writer, Rodney Aitchtey, suggests 
be opened at random. The Interactive Book by Celia Pearce (1997) urges the reader 
to "let kismet be your guide" (1997: xxi) and provides a number of suggestions for 
how the reader might `use' the book, in a style akin to `surfing' the Internet with 
links (to related chapters) highlighted in the text. Sue-Ellen Case's book The 
Domain-Matrix (1996) also attempts "to emulate more the web sense of cyber- 
reading than the traditional composition in print" (1996: 7), and the practice of 
`surfing'. (Case's book also considers some issues relevant and similar to those in 
Digital Dialogism, but here is not the place to expand on these. ) 
The conventional starting point of the thesis, the Contents page, acts as a hypertext 
network overview, a TOC. It provides a number of markers, or signposts, for notable 
points in the thesis, should the reader want to find a specific entry. Many of these are 
part and canto titles for one of the number of `strands', or loosely defined pathways, 
in the thesis. The most notable and linear of these strands is the epic poem `The First 
Unborn', and it is this that is divided into parts and cantos. This poem acts as a 
central focus for the thesis and reader, should they wish a central focus. It could be 
read on its own, but as it is often fractured by not always being on consecutive 
pages, even this strategy is not straightforward. The major Mirrorworld to the poem 
are the notes contained in `In Lieu of an Appendix' (a conceit derived, in part, from 
Nabokov 1973); with another being the experiences of Ermy, a character from the 
poem attempting to write a thesis. This latter strand also acts as Counterpoint to the 
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`academic' strand, which in turn relates to the poem, the quotations and any other 
notes contained in the thesis. 
An overall structure can be identified and described as follows. After this 
Introduction is a block of six sections on various aspects of the thesis, including 
referencing conventions, the use of definitions, and an outline of the different fonts 
used for the different strands (in a fashion reminiscent of the guide page in Rucker, 
Sirius, and Mu (eds) 1993). Following this come three alternative points of entry, a 
form of Tangle, which are background ideas to the writing of the thesis: performance 
and memory, the `self' and writing, and Wittgenstein's influence on the thesis, 
incorporating a parody of one of his works. The next block consists of the main part 
of the thesis, its body, which comprises the strands referred to above. The poem 
notes come next, followed by a Postscript, and Bibliography. This final block should 
not be avoided as it provides a neat summary of the links to other texts, the intertexts 
and hypertexts that are referenced in the thesis. 
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Closing Statement: `Disce quasi semper victurus: vive quasi cras moriturus' 
In keeping with the thesis' embodiment of an `ethic of unfinish' and the wish for it 
to act as a node (or matrix of nodes) in the docuverse, containing links to other 
nodes and networks, this closing statement will provide `hotspots' which, when 
activated, will lead the reader to relevant, yet diverse, sources. 
There are currently four main texts that illuminate this thesis in terms of what I 
attempt to do with it, or which support my approach and clarify my position. All of 
them were read after the thesis was submitted. They are nothing to do with dance, 
but display certain theoretical similarities with the idea that there is no 
straightforward way to ask questions and give answers in respect to activities such as 
dance. Gerald Bruns's (1999) book, among other things, examines the links between 
philosophy and poetry, and philosophers' intimacy with the world (or lack of it). 
This book suggests that the lines between literature (poetry) and philosophy (ethics) 
are collapsed, when literary works are explored from a number of directions in order 
to explore the worlds of writer and reader, the subjects and objects of 'self' d 
`world'. Alan Fletcher's (2001) immense collection of images, `factoids', aphorisms 
and musings, denies any attempt at a linear reading and urges a playful and aleatoric 
approach. It presents the reader with a large number of starting points and sets up 
debates and dialogues by juxtaposing apparently opposing viewpoints. R. D. Laing's 
(1977; first published 1976) semi-autobiographical `story' is a shifting meditation on 
the `self in the world, which uses a range of voices to ask `Who Am IT. As the 
writer himself suggests, there are no easy answers, and that stories are often the best 
way "to convey the nature of [... ] perplexity" (Laing 1977: 143); science and morals 
"shatter each other" (Laing 1977: 143). The fourth book, by Neil Postman and 
Charles Weingartner (1971; first published 1969), raises questions about the way 
education is conducted. It is McLuhanesque, polemical and of its time, but still 
seems relevant in challenging received notions of anything. The final words of this 
introduction are also the final words of Postman and Weingartner: 
Intellectual strategies for nuclear-space-age survival - in all dimensions of human activity - include such concepts as relativity, probability, contingency, 
uncertainty, function, structure as process, multiple causality (or non-causality), 
non-symmetrical relationships, degrees of difference and incongruity (or 
39 
simultaneously appropriate difference). 
Concepts such as these, as well as others both implicit in and contingent on 
them, comprise the ingredients for changing ourselves in ways that 
complement the environmental demands that we all face. The learning of such 
concepts will produce the kinds of people we will need to deal effectively with 
a future full of drastic change. 
The new education has as its purpose the development of a new kind of 
person, one who - as a result of internalizing a different series of concepts - is 
an actively inquiring, flexible, creative, innovative, tolerant, liberal personality 
who can face uncertainty and ambiguity without disorientation, who can 
formulate viable new meanings to meet changes in the environment which 
threaten individual and mutual survival. 
The new education, in sum, is new because it consists of having students use 
the concepts most appropriate to the world in which we all must live. All of 
these concepts constitute the dynamics of the question-questioning, 
meaning-making process that can be called `learning how to learn'. This 
comprises a posture of stability from which to deal fruitfully with change. The 
purpose is to help all students develop built-in, shockproof crap detectors as 
basic equipment in their survival kits. 
(1971: 204) 
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On the Referencing of Major Philosophical and Literary Works 
References to works authored by Wittgenstein (even if edited by someone else), will 
follow the conventional capital-letter system. Those works that are divided into 
sections only, such as Zettel (1967), will be cited by the capital-letter(s) denoting 
that text (see Bibliography) followed by the section (§) number, e. g. Z §543. 
References to Philosophical Investigations (1953) will either be section numbers if 
they are from Part I (pages le-172e), e. g. PI §281, or page numbers if they are from 
Part II (173e-232e), e. g. PI 181e (the `e' after the page indicates the page of the 
English translation if there exists an edition with the original German en face). 
References to Culture and Value (1998; see note in Bibliography) will be given as 
CV page and manuscript number, e. g. CV Ile: MS 109 204. Works which are not 
divided into sections, such as The Blue and Brown Books (1958), will give the page 
number after the letter, e. g. BB 154. Works that are mentioned but not quoted from 
will be referred to by the date of publication of the edition in the Bibliography, 
unless a particular section or page is drawn to the reader's attention. Any other 
references that deviate from or are not included here should be self-explanatory, for 
example, quotations from prefaces or introductions numbered in small Roman 
numerals. 
Major philosophical works by other writers are also referenced according to 
recognised conventions, for example, giving the chapter and section or paragraph. 
This makes it possible to find the reference in any publication which retains an 
annotated structure, and not just the item cited. 
There are references to texts of literature, for example the texts of Dante and Milton, 
and the works consulted are listed in the Bibliography. However, as many of these 
writings have been so frequently published, the references are for book, chapter, 
paragraph and line numbers (according to the structure of the work) instead of date 
of publication and page reference. 
Occasionally, across the philosophical and literary works, there may be a variation in 
translation from one version to another, and if this impacts significantly on the sense, 
the specific edition may be cited. 
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On Influences 
A list of influences would extend the thesis by its word-length again. The 
Bibliography lists only those texts cited in the thesis, and omits many texts that were 
of influence but which did not make the final version. The influence of a work (of 
art, of literature, of music, of philosophy, etc. ) is often difficult to define. It may be a 
turn of phrase or a bridge between hitherto unlinked references that connects diverse 
references. New influences are constantly arriving on the scene, as acquaintances at a 
cocktail party. Some are recalled at a later date, many are forgotten, until their face is 
seen again and their name in labris natat (see Wittgenstein PI 219e). The primary 
influence, it could be said, is Ludwig Wittgenstein, who is like a good friend who 
you get to know better and better over a lifetime, but still never fully understand. The 
second influence is Friedrich Nietzsche, the slightly mad friend who runs in from 
time to time and shouts something `profound', and is either life and soul of the party, 
or extremely frustrating. The face across the room who you know a little bit about 
and would like to know more of is Jacques Derrida. Like Nietzsche he is inspiring in 
short bursts but frustrating too. (More will be said about these guests throughout the 
thesis. ) Other people at the party who could be given notice are James Joyce, 
Vladimir Nabokov and Italo Calvino. It is in these forms that they appear to you: 
Joyce's Ulysses (1998; first published 1922), Nabokov's Pale Fire (1973; first 
published 1962) and Calvino's If on a winter's night (1993; first published in Italian 
1979, and in English 1981). Also making appearances are works by Marshall 
McLuhan such as Counterblast (1970) and with Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the 
Massage (1967). Each of these works plays with structure, form and the reader's 
relationship with the writing. In Ulysses, the reader is presented with an immense 
array of references and styles; fictional characters inhabit a super-realistic Dublin, 
experiencing one day in 1904 in extreme detail, yet prefiguring Beckett's Waiting for 
Godot (first performed in Paris 1953) in its lack of action; the work has been 
described as being, in a way, "allotropic", existing as `novel' and `anti-novel' at the 
same time (see Joyce 1998: xvii). In the multilayered Pale Fire, the writer and editor 
of the poem, which gives the book its title, are fictionalised and the story exists 
between the lines of the central poem's satirical academic commentary; the work is 
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more self-contained, though, than Ulysses, and is set in, arguably, a more enclosed, 
fictitious world. As is If on a winter's night, in which the processes of reading and 
writing are taken apart and laid bare; stories are started but never finished, yet the 
whole follows a narrative in which you, the reader, are the main protagonist. These 
literary works have theoretical underpinnings. The work wouldn't exist without the 
theory, and vice versa. The same could be said of McLuhan's experiments with 
images and typography; his `mosaic' writings. And although his dictum "The 
Medium is the Message" has come under critical attack (see Grosswiler 1998 and 
Horrocks 2000, for examples), there is still something about it which seems to strike 
a chord of correctness when talking about these works, and others like them. 
Certainly, Wittgenstein's writing and his philosophy are intricately linked in terms of 
"stylistic and literary considerations" (Kripke 1982: 5fn. 4) and the `contents of his 
thoughts', that is, his investigations of words and their uses. 
Indeed, the concept of the cocktail party is also an inspiration. At a party, it has been 
theorised, we filter and accept or reject aural messages based on a series of criteria: 
the cocktail party effect (see Carterette and Friedman 1978). Of course this leads us 
into notions of attention and perception and communication, rather prematurely. 
This thesis is like a cocktail party (it is like many things) at which the reader is a 
guest. Some faces and names are familiar, and much `information' is presented in 
the guise of a lot of noise and chatter. The reader must, as in the party situation and 
in life and in art, filter the `meaningful' from the `meaningless'. The writer has 
already filtered a great deal of material (there is a reason why everything is included 
here, and this could be called the `meaning'), but the filtering continues in the 
reading process. 
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... the citations which go to make up a text are anonymous, untraceable, 
II and yet already read: they are quotations without inverted commas. 
(Barthes 1977: 160; italics in original) 
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On Dictionary Definitions 
The concept of the `dictionary definition' of a word is problematic, and is used 
advisedly. Where `dictionary definitions' are given these should not be seen as 
offering strictly "philosophical assistance" (O'Brien in Fann 1967: 404) or the 
definite meaning(s) of a word. They are pointers to the diversity of meaning of a 
word, not a full indicator of how the word should be used, or where. The 
etymologies of words are generally indicated by italicised source words followed by 
an English translation. Whether a root word is Latin, Greek or another language is 
not always specified. Again, these are used playfully and often as `poetic' and 
polysemic devices to show the linkage (nexus of meaning) and development (change 
of use over time; fluxus of meaning) of words. All definitions and etymologies of 
words are derived from the dictionary that was to hand (Sinclair 2000). 
45 
On Reading 
It will be clear to a reader of this thesis that it defies a standard structure of an 
introduction followed by a chapter-by-chapter argument leading to a conclusion. The 
decision to define the thesis as an unconventional, non-linear exploration rather than 
a fully expounded dialectic or deduction, was not made easily. It has required that a 
discussion of the form and structure be written into the thesis, as a meta-theoretical 
explication and justification of the approach. However, this material can be 
interpreted as relevant to the topic(s) of the thesis in less than merely tangential 
ways. Any study of dance (of anything) that attempts to bypass or ignore the mode 
(language, voice, style) in which it is written (or expressed), and which is assertoric 
in its delivery, fails to acknowledge the `intrinsic' problems every mode `contains'. 
And not only does it neglect to notice and make use of these problems, it generates 
more problems and fosters and furthers misunderstanding. That is not to say that this 
thesis (or rather, the writer) believes it contains nothing that is problematic. On the 
contrary, it is the problematising [sic] of the issues through the anarchic (mis)use of 
structure (and subject matter) that serves the purpose of highlighting the infelicitous 
and inferential processes of express-ion/ing and interpretat-ion/ing. 
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Digital Dialogism: dance at the edge of language. 
This thesis is a map without a territory, even one to precede, but it has a key and 
signposts (or better, it is a series of signposts). And these pages are that `key', 
indicating some of the conventions that will be followed through the course of this 
THE FIRST UNBORN thesis. 
The strand written in `Garamond' font, size twelve 
and to start with in Dante's terra rima 
('though this poetic form I was forced to shelve 
when the point had been made, and I changed schema 
to demonstrate a range of writing styles as 
though shifting from one to another bema); 
moving into more `modern' modes 
in which rules are less prescribed 
rhyme and metre are ditched 
ballast 
dropped 
over the side 
even the font 
changes 
and the look 
changes 
as the reader is taken on a journey 
The textboxes written in Baskerville' font, 
size 10 points, single spaced, are 
predominantly quotations (referencing 
conventions are followed in these boxes as 
far as possible) and they could have been 
footnotes or endnotes, or just as well 
included in the `main' strand of the thesis. 
They are not included in the `body of the 
text' in order to highlight them, separate 
them out of the `argument' and place them 
in a disconnected relationship with the rest 
of the material. 
through ideas 
cý L_" 
gyp' 
eý, ý 
". 
--., ay 
11ONIL, 
cAI-- 
across the page 
over the page 
The text boxes containing the fictionalised account of a writing process (that of 
Ermy, a character from the poem, 'The First Unborn') are characterised by the 
use of'Arial' font, size 9 points, single spaced, for the description of what Ermy 
is doing, except when Ermy thinks, 'My 1l GIs look lie lhis cm&rsW by I point. 
Occasionally what he reads will be presented in a style that approximates what 
he sees. Also, this strand expands to fill a whole page at times to usurp and 
replace the other strands. When Ermy types his notes they are shown thus: 
Indented and in 'Lucida Sans Typewriter' font, size 8 
points, 1.25 spaced. 
They are fragmented and more like a stream of 'cognition' 
than written in finished prose. They ask questions and lead 
to references that are not always followed up. (See Z §5) 
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However, it should be noted that these conventions and rules are not rigid and can be 
broken without warning. The main body of the text, the flesh of the writing (this part 
printed in `Times New Roman' font, size 12 points, 1.5 spaced) is the most liable to 
Before it's too late, it should be pointed out be disrupted and discontinuous. 
that the poem is to be voiced, read out loud 
(it was intended to be spoken and heard), It pours into the gaps created by 
unless there are instructions on how to read. and around the other parts, 
And so, various conventions come and go 
as we encounter mythological and 
fictional and `rear characters who guide us 
through some of the main findings of the research. 
However, I would just like to say, and this 
can be applied to the thesis as a whole: 
what is not written is more important than 
what is. 
At times there may be two or more 
quotations, sometimes complementary, 
sometimes oppositional or contradictory. 
The role and use of quotations in academic 
writing is linked to the ideas that there is a 
validity in the written word, an authenticity 
of thought; an expression is appropriated 
and displayed for at it is: somebody else's 
words, their `gesture of thought'. like a 
movement that is copied by one dancer 
from that of another, or a dancer imitating 
(being taught) a movement by a 
choreographer, the quotation is at once an 
old (`original) expression and a new 
(`unoriginal') expression. Like the movement 
in a dance piece, the quotation means little 
or nothing without its new and earlier 
surroundings, its literary environment, its 
suggesting that there is no 
dominance to any of the 
strands. Many of the pages are 
`self-contained' and rarely will 
this strand continue onto the 
next page in a straightforward 
manner. 
Context: C16 from Latin contextus 
a putting together, from contexere 
to interweave, from com- together 
+ texere to weave, braid. 
" v, d, QVrv 
The problems of presentation and thesis construction and 
conventions are touched on here. The writing becomes less 
note-like as Ermy gets into his stride, and begins to 
structure his thoughts as an oral presentation. Issues of 
identity and the notion of authorial voice (authenticity) 
are indicated and challenged here, as the blurring between 
my reality (experience) and Ermy's reality is demonstrated 
and played out for the reader. 
My head comes to rest in my hands as I re-read the last paragraph. 'Does i say 
whatlwantibsayinthe#tvWV tisft#tWDoesftcureptandise8atimv"w 
Doesihe readergetasense, the sense, fit my ttrim Sio upset and p rbWrr yamposkn in fie 
w* 9 pomss, ft öfvg pomss7 I close my eyes for a few seconds and breathe out through my nose. I decide that it is time to move onto another strand. 
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On the Impossibility of Writing 
A thousand times tries the writer to express themselves in the way they want 
The times a writer tries to express what they want to say 
All the attempts by a writer to say what they want 
Uncountable, perhaps, the number of times a writer tries to express 
How many times does a writer try to say what they want to say 
What number expresses the difficulty a writer faces 
How can we describe the ways, the struggles of a writer to express themselves? 
When a writer finds a way of saying what they want to say 
How does the writer know that what they write says what they want 
A writer uses words to try 
A writer employs 
A writer writes words to say the things 
Words can often fail the writer in their 
The writer can often not find the words to say what they want to 
The writer sits down to write and cannot find the words 
The writer knows the words, but cannot put them into an order 
The order of the words is not always easy to find 
The writer orders the words in the best way they can 
A range of expressions to say what they want 
Does the writer know what they want to say? 
The writer knows what to write, but cannot 
The writer thinks they know what to write 
The writer thinks 
There are innumerable thoughts that 
The writer struggles, wrestles 
The writer wrestles with wretched writhing 
A sentence is the result of the writer's 
The sentence is a result 
Sentences form the outcome of the writer's thinking 
The writing of sentences, and the structuring of these sentences, by a writer 
How the writer puts together the sentences they write 
When sentences are structured into paragraphs and chapters 
Paragraphs and chapters are the outcome of the writer's 
The finished chapters of a book 
The writer's book is finished when the chapters 
The word is the smallest part of the writer's 
The letter is the smallest 
To make sense, the letters need to be ptu in the ringt order 
The meaning of a sentence depends on the letters of the words 
The letters of the words 
The letter of the law 
The word of the law 
The laws of grammar 
The rules of grammar 
Writing according to rules 
The writer follows rules 
The writer writes the rules 
The rules write 
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The reasons this thesis has taken the form that it has are rooted in the problems 
hinted at in the section entitled `On the Impossibility of Writing'. Every time an 
attempt was made to write the ideas, to express and explain the findings and results 
(if they can be called that) of any research, reading and exploration of the issues, the 
problem(s) of language, and writing, came to the fore. The notion that a thesis on 
dance could not be anything but metaphorical and mythological (analogical, 
allegorical, antithetical) began to push aside the themes of the thesis. But the themes 
were linked to the structure of the thesis in an almost symbiotic relationship. When 
thinking about the connection between `dance' and `language' (an extension of the 
links between dance and meaning), the multiplicity of both made it difficult to 
consider either as a distinct group of activities and forms. Any consideration of the 
human being in a technologically- and linguistically-based context, that is culture (or 
to make matters worse, range of cultures), opens up so many issues of difference, 
ontology and personhood (the social construction of the 'self, of `identity', the 
meaning of `freewill' and the `value' of human life, to name but a few of the issues). 
Even for the categorisations of `human being' and `culture', terms that many English 
language speakers can use with confidence, the range of uses (meanings) is extensive 
and includes exoteric and specialist utilisations (for example, scientific, 
philosophical, poetic and historic). 
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"There is no beginning, there is no beginning... " 
(From the 
Writer 
of 
Digital Dialogism 
to the 
Reader 
of 
Digital Dialogism 
to act 
as a 
Preface 
but 
not 
to be read 
as a 
Preface) 
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La sottise, l'erreur, le peche, la lesine, 
Occupent nos esprits et travaillent nos corps, 
Et nous alimentons nos aimables remords, 
Comme les mendiants nourrissent leur vermine. 
Charles Baudelaire `Au Lecteur' 
(1982: 183) 
Folly, error, sin and parsimony, 
Preoccupy our spirits and work on our bodies, 
Feeding our consciences, 
Like beggars nourishing their lice. 
Charles Baudelaire `To the Reader' 
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The enigmatic opening line of Samuel Beckett's exposition for Krapp's Last Tape 
(written in 1958) reads: "A late evening in the future" (Beckett 1986: 215; as are the 
following descriptive quotations). The action is centred in a timeless room, except to 
say that it is towards the end of the day, but paradoxically the play is about time. It 
evokes the future and the past, while being set in the present that isn't the present at 
all, it is as Beckett tells the reader (but not the audience) "in the future. " What does 
Beckett mean by this? The main character, a "wearish old man" called Krapp is no 
help. Beckett's description of him (from the coined word "wearish" -a play on 
weary? - to the clothes he wears) places him in a non-definable period that could 
refer to 1958, or 1978, or 2008. Neither is he specific about when the events of his 
life which he is re-playing took place. Krapp is a clown, not bound by the usual rules 
of time and space. He has a white face and purple nose, and disordered grey hair, ill- 
fitting garb and eats the most comical of foods - the banana - and almost slips on a 
recently discarded banana-skin. Krapp's obvious link to excrement and nonsense, 
through his name, is echoed in his grimy and dirty appearance. Dressed in rusty 
black, with a "Heavy silver watch and chain", Krapp represents time and decay, like 
Father Time, the begetter of time capable of cutting it short with his scythe yet 
holding on for dear life to his hourglass. Krapp's being in his dotage is important. It 
immediately suggests decrepitude, failure of key faculties like sight ("Very near- 
sighted (but unspectacled)"), hearing ("Hard of hearing"), mobility ("Laborious 
walk") and most prominently yet least explicit, memory. Perhaps Beckett is 
suggesting that memory is the central aspect of human beings, as Fishbach and Coyle 
imply: "Memory is the scaffolding upon which all mental life is constructed" (in 
Schacter 1995: ix), but as such it is hidden, invisible, and taken for granted. Alvarez 
supports this idea: "[In] Krapp's Last Tape, memory and the contrast between a lost 
past and the sour present had become Beckett's only themes" (1973: 97). We, human 
beings, are nothing without memory-no language would be possible, no interaction 
with others and we would face constantly new interaction with the world making 
adaptation and advances (social, technological, etc. ) impossible. 
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Fast forward to Soderbergh's film Sex, Lies and Videotape (1989), in which a young 
man, Graham (played by James Spader), suffering from male erectile disorder when 
in the presence of others, masturbates while watching own-made video recordings of 
sexually explicit interviews with women. It wasn't always a problem for him, we are 
told, and is related to his being a pathological liar. Male erectile disorder, whatever 
its cause - physical, or as in this case, psychological - is mistakenly regarded as an 
old man's problem and commonly referred to as `impotence'. Impotence, the mere 
word conjuring up images of frail, frustrated men of a certain advanced age, is also 
used to convey lack of power and strength, particularly in men. It implies failure, 
through a breakdown in usual and desirable function, and can be personally and 
socially debilitating for the man who experiences it and suffers it (let us just consider 
the male point of view in this example). It is a sign that the machinery of the body is 
malfunctioning; a psychosomatic disorder in extremis, in an extremity that is, if we 
believe Freud (see Freud 1995 and Lacan 1977), the crucial body part not only in 
shaping men's sexual identity, but women's sexuality too (through a lack of it). 
There are obvious difficulties with this phallocentric approach, and only a phallus 
fixated person would seriously entertain the idea that it was the crux of the matter. 
But, when normal function is disrupted, there is a focus on the cause or causes of 
what may then be felt as a problem. The problem may or may not be seen as an 
inability to reproduce, or as an inability to reach orgasm, or as an inability to satisfy 
any number of personal desires (egotistical and otherwise). The problem is 
heightened when there is an ability to recall previous successes. The past impacts on 
the present. 
[... ] I seek 
This unfrequented place to find some ease, 
Ease to the body some, none to the mind 
From restless thoughts, that, like a deadly swarm 
Of hornets armed, no sooner found alone 
But rush upon me thronging, and present 
Times past, what once I was, and what am now. 
(Milton, Samson Agonistes, 11.16-22) 
Rewind way back to the Seventeenth Century, to find John Milton, growing old and 
blind (see Trevor-Roper 1997), weaving his experiences into his poetry, for example: 
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When I consider how my light is spent 
Ere half my days, in this dark world and wide 
(Milton's sonnet number XX) 
But cloud instead and ever-during dark 
Surrounds me, [... ] 
So much the rather thou, Celestial Light, 
Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers 
Irradiate; 
(Milton, Paradise Lost, iii, 11.45-6 & 51-3) 
O loss of sight, of thee I most complain! [... ] 
O dark, dark, dark, amid the blaze of noon, 
(Milton, Samson Agonistes, 11.67 & 80) 
Milton's Samson like the Biblical Samson, is made impotent by a treacherous 
woman. His strength and prowess were contained in his seven locks of hair, uncut 
since birth. His wife, Delilah (one of his enemies, the Philistines), tricks Samson and 
shears his locks. He is then blinded by the Philistines, and bound. Samson, however, 
wreaks his revenge on his captors by pushing down the pillars supporting the 
banqueting house, killing a fair few of his enemy as well as himself. Milton's 
retelling is somewhat personal: the poet was old (into his sixties, very old for the 
seventeenth century, but not quite as old as Krapp, who is sixty-nine) and had been 
blind for many years from progressive myopia. 
Throughout Beckett's play, there are references to the night and darkness, and loss of 
sight. As an example, Krapp sings, off-stage, the following song (the same song is 
repeated later in the play): 
Now the day is over, 
Night is drawing nigh-igh, 
Shadows-[coughs] 
(Beckett 1986: 219) 
Milton, being bereft of vision, could not write, and would dictate passages of his 
poems to his daughter, after sleepless nights filled with flashes of inspiration: 
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Taught by the Heavenly Muse to venture down 
The dark descent [... ] 
Yet not the more/Cease Ito wander where the Muses haunt 
(Milton, Paradise Lost, iii, 11.19 & 26-7) 
The central device of Krapp's Last Tape is that of the elderly Krapp listening to 
diary recordings on an old tape player (instead of a daughter, a technological 
extension). In the recordings he is dictating his musings to someone-himself in the 
future. 
The organism compared with a 
dictaphone spool; the impression, the 
trace, is the alteration in the spool that 
the voice leaves behind. Can one say 
that the dictaphone (or the spool) is 
remembering what was spoken all over 
again, when it reproduces what it took? 
(Wittgenstein RPP 1 §220) 
In near silence, running his fingers through his still damp hair, Ermy stares at 
the VDU in front of him. White ASCII against the black, partially reflective 
reboot screen, an underscore flashing in the top left-hand comer. 
'I'mIoM gfred, ' Ermy thinks as he pulls at the skin on his face while inspecting 
the spectral picture of himself in the coated, anti-glare glass of the monitor. 
'Come on, ' he murmurs with elongated vowels, the impatience beginning to 
make his head hurt, tight and anxious. 
A large black fly, the size of a B-52 and twice as loud, circles above Ermy's 
head. His arm extends out behind him to the can of insecticide. Two well aimed 
bursts of ack-ack fire explode around the fly, which then dives 
erratically towards the window, rebounds off the glass and makes a passage 
for the open doorway. Ermy thinks, 'Ihaieiiesdisease spea*Umadiieanoca&ienoe 
tables my actin' as he places the aerosol back on the shelf and turns 
to the PC. 
A familiar sample of sound announces the successful restart, and a picture 
appears in blocks across and down, filling the screen. Once again his own 
face is visible on the monitor, more pixelated than his previous reflection. 
Ermy smiles, even though he has seen this picture almost everyday for the 
last year or so. A mostly white image of himself, a digital image never existing 
in printed form. Ermy feels this is somehow apt. 
Lifting his hands from the wrist rest, Ermy rubs his eyes and draws the heels of 
his thumbs down his pale face, unshaven in two or three days. A strained 
yawn and on with work: 
Today's Issue: The Virtual Body as Myth 
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"And what has this got to do with this thesis? " 
The answers are complex, but not complicated. The thesis is infused with 
intertextual references, parodies of style, appropriations and deconstruction of 
ideas; it is a multilayering of many texts to make a whole, a `patchwork quilt' (do we 
see such a quilt as one thing? or a collection of many things? ); it sometimes starts 
with one subject and moves into another without apparent (explicit, obvious) 
connection; it is `intended' to `represent' (two loaded words) the humanised, modern 
world and `thought processes' as we move through this world; it uses technology as 
a door (one of many) to enter into discussions about dance, language and philosophy 
(even more loaded words). 
ßj9 ToJ 
To discover more about why it is relevant we must do some archaeology. 
What is a body? What is a Virtual Body? Can one exist 
without the other? What does this (exist) mean? Is not the 
definition of a body: something physical? 
Is the body what gives the person substance? Or does the 
person give the body substance? What do I mean by 
'substance'? 
What is the relationship between body and person? What is 
the relationship between someone else and my body? What 
happens when my body is transformed into something else? 
Like what? 
Say I had a false leg. Am Ia different person? Well, I am 
in a way. But different to what? -To who I was before. But I 
am always different to who I was before because my 
experience changes who I am. 
57 
Not the beginning exactly (that is a while further away, if it is definable at all), but to 
September 1999, when I, Deveril, under my old name, Deveril Garraghan, presented 
a `work in progress' in the Dance Studio of the Performing Arts Technology Studios 
building of the University of Surrey: 
FMS 
Or, 'Clinging to the Past' 
A video monitor is wheeled in by a man with his arm in a sling. He has some problems 
carrying out his task, but he eventually manages and a video is played. 
Close-up video of mouth, with overlaid text: "Please do not adjust your set", flashing 
intermittently with "Please adjust your mindset". 
The words are out of sync. with the mouth's movements. 
The voice is saying: 
What you are about to see is an experiment and should be viewed as such. There are 
lessons to be learnt by us all. This is a learning experience. But don't take that as an 
excuse, although it is one. When this is all over you may not be able to remember all of 
what you have seen here tonight, for that is the way it works. Take what you can, and 
make it your own. That is also the way. A fragment of my dreams will live forever in 
you. Its a cheeky bugger isn't it. And now, take the weight off your soles. [Pause] Are 
you sitting comfortably? We are about to take a trip down memory's lanes. 
The video monitor is wheeled out. The audience settle. The lights fade down to blackout 
and the voiceover starts. 
So who am 17 
I can't answer that. 
"What gives me the right to speak of an 'I', and even of an 
'I' as cause, and finally of an 'I' as cause of 
thought? " (Nietzsche 1990: 46; BGE §16) 
I'm missing the point of the issue: what makes the Virtual 
Body a Myth? 
As I understand it (from my dictionary), a myth is a person, 
or thing, that is fictional or unproven. Or, a theme or 
character type embodying an idea. 
The virtual is artificial. Virtual Reality (VR) equals 
Artificial Reality. Now can this be? Is it the same as 
'unreality'? 
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The short demonstration performance had evolved from a series of notions 
concerning the nature of memory and its relationship with objects. These ideas were 
soon attached to theories of recovered memory and memory distortion. The opening 
voiceover of FMS consisted of extracts from the Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV Dissociative Disorders: 
Have you ever been unable to remember your name, age, address, or other 
important personal information? 
Have you ever felt as if there were large gaps in your memory? Have there ever 
been hours or days that seemed to be missing, or that you couldn't account for? 
Has there ever been a time in which you had difficulty remembering your daily 
activities? 
Have you ever found yourself in a place and been unable to remember how or 
why you went there? Have you ever traveled away from home unexpectedly and 
been unable to remember your past? 
Have you ever felt as if there was a struggle going on inside of you? Have you 
ever felt confused as to who you are? 
Have you ever felt as if, or found yourself acting as if, you were a child? Have 
you ever acted as if you were a completely different person? 
Have you ever found things in your possession that seemed to belong to you, 
but you could not remember how you got them? 
Have you ever felt as if you were living in the past, or reliving the past as though 
it were occurring in the present? 
... reliving the past as though it were occurring in the present? 
... reliving the past... reliving the past... reliving the past... [Fade out] 
The DSM-IV is the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders, fifth 
and most recent edition, published by 
the American Psychiatric Association in 
1994. (There was a revised third edition, 
III R. ) It "is the major guide for the 
classification, treatment and prognosis 
of psychological/psychiatric 
disorders" (Reber 1995: 207). The 
SCID-D was written by Steinberg 
(published in 1993), although the text 
cited was found in Baddeley, Wilson 
and Watts (1995: 339-40). 
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With the text, the suspended light bulb flickers on. From the rear of the stage, the 
'Teacher' appears. He is dressed in a raincoat and carrying an umbrella, all his 
garments are in shades of brown. He walks forwards very slowly. He also carries a 
basket, filled with the objects he will need for the next series of actions. His head is 
wrapped in cling-film. He moves to the desk, shakes the umbrella and sits. 
On the desk is a computer, a microphone, a video camera and an audio cassette 
player. Also on the desk are apples in various states of decay, wrapped in cling-film. He 
has a hole in the cling-film over his mouth. The Teacher' whispers into the microphone, 
with a broken, distorted voice: 
There is no beginning. 
There is no beginning. 
A lost voice flows through the room. An echo of fear. 
A forgotten face appears at the window, and blinks one eye open. The other is 
missing. A look of fear. 
He picks at the cling-film over his right eye, making another hole for him to look 
through. He continues: 
A smell from the past wisps by the door. So that is what fear smells like. 
There is no beginning. 
There is no [Pause] beginning. 
Frag [Pause] ment. 
A fault in the continuum. A feather-like crack. 
The text continues, but the content is not important here. (For those interested, the 
action is centred around a correspondence course with source materials and tutorials 
on various media: videotape, audio tape, in books and on computer disks. The 
theme, simply put, is the failure and invention of memories in relation to romantic 
relationships, the artistic muse, the role of technology in memory extension, the 
instability of the `self' and the decay of the `body'. In FMS each memory, each story, 
is recorded as a stream of sounds on an audio cassette; or in the form of a series of 
images on a video cassette; or as digital information on a computer disk; or as words 
in books and letters; or as pictures in photographs kept in an album; or simply as an 
object such as a flower or basket. ) 
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The title of the piece: FMS, is the abbreviation for False Memory Syndrome. The 
definitions and explanations vary for this controversial condition. The arguments for 
and against the validity of it as a `real' psychological disorder are not to be discussed 
here (see, for example, Loftus and Ketcham 1994, Ofshe and Watters 1995, Schacter 
1995 and 1996, Scott 1996 and Pendergrast 1998), but a section from False Memory 
Syndrome Foundation's website should suffice as a description: 
When the memory is distorted, or confabulated, the result can be what 
has been called the False Memory Syndrome: a condition in which a 
person's identity and interpersonal relationships are centered around a 
memory of traumatic experience which is objectively false but in which 
the person strongly believes. Note that the syndrome is not characterized 
by false memories as such. We all have memories that are inaccurate. 
Rather, the syndrome may be diagnosed when the memory is so deeply 
ingrained that it orients the individual's entire personality and lifestyle, in 
turn disrupting all sorts of other adaptive behaviors. The analogy to 
personality disorder is intentional. False memory syndrome is especially 
destructive because the person assiduously avoids confrontation with any 
evidence that might challenge the memory. Thus it takes on a life of its 
own, encapsulated, and resistant to correction. The person may become 
so focused on the memory that he or she may be effectively distracted 
from coping with the real problems in his or her life. 
John F. Kihlstrom, Ph. D. 
Increasingly throughout the country [USA], grown children undergoing 
therapeutic programs have come to believe that they suffer from "repressed 
memories" of incest and sexual abuse. While some reports of incest and sexual 
abuse are surely true, these decade-delayed memories are too often the result of 
False Memory Syndrome caused by a disastrous "therapeutic" program. False 
Memory Syndrome has a devastating effect on the victim and typically 
produces a continuing dependency on the very program that creates the 
syndrome. False Memory Syndrome proceeds to destroy the psychological 
well-being not only of the primary victim but through false accusations of 
incest and sexual abuse other members of the primary victim's family. 
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Notes were written in the run up to making the piece: 
This piece is not about child abuse, however. The traumatic events repressed 
by the protagonist in this piece relate to his personal and intimate relationships 
with women in his life. He, or someone, kept video diaries documenting these 
relationships, but through time they have become distorted and replayed such 
that they offer only abstract glimpses of the past; perhaps as seen and 
remembered by him. He is so obsessed by the past that he relives these false 
memories repetitively, unable to separate fact from fiction, past from present, 
and his own experience from that of others. 
A possible interpretation might be that we now use cameras and other 
machines to capture and hold our memories. Videos, films, photographs act as 
triggers to let loose recollections of the past, while other memory banks 
contain the lives of thousands - books, audio recordings, computers, etc. When 
we see or interact with these, we assimilate their information into our own 
lives, make our own memories of them. I can trick myself into believing that I 
was there when I look at someone else's home movie. Or pretend that it was I 
who took that photograph in a stranger's album. Those can be my thoughts in 
your diary. My life story totally fabricated from fragments of other people's 
lives or the words of fiction. Who is to know that I was never really there at 
all, if I tell them that I was? If I tell myself enough, truly I will grow to believe 
it myself. 
This led into thinking of how the reliance on technology to act as a repository for 
memories is perhaps misguided. Just as human memory is unreliable, corruptible and 
shaky in its foundations, so it is with technology. We all know how an audio cassette 
can become tangled or stretched by the rollers; or how rock carvings and inscriptions 
can become eroded; or how a precious video can be accidentally erased; or how a 
computer disk can develop a surface error; or how vinyl records become scratched, 
warped and inaudible over time; or how books and photographs become faded and 
can get burnt; or how websites are updated or removed making the information they 
once contained proffered transitor r inacible. 
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Walter Benjamin killed himself shortly 
after the 
Gestapo had confiscated his 
apartment, which contained his 
library [... ] and many of his 
manuscripts [... ] How was he to live 
without a library, how could he earn a 
living without the extensive collection 
of quotations and excerpts among his 
manuscripts? 
(Arendt 1973: 168) 
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Any extension, whether of skin, hand, or foot, affects the whole psychic and 
social complex. 
(McLuhan 1964: 4) 
Marshall McLuhan's book Understanding Media (1964) is subtitled The Extensions 
of Man. McLuhan talks of extending the central nervous system globally and he 
argues that all media are extensions of human beings and our senses, and that there 
is no distinction between a physical extension and one that contains information. 
`Information' can come in many forms, for example, words, images, numbers, 
statistics and even physical movements. Technological media is an extension of our 
memory and as a result, of us as a totality. If there is no separation, as such, between 
our memory and our body, any extension of either is an extension of us, of me. My 
bookshelves are my memory store, and contain things that I know, things that I have 
known and forgotten, things I will know if I get round to reading the books, and 
things I will probably never know. We are tempted to say, "When I read, somebody 
else's thoughts are transferred into me. " Whose thoughts are they then? The writer's 
or mine? 
The man at the computer turns his head to look around the room in 
which he sits. 'Reaky. This iisLB1-! His thoughts stop, and he is still. 
The books on his shelves stand at various angles-some upright; 
some leaning onto others as though they were a photograph of 
dominoes mid-topple; some lying on their sides in vertical piles. 
'Md Hem.. whaeisi? ' 
His sight alights on the book he wants and he sees his hand move 
out towards the tome's spine. The weighty article is levered off the 
shelf, leaving a gap into which the smallest of its neighbours falls. The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace forms an archway with The Cyborg Handbook, but Ermy doesn't notice this. 
He is already reading. 
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,5 
The Erotic Ontology of Cyberspace 
Michael Heim 
Introduction 
Cyberspace is more than a breakthrough in electronic media or in 
computer interface design. With its virtual environments and simu- 
lated worlds, cyberspace is a metaphysical laboratory, a tool for exam- 
ining our very sense of reality. 
Ermy re-reads the opening paragraph. He mutters with a quizzical tone, 
'Sense of reality... ' He skim-reads down the page. 
When designing virtual worlds, we face a series of reality questions. 
How, for instance, should users appear to themselves in a vidual world? 
Should users appear to themselves in cyberspace as one set of objects 
among others, as third-person bodies that users can inspect with 
detachment? Or should users feel themselves to be headless fields of 
awareness, similar to our phenomenological experience? Should cau- 
sality underpin the cyber world so that an injury inflicted on the user's 
cyberbody likewise somehow damages the user's physical body? And 
who should make the ongoing design decisions? If the people who 
make simulations inevitably incorporate their own perceptions and 
beliefs, loading cyberspace with their prejudices as well as their insights, who 
should build the cyberworld? Should multiple users at any point be 
free to shape the qualities and dimensions of cyber entities? Should 
artistic users roam freely, programming and directing their own unique 
cyber cinemas that provide escape from the mundane world? Or does 
fantasy cease where the economics of the virtual workplace begins? But 
why be satisfied with a single virtual world? Why not several? Must we 
pledge allegiance to a single reality? Perhaps worlds should be layered 
like onion skins, realities within realities, or loosely linked like neigh- 
borhoods, permitting free aesthetic pleasure to coexist with the task- 
until a question catches his eye: 
oriented business world. Does the meaning of "reality"-and the keen 
With thumb and forefinger he turns the page. 
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60 The Erotic Ontology of Cyberspace 
existential edge of experience-weaken as it stretches over many virtual 
worlds? 
He lingers on the word 'weaken'. He considers typing something, but the sentence won't form for him. 
He continues reading and taking passages from the text. 
"The way we understand the ontological structure of cyberspace will 
determine how realities can exist within it. " (Heim 1991: 60) 
"By connecting with intellectual precedents and prototypes [Plato and 
Leibniz], we can enrich our self-understanding and make cyberspace 
function as a more useful metaphysical laboratory. " (Heim 1991: 60) 
"Ontology": the quasi-scientific, metaphysical study and systemisation of being 
and existence, with a hierarchical structure based on categorial schemes 
containing either universals and particulars, or abstract and concrete entities 
(although the distinctions have been blurred in some ontologies). (See 
Honderich 1995) 
"Erotic": C 17th from the Greek er3tikos 'of love', from eras 'love'. Now the 
word is used to mean something more sexual, physical, bestial. 
"Cyberspace": Where to begin? Try Benedikt's 'Introduction' (1991: 1-25); or 
Kevin Robins' 'Cyberspace and the World We Live In' (1995). 
Heim claims that the allure of the computer is erotic, and goes on to poeticise 
about how the "world rendered as pure information not only fascinates our eyes 
and minds, but also captures our hearts" (Heim 1991: 61). 
Ermy snorts and shakes his head. And reads the sentence in a whisper: 'The world rendered as pure 
information not only fascinates our eyes and minds, but also captures our hearts: He crosses his 
arms and picks at a dry patch of skin near his left elbow. He tries to make sense of the words. 
He is overwhelmed by the concepts he is contending with. He decides to go to another book, one with 
pictures (he smiles) for some clarity, and he hopes, inspiration. After a short flick he finds the pages 
he is looking for. He makes a note of a key quotation. 
It says here, concerning virtual reality: "The dream of another body will 
increase the perception of the self as an object, since internal experience 
will inevitably be of the real body" (Buick and ]evtic 1995: 119). 
This seems to be an easy sentence to understand, yet it is problematic when 
taken apart and examined in terms of the category-mistakes it seems to contain. 
[Must make reference to Ryle's definition of 'Category-mistakes' and his 
illustrative examples (1949: 16ff). ] 
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Although the human memory is still not fully understood, it could be described as 
part of the complex of characteristics that makes us human (but not totally unique or 
distinct from other animals which also display the ability to remember; and even 
certain metals, for example nickel, are described as having `memory'). Despite not 
knowing how we do it, we say that we `remember things' (unless we have a 
neurophysiological problem). Section 306 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
Investigations (1953) reads: 
Why should I deny that there is a mental process [called `remembering']? But 
`There has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering.... ' 
means nothing more than: `I have just remembered ... . 
'. To deny the mental 
process would mean to deny the remembering; to deny that anyone ever 
remembers anything. 
That is also to say that we cannot talk about `the memory' (a `mechanism' for 
remembering not a notion to hold onto) without referring, in some way, to the act 
of remembering `a memory' (the thing that is remembered-not an `object', as will 
be discussed). It is worthwhile considering the use of the word `memory' as it refers 
to the so-called `part' of human beings (and other animals we can suppose) that 
stores memories, and this second use of the word `memory', as - and here words 
could be said to fail to describe - the image, the past experience remembered. 
Ermy moves from book to keyboard; turning pages and tapping at the 
plastic keys when a thought forms. Sometimes he pauses, a knee 
vibrating, perhaps in time with some distant, unheard beat. 
Shoulder tension pulls his attention from reading and typing. Ermy 
throws back his head, mouth open, and rocks his occiput against his 
gristly trapezius. 
He sighs his relief, and resumes his writing 
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It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the 
beginning. And not to try to go further back. 
(Wittgenstein OC §471) 
We are told that everything has a beginning and an end. There is no beginning. 
However, when we look back at our lives we cannot be sure of the beginning, the 
start. There is no beginning. There is not one definite event or thought that we can 
say with certainty forms our earliest memory. There is no beginºning. Over the time 
of our lives, and even from one day to the next, these memories shift, get jumbled 
about, and their order is forgotten and reinvented. And even 
(especially) our early memories are prone to this process. (See, for example, Ceci 
1995, Levine 2000 and Wheeler 2000. ) Any memory can find itself dislodged and 
combined or related to another memory, separated from the first in time and space. 
Take a computer as an analogy. A computer disk drive doesn't store data in distinct 
blocks, but scattered across its surface. We can improve its performance by 
defragmenting the disk, rearranging the files into adjacent blocks. But this is not a 
permanent arrangement, and with time and with more data to store, the disk 
fragments this information again and again. The passage on the FMS programme for 
the audience read: 
memories are not stored in any single location in the brain [... ] nor are they 
distributed throughout the entire brain [... ] Different parts of the brain hold on 
to different aspects of an experience, which are in turn linked together by a 
special memory system hidden deep within the inner recesses of our brains 
[... ] How accurate are the tales we tell about our lives? D 
(Schacter 1996: 9) Zs 
x-996, 
41, 
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We have designed computers to extend our brains, and computers (and other forms 
of technology) give us analogies for looking at the workings of the brain. But it's a 
bit of a chicken and egg situation. Are our brains organic computers or do they just 
appear to be like the mechanised versions we have constructed? Or are computers 
like our brains because that's how we see our brains? Daniel Dennett has written: 
The level of description and explanation we need [to describe the brain] is 
analogous to (but not identical with) one of the "software levels" of 
description of computers: what we need to understand is how human 
consciousness can be realized in the operation of a virtual machine created by 
memes in the brain. 
(1993: 210; italics in original) 
Virtual machine is another term for the computer's memory (the `plastic' part) that 
can store programs and data: "the merely transient patterns that are made to track 
whatever it is that is to be represented [... ] `made of rules rather than wires' [... in 
other words] what you get when you impose a particular pattern of rules on all that 
plasticity" (Dennett 1993: 211; italics added). Although Dennett is talking about the 
`conscious' brain, he helps to find a place in the argument for the idea of the 
unconscious, or how memory might function as a separate system. 
Dennett adds that "A meme's existence depends on a physical embodiment in some 
medium" (1993: 204), whether it is a brain or a book or a computer or whatever is 
dependent on the content of the meme. The metaphor of the meme is interesting as a 
tool for describing how ideas get around and are stored. But if it can be seen as 
`scientific', as Susan Blackmore suggests it can (see Blackmore 1999), is another 
matter. 
[A meme is] a unit of cultural 
transmission, or a unit of imitation [... ] 
Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, 
catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of 
making pots or building arches. Just as 
genes propagate themselves in the gene 
pool by leaping from body to body via a 
sperm or eggs, so memes propagate 
themselves in the memes pool by 
leaping from brain to brain via a process 
which, in the broad sense, can be called 
imitation. 
(Dawkins 1976: 206) 
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A contentious statement: The act of performance is one of expression and 
transmission of ideas, of memes. FMS was an attempt to explore the transference of 
memory, not only between the contents of the performance texts and the character on 
stage, but also between performer and audience. This was a circularly-evolved 
exploration, with theatrical devices both initiating and being born out of the themes 
being examined. For example, there was a question of how to present a series of 
video-dances (the main impetus of the piece in terms of beginning the process of 
creation) without an apparent reason. The Beckett play suggested the device of 
presenting the dances as memories and the Soderbergh film added some extra 
resonances to the basic starting points. As sources they are not emphasised in the 
performance, and anyone watching it would probably not have immediately 
considered them (even a knowledge of Beckett might not have helped). The format 
and structure were inspired by Beckett's Krapp's Last Tape, which begins with 
Krapp looking through a ledger which contains contents and descriptions of his reels 
of tape, his memory banks. 
"The dream of another body_" Does a body dream? If it does, 
is it the whole body, or just a part (the brain, for 
example)? Or is the word 'body' simply being used as a 
synecdoche for a person? No-one says: My body was dreaming; 
or, my brain was dreaming. Do they mean 'dream' in the sense 
of 'what we (human beings) experience when asleep'? Or are 
they using it in a different sense? For example, to mean the 
'aspiration of someone'. (Is a dream like a breath? Patently 
not, but could be described poetically as such. ) To talk of 
dreaming in an awake state is certainly an error, but still 
useful. [See RPP 1 §234. ] 
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The public improvisation of FMS prompted thinking on how the performance 
process itself was linked to the theme of technological extension of memory. The 
text to be spoken was read off a computer screen, in part due to a lack of time to 
learn and remember it before the performance. This suggested that there was a 
reliance on the computer to `remember' the words. Also in the performance the text 
for one of the videos was `spoken' by the computer. However, the old Mac SE/30 
was not properly able to reproduce the voice, giving its delivery a broken, staccato 
property and a fragile quality. Just as the human voice was distorted (by an effects 
pedal), so too was the voice of the computer. Computer technology is usually 
considered to be special and an advancement of human capabilities, but it is as 
capable of failure as humans are. There exists a one-sided relationship with 
technology. Humans depend on it for so many things, yet it is not dependant on us. It 
makes no difference to the computer whether it is turned on or left off, at least not in 
the same way as it makes a difference to us whether it is on or off. If a computer is 
damaged it does make a difference to its ability to function properly, but it is not 
aware of this damage as we are aware of its damage. We might even consider this 
damage as we consider personal damage. If valued computer files get a virus or get 
trashed or inoperable, we may feel a sense of loss and regret. Not exactly the same, 
certainly not as intense, as a profound personal loss, but not too dissimilar. 
"increase the perception of the self as an object-" How does 
one 'perceive the self'? When is the self capable of being 
perceived of 'as an object'? The word 'self' is the main 
problem here. It has taken on a Cartesian sense, it seems, 
but not quite. The Cartesian self is imperceptible, 
incorporeal, but a substance of sorts; only through thinking 
is it 'experienced'. 
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A newspaper article on Alzheimer's disease ('What happens to me? ' The Guardian, 
7 July 1999), outlines the problems presented by the disease. The interview with 
John Carey, a 51 year old ex-casting director for films, diagnosed as having 
Alzheimer's and Multi-Infarct Dementia, highlights the effects of the disease on the 
`self (see below), especially on someone still considered relatively young. The last 
paragraph reads: 
Lose your memory and the self goes down with it. We've tended to see those 
selves with Alzheimer's as old women and men. What would they have been 
doing if they didn't have the disease? Watching daytime television, reliving 
the long-lost past? But this isn't about your mum or your gran getting 
Alzheimer's. John is saying what it's like when it's you who is going into the 
dark. 
(Grant 1999: 2; italics added) 
`Losing your memory' is equated with losing the light around you. Just as Milton 
(like Homer before him) and Samson lose their sight, Krapp loses his sight, his 
memory and his virility, so too the `Teacher' in FMS is prevented from seeing 
properly and remembering unaided because of the loss of things that meant a lot to 
him, but which he still has reminders of in the form of various objects. Rod 
Michalko in his phenomenological and socio-historical study of losing one's sight 
and blindness writes: 
The loss of a valued object is often described in terms that depict both the 
value of the object lost and the worthless nature of what results from this loss 
[... ] A sound mind, a fortune, and sight are not spoken of in terms of loss since 
they are themselves valued. We do not say of persons who have had their sight 
restored that they have lost their blindness. 
(1998: 26; italics in original) 
This thesis is about losing one's blindness, about learning to see, about seeing things 
in new ways. It is about the ways of seeing that are in themselves blind. It is about 
clearing away the obstructions to vision. It is about sight and about blindness and not 
about sight and not about blindness. It is about the eye, and the T. It is about losing 
the T. It is about loss and lack and it is about finding and having. The `I' is ImplIcIt 
in the thesIs, in the wrItIng: "that neutral, composite, oblique space where our 
subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very 
identity of the body writing" (Barthes 1977: 142). 
CO, tof 
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WP §490). 
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There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. 
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a 
report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my 
will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or 
rather showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could 
not be mentioned in that book. - 
(Wittgenstein TLP §5.631) 
The eye is not part of the visual field, according to Wittgenstein (TLP 5.6331); the 
`I', the philosophical self, "the metaphysical subject, [is] the limit of the world-not 
a part of it" (Wittgenstein TLP 5.641). Of course anything `metaphysical' doesn't 
exist: to quote and paraphrase A. J. Ayer, if we "regard the self as a 
substance" (1990: 134), when we try to observe it, we are unable to-it is 
insubstantial. It is not verifiable through introspection, or through what we call 'self- 
consciousness', neither is it satisfactorily explained by the Humean `stumbling on 
perceptions' which when bundled together constitute a notional self, nor is it the 
(metaphysical rather than metaphorical) soul. Personal identity can be defined of "in 
terms of bodily identity, and bodily identity is to be defined in terms of the 
resemblance and continuity of sense-contents" (Ayer 1990: 136). From here the 
philosophical argument (well Ayer's argument) slips, via the reduction of the self as 
talk about sense-experiences, into the subject of solipsism. However, the question of 
`personal identity' is answerable in many more ways than Ayer's definition. 
"I a*,,, lta Poet apoe,, : but Jacque* Canay,, wrote Mw 
"internal experience-" Where is the experience? When I feel 
tense in my shoulders it seems to make sense to say that I 
experience it inside my body. But when I massage them (or 
have them massaged), I could say that the experience is 
external. Where is the experience of virtual reality? 
Perhaps it makes little or no sense to use the words 
'internal' and 'external' in relation to experience, except 
that we understand what we are talking about when we do. In 
experiencing VR the human being is using the same organs and 
senses as they would to experience another-the other-so- 
called reality (real reality? ): the eyes for vision, the 
ears for hearing, the skin for feeling, the smell and taste 
receptors. The problem arises of where we 'feel' and 
'experience' these sensations from external stimuli. I feel 
a massage in my skin and muscle, but do I feel seeing 
something in my eyes? [Z §495. ] VR is based in reality, it 
is reality. Nothing more, nothing less. 
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Serre, fourmillant, comme un million d'helminthes, 
Dans nos cerveaux ribote un peuple de Demons, 
Et, quand nous respirons, la Mort dans nos poumons, 
Descend, fleuve invisible, avec de sourdes plaintes. 
Charles Baudelaire `Au Lecteur' 
(1982: 183) 
Serried, seething, like a million ants, 
In our brains riots a Demon horde, 
And, when we breathe, Death in our lungs, 
Descends, a sightless river, with deaf moans. 
Charles Baudelaire `To the Reader' 
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If I do not know how to begin a book that is because something is still unclear. 
For I should like to begin with the original data of philosophy, written & 
spoken sentences, with books as it were [there is no full stop] 
And here we encounter the difficulty of "Everything is in flux". And perhaps 
this is the very point at which to begin. 
(Wittgenstein CV 11 e: MS 110 10) 
This quotation from one of Wittgenstein's diary manuscripts dated 12.12.1930, 
indicates the problem of starting a written philosophical endeavour-like a million 
ants, or a deadly swarm of hornets, ideas will not stay still: 
I jump about all round the topic; that is the only way of thinking that is natural 
to me. Forcing my thoughts into an ordered sequence is a torment for me. 
(Wittgenstein CV 33e: MS 118 94v) 
Combined with this is the added difficulty of lack of clarity: how can one begin to 
write when the thoughts aren't clear? So, perhaps the reason to write is because the 
thoughts aren't clear, in the hope that in the doing, clear sense will come: In starting 
with the "original data of philosophy" lies the root of the problem: reading is a tricky 
business. It places demands on the reader, it can frustrate as much as it can 
illuminate, it keeps the reader in a state of mental agitation. Often, when reading 
certain texts, it is impossible to read without wanting to write-'thinking' off one 
page, to `think' on another. "Philosophy is, not a body of doctrine but an 
activity" (Wittgenstein TLP §4.112). Paul Feyerabend writes of "the relation 
between idea and action" (1993: 17) and suggests that the generally accepted order 
of events is "that a clear and distinct understanding of new ideas precedes, and 
should precede, their formulation and their institutional expression" (Feyerabend 
1993: 17). He continues: 
First, we have an idea, or a problem, then we act, i. e. either speak, or build, or 
destroy. Yet this is certainly not the way in which small children develop. They 
use words, they combine them, they play with them, until they grasp a meaning 
that has so far been beyond their reach. And the initial playful activity is an 
essential prerequisite of the final act of understanding. There is no reason why 
this mechanism should cease to function in the adult [... ] Creation of a thing, 
and creation plus full understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are very 
often parts of one and the same indivisible process and cannot be separated 
without bringing the process to a stop. 
(Feyerabend 1993: 17; italics in original) 
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So, as there is often no beginning to identify with any, what was once called, surety 
and would now be called certainty or precision (thoughts aren't precise, in one 
sense, but then how more precise can they get when they are expressed? ), there is a 
difficulty in finding an end. Of course there has to be an end to a philosophical or 
creative process in one sense -a book may eventually be published, even it is after 
the writer's death, or a painting will get left in an `unfinished' state, only to be 
displayed in a gallery, etc. - ideas are crystallised into a form, be it words, sounds, 
`representational' or abstract markings, or movements. 
One aspect of postmodern life is the 
radical proliferation of information. 
There is always more and more to read; 
there is no end of things to read. 
Academic study in the postmodern age 
partakes of the postmodern sublime: 
there is always too much for anyone to 
get his or her mind around. There is no 
escape from perplexity. 
(Fortier 1997: 147) 
"Thinking" in primitive conditions (pre- 
organic) is the crystallization of forms, as 
in the case of crystal. - In our thought, 
the essential feature is fitting new material 
into old schemas (= Procrustes' bed), 
making equal what is new. 
(Nietzsche WP §499; italics in original) 
Nietzsche (1968b: 273): 
WP §500 (1885-1886) 
Sense perceptions projected "outside": "inside" and 
"outside"-does the body command here-? 
"real body. " Supposedly contrasted with the virtual body. 
But there can surely be only one type of body experienced 
and to call it 'real' or otherwise is unnecessary. The 
virtual body: what can this be called? Is it a 
`representation', in an artistic sense, of a human body? It 
is not a purely visual representation in the idealised 
version of VR: the body can be 'experienced' by all the 
senses, through touch as can a 'real body'. The ultimate 
goal: total and immersive verisimilitude. The willing 
suspension of disbelief is unnecessary because the 
experience does not require that the participant pretend 
that the world they are in is anything but real: 
The imagination is dead: only the technology is new. 
The visions are bereft [... ] but the point is that the 
technology will, supposedly, let us experience them as if they were real. 
(Robins 1995: 139; italics in original) 
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"The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular 
purpose" (Wittgenstein PI §127). What does Wittgenstein mean by this? It may be a 
note about collecting examples, or it seems to me, that it is more about constructing 
examples which serve to illustrate an issue (consider that Wittgenstein was an 
experienced engineer and architect; this will recur as a motif, as it does in 
Wittgenstein's writings). This assemblage of examples is the work of philosophy 
that results from the activities of the philosopher is like a machine built for a certain 
job. So the philosopher is an inventor, a creator, an artisan. Is the philosopher an 
artist too? (The last two words in italics have been synonyms to each other in the 
past, but they have drifted apart in recent times. ) I think that the answer has to be: 
yes and no. 
To restate, it could be said that there is never a fully completed philosophy. How can 
anyone determine the end of a thought process? A work of art (be it a painting, a 
poem, a play, or whatever) even when hung on a wall, reproduced in a book, 
performed on a stage or put aside by the artist, is not at the end of its making. There 
is never a finished work of art. Until the work is `dead', and this is a loosely used 
term because it is not `alive' in the first place, there is a chance for its being 
interpreted. With each new person who comes into contact (through any of the 
senses) with the work - and even those persons who re-contact the work - comes a 
new life to the work of art-this life is the interpretation. A work of art is truly 
finished when it is `dead', destroyed and not remembered by any living human being. 
The ideas sketched in this thesis are a work-in-progress report; incomplete and 
needing to be filled in. Yet they are the final product, the end of the process, but 
written into the thesis is the process (the thinking, the questioning, the understanding, 
the act of writing). 
But what about the ideas that the human being could exist in 
"a kind of meta-atmosphere composed of a pure digitalized 
[sic] electronic information"? (Tomas 1995: 38) The human 
body as an archaeological artefact, an extinct yet 
reconstituted dinosaur, or a plaything for the 
transmigrated, who possess it as a familiar spirit. (See, 
for example and explanation, Moravec 1988. ) 
Ermy ponders this remote possibility, and shakes his head. 'rmnotinle, esiedWhat I 
day'tihFkVMvtvmWbefiepciVWWewakMtienbehumanbe s' 
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Wittgenstein once said that, "A philosopher who is not taking part in discussions is 
like a boxer who never goes into the ring" (Rhees 1984: 133). What about 
discussions with yourself? Do they count? Writing philosophy can be a lonely 
activity, so perhaps it is no wonder that philosophers invent interlocutors with which 
to spar (the list of examples is too daunting to attempt to summarise it). Once again, 
Wittgenstein, in 1948, wrote in his diary: 
Almost the whole time I am writing conversations with myself. Things I say to 
myself tete-a-tete. 
(CV 88e: MS 137 134b) 
This is all well and good if you are Wittgenstein, but lesser philosophers (i. e. this 
one) do not have such eminent sparring partners. However, I consider the creative 
aspect of this philosophical work - and it is with some reluctance and trepidation 
that I call it such - to be the construction of imaginary characters and situations 
through which to investigate the themes. The title of this thesis, Digital Dialogism: 
dance at the edge of language, reflects the back-and-forth of ideas between 
conversers. (The title as a whole and in parts, while being sufficiently vague and 
multifaceted, stands in little need of explanation: "Anything the reader can do for 
himself, leave it to the reader" (Wittgenstein CV 88e: MS 137 134b). ) 
Somewhere, St Augustine wrote that the representations of 
art are libri idiotarum: the books of the simple. [See 
Clement 1994: 1] Also, he wrote in his Confessiones: 
We see the things which you have made, because they 
exist. But they only exist because you see them. 
Outside ourselves we see that they exist, and in our 
inner selves we see that they are good. 
(Augustine 1961: 346) 
Obviously he is writing as though to God (other translations 
use 'Thou' instead of 'you'), but there is a problem here 
because he uses the things he sees as a proof of God's 
existence, while saying that only because God exists do the 
things he sees exist. Augustine's belief in eternal, 
spiritual truths is what underlies his argument. His inner/ 
outer distinction is based on his views of the sluggish 
corporeal sense organs and the immaterial (and superior) 
soul. There is a suggestion of a hidden inner world where 
the soul resides before being set free at death to rejoin 
Cod. Augustine follows Plato's transcendence of embodiment, 
and also his elevation of sight as the prime sense, through 
the insistence that goodness is seen through the power of 
the soul, divine inspiration, or what we might call 
'intuition' [C 15th Late Latin intuitio a contemplation, from 
Latin intueri to gaze upon, from tuen to look at]. 
4 
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Words plucked from the air can often develop a highly resonant complex of 
meanings. `Dialogism' is one such word. Based on ideas presented in the 1929 book 
by Valentin Nikolaevich Volo§inov (1986), it refers to the structuring of an utterance 
or a series of utterances, even those which could be said to be monologues or 
soliloquies (to use theatrical parlance), where an utterance is an "active, 
performed' (Holquist 1990: 60) linguistic construction, be it spoken or written. In 
the book, Dialogism: Bakhtin and his world, Michael Holquist (1990) describes the 
philosophical traditions of Bakhtin and his circle and the nature of dialogism as a 
way of connecting human beings and the world, through language. It stresses 
multiplicity and relative centres rather than duality and absolutism. The self is not 
the Cartesian `I' but an ever-changing and contextually dependent sign. The word `I' 
is an empty word (sign) used to `shift' the "center of discourse from one speaking 
subject to another" (Holquist 1990: 23); the self is not perceived as is the other. The 
self is dialogically authored (like a story perhaps) and shared; 
Existence is not only an event, it is an utterance. The event of existence has the 
nature of dialogue in this sense; there is no word directed to no one. 
(Holquist 1990: 27) 
As with other signs, in a Saussurean sense, the `I' is made of the signifier and the 
signified, but in dialogism what is most important is the relationship between these 
aspects. Dialogism is bound up in the act(s) of communication (communicating), but 
emphasises the multitude of differences at play in any given dialogue, over time and 
in different spaces. It is syntagmatic and attempts to account for the range of 
meanings created by combinations of words in social contexts, that is, as actually spoken 
and written, and from the point of view of those who use the language. "Discourse does 
not reflect a situation, it is a situation" (Holquist 1990: 49; italics in original). 
In dialogism, life is expression. Expression means to make meaning, and 
meaning comes about only through the medium of signs. This is true at all 
levels of existence: something exists only if it means. 
(Holquist 1990: 49; italics in original) 
In a Wittgensteinian way, understanding is shown "as a response to a sign with 
signs" (Holquist 1990: 49; italics in original); and all signs are linked, as in the later 
Lacanian `signifying chain', but without an insistence on it breaking and 
disappearing into an `inner being' (see Vologinov 1986). 
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This is a thesis about dance. But it doesn't wear this on its sleeve. Maybe it is more 
of a thesis for those interested in dance. Maybe it is a thesis for those wishing to 
consider dance from new directions. Maybe it is a thesis for the writer to indulge in a 
`dance of language', rather than `language of dance'. Maybe it is a thesis about the 
processes of thought. As Nietzsche wrote: "thinking wants to be learned like 
dancing, as a kind of dancing" (in TI, `What the Germans Lack' §7,1968a: 76). This 
thesis is the result of thinking about dance and allowing that thinking to dance itself. 
This is a thesis about the implications of technology on the performing human being. 
But, this is almost an incidental. It is the starting point more than the vanishing point 
of a perspective. "The Renaissance Legacy" of the vanishing point, writes McLuhan 
(in McLuhan and Fiore 1967: 53), prompts a detached observer, situated externally 
to the frame of experience. If this thesis were a painting it would have multiple 
vanishing points and employ aerial perspective; it is `involving' rather than 
`detaching'; it is akin to Cubist, Futurist and Constructivist art, especially sculptural 
works (but this is not a metaphor to adhere to too closely). Conceptually it started 
from a narrow focus and grew outwards. It has ended up wider than it was supposed 
to - the frame is expansive rather than restrictive - and it is the result of two views: 
the reader's (and there is a multitude of readers) and the writer's, or rather, the 
work's. This is perhaps the inverse of how a PhD usually progresses. Perhaps the 
focus of a PhD moves in and out from a central line, widening and narrowing in 
scope as information is fed in and then more or less intensely examined (and 
exploited). 
Ermy gazes into space and contemplates this last bit. ? oifi1rvwmearublgtwby 
Mian, which nowmeans bW a#=Tialt*V just by kna*g k almost as an Wkxke kvAieclga 
But Immesfomfie Lalin faboldng Etscmelhing. I do not bdc aryMm b krow sorre t Oi LUK Butwhatislavt 7 
He breathes in, filling his lungs with stale air. He glances at the window; it is 
shut. He disconnects his coccyx from the seat and lifts the latch on the frame 
and swings the window outwards to let the air in. 
Ermy pauses and peers through the brick dust and glass. 
He thinks, 'E ven öiagh I don't um1ysee L, lk maue is an aýsideb my house. What rI was 
bind? Wald the dithith between inside and aulside be the same? Ccild I doubt that theres an 
outside? Why shall I doLd V As a s4tad person, do I dmd the e toe d tliiW around me 
when I shut my eyes? Wet, I cold but itmcuW do me mx: h good b daLEt t besides I can ak&uys dlaymydmh byr9 n'Veyes, oremnbud*g sameltft Beüernolesom Of tisdaW 
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This is a thesis about the difficulties of writing a thesis on philosophy, especially a 
philosophy of performance in the modem technological age. It is not a history. It is 
not an ethnography. It is not an analysis of a specific work, or artist, or genre, or 
technique. It isn't a treatise on what dance and technology is or should be. It could 
have been any of these things. It is a product of the lack of "the calm of an easy 
security" (Bartfies 1977: 155) found in interdisciplinarity. 
"Inter-disciplinary structures in 
all their forms are symptoms of 
this: every discipline is aligned on 
the degenerated concepts of 
another" (Baudrillard 1990: 58). 
IvO%i`&ýI'.. ', ý, ý &&ig"Ieý$ýý is, 
The use of visual metaphors for 'knowing' and 'not knowing'. 
Even a blind person I met on the train, and had a 
conversation with, used the word 'see' in this sense, before 
saying 'see you later' as I got off at my destination. This 
is noted as common in Michalko (1998), as is the use of the 
problem of blindness as a metaphor for other kinds of 
"'lack', 'inability, ' or 'incompetence"' (Michalko 1998: 
24). Blindness is equated with many negative attributes and 
is a poetic metaphor which has been used in a range of 
texts. 
When sight is lost or not used there is a fallacious 
assumption that the other senses have a heightened ability 
to experience the world. Indeed research cited by Patrick 
Trevor-Roper "concluded that the loss of a major sense 
impairs rather than increases the acuity of the 
others" (1997: 163fn). Extra care is taken by the blind 
person so as not to endanger themselves; they learn to judge 
and navigate through the world from the available 
information. 
What is the 'haptic' sense? [Come back to this. ] 
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This thesis takes as many forms as the subject it purports to be a study of. It doesn't 
encourage or condone the making of generalisations and assumptions (although it 
can be guilty of doing just that). It is, as will be outlined elsewhere, about the 
descriptive language of dance, of the world. Indeed it is as much about the world as 
it is about dance. And this could be said to be only a little bit about either. It asks 
questions of language and concepts that may be uncomfortable for some readers. 
They were uncomfortable for the writer. It is a challenge to the complacent use of 
terminology and concepts which is pervasive in the descriptive language of dance 
and its processes. Notice how the word `descriptive' has found its way into the 
phrase `the language of dance'. One of the notions questioned is that 'of `the 
language of dance'. 
"Language is something that 
is spoken" (Rhees 1970: 70). 
Whatever language we use for 
description now seems abstract and thin, 
by contrast with the immediacy and 
concreteness of lived experience. Where 
reality is a web of specific, particular, individual things, each with its own 
tang, language now appears as a disembodied ballet of abstractions. 
(Black 1968: 119) 
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This thesis is about wordplay - `language-games' - and the play of words. It is about 
the play of meaning, but has little to do with the meaning of play. It is, however, 
playful and serious at the same time. It is a world in which the word is all there is- 
the imaginary -worlds of children are perhaps its relatives. It wants to say that the 
wor(l)d is all there is. But this is too extreme. We all, even scientists, live according 
to a `world-picture' (a Weltanschauung) learnt as children (see Wittgenstein 
OC § 167), that is mostly hidden from us, and which thwarts us from time to time in 
our attempts to say what we want to say (see Wittgenstein OC §422). Wittgenstein 
suggests that 
The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of 
mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be 
learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules [... ] 
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts 
may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the 
river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of 
the one from the other. 
(Wittgenstein OC §§95 & 97) 
This thesis explicitly expounds and explores a mythology, to investigate a 
world-view. (If there was another way of doing it, it wasn't made apparent. ) The 
mythology extends to the process of writing a thesis. It is part of the play between 
so-called `rational thought' and `creative thought'. One shapes the other and is 
shaped in return, just as the river shapes (erodes, shifts the silt) and is shaped 
(contained) by the river-bed. Rivers meander and change course, as do world-views 
and mythologies. 
When Feyerabend writes: 
the initial playful activity is an essential prerequisite of the final act of 
understanding. There is no reason why this mechanism should cease to 
function in the adult[, ] 
(1993: 17) 
he can be seen to echo one of Sigmund Freud's descriptions of creativity in the 
writer: 
The creative writer does the same as the child at play. He creates a world of 
phantasy which he takes very seriously-that is, which he invests with large 
amounts of emotion-while separating it sharply from reality. Language has 
preserved this relationship between children's play and poetic creation. 
(Freud 1995: 437) 
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Disregarding the description of seriousness as an `investment of emotion' (the word 
`emotion' will come under scrutiny in the thesis) and the `separation from 
reality' (`reality', another word with issues), there is a hint at the commonality 
between artistic (and philosophic) writing and play; for Freud, "a piece of creative 
writing, like a day-dream, is a continuation of, and a substitute for, what was once 
the play of childhood" (Freud 1995: 442). 
[link back to FMS] ýýP, vu 
The breaking of rules. The breakdown of structure. The break from the norm. 
ipat wer' when, 
Nietzsche: "who has to be a 
creator always has to 
destroy" (TS, Z `Of the Thousand 
and One Goals', 1969: 85). 
John Milton, bereft of vision, could not write with an 
implement, so after sleepless nights filled with flashes of 
inspiration, he would dictate passages of his poems to his 
daughter; this is referenced in his works, for example, 
Paradise Lost, iii, lines 19-20. Today, Milton could use a 
computer and voice recognition software, or if he could 
touch-type, just a keyboard, or a combination of the two. 
Trevor-Roper writes "blind poets rarely compose long or 
complex poems. Milton was the exception" (1997: 169). Homer, 
too, was blind. 
See also Feyerabend (1988: 178) on Homeric formulae: "The 
requirement of memory demanded that there be ready-made 
descriptions of events that can be used by a poet who 
composes in his mind, and without the aid of writing... " The 
Homeric poet "has no interest in originality of expression, 
or in variety. He uses or adapts inherited 
formulae. " (Quotation from Page, D. I. (1966) History and 
the Homeric Iliad. Berkeley: ?????, p. 230) 
Ermy has some words he would like to say. `How bi ter time oxnxfiom? 
Shaidlusetc* clesorendncies7 But before he can act on them he is typing again. 
Interfaces. Cybernetics. The links between humans and machines. 
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Filippo Marinetti called for the death of the literary `I', which was to go hand in 
hand with the destruction of syntax, imagination without strings and words in 
freedom-words as visual art, as onomatopoeia, the use of 
Condensed metaphors. Telegraphic images. Maximum vibrations. Nodes of 
thought. Closed or open fans of movement. Compressed analogies. Color 
Balances. Dimensions, weights, measures, and the speed of sensations. The 
plunge of the essential word into the water of sensibility, minus the concentric 
circles that the word produces. Restful moments of intuition. Movements in 
two, three, four, five different rhythms. The analytic, exploratory poles that 
sustain the bundle of intuitive strings. 
(Marinetti 1913) 
Futurist poetry abolished punctuation, and thereby abandoning the concept 
`sentence', in speech and in writing. Breathing mechanised allowing for a 
jackhammer assault on the listener; words like fists `in no conventional order'; all 
writing from and of the universe, the world of the writer, analogised for speed 
(telegraphic, digital, optical), laconic, terse; a restricted speech code as between 
friends will exist between poet and audience, so that 
[poets] can make themselves understood with half a word, a gesture, a glance. 
So the poet's imagination must weave together distant things with no 
connecting strings, by means of essential free words. 
(Marinetti 1913) 
Free words=free association(? )-sounding like a psychoanalytic tract. But how can 
the connections be constru(ct)ed when they are not there? The poet-writer is not in 
control-their imagination (subconscious? unconscious? ) is. Do they seek to 
deceive? 
"can we experience the Jungian Self in a 
dance? " (Zweig in Anderson 1996: 144) 
"In poetry, as in psychoanalysis, 
language is pushed to its limits, 
and becomes a struggle with the 
inexpressible" (Benvenuto and 
Kennedy 1986: 119). 
[Wonder whether this is too cliched and treading on old 
ground. Note that the word 'cliche' is derived from the 
French verb clicher to stereotype; imitative of the sound 
made by the matrix (the gangue in which a mineral is 
embedded, or a kind of mould) when it is dropped into molten 
metal. The word 'matrix' is derived from the Latin for womb, 
and mother. Much more polysemous than I had thought. A 
matrix is also the metal mould for casting type for 
printing, and now a signal generating circuit in computing. 
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C'est le Diable qui tient les fils qui nous remuent! 
Aux objets repugnants nous trouvons des appas; 
Chaque jour vers 1'Enfer nous descendons d'un pas, 
Sans horreur, a* travers des tenebres qui puent. 
Charles Baudelaire `Au Lecteur' 
(1982: 183) 
It's the Devil who pulls the strings that make us dance! 
It is in hateful objects that we find peace; 
Each day, one step further towards Hell, 
Without horror, through the stinking shadows. 
Charles Baudelaire `To the Reader' 
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The overall structure of the thesis was (going to be) influenced, in part, by 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1953), and its album format. His notes 
for this posthumous publication were collections of written-down thoughts (often on 
scraps of paper and merely clipped together, perhaps in an order intended for 
publication, but never fully completed to Wittgenstein's high standards), which 
follow a theme for a short distance before moving onto another. As Saul Kripke 
(1982) and others argue, "Wittgenstein's professed inability to write a work with 
conventionally organized arguments and conclusions stems at least in part, not from 
personal and stylistic proclivities, but from the nature of his work" (Kripke 1982: 
69). The work is ultimately a graft hybrid, a chimera. Often non-sequential, and 
repetitive, he approaches the same topics from different angles. He writes in 
metaphors, analogies and allegories to illustrate the problems; to allow us to re- 
examine the familiar, the ordinary and everyday. He re-phrases his questions and 
queries, undergoing a "perpetual dialectic, where persisting worries, expressed by 
the voice of the imaginary interlocutor, are never silenced" (Kripke 1982: 3). Just as 
a poet cannot carry a long or complex poem in their head (see Trevor-Roper 1997), 
or just as a painter cannot carry a large canvas around easily - preferring to rely on 
sketchbooks - so too a philosopher cannot compose a convoluted argument without 
writing and recording their ideas. As Wittgenstein himself writes: "The 
philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of 
landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved 
journeyings" (Wittgenstein PI vii). Some of the following sketches are more 
complete than others. (See Binkley 1973 and Kripke 1982, for discussions of 
Wittgenstein's style and way of philosophising. ) 
"`Dislocations' of specific words 
and phrases are, after all, ways of 
locating others" (Perloff 1996: 93; 
italics in original). 
Also the Matrix: "The vast computer network in William 
Gibson's Neuromancer. In the early days of the Net, the term 
was also used to describe the growing mass of interconnected 
networks" (Hale 1996: 73). The word 'gangue' is derived from 
the Old English gang for journey. One word takes me on a 
etymological journey through many others, or as Wittgenstein 
says: "(A multitude of familiar paths lead off from these 
words in every direction. )" (PI §§525 and 534)] 
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With regards to Wittgenstein's influence on the content of the thesis it must be 
stressed that it is the so-called later Wittgenstein, the post-Logical Atomist 
Wittgenstein (if he should be categorised), who is the major figure of inspiration. 
Despite the fact that it was his first work Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung, better 
known by the title of the English publication Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
(Wittgenstein 1961; hereafter shortened to Tractatus), which was the most notable 
publication of his work in his lifetime, Wittgenstein underwent a transformation of 
ideas thus reinventing himself as a different kind of philosopher. There is, quite 
predictably, debate as to the validity and appropriateness of referring to the `Two 
Wittgensteins'-often accompanied by talk of his transitional or middle period. 
Whatever the grounds for any side of the debate, it is to be assumed from statements 
by Wittgenstein that there was a shift in his thinking and method, to a certain extent. 
(See Hintikka in Teghrarian 1994: 1-40. Attention is drawn also to Dennis O'Brien's 
chapter, `The Unity of Wittgenstein's Thought' in Fann 1978: 380-404, and Richard 
Bernstein's essay, `Wittgenstein's Three Languages' in Copi and Beard 1966: 231- 
47. The myth of the `Two Wittgensteins', according to Bernstein, focuses on the 
concept of a `logically perfect language': the Tractatus, it is said, moves towards a 
construction of such an ideal language, outlining a truth-functional view of 
propositions - "The truth-functional view of language supposes that the truth or 
falsity of a complex sentence is a function only of the truth or falsity of the 
component elementary propositions into which complex sentences, in principle, may 
be analysed" (Hunnings 1988: 32) - through developing a Picture Theory (discussed 
in another part of this thesis); while the Philosophical Investigations is said "to 
uncover the perversity of the quest for the ideal language" (Bernstein in Copi and 
Beard 1966: 234). The intricacies of these philosophical issues will not be untangled 
here. ) The (highly simplistic) version to be adopted here: In 1928-9 and afterwards, 
conversations with Piero Sraffa and others led to Wittgenstein, in a way, recanting 
and denouncing his own theories, which had already caused a stir in European 
philosophy (influencing the Logical Positivist Vienna Circle, among others), and 
thereby started another revolution in philosophy, a Wende der Philosophie. 
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Discussions with the Marxist economist Piero' Sraffa, who criticised the Tractatus, 
and made its author "feel like a tree from which all branches had been cut" (von 
Wright in Malcolm 1958: 16), prompted a radical self-criticism in Wittgenstein. 
("Later, during [ ... ] the sixties, Sraffa considerably played 
down his influence on 
Wittgenstein's later intellectual development" (Potier 1991: 48). For what reason or 
reasons, Sraffa's biographer, Jean-Paul Potier, doesn't make clear, although Ray 
Monk states that in May 1946, Sraffa decided "that he could no longer give his time 
and attention to the matters Wittgenstein wished to discuss" (Monk 1990: 487). ) 
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Ermy reaches to turn on the small lamp hanging beside his desk. He takes 
delight from the crackle he can produce by holding the switch half on and 
making the bulb sputter out light like a child spraying saliva with their tongue. 
He is intrigued by the power of electricity to bring a kind of life to the metal 
filament. He thinks about the wonder such things must have evoked in people 
before electricity was commonplace. 'WeL' he thinks, 'euer human beiigs were 
v&Wletkasmy, 43bwasfre. Whatiatebcdyaferlhef thasgoneoutofk? Apledashes. 
A spent bulgy We can see k ft and fed heat, but not feel k# and see heat We can see when 
sorrel *V isdw, Wme can't see Ab. We can see"%A (orguess)wl= someone isthg, or in 
pal, but we carrot see 1bot # or pail. Are lhey mAffU or mrr t? Even tro eleakily is 
m*r'k#tbasediappeosbusastuokisrot. lsftomBd? Neread saneU about1his..: He 
reaches for a book and opens it at the back. He scans the index and registers 
the entry. He fingers the page as though it were in Braille, until he finds the 
quotation: 
Why do we think of the phenomenal as immaterial? We do so because, as Ryle 
put it, we insist on thinking of having a pain in ocular metaphors - as having a 
funny sort of particular before the eye of the mind. That particular turns out to 
be a universal, a quality hypostatized into a subject of predication. 
Ermy types. 
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The Tractatus will be used as a model for an old way of talking about dance (and 
here urged to be discarded), and the subsequent change(s) in Wittgenstein's work as 
the model for the thesis itself. One problem of stating this is the danger that in 
referring to the Tractatus (and indeed the rest of Wittgenstein's oeuvre) it may be 
taken to be an adoption of it, or an interpretation (in all likelihood, a 
misinterpretation) of it, or an application of it in a way that is mistaken or 
inappropriate. It may be seen as offering a reading of the Tractatus as well as using it 
as a framework. This is not entirely the case. While there are certain similarities in 
the theories being compared and merged, and this is played out in the structure and 
style of the progeny of their coitus, one does not echo or mirror the other. There will 
"It is as if our concepts involved 
a scaffolding of facts. " 
That would presumably mean: 
If you imagine certain facts 
otherwise, describe them 
otherwise, than the way they 
are, then you can no longer 
imagine the application of 
certain concepts, because the 
rules for their application have 
no analogue in the new 
circumstances. 
(Wittgenstein , Z§350) 
"Why do we think of the phenomenal as 
immaterial? " (Rorty 1980: 31) 
Gilbert Ryle (1949) notes the use of what his index terms 
'Optical metaphors' in language about understanding and 
other 'mental acts', for example the formation of arguments. 
"When a person has got an argument, his first or his 
fiftieth deployment of it in speech or writing certainly 
takes time" (Ryle 1949: 302). The act of understanding or 
arguing is not an instantaneous process, but has a number of 
stages. We do not always 'see' the processes operating 
(indeed we cannot, even viewing the activity of the brain is 
not to be taken as 'seeing' the arguments forming), but we 
can track the argument's stages: the "consecutive 'seeings' 
of implications" (Ryle 1949: 303), in some way, when they 
are expressed in words. Rorty refers to and refutes the 
hypostatisation of mental qualities and sensations, perhaps 
following Ryle's assertion that sensations 
are not perceivings, observings or findings; they are 
not detectings, scannings or inspectings; they are not 
apprehendings, cognisings, intuitings or knowings. To have a sensation is not to be in a cognitive relation 
to a sensible object. There are no such objects. 
(Ryle 1949: 214) 
be an assessment of the similarities of both old and 
new models of discussing dance (and the latter-day 
issues prompted by new technologies) and the works 
of Wittgenstein, which serve as a stylistic support, a 
stylobate, a stulos or (architectural) column. 
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(The beginnings of a) Tractatus Choreo-Philosophicus 
1 Dance is made up of movements. 
1.1 In between the movements are stillnesses. 
1.11 A dance is the combination of movement and stillness. 
1.12 The totality of the dance is the movement and stillness it 
contains. 
1.13 The movements in physical space are the dance. 
1.2 The dance divides into movements. 
1.21 Each movement can be taken in isolation. 
2A movement is not an object (a thing), but it exists. 
2.01 A movement can only exist in a thing (a body). 
2.011 It is essential to a movement that it is of a thing but not a 
thing. 
2.012 A movement can be divided into parts, so that each part 
of it can be said to be a movement. 
2.0121 Each part is capable of isolation while retaining a 
connection to the whole. 
Just as we cannot imagine spatial objects detached from 
other objects and outside space, so too there is no movement 
we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining 
with others. 
2.0122 No two parts can occupy the same space and time. (It is 
impossible for movements to move through each other. ) 
2.0123 When I know a movement I know how it can occur in 
any given sequence of movements. 
2.01231 To know a movement is to know all its internal 
properties. 
2.0124 If all movements are given, then at the same time all 
possible combinations of movements are given. 
2.013 Movements produce positive and negative space. 
2.0131 The movement itself must be situated in positive space, 
but it is surrounded by negative space. 
A movement must have some motion. 
2.014 Bodies contain the possibility of movement. 
2.0141 The possibility of movement is the potential form of a 
body. 
2.02 Bodies function as simples. 
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2.0201 When we talk about bodies as complexes we refer to the 
mind in the body, and this can be resolved into a statement 
about constituents. 
2.021 Bodies make up the substance of movement. That is why 
they cannot be composite. 
2.0211 If bodies had no substance, then movements would not 
have any sensible qualities, or any sense. 
2.0212 In that case we would not use movement to represent the 
world. 
2.022 It is obvious that an imagined movement, however 
different it may be from a real one, must have something-a 
form-in common with it. 
2.023 Bodies are just what constitute this unalterable form. 
2.0231 The substance of a body can determine the form, but the 
movement meaning remains unchanged. It is by the means 
of movement that meanings are represented-only by the 
configuration of bodies that they are produced. 
2.0232 In a manner of speaking, a movement can be the same in 
a different body. 
2.0233 If two movements have the same form, the only 
distinction between them, apart from their external 
properties, is that they are different. 
2.02331 Either a movement has unique properties, in which case 
we can immediately use a description to distinguish it from 
others and refer to it; or, on the other hand, there are several 
movements that have the whole set of their properties in 
common, in which case it is quite impossible to indicate one 
of them. 
For if there is nothing to distinguish a movement, I 
cannot distinguish it, since otherwise it would be 
distinguished already. 
2.024 Meaning is what subsists independently of what is the 
case. 
2.025 It is form and content. 
2.0251 Movement meaning is a form of object. 
2.026 There must be meanings, if the world is to have 
unalterable form. 
2.027 Objects (meanings), the unalterable, and the subsistent 
are one and the same. 
2.0271 Meanings are what is unalterable and subsistent; their 
configuration is what is changing and unstable. 
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2.0272 The configuration of movement meaning produces dance. 
2.03 In a dance movement meanings fit into one another like 
the links of a chain. 
2.031 In a dance movement meanings stand in a determinate 
relation to one another. 
2.032 The determinate way in which movement meanings are 
connected in a dance is the structure of the dance. 
2.033 Form is the possibility of structure. 
2.034 Movement makes up a dance. 
2.04 Any movement is a possible source of dance material. 
2.05 Dance makes movements meaningful. 
2.06 Emotion makes dance movements meaningful. 
2.061 Dance externalises inner feelings. 
2.062 Inner feelings are the meaning of the dance. 
2.063 The inner feelings of the dancer are the meaning that they 
externalise in dance. 
2.1 We picture meanings to ourselves. 
2.11 A picture presents a situation to the mind. 
2.12 A picture is a model of reality. 
2.13 In a dance movements have the elements of the picture 
corresponding to them. 
2.131 In a dance the elements of the dance are the 
representatives of meaning-objects (emotions, thoughts). 
2.14 What constitutes a dance is that its elements are related to 
one another in a determined way. 
2.141 A dance is a picture is a fact. 
2.15 The fact that the elements of a dance are related to one 
another in a determined way represents that meanings are 
related to one another in the same way. 
Dance has pictorial form. 
2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to 
one another in the same way as the elements of the picture. 
2.1511 That is how a dance is attached to inner reality; it reaches 
right in to it. 
2.1512 It is laid out against reality like a measure. 
2.15121 Only the end-points of the graduating lines actually touch 
the object that is to be measured. 
2.1513 Part of the dance, its pictorial relationship, is that which 
makes it a dance. 
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2.1514 The pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of 
the dance's elements with emotions and thoughts. 
2.1515 These correlations are the feelers of the dance, with 
which it touches (inner) reality. 
2.16 If a dance is to be a picture, it must have something in 
common with what it depicts. 
2.161 There is something in a dance that enables it to be a 
picture of what it depicts. 
2.17 What a dance must have in common with inner reality, in 
order to depict it as it does, is its pictorial form. 
2.171 A dance, like a picture, can depict any inner reality whose 
form it has. 
An angry dance can depict anything angry, a happy one 
anything happy, etc. 
2.172 A dance cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it 
displays it. 
2.173 A dance represents its subject from a position outside it. 
(Its standpoint is its representational form. ) 
2.174 A dance cannot, however, place itself outside its 
representational form. 
2.18 What any dance, of whatever form, must have in 
common with inner reality, in order to be able to depict it is 
logical form i. e. the form of (inner) reality. 
2.181 The meaning of an expressive movement is given solely 
by the character of the emotion which it stands for. 
2.182 Every expressive movement is a picture of the emotion it 
expresses. 
2.19 Dances can depict the world. 
2.2 A dance has logico-pictorial form in common with what 
it depicts. 
2.201 A dance depicts (inner) reality by representing a 
possibility of existence and non-existence of states of being. 
2.202 A dance represents a possible situation in physical space. 
2.203 A dance contains the possibility of the situation that it 
represents. 
2.21 Dance can be a true or false representation of inner 
reality. 
2.22 What a dance represents it represents independently of its 
truth or falsity, by means of its pictorial form. 
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2.221 What a dance represents is its sense. 
2.222 The agreement or disagreement of its sense with inner 
reality constitutes its truth or falsity. 
2.223 In order to tell whether a dance is true or false we must 
compare it with reality. 
2.224 It is impossible to tell from the dance alone whether it is 
true or false. 
2.225 There are no dances that are true without or before 
experience. 
3A logical picture of facts is a thought. 
3.001 `A meaning is thinkable': what this means is that we can 
picture it to ourselves. 
3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world. 
3.02 A thought contains the possibility of the situation of 
which it is the thought. What is thinkable is possible too. 
3.03 Thoughts can never be of anything illogical, since, if it 
were, we should have to think illogically. 
3.031 Dance is the representation of thoughts. 
3.032 It is as impossible to represent in dance anything that 
`contradicts logic' as it is in geometry to represent by its co- 
ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space. 
3.0321 In all action, what is done must occur in accordance with 
the mechanical principles of movement. 
3.04 It might very well be that, above all, the dance asks for 
direct communication without any detours. Because its 
bearer and intermediary is man himself, and because his 
instrument of expression is the human body, whose natural 
movement forms the material for the dance, the only 
material which is his own and his own to use. (Wigman 
1966: 10) 
3.05 Dance creates movement images that increase sensitivity 
to reality. 
3.1 In a dance sequence a thought finds an expression that 
can be perceived by the senses. 
3.11 We use the perceptible sign of a dance sequence as a 
projection of a thought. 
The method of projection is to feel the sense of the 
movement sequence. 
3.12 The sign with which we express a thought (an emotion, a 
feeling) is called a gesture. 
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This is not a thesis about Wittgenstein (or indeed about anyone), but it must be 
stated that it is nigh on impossible to separate the person from the philosopher (or 
philosophy); as Erich Heller states, "The appreciation of Wittgenstein as a person 
and thinker (and how misleading is this "and"! )" (Heller in Fann 1978: 93). 
Wittgenstein will be sketched out to give a background to his works, and often his 
life (the mythology) and personal comments will be used in place of his 
philosophy"Work on philosophy - like work in architecture in many respects - is 
really more work on oneself" (Wittgenstein CV 24e: MS 112 46). This is a challenge 
to the notion that philosophy is one type of activity or writing, only found in certain 
circumstances; Wittgenstein is reported to have said that "it is much more revealing 
and important when you find this sort of confusion in something that's said `in a 
silly detective story than when you find it in something that's said by a silly 
philosopher"' (Wittgenstein PO 326). Wittgenstein also based much of his 
philosophy on what we could call `ordinary language' (see, for example, BB 28 & 
56) or `everyday speech': common words, expressions and utterances which 
`contain' or rather `obscure' and to a certain extent `simplify' experience according 
to the inherent `understandings' of the language and culture to which it belongs. And 
it is wrong to think that ordinary language always conforms to a "standard of 
exactness" (Wittgenstein BB 25) like that (supposedly) found in science or 
mathematics, it rarely does. Each part of language has its own set of rules, but in the 
case of ordinary language these rules are not strict. However philosophy uses words 
in peculiar ways which often don't tally with their uses in everyday situations, and 
often tries to demand strict meanings for words. However, 
It is wrong to say that in philosophy we consider an ideal language as opposed 
to our ordinary one. For this makes it appear as though we thought we could 
improve on ordinary language. But ordinary language is all right. Whenever 
we make up `ideal languages' it is not in order to replace or ordinary language 
by them; but just to remove some trouble caused in someone's mind by 
thinking that he has got hold of the exact use of a common word. 
(Wittgenstein BB 28) 
"[To read fantasy and adventure 
stories] was all I asked for [as a 
boy... ] Even today I would rather 
read `thrillers' than 
Wittgenstein" (Sartre 1965: 53). 
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Philosophers invent new words, or "very often talk about investigating, analysing, 
the meaning of words" (Wittgenstein BB 27-8) as though there is a real meaning 
besides that which "someone has given to it" (Wittgenstein BB 28). Lewis Carroll's 
Humpty Dumpty, the archetypal philosopher, in response to Alice's admission of not 
knowing what he meant by the word `glory', says with some contempt: 
`Of course you don't-till I tell you. I meant `there's a nice knock-down 
argument for you! " 
`But `glory' doesn't mean `a nice knock-down argument, " Alice objected. 
`When I use a word, ' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, `it 
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less. ' 
(Carroll 1992: 159) 
He goes on to describe the made-up words `slithy' and `mimsy' as being like a 
`portmanteau': "two meanings packed up into one word" (Carroll 1992: 160). Here 
we are tempted to ask: What is `meaning'? 
See Ayer 1990: 171 if. "The principle of 
verification is supposed to furnish a 
criterion by which it can be determined 
whether or not a sentence is literally 
meaningful" (1990: 171). Also Hintikka 
in Teghrarian 1994: 23-5; for example: 
"what makes it possible for a complex 
sentence to represent reality is no longer 
its pictorial character, but the use that 
connects it with other propositions, 
ultimately the world" (Hintikka in 
Teghrarian 1994: 24). 
`Meaning' is one of the words of which one 
may say that they have odd jobs in our 
language. It is one of these words which 
cause most philosophical troubles. 
(Wittgenstein BB 43-4) 
[Look up the word `predication'. ] 
This is similar to Donald Davidson's denial of objects and 
entities in the mind (see Davidson 1990). But, John Heil in 
his chapter on epistemic privilege writes: 
Davidson's suggestion requires that we jettison the 
notion that content-bearing states of mind are 
usefully regarded as entities - Cartesian ideas, 
sentences in mentalese, neural inscriptions, pictures 
on an interior television screen. Such entities might 
exist. 
(1990: 402) 
Heil doesn't disagree with Davidson's suggestion, and the 
rest of his chapter questions viewpoints that attempt to 
provide a definitive model. 
But I am not interested in whether 'mind' exists or not (I 
don't accept the standard account of the 'mind'), or if 
there are mental 'objects' as such. I am more concerned with 
the language we use. Not one explanatory statement of 'mind' 
satisfies all examples-we cannot define it comprehensively. 
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From around 1930, shortly after his return to Cambridge and his subsequent 
appointment as research fellow, Wittgenstein began to lecture in his own inimitable 
style, and it is these lectures and their accompanying notes (both his students' - see, 
for example, Wittgenstein 1966 - and his, although the latter are few and far 
between because in the main he lectured `off the top of his head' and resented 
anyone else taking notes) which illuminate the shifts in his thinking, alongside his 
own diaries, notebooks, manuscripts and aforementioned writings on scraps of paper 
(Zettel, in German, hence the title of one of his posthumous publications 
(Wittgenstein 1967); see von Wright's chapter, `The Wittgenstein Papers' in PO 
480-510 for details of the original documents, and Glock 1996, for example, for a 
comprehensive list of publications and sources). In his time at Cambridge, and after 
he left for good in 1947, Wittgenstein wrote and lectured on mathematics, logic, 
aesthetics, psychology, religion, philosophical methods, epistemology and language, 
drawing on a range of writers including Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, Saint 
Augustine, Sigmund Freud, Leo Tolstoy and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. He came 
from an extremely wealthy Viennese family and was highly cultured, yet he 
renounced any personal wealth in favour of an austere life and considered manual 
labour to be preferable to philosophy in many respects. He spent time in Norway, 
Ireland and the USA, teaching schoolchildren in Lower Austria, and he was 
interested and accomplished in a number of areas from engineering and architecture 
to music and crime fiction and movies. In the 1914-18 War he fought for his country 
in Russia and in Italy (where he was captured and put into a camp), and from 1941 
he worked as a porter in a London hospital before working on the physiology of 
shock in Newcastle. Wittgenstein was not the stereotypical academic philosopher. 
His life experiences profoundly shaped his philosophy, and although it is not 
possible here to expand on the links at length, it is necessary to note that 
Wittgenstein's work is based on his experiences as a human being at the extremes of 
existence, and his constant questioning of these experiences. (For more biographical 
analysis see, for example, McGuinness 1988, Monk 1990, and Edmonds and 
Eidinow 2001. ) 
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Following the influence of Sraffa, Wittgenstein began to see philosophy within the 
context of the human world, people and cultures. "Wittgenstein once remarked to 
Rush Rhees that the most important thing he gained from talking to Sraffa was an 
`anthropological' way of looking at philosophical problems" (Monk 1990: 261). 
Even his thoughts on mathematics place it in the context of human practice, and this 
is the case with the rest of his work. Perhaps it is this focus on the humanness of 
human beings that makes it possible to apply his writings in a number of disciplines, 
including ethics (see, for example, Diamond 1995); psychiatry (see, for example, 
Sass 1994); the philosophy of aesthetics and art (most relevant here is his influence 
on Best 1974, also Tilghman 1970); the philosophy of science (see, for example, 
Feyerabend 1993; Feyerabend also wrote about the Philosophical Investigations, see 
Fann 1978: 214-50); and even literature and other art forms (see Perloff 1996, for an 
overview of his influence on writing); the list is long and growing, with new books, 
or those still awaiting publication, showing that interest in Wittgenstein is anything 
but dwindling. He has, however, been criticised for a number of reasons (both during 
his life and since), and these are sometimes valid, sometimes based on 
misunderstanding or unsatisfactory arguments. He is often accused of being obscure 
and impenetrable or not sustained enough in his arguments. However, to counter this 
it could be said that the obscurity lies in his `style of thought' and not in his 
language, for as Hanna Pitkin notes: "He writes elegant, lucid German" (1972: vii). 
Any `obscurity' may be a strength in his writing, allowing it to be variously 
interpreted and applied (equally mis-interpreted and mis-applied) and used for 
inspiration. The keywords here are `inspiration' and `interpretation'. Wittgenstein, it 
seems, was aware of the need for and unavoidable `nature' of interpretation 
(although he often had a distinctive formulation in mind for the meaning of this 
word, for example, in the case of `obeying a rule' it means, or ought to be restricted 
to mean, "the substitution of one expression of the rule for another" (Pl §201); the 
importance of `obeying a rule' may well be crucial in understanding the following 
thesis and some of the arguments contained in it, see Kripke 1982). 
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There is in this thesis, inspiration taken from interpretations of Wittgenstein's 
investigations. The results (the interpretations and the subsequent thoughts, attitudes 
and questions) are not simply based on uninformed readings of Wittgenstein's 
works, which have been used in conjunction with a range of other texts about the 
subjects contained therein. Neither have Wittgenstein's works been taken as an 
unchallenged gospel (his attitude to dogma was that it is like a brake, "as though 
someone attached a weight to your foot to limit your freedom of movement" (CV 
33e: MS 118 86v; cf. Nietzsche WP §377 and BGE 31, for example)), yet a key 
piece of inspiration is found in his `Preface' to Philosophical Investigations: 
I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, 
if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own. 
(PI viii) 
As David Best wrote: "I cannot do better than echo that 
How much we are doing is changing the 
style of thinking and how much I'm 
doing is changing the style of thinking 
and how much I'm doing is persuading 
people to change their style of thinking. 
(Much of what we are doing is a 
question of changing the style of 
thinking. ) 
(Wittgenstein LC 28) l 
view" (1974: xv). 
"In other words we must not ask 
ourselves whether it can define thought 
but whether it makes us Brink, and leads the 
mind to assume deeply effective attitudes 
from its own point of view" (Artaud 
1970: 51; italics in original). 
Nietzsche has written about the ways in which language 
shapes concepts. 
WP 5522 (1886-1887) 
Ultimate solution. -We believe in reason: this, 
however, is the philosophy of gray concepts. Language 
depends on the most naive prejudices. 
Now we read disharmonies and problems into things 
because we think only in the form of language-and thus 
believe in the "eternal truth" of "reason" (e. g., 
subject, attribute, etc. ) 
We cease to think when we refuse to do so under the 
constraint of language; we barely reach the doubt that 
sees this limitation as a limitation. 
Rational thought is interpretation according to a 
scheme that we cannot throw off. 
(Nietzsche 1968b: 283; 
. italics in original) 
[See Augustine on 'eternal truths' above. ] 
Summary: Because, in describing and avowing our 
psychological states, we use words that imply we are looking 
at or able to touch objects we mistakenly assume that there 
are objects in us. 
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Wittgenstein and dance may appear to be an uncomfortable pairing, if he is generally 
understood as a philosopher of language. Dance is often considered beyond the 
clutches of language-a silent artform, but for the musical score or accompanying 
sounds of the dancers' feet or costumes. Dancers have traditionally not spoken- 
their movements `speak' for them. Dance is regarded to be a `pure' form of 
communication-it expresses the dancers' emotions without the need for them 
translating them into words and speech. Patently these are unsupported 
generalisations, and there are notable exceptions to these attitudes and examples that 
clearly unsettle them. (These issues will be addressed in more detail elsewhere. ) 
What the application of Wittgenstein's methods can afford is a means of 
`deconstructing' (the term is used reluctantly, although Wittgenstein once wrote: "It 
occurred to me today as I was thinking about my work in philosophy & said to 
myself: `I destroy, I destroy, I destroy -"' (CV 19e: MS 154 21v)), and then 
reconstructing (restructuring) the underlying and more apparent conceptions of 
dance-which can only find expression in language (this somewhat disregards the 
`immediate', `physical', `emotional' responses to dance - how it makes us feel -, but 
this issue is perhaps one of the threads running through this thesis). 
For Walter Benjamin the quotation was 
"like robbers by the roadside who make 
an armed attack and relieve an idler of 
[their] convictions" (1973: 43); it is 
destructive yet cleansing, disruptive yet 
focussing in effect (see Benjamin 1973 
and Arendt 1973). 
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Ermy shifts uncomfortably on his orthopaedic back chair, and sniffs. He reads 
from the old book with the blue cloth hardcover. 'In my head. ' The words seem 
to echo. Ermy's brow knits and his upper lip starts to curl. 'hmyheadhmyhWdh 
myheai' He turns back to the computer, his right index finger poised over the 
'B' key, his left little finger already pressing the shift key. 
But I am troubled by the suggestion that 'in my head' is 
somehow wrong. 
Where else is it? 
Where's what? And to use the word 'where' is to imply a 
location that doesn't exist. Of course my head exists, and 
there is even an inside to my head, but there is no place 
where a thought is. 
[There are plenty of disavowals of this model or picture of 
the mind, Ryle is not the only one. However, there are 
plenty of supporters of this model too. ] 
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What about emotions and feelings? 
"The thought is in my head. " 
"The anger is in my stomach. " 
"The love is in my heart. " 
"The pain is in my foot. " 
"The body is in virtual reality. " 
But do we not hear a voice in our head when we think? [This is 'common-sense', 
but I mustn't get sucked in by what Dawkins calls 'The Argument from Personal 
Incredulity': I can't understand how that might be, so therefore it isn't 
feasible. ] 
Ryle suggests 
that the phrase 'in the head' is felt to be an appropriate and expressive 
metaphor in the first instance for vividly imagined self-voiced noises, 
and secondarily for any imaginary noises and even for imaginary sights, 
because in these latter cases a denial of distance, by assertion of 
metaphorical nearness, is intended to be construed as an assertion of 
imaginariness; and the nearness is relative, not so much to the head- 
organs of sight and hearing themselves, as to the places where their 
shutters are put up. 
(Ryle 1949: 39) 
Here we are dealing with our own thoughts. There is nothing to observe here, as 
Davidson points out, in the way that Ryle might suggest observing someone else 
to see that they have a mind (see Davidson 1990). So what is happening when I 
see someone else doing something and surmise that they feel a certain way? 
[Return to this. ] 
Davidson writes of the following kind of statements: "These metaphors are 
probably instructive" (1990: 392). 
"I have before my mind. " 
"My mind entertains such things. " 
"In my mind... ": the phrase which Ryle says "can and should always be dispensed 
with" (1949: 40), an over-sophisticated expression for the misleading metaphor 
of 'in the head' (Ryle 1949). 
A joke after Ryle: 
Question: "What can be deep, but never min(e)d? " 
Answer: "Thoughts. " 
Ermy wonders whether this joke is at all funny. 'Pertiapsfsnctmeantbbef. iry, assudlJjstda". V rr#wasI 
dieerdedcnedhisbiogatkdessays7 He also thinks of meaning-blindness. He thinks of translating 
the joke into other languages. Then he realises that once again he has been led off the subject 
slightly. How to get back on track? He thinks of a question. 
What am I trying to do here? 
The problem is: trying to discuss the Virtual Body in such a way that doesn't 
resort to using language that is riddled with category-mistakes; that pays heed 
to the idea that our concepts are constructed out of metaphors. But as soon as 
this is stated it seems that the whole of language is unavailable for use, or 
as Nietzsche might have it, "has to be placed within inverted commas" (Blondel 
1991: 150). 
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The philosophical precedents here are writers such as the supportive and 
anarchic Feyerabend, the explanatory and scientific Dennett, the inquisitive 
and therapeutic Wittgenstein, the destructive yet optimistic Nietzsche, the 
antagonistic and pragmatic Rorty, and the instructive and clarifying Davidson. 
[How to convey this wealth of previous writing? ] 
Paul Feyerabend (1993) writes of the difficulties faced by philosophers who 
attempt to proffer new views which seem to go against the common-sense 
frameworks, the natural interpretations, which throw up the "impenetrable stone 
wall of well-entrenched reactions" (Feyerabend 1993: 64; italics in original), 
of what Paul Churchland, for example, would call "folk psychology" (1988: S6). 
Feyerabend describes the unity of 'phenomenon' and word, or "appearance plus 
statement" (1993: 57), which is learnt by language users as children, invisibly 
influenced by the beliefs and ideologies of their ancestors. He writes of the 
development of observation languages, through the 'argument of observation' and 
the supposed unambiguous sensation and its given connection with "parts of a 
language" (1993: S9). The language then contains very well hidden concepts, 
which "are ambiguous and dependent on background" (Feyerabend 1993: 60-1), and 
not only this but these are related to how things are perceived bringing about 
a circularity which means that in order to uncover a concept we must "always 
use part of it in the attempt to find its constituents" (Feyerabend 1993: 61). 
But we can introduce new observation languages and use them in comparison with 
the old, well established languages. However, there are the previously 
mentioned problems in trying to do this, and Feyerabend writes that 
we must emphasize that a comparative judgement of observation languages, 
e. g. materialistic observation languages, phenomenalistic observation 
languages, objective-idealistic observation languages, theological 
observation languages, etc., can start only when all of them are spoken 
equally fluently. 
(Feyerabend 1993: 64; italics in original) 
On page 22 Feyerabend (1993) asks: "How can we discover the kind of world we 
presuppose when proceeding as we do? " 
' The answer is clear: we cannot discover it from the inside [... ] we need 
a dream-world in order to discover the features of the real world we 
think we inhabit (and which may actually be just another dream-world) 
[... ] We must invent a new conceptual system that suspends, or clashes 
with, the most carefully established observational results, confounds the 
most plausible theoretical principles, and introduces perceptions that 
cannot form part of the existing perceptual world. 
(Feyerabend 1993: 22-3; italics in original) 
Feyerabend favours counterinduction and the acknowledgement that "all 
methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have their limits" (1993: 23; 
italics in original). His book, Against Method (1993), targets the practice of 
science but has ramifications for the arts and other disciplines where critical 
and analytical theories affect perception of them (and vice versa). It is 
historical as much as it is philosophical. When he writes of the sciences that 
"the new situation requires a new philosophy and, above all, new 
terms" (Feyerabend 1993: xii) it is applicable to the arts. Furthermore, as the 
arts attempt to apply 'the scientific way' to their practice and self-analysis, 
as Feyerabend writes of science: 
Shall we continue using outmoded terms to describe novel insight or would it not be better to start using a new language? And wouldn't poets and journalists be of great help in finding such a language? 
(Feyerabend 1993: xii) 
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Ermy is reminded of a quotation and pulls off the top shelf the black paperback with the white and 
yellow writing on the spine: 
He opens the book at a few pages in from the back and skims the alphabetised subject index: poetry 
writing (poets, poetry) be, 23e, 28e, 38e, etc. Deftly he finds the correct entry, and the line he could 
only half recall: 
one should write philosophy only as one writes a poem. 
He types in the page reference for later. 
See Wittgenstein Culture and Value, 1998: 28e for quotation on philosophy and 
poetry. 
Ermy puffs out a gasp and looks at the clock in the corner of the screen. 
It reads: 
22: 41 
'Tmeforbei' Ermy thinks to himself. And then wonders what it means to think something to oneself, as 
he shuts down his computer. 
10-3 
To demonstrate quickly a form of deconstruction, consider Moore and Yamamoto's 
description of `Body Movement' as "The Original Extension System" (1988: 74), 
and their statement that "all extensions distil biological experience, leaving out some 
aspects while exaggerating others" (Moore and Yamamoto 1988: 78). The word 
`distil' implies the extraction of an essence, but this thesis denies that there is such a 
thing as an essence of experience. Why should it be a paradox, as Moore and 
Yamamoto later write, that "body movement is at once natural and contrived, 
visceral and symbolic, personal and social, ever present and constantly 
disappearing" (1988: 85; italics in original)? These pairs are only contradictory if 
they are set up as opposites. To reapply a comment Wittgenstein made about talk of 
mental processes and states: "The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been 
made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent" (PI §308). Body 
movement is body movement is body movement. It may well be considered 
`natural', `contrived', `visceral', etc., but to what end? These words seem to explain, 
to penetrate, but rely only on a picture of the world that is built from a set of 
concepts that encourage, as it were, confusion. The paradox is merely grammatical. 
And therefore so should our investigation of the phenomena be grammatical 
(Wittgenstein 1953). (The subject of grammar will be taken up along another path. ) 
"in the final analysis all problems are linguistic problems" (Arendt 1973: 201). 
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In her chapter entitled `Family Resemblance' (in Fraleigh and Hanstein 1999: 3-21), 
Sondra Fraleigh examines the diversity of what can be called dance activities and the 
difficulties of defining them. The concept of `family resemblance' was employed by 
Wittgenstein to illustrate relationships between words and other phenomena, by 
drawing up overviews, frameworks and criteria (see PI §67 and BB 17; also, the term 
was used by Nietzsche in relation to the links between different traditions of 
philosophy, see BGE §20). As a concept it is anti-essentialist, stressing networks of 
similarities as opposed to a single common feature - an analytic definition - of any 
given set (as an example Wittgenstein uses the term `game' to show how there is a 
range of activities linked across a series of overlapping conditions which can be 
applied to the term `game' in most, if not all, of its manifestations). It should be 
noted that in the case of certain terms, the devising of a genealogy can be incredibly 
difficult and self-defeating, and seldom gives elegant results (see Wittgenstein BB 
19). Related to this concept is the notion and application of `criteria': "These are 
ways of telling whether something satisfies a concept X, or evidence for something's 
being an X' (Glock 1996: 93); although it is often difficult to combine criteria with a 
family-resemblance concept. The Family of Meanings that Fraleigh describes for 
dance come under the following headings: "Creativity Is Apparent in All Dance"; 
"Aesthetic Value Belongs to All Forms of Dance"; "Dance Always Has Style"; 
"Meaning Depends on Context"; "Dance Is Both Art and Entertainment"; "Dance Is 
Often Used as an Educational Medium"; "Dance Is Used for Therapeutic and 
Healing Purposes"; "Dance Is a Source for Self-Knowledge and Human 
Development"; "Dance Often Intersects with Religion"; "Dance Is a Broad Category 
of Human Activity"; "Ritual Often Sustains Dance Practices"; "Dance Is a Theater 
Art" (Fraleigh and Hanstein 1999: 6-14). Having stating that she is using the `family 
resemblance' concept, Fraleigh falls into the traps of generalisation and essentialism 
in her extended explanations of each defining factor of what `dance' is-she 
describes criteria, and categories. Fraleigh says things such as "Dance is not just 
movement, but movement that has been created for some particular 
purpose" (Fraleigh and Hanstein 1999: 6); "Dance always has style [... ] Style 
emerges from intention" (Fraleigh and Hanstein 1999: 8; italics in original); 
"Affective qualities are aesthetically distilled in dance" (Fraleigh and Hanstein 1999: 
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11); dance "is not competitive in essence" (Fraleigh and Hanstein 1999: 13); and 
"Dance is further contextualized as theater and often called art" (Fraleigh and 
Hanstein 1999: 14). These will not be de- and re-structured according to a 
Wittgensteinian method here, but should indicate the kinds of examples that 
contradict the `family resemblance' concept. By succumbing to the "tendency to 
look for something common to all the entities which we commonly subsume under a 
general term" (Wittgenstein BB 17), Fraleigh has bastardised the concept the point 
of which is to not delimit with a set of commonalities. The final nail in the coffin 
comes when Fraleigh writes that dance may become "the means for communication 
and art making, but its intrinsic character does not require this" (Fraleigh and 
Hanstein 1999: 14), which is surely the least Wittgensteinian of suggestions. In an 
attempt to sketch what should be a web of similarities (and differences), Fraleigh 
merely gives a list of analytic definitions for the word `dance'. Fraleigh seems to 
start with her own conception of `dance' (admittedly she states that it "is a broad 
category of human activity [... which] evolves new forms" (1999: 13)), rather than 
with a number of examples with which to explore "their multifarious 
relationships" (Wittgenstein PI §66), and then moving onto another set of examples 
when will be found "many correspondences with the first group, but many common 
features drop out, and others appear" (Wittgenstein PI §66), and so on. 
Wittgenstein's Blue Book (1958) contains the following observation and comment: 
The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had 
to find the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical 
investigation; for it has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher 
dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to 
understand the usage of the general term. 
(BB 19-20) 
Ite 
word, eW44 sp 
106 
The secondary literature on Wittgenstein's `family resemblance' concept is wide- 
ranging and too difficult to encapsulate here (it is generally consigned to chapters or 
just part of a book, rather than being seen as warranting a whole tome in the way the 
Private Language problem does), and contains appraisals and objections- 
incoherency often being the main one, but this could be said to be a 
misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's `method'. Whatever the philosophical objections 
to it, the `family resemblance' concept is a useful, if not an altogether satisfactory, 
account of how words and phenomena can be classified and linked - if this is what 
we want to do to them - but one which cannot be used in every circumstance, for 
every concept. In summation of the `family resemblance' concept, Hunter suggests 
that 
the criterion of class membership [is] linguistic: anything is an X if the 
linguistic community routinely so describes it [... ] If we did not have some 
way, apart from their resemblances, of setting the right objects before us, we 
would have no way of surveying them to find out if they have common 
features or family resemblances or whatever. If we choose objects because they 
have common features, or because they have family resemblances, it will be no 
discovery, but a foregone conclusion, that they are related in those ways. 
(1985: 59) 
This relates to such statements by Wittgenstein as "The meaning of a phrase for us is 
characterized by the use we make of it" (BB 65), which might be seen to undermine 
the `family resemblance' concept. However, other things written by Wittgenstein 
allow for ambiguities (BB 58) and multiple `meanings' for the same concept (PI 
§531-2). 
The term `family resemblance' as used by Wittgenstein has been taken up by many 
writers in the arts and studies of aesthetics, and "welcomed as a liberation, an 
acceptance which has by and large led to the abandonment of attempts to discover 
the essence of art" (Glock 1996: 35), or the search to define `beauty' (sec 
Wittgenstein LC 10). In writings on dance, it is used either often without explanation 
to indicate links between related artforms - "we can see that there is a family 
resemblance between the postmodem fairytale and the ballet fairytale" (Banes 1994: 
281) -, or, seemingly ignored in discussion of beauty and ugliness in dance and the 
range of dance styles (see, for example, Mackrell 1997). 
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Wittgenstein is relevant to the discipline of writing and theorising about `dance' (of 
whatever form) in ways much more closely related to the language used to describe 
`dance'. As Best (1974) has already demonstrated, Wittgenstein's later philosophy 
offers more than just tangential strategies for looking at dance and the arts in 
general. Best writes of the. position of his own book, Expression in Movement and 
the Arts: a philosophical enquiry, stating that "a viable theory of aesthetics can be 
constructed only from within a general philosophical position" (1974: xi-xii), and 
applies Wittgenstein to the enquiries into dance. What Best calls "underlying, 
misconceived presuppositions" (1974: xii) about a range of notions saturated then, as 
they still do, the dance and art world(s). His aim is to expose the fallacious and 
confused conceptions, including "the relationship of mind to body" (Best 1974: xii), 
that constitute the `philosophical' grounding for many people in the arts. The 
importance for Best in doing this is intimated when he criticises a particular 
approach as "[projecting] the meaning of dance into a transcendental realm", thereby 
losing sight of the meaning being instead "somehow inextricably bound up with 
human interests and emotions" (Best 1974: xiv). Wittgenstein was also averse to 
what he termed, as early as 1918, "transcendental twaddle" (in Engelmann 1967: 
11), or "what we would call in current parlance, bullshit" (Perloff 1996: 31). 
(Wittgenstein could be said to have held a somewhat transcendental or mystical 
view, especially when parts of the Tractatus are considered, but he moved away 
from this conception. ) The problems ("mysterious difficulties" (Wittgenstein PO 
187)) of understanding the world, the questions presented by language yet not 
recognised as such, can often only be answered, Wittgenstein suggests, by people 
inventing 
something that no explanation seems able to remove. [... This] satisfies a 
longing for the supra-natural //transcendental//, for in believing that they see 
the `limits of human understanding' of course they believe that they can see 
beyond it. 
(Wittgenstein PO 187) 
"One cannot separate the body and 
mind, nor the senses from the intellect, 
particularly in a field where the 
unendingly repeated jading of our 
organs calls for sudden shocks to revive 
our understanding" (Artaud 1970: 66). 
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Dance in the world, of the world. The "postmodemist world where television 
advertisements, posters and everyday communication reflect [the] dispersal of 
meaning and focus" (Adshead-Lansdale 1999: 14); Barthes' "infinite text" 
(1976: 36), which it is impossible to live outside of, not only when writing but when 
reading (in its many senses) and living in the world of constructed and constructing 
meaning(s). 
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Jiigital Dialogism: dance at the edge Of language. 
(The Prolegomenon to a Thesis on 2 1St Century Dance Writing. ) 
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THE FIRST UNBORN 
(An Epic Poem, the Spine to a Thesis on Dance and New Technology. ) 
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In the writing in this thesis there is a reliance on concision (brevity; also cutting 
apart, division; from the Latin concidere to cut to pieces; also scindere to cut), and 
frag ment a tion (the act of fragmenting or the state of being fragmented; fragment: a 
piece broken off or detached; an incomplete piece; a scrap; a theme as well as a style 
Prologue: Alphaville 
Canto 1: The Meetin 
. 
A lour wind whorls through the vespertine streets; 
vortices of vulgar gas belch from the ground 
like sour milk from mothers' swollen teats. 
Boys wait and bleed without making a sound. 
Weeping and livid, the burning bush scars; 
perfect parallel lines, twin razor wound. 
With the blank expression of burnt-out cars 
people gather in the strobic half-light 
to breathe the insalubrious high-tar. 
Our hero, a slight man with hair of night, 
a demigod and the third-born child of 
she who helps the epic poets to write, 
has a voice as soft as a moleskin glove. 
He floats through the foetid air of the sick 
and frantic demimonde, devoid of love. 
of the writing and thinking). As 
there is incision and division, so 
too is there grafting, a series of 
s(c)ions affixed to a stock text. 
Implicit in the relationship of the 
scion and the stock is the point 
of union, the cut, the split, the 
rend, the scissura, it is with 
(con) scission. Writing is simply 
grafting/graph(t)ing. (Writing is 
graft (work), but it is also a "play 
of revelation and 
concealment" (Spivak in Derrida 
1997: xlv). ) In the etymological 
tree the roots of the words `prat' 
Stinging eyes behind glass, glance needle-prick 
and `graph' are the same. The 
looks, neurons fire and images of faces Greek word Graphein (to write) 
connect jigsaw-like in brains of plastic. linked to grapheion (writing 
tool), off-shoots - by-passing gramrna for letter (alphabetic unit) or weight, another 
route - to grafo and graffito (a little scratch; graffiti the marks made on walls and 
artefacts), a detour through graphite (the pencil), leads us to stilus (writing 
implement) - influencing the cutting implement, stiletto -, leads us (backwards) to 
stylus, which brings us to style. (Cf. `Type' from typus figure, from tupos image, 
from tuptein to strike. ) 
"Our investigation is therefore a 
grammatical one [... ] for the process is 
sometimes like one of taking a thing 
apart" (Wittgenstein PI §90). 
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Style (the particular mode of orthography, punctuation, design, etc. followed in a 
book) is grafted to the content. Style is how it looks as much as how it reads. Words 
are &ymbels pictures after all-something forgotten in the desire to give them a 
heightened importance: symbols. Changes in font interrupt the fIow of the 
Our sable son, secure in such places, 
lifts a svelte arm and points to the night sky. 
With crooked fingers, slowly, he traces 
a long-forgotten shape, and though they try, 
the gist is lost to the assembled throng. 
(But is meaning just a human-made lie? ) 
The ebon one, who chartn'd the beasts with song, 
and animated with verse, rocks and trees, 
unlocks his ashen lips to free his tongue. 
Who will join me on a quest to Hades? ' 
The words hang in the air, like a thousand 
agaric spores lost in a low heath breeze. 
The stranger's satin voice echoes still, and 
those gathered there are speechless, too shocked to 
step forward or to raise a single hand. 
reader, alerting them to the act 
of reading, of looking. The 
reader has to work (graft) harder. 
Words `stand out' from the page; 
punctuating the space of the 
page; black contrasting with the 
white. Words may be broken, 
fractured, 
cut up into syllables and 
phonemes. De-contextualised. 
This serves to alter their 
meaning, give them new 
aspects-like the Jentsch rabbit- 
duck picture. It increases the writer's word-power by giving more meaning(s) per 
word. Perhaps. Fragmented words show `family resemblances'. As illustrated in the 
`de-constructive' writings of Derrida, "the individual phonemes/graphemes 
constituting words are often evoked out into an independent dance" (Spivak in 
Derrida 1997: xlvi). 
In reading: seeing the picture of the 
word: "I saw the word fleetingly" - that is a special experience, it cannot be 
portrayed on film. 
(Wittgenstein RPP §590) 
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Style (a distinctive, formal, or characteristic manner of expression in words) is 
grafted to the content. Style is how it sounds as much as how it reads. Spoken words 
are symbol like pictures after all-something forgotten in the desire to give them a 
heightened importance: symbols. Changes In intonation interrupt the fIow of 
`I am in need of a companion, who 
is not weak and on whom I can depend, 
to regain a central human virtue. 
We'll pass through days that never reach an end, 
and wrestle with concepts of vast weight... 
Am I in the right place to find a friend? ' 
... Digital silence is not as great 
as the hush which now besieges the room. 
Noise filters this sound-void could not create. 
As though time is dead and sealed in its tomb, 
seconds decompose into minutes, then 
years are reversed, men become babes in wombs. 
In the midst of this mare's-nest and mayhem 
one man is calm, belying his nature. 
Breaking the hermetic seal to breathe again, 
this second man, a shimmering figure 
of silvery-white opes his fine-toned throat 
to mouth a voice melodious and pure. 
the listener, alerting them to 
the act of listening, of hearing. 
The listener has to work (graft) 
harder. Words `stand out' from 
the noise; punctuating the silence 
of space; sound contrasting with 
the silence. Utterances may be 
broken, fractured, cut up into 
syllables and phonemes. 
De-contextualised. This serves to 
alter their meaning, give them 
new aspects-like the Jentsch 
rabbit-duck picture. It increases 
the speaker's word-power by 
giving more meaning(s) per 
word. Perhaps. Fragmented 
words show `family resemblances'. As illustrated in the `de-constructive' writings of 
Derrida, the individual phonemes constituting spoken words are often evoked out 
into an independent dance (after Spivak in Derrida 1997: xlvi). 
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Style (the manner in which something is expressed or performed, considered as 
separate from its intrinsic content, meaning, etc. ) is grafted to the content. Style is 
how it looks as much as what it means. Dances are symhels pictures after all- 
something forgotten in the desire to give them a heightened importance: symbols. 
`I am the person who hits the right note. 
Changes in movement 
Ermy is my name, due to ermine hair interrupt the fIow of the 
and my resemblance to a wintry stoat. 
audience, alerting them to the 
What is your name? Where are you from and where 
must we go? I have a right to know these 
things if I am to accomp'ny you there. ' 
`I agree, you are right to speak these pleas. 
And all will be answered soon, I promise, 
when we are set on our way to Hades. ' 
But, what do you mean when you say all this? 
Please don't consider me discourteous, 
but why should I risk life in the abyss? ' 
`Again, the question is not impious, 
your concern for your `self shows great esteem. 
And one more thing-my name is Orpheus. ' 
At the utterance of the last morpheme, 
Ermy fell to the floor like a moth caught 
by a flame it thought to be a moonbeam. 
act of watching, of looking. The 
watcher has to work (graft) 
harder. Dances `stand out' from 
the stage; punctuating the space 
of the stage; movement 
contrasting with the still. Dances 
may be broken, fractured, cut up 
into sequences and movements. 
De-contextualised. This serves to 
alter their meaning, give them 
new aspects-like the Jentsch 
rabbit-duck picture. It increases 
the choreographer's artistic- 
power by giving more meaning(s) per movement. Perhaps. Deconstructed dances 
show `family resemblances'. As illustrated in the `de-constructive' writings of 
Derrida, the individual movements constituting dances are often evoked out into an 
independent set of words (after Spivak in Derrida 1997: xlvi). 
"One might say that it is in its function 
of dismantling language that poetry has 
to operate, in order to express 
something beyond ordinary language - 
whether the effect of creation or 
revelation takes place as a disturbance, 
or ineffable enjoyment" (Benvenuto and 
Kennedy 1986: 119-20). 
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Orpheus was a prince, he had been taught; 
the poet whose voice denied the Sirens 
the bodies of all-but-one Argonaut. 
And as Ermy genuflects, the room listens 
for the next words of the Thracian hero, 
somewhat embarrassed by the man's actions. 
But the singer is silent, says zero, 
says nothing, until he puts his hand on 
Ermy's shoulder and whispers, `Shall we go? ' 
The kneeling man stands as swift as a swan, 
shakes Orfeo's hand, then nods his reply 
and in a nanosecond they are gone, 
as a sea of faces waves goodbye. 
Wittgenstein points out that, when we 
use a proper name, there often is no one 
description that we would be willing to 
equate with the name: we may have in 
mind several descriptions, different ones 
may come up at different times, and so 
on. Indeed, Wittgenstein has sometimes 
been taken to be suggesting that proper 
names operate by means of a `cluster' of 
descriptions. 
(Goldfarb in Tait 1997: 83) 
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It could be said that writers, both wittingly and unwittingly, conceal things in their 
writing and in the act of writing (cf. Nietzsche BGE §289; see below). This allows 
the reader opportunities to find things out for themselves, often from other sources, 
sometimes by prompting a kind of self-asked and self-answered question. Indeed, it 
could be argued that the words (generally the product of writing) themselves are 
concealing and fluid, despite their apparent openness and transparency. It is as 
though the signs (words) do not point to anywhere in particular, while at the same 
time they prompt moves in certain directions. The prompts themselves are not 
always openly displayed-hidden signs, codes. (These highly simplified expressions 
of complex ideas have their links with the works of Charles Sanders Peirce, 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Jacques Derrida and Umberto Eco, among others. Generally 
un(der-)examined for the purposes of this thesis, but touched by the sprawling 
stolons of the research. ) In this thesis, prompts are sometimes found in the 
contradictions set up between opposing viewpoints, or even in the so-called same 
viewpoints of people with superficially similar theories. This may be an example of 
hiding behind others' ideas. Or it may be a way of showing that there is no one 
answer or way. 
Thy rao-re-'CIWWlo f Lao riw (1994) guteV e 
ca"''lv, v 4fle4, i4, not 23ie. 
It is very difficult to describe paths of 
thought where there are already many 
lines of thought laid down, -your own or 
other people's-and not to get into one of 
the grooves. It is difficult to deviate from 
an old line of thought just a little. 
(Wittgenstein Z §349) 
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A constant, yet often unacknowledged, element of philosophy is the `question', 
because it is generally the `answer' that is most important. Wittgenstein wrote: "In 
philosophy it is always good to put a question instead of an answer to a 
question" (RFM II §5), although it frustrated him that he asked "countless irrelevant 
questions" (CV 77e: MS 136 117a). This thesis asks questions, not because it is 
totally unsure about a subject and wants an answer, but because the question can get 
inside a problem and investigate it that way rather than explode it into a set of 
answers which may be an attempt to stop the investigation (yet, as we know, answers 
seldom offer the end to an argument). A question can provide clues about the asker's 
viewpoint and show their understanding of a problem. 
For Wittgenstein, the question is not a humble assertion: it is another way of 
taking a wider look around [... ] Some of Wittgenstein's own questions are 
commissions: commissions to think in new ways, to see clearly and 
synoptically, to see aspects yet unnoticed. 
(Binkley 1973: 71) 
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"I strive not after exactness, but after a 
synoptic view" (` ingenstein Z§464). 
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Re. - fcrm, (v. iatr. )" 
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re- prefix 1. indicating return to a previous 
condition, restoration, withdrawal, etc.: rebuild; 
renew; retrace; reunite. 2. indicating repetition of an 
action: recopy; rema rj. 
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The thesis is not based on an intention to present the truth. It is not even a truth, as 
such, but an opening up of thoughts in the reader, you, that hopefully will lead you, 
to a number of `truths' that work for you. These truths may even be opposed to what 
you think you understand in the work presented here. That is a welcome response to 
this piece of writing. Wittgenstein states that "The truth of certain empirical 
propositions belongs to our frame of reference" (OC §83). Hans-Johann Glock 
writes: 
The words `is true' have a meaning or role only because human beings make, 
dispute and verify assertions; the concept of truth does not exist independently 
of our linguistic behaviour. But whether or not these assertions are true 
depends on how things are, because that is how we use the term `true'. 
(1996: 368) 
With a sense of irony, there is a nod to redundancy or deflationary theories of truth, 
and the Nietzschean killing of truth: 
What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been 
poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, 
after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths 
are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions-they are metaphors that 
have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which 
have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as 
coins. 
(Nietzsche 1976: 46-7) 
And as Nietzsche points out, when we are driven by the will to truth: "why not 
rather untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? " (Nietzsche BGE § 1; italics in the 
original). For Nietzsche "Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of 
life could not live" (WP §493). He also wrote: "Truth is ugly. We possess art lest we 
perish of the truth" (Nietzsche WP §822; italics in the original). 
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"No poem is intended for the reader, no 
picture for the beholder, no symphony 
for the-listener" (Benjamin 1973: 70). 
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Just as Wittgenstein has influenced this thesis in a number of ways, so too has 
Nietzsche, another German-language philosopher, although to not so great an extent 
(unless his anti-foundationalist influence on the last fifty years of the Twentieth 
Century in philosophy is counted, particularly his influence on writers such Jean- 
Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Richard Rorty; see 
Robinson 1999). Fraleigh describes Nietzsche as "the dancer's philosopher" (1987: 
xxxi), influencing, among others, Isadora Duncan (alongside Walt Whitman and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau: "the only dance masters [she] could have" (Duncan 1988: 
62); Duncan's book opens with a quotation from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, `The 
Seven Seals', section 6) and Doris Humphrey (who, in The Art of Making Dances 
(1959) cites Nietzsche's writings on the Ancient Greeks). His works are indeed 
peppered with references to dance and dancers, but it is not just his use of dance as 
an image and metaphor that is relevant to this thesis. His writing style(s) and radical 
anti-philosophy bias are of import too. The essay, 'Nietzsche's Voices' by Ronald 
Hayman (1997), explains the modes in which Nietzsche set about writing his 
philosophy, and how we might approach the multiplicity of writing conventions. 
(See also Derrida 1978, for a less accessible essay on the subject of Nietzsche's 
styles. ) Nietzsche moves from poetry to aphorisms to philosophical prose to 
fictionalised philosophy. Like Wittgenstein, Nietzsche often wrote as and when the 
muse was with him, or when he had enough energy to manage to write. Nietzsche 
wrote notes on scraps of paper, as did Wittgenstein, and later pieced them together to 
form extended, yet often errant, works. His philosophy is put into the mouths of 
characters in his texts: Zarathustra the prophet (Nietzsche 1969) or the madman of 
Joyful Wisdom (Nietzsche 1960). And even when it isn't, there is a sense that there is 
a monologue being written, a rhetorical argument, or what might be called 
"confidential discord and discourse" (BGE §289), or in other words, `a dialogue with 
himself' (although not in the same way that Wittgenstein seems to `debate' with 
himself). Nietzsche wears masks (a recurring theme in his works, see Nietzsche 
1990), it could be said, when he writes: "Every philosophy, " he says, "also conceals 
a philosophy; every opinion is also a hiding- 
Any true feeling cannot in reality be 
expressed. To do so is to betray it. To place, every word also a mask" (BGE §289; italics 
express it, however, is to conceal it. 
(Artsud 1970: 53; italics in original) 
in onginal; cf. Wittgenstein BB 28). 
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Canto 2: Some Exposition. 
Ermy and Orpheus, like Yang and Yin, 
proceed to get their journey underway, 
and the latter lets his fable begin. 
`Now Ermy, as I promised I would say, 
I will tell you the reason why we're here 
and what occurred to cause me such dismay. 
I had a love, Eurydice, my dear, 
a nymph so fair I had to marry her 
to prove to all that my love was sincere. 
On our wedding night, one man did demur. 
the satyric, sylvan Aristaeus. 
But Eurydice, loyal and demure, 
denied him and declined his advances, 
at which he chased her to an anguine death, 
a snakebite which sent her to Tartarus. 
It is to this place we must travel if 
I am to plead with Hades for her return, 
and bring her back to breathe an earthy breath. ' 
Ermy, not normally so taciturn, 
had listened intently to Orpheus, 
and knew there was still lots for him to learn. 
`Why me? ' he asked. `How can I be of use? 
I feel a blank page when it comes to Hell, 
I've never even heard of Tartarus. ' 
`Ermy, you have much to offer, this I could tell 
when I first saw how your grey matter shone. 
You were the only volunteer as well. 
I think I should give you a quick lesson 
on the mythical Underworld which lies 
past the river of sadness, Acheron. 
Now, depending on who you analyse 
there are diffrent orders to what comes then, 
or diffrent names for the evil Erinnyes, 
the Keres, the Moerae and the children 
of Night-Hypnos and his sib Thanatos, 
or Sleep and Death as they are known to men. 
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If every writer wears a mask, or a series of masks, and if every word is a mask, there 
is a challenge to the notion that the writer is expressing anything stable (part of the 
logocentric attitude): if we were to try to remove the mask, it is possible that there 
will be an unending succession of masks, an infinite Russian doll. The same is 
applicable to writing as it is to speaking. Language, in its many forms, is a mask that 
most persons wear. Logonomic rules are the "virtually mechanical" (Laing 1965: 95) 
It is indeed becoming more and more difficult, even 
senseless, for me to write an official English. And more and 
more my own language appears to me like a veil that must 
be torn apart in order to get at things (or the Nothingness) 
behind it. Grammar and style. To me they seem to have 
become as irrelevant as a Victorian bathing suit or the 
imperturbability of a true gentleman. A mask. Let us hope 
the time will come [... ] when language is most efficiently 
used where it is being most efficiently misused. 
(Beckett 1984: 171-2) 
social dictates of which 
language-mask is worn at any 
given time. Masks (selves, 
identities, personalities, 
characters) are placed and 
replaced on and over previous 
masks. The writer, as for the 
speaker, `hides' behind these masks, but can never be located as a fullness. Here we 
see an example of `the death of the author' of Barthes (1977), the loss and re- 
creation of identity through writing, a dissociative disorder, a schizoid disruption: 
"schizophrenic, as all literate men have been since the invention of the phonetic 
alphabet" (McLuhan 1962: 22), a self divided, disintegration of what is considered 
as a whole and its subsequent reintegration into a new form. As Christopher 
Horrocks writes: "In this paradigm, the primacy of a text's meaning and possible 
interpretation is construed as an effect of a constant semiurgy: the mobilisation and 
reconfiguration of signs in endless combination with multiple effects" (2000: 28). If 
the word is a mask and the written word is a technology, is it appropriate to say that 
technology is a mask? 
ýýý 
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Ermy sits on the edge of his bed, and swings his white lead legs onto the 
mattress, lowering his cracked alabaster back onto the firm mattress. In his 
hand a copy of Alice in Wonderland. Ermy had begun the book the previous 
evening. He feels like the tardy, pink-eyed white rabbit as he rushes down the 
rabbit-hole into the surreal wonderland. He is intrigued by the questions of the 
Caterpillar: 
"Who are you? " said the Caterpillar. 
This was not an encouraging opening for a conversa- 
tion. Alice replied, rather shyly, "I-I hardly 
know, 
sir, just at present-at least I know who i was when 
I got up this morning, but I think I must have been 
changed several times since then. " 
"What do you mean by that? " said the Caterpillar 
sternly. "Explain yourself? " 
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A technology through which any human act is `mediated' is a mask, a (sur)face, 
behind which there is no `inner self, no true meaning to be uncovered. Each 
utterance, each inscription, each (pseudo-)linguistic expression is an outering of 
sense (see McLuhan 1962), but `sense' in the mould of Derrida's `trace'. (Here too 
are connections with McLuhan's extension theory, and its relative, the law of 
enhancement - or amplification - from his tetrad of media, which accentuates the 
metaphoric and linguistic, the rhetorical and grammatical (see Grosswiler 1998). ) 
However, while there are superficial links between Derrida and McLuhan, they are 
opposed (at least in the latter's earlier writings) on the issue of "the primacy of 
speech over print and television" (Horrocks 2000: 28), or what Derrida calls, 
logocentricity (a form of idealism that assumes there is something beyond the text 
giving fixed meaning to the text). McLuhan makes provocations such as: "The 
interiorization of the technology of the phonetic alphabet translates man from the 
magical world of the ear to the neutral visual world" (1962: 18), which heads a 
section based on an `anthropological' comparison by J. C. Carothers of non-literate 
Africans and literate Westerners. The reading is not carried out in the same way as 
Derrida's deconstruction of Levi-Strauss (Derrida 1997), but rather as an 
appropriation of Carothers' assumptions and assertions. Without recounting these 
writers' arguments in full - another side-track - it is necessary to highlight them as 
having a bearing on this text. 
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People nowadays think, scientists are there to instruct them, poets, musicians 
etc. to entertain them. That the latter have something to teach them; that never 
occurs to them. 
(Wittgenstein CV 42e: MS 162b 59v; italics in 
original) 
This thesis is a poetic academic investigation (if this is not a contradiction in terms). 
Binkley writes that "Philosophy is more like poetry than it is like science or theology 
or lexicography" (1973: 28). "The language used by philosophers is already 
deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight; ittgenstein CV 47e: MS 163 
daftce4v 
47v). 
I know the power of words. Seeming trifles that fall 
like petals beneath the heel-taps of dance. 
But man with his soul, his lips, his bones... 
(Mayakovsky 1965: 412) 
Now Ermy feels like Alice, and wonders if we are not all like Alice. He wonders 
what it means to feel like someone. What is to 'feel' like yourself? Ermy thinks, 
'IdontfaelWItisbbemysetIjistamnyserf= I can't explain myself, I'm afraid, sir, " 
said Alice, -[I dhargewhatslhisch@ ge? V areiheaieiiaforbeideiJyofaperson? lfrki 
wes\A Tienwinsaidfa- because I'm not myself, you see "-Patixinrie®. ie 
Book My body is WEt people recogriee me by; and my voioa-"I don't see, ' said the 
Caterpillar. -My body charges kle fam one day b he new "1'm afraid I can't put it 
more clearly; Alice replied very politely, -butt candrarUeovertrn krleedkdoes. - 
"for I can't understand it myself to begin with; and being so many different sizes 
in a day is very confusing "-Myh®ismaedrgper/E, feseerdedc> Q*lcanti- 
"It isn't, " said the Caterpillar. -Ntxfinteehbroemybwerr osbnvwc(por, , 
as a ie®jan b my hals rated-"Well, perhaps you haven't found it so yet, " said 
Alice; Q*'lncteMe lips -"but when you have to turn into a chrysalis-you 
will some day, you know-and then after that into a butterfly, I should think 
you'll feel a little queer, won't you? "-Myears ardbtheaadasl oedºWrirand 
ekp dxwt wtrch MOM and h otens-"Not a bit, * said the Caterpillar. -bows 
c>icp andgaw, soon be vekp myeyM wtxah ne'. «perlbc# aalt b tie der>hg ºeiso*nn n die 
miiorby maEg loss dhnct Vie moo fiey cxmey b my bail (aril i my bah mist* pEü1g Ehe 
messqqe s! ). -"Well, perhaps your feelings may be different, ' said Alice; - Tliss 
not blbua *rmM sfgl nandsW* bi&sawLpandaradc= all I know is, it 
would feel very queer to me. "-VVcftbloescnanewmeenigr-d). tavWfvnhemb 
bra but a nmue of my ba ya * sbengdt - "Youl" said the Caterpillar 
contemptuously. -Cam. s asssr6s' Tie body Is l -Who are you? "-Nhe sC 1A9 
Ern#ie&. cffr' Ermy begins to nod off, contemplating his body and person. 
He realises, or decides, that they are one and the same thing. But what about his personality? 
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This thesis challenges any idea akin to the proposition: Poetic language is more 
advanced than any other form of language. What could be said to distinguish 
`poetry' from other forms of language is that there are different grammatical rules 
and conventions, but there is no single definition of `poetry' (instead, a family of 
poetic styles). The question `What is Poetry? ' remains unanswered, despite attempts 
to box it up in a neat defining package. The question should be, as Wittgenstein said: 
"How do we use poetry? " (LC 34). A purpose of poetry is to condense experience 
and belief into a near abstract collection of words, both meaningless and meaningful 
at the same time (which is what philosophy does too). "Do not forget that a poem, 
even though it is composed in the language of information, is not used in the 
language-game of giving information" (Wittgenstein Z§ 160), or, in other words, it 
takes `ordinary' words and makes them strange by de- and re-contextualising them. 
Recent writings about language have suggested that `ordinary' language is as 
`unordinary' as the language of poetry; each has its peculiarities and irregularities, its 
uses and each is capable (without implying an autonomy which language doesn't 
possess) of making its users vagarious, erroneous and erratic. 
"Since poetry is in truth only a 
superior, more concentrated and 
intense life than what we live from day 
to day, like the latter it is composed of 
hyper-alive elements and moribund 
elements" (Marinetti 1913). 
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His attention sparks again, and he turns from his side onto his back, eyelids flutter open in the lamplight, open book still clutched in his right hand. 
Ermy yawns, jaw cramping and chest aching with the involuntary action. He 
rubs a hand against an eye. Words come to Ermy without his bidding them. 
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A poem works on a number of levels - it can be visual, aural, metaphorical, literal, 
clear or opaque - all at the same time. If you remove one element - the poetic 
structure, the poeticity - the poem changes from one thing into another, especially 
when the structure and form of it is central to its being. There is a reason why a poet 
writes a poem in a particular way, and this should not be overlooked when 
interpreting the poem, even when this is a matter of typographic structure. Anyone 
can re-write, re-word, re-structure a poem, but to do so is to miss the point of the 
poem-it is only that poem when it is seen 
"Ut pictura poesis" (Horace Ars Poetua 1.36 1) 
or heard in a certain form. But in saying 
this is it not saying that any act of interpretation is a removal of the poem's `central 
quality'? That depends on what you conceive the poem's `central quality' to be. If it 
is to offer a (perhaps limitless) range of interpretations, then no. The multiple acts of 
(re-)interpretation (re-)affirm the poem's here-called `central quality'-that which 
makes it a poem, the poem that it is, the poems that it is when read by different 
people. Wittgenstein discusses the questions: "How should poetry be read? What is 
the correct way of reading it? " (LC 4-5)-there is no one way of reading it, it 
depends on the poem, but each poem may have rules which help them to make 
sense, as it were, such as metre (rhythm). But if someone were to read a poem with a 
prescribed metrical pattern with the wrong rhythm, would that alter the meanings of 
the words that make up the poem? 
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Nietzsche writes, "For one cannot subtract dancing in every form from a noble 
education-to be able to dance with one's feet, with concepts, with words: need I 
still add that one must be able to dance with the pen too-that one must learn to 
write? " (TI §7). Removed from the context of his criticism of the contemporary (to 
Next, the river of lament Cocytus 
Nietzsche) German education 
flows unto the Grove of Persephone system, the German people's 
which is guarded by bronze-tongued Cerberus. 
lack of understanding of nuance 
Beyond this burns scalding Phlegethon, the 
river of fire fuelled by crimes of passion, 
which bcmoats, through gates of chalcedony, 
Tartarus, the gaol of degradation 
in which Eurydice dwells, unaware 
of my plan to end her condemnation. 
The Afterworld consists of otherwhere, 
like the rivers Lethe and Styx, and the 
Elysian Fields, but we won't go there. ' 
`I still can't see why you even need me, ' 
Ermy said, `you stem to have it sorted, 
and there is no way I can help, surely. ' 
At this, Orpheus dimly retorted, 
`My lucent friend, the gains are much too great 
and grave for this quest to be aborted. 
My account was merely to educate 
you about the Hell of the Ancient Greeks, 
do you think that it's the same to this date? 
Hell doesn't look like it does on antiques. 
No! It has altered like the Earth, and hence 
it is now controlled by computer geeks. 
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and crude and shallow 
`spirituality', this is still an 
urgent call for the use of 
language in a way that `dances' 
and thereby sends shudders 
through the reader. For 
Nietzsche, as for Wittgenstein 
and Derrida, writing is an 
aesthetic act: it is of the body, of 
the blood, of gesture, of 
sensation, of mood, of tone, of 
Stimmung. 
See. 
te 8 2ULpn 
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It may be poetic to say that dance is like poetry, and of course the reciprocal of this: 
poetry is like dance. If poetry abstracts and expresses the otherwise indescribable by 
means of language, employing a range of linguistic devices from metaphor, allusion, 
allegory, irony, simile and so on, then dance may be the non-linguistic analogue of 
poetry. (See Fraleigh 1987 e. g. p163. ) 
Behold the binary code that hides sense, 
the downwards spiral of the genome race, 
the propensity of humans for pretence. 
Take the machines which move at quick'ning pace, 
the robots we entrust with human lives, 
and rubbish we call satellites in space. 
The silicon utopian dream that thrives 
in valleys of the cerebral cortex 
of soulless technocrats with virtual wives, 
who fantasise of having cyber sex 
with hardbodies, software and virus-free 
whores, while ENS makes their muscles flex- 
The Hatter opened his eyes very wide on hearing this; 
but all he said was, "Why is a raven like a writing- 
desk? " 
"Come, we shall have some fun now! " thought Alice. 
"I'm glad they've begun asking riddles. -I believe I can 
guess that, " she added aloud. 
"Do you mean that you think you can find out the 
answer to it? " said the March Bare. 
"Exactly so, " said Alice. 
"Then you should say what you mean, " the March 
Hare went on. 
"I do, " Alice hastily replied; "at least-at least I 
mean what I say-that's the same thing, you know. " 
"Not the same thing a bit! " said the Batter. "You 
might just as well say that 'I see what I eat' is the 
same thing as 'I eat what I see'! " 
"You might just as well say, " added the March 
Hare, "that 'I like what I get' is the same thing as 
'I get what I like'! " 
"You might just as well say, " added the Dormouse, 
who seemed to be talking in his sleep, "that 'I breathe 
when I sleep' is the same thing as 'I sleep when I 
breathe'! " 
"It is the same thing with you, " said the Hatter, 
and here the conversation dropped, and the party sat 
silent for a minute, while Alice thought over all she 
could remember about ravens and writing-desks, which 
wasn't much. 
And so Ermy eventually relaxes into sleep, thinking of ravens and writing- desks, or rather, not very much. 
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This thesis is academic in that it distils a number of thoughts and ideas by a range of 
thinkers, in the main writers, into a partially recognisable form that can be called a 
`thesis'. A PhD thesis should be the result of `original' research, and a coherent 
argument. Or be `original' in its argument (the `thesis' is the argument). But where 
does the originality come in this thesis? And where is its coherency when it is based 
It is into this Stygian gloom we on 
incoherency? Hopefully the 
must travel; into total dark descend originality comes in the way that 
so that we might complete our hard journey. 
the material is presented and 
In the descent, this world we will transcend 
and be so deep in thought that we may think 
deep thoughts too difficult to comprehend. ' 
Ermy could feel his heart begin to sink 
but he knew this was what he had to do, 
that in some way he was a vital link. 
`So I need you to teach me about new 
ways to communicate and to travel- 
I am like Fogg and you are Passepartout, 
but it won't take eighty days to reach Hell. ' 
combined (juxtaposed). 
Wittgenstein wrote on the 
subject of being `reproductive in 
his thinking', agreeing that he 
had "never invented a line of 
thinking but that it was always 
provided for [him] by someone 
else & [he did] no more than 
passionately take it up for [his] 
own work of clarification" (CV 16e: MS 154 15v). He concluded this paragraph by 
stating: "What I invent are new comparisons" (CV 16e: MS 154 15v). 
Thus we can understand poetry is 
anarchic in as much as it questions all 
object relationships or those between 
meaning and form. It is also anarchic to 
the extent its occurrence is the result of 
disturbances leading us nearer to chaos. 
(Artaud 1970: 31-2)1 
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This thesis is multilayered, multifaceted, but there is no one satisfactory simile to 
describe it. It is not onion-like: the reader does not start at the outside and peel away 
the outside skin and through successive layers to reach the core. It is not linear in the 
traditional sense of linear, that is beginning at starting point and moving through a 
narrative or an argument to an end. It has, or rather is, a number of meta-texts (the term 
`metanarrative' has associations to be avoided here) that can be read separately (from 
the ascribed beginning or, for the more adventurous, from any random point), or in 
conjunction with each other. An analogy with the thesis is that of the human being, the 
human body. But it is just an analogy, designed to enliven the description of the thesis' 
structure; a tree might have served as well. As in the case of Nietzsche, these 
metaphors are not tangible images: they lead instead to the philological notion of 
interpretation [... ] The body, as a relation of forces of the assimilated signs is an 
interpretative space. 
(Blondel 1991: 205,23 8) 
This analogy has obvious difficulties, but it will be sketched out in terms of similarity, with 
a disregard for the differences. The body is not just part of the human being, it is the totality 
of the human being (themes arising from this statement and others like it will be explored 
throughout this thesis). Yet the body both is and is not generally viewed as a single unit: it is 
composed of parts, such as organs, skeleton, nerves. Some of these parts are essential to 
life, others are not so crucial (for example, a limb can be lost and the body would still be a 
living human being, and regarded, one might hope, as a person (again, a recurring theme for 
this thesis)). The parts of the human organism work together, usually, to the benefit of the 
person by maintaining life, without the need for much control or input from the person 
(besides the continued and successful obtainment of the necessary nutrients and other 
chemicals needed to sustain the body at a cellular level); the thesis is divided into parts, but 
each of them is linked to others, and it is self-sustaining, dependent only on the reader. The 
body is made up from a large number of tiny units, and it is sufficient here to start at the unit 
of the cell. The thesis, too, is multi-cellular, if letters can be seen as the cells. The cells 
(letters) are grouped into tissues (words; the body only has four basic types of tissue, which 
could be seen as similar to the divisions of words into classes, for example, nouns, verbs, 
"Nur im Zusammenhange 
adjectives and pronouns), which are then integrated 
eines Satzes bedeutet die into systems of organs (sentences). Wörter etwas" (Frege 1884: 
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The body of the text is made up of collections of sentences (paragraphs, sections, 
chapters), just as the body of the human is structured as a series of inter-linked 
systems. The human body cannot be said to have a beginning or an end, although it 
can be said to have boundaries (although even these are difficult to define at times). 
It can be described in a number of ways: for example, artistically, from different 
directions, from the `inside', from the `outside', macroscopically, microscopically, 
metaphorically, scientifically from a range of disciplines, and philosophically. As 
someone might say the body is multilayered, so is this thesis. But do not forget 
Wittgenstein's question: "Is a bit of white paper with black lines on it like a human 
body? " (PI §364) 
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Canto 3: Preparing for the Journey. 
The focus is now not on one but two, 
but consider them as inseparable, 
like the body-mind whole that I call `you'; 
a cypher that is indecipherable; 
a gyring thought ravelled in a gyrus; 
a composite poet: Dante-Virgil 
who will lead us into our Tartarus 
and show us things that we have never seen. 
Like Jesus resurrecting Lazarus 
our guides will revive thinkers who have been 
dead for years, gather up their scattered parts 
and repair them like a broken machine. 
They'll be taunted and haunted by Descartes' 
ghost, which resides in our everyday words. 
(And this is sort of where the story starts. ) 
Many of the names we may not have heard, 
the idea-paths may at first seem uphill, 
but Orpheus will remain undeterred. 
So must we if we are not to get ill. 
Do not lay down all hope at hell's arched gate, 
or like this canto we'll reach a standstill. 
This tale of Orpheus is inchoate, 
and for Ermy an obscure world draws near 
where words and images will obfuscate. 
One last stanza to try to make things clear- 
in this realm there is no real, anything 
at all can happen in an epopoeia. 
(And I mean, virtually anything. ) 
Z'tt'rat-are, 
oyv D to- Ote4lti ýca4-tey, ºtio klou" t rte' ate, ý`"ýy 
°f t-&M& to- duz,. 
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The spine of the thesis is an epic poem: `The First Unborn'. It supports the thesis as 
the vertebrae in animals support the torso and head. It has a top (a start) and a 
bottom (a finish, of sorts), and is a composite of parts, segmented and flexible with a 
limited range of movement. It is composed according to different stylistic (literary) 
conventions. Like the spine it has other supporting structures and organs hanging off 
it. The backbone is also the conduit for the spinal cord, part of the central nervous 
system, extension of the brain, which gives rise to the numerous pairs of spinal 
nerves (31 in humans) that radiate outwards to the peripheral nervous system and all 
the visceral and somatic parts of the body. In the thesis there are quotations and 
references which are like the nerves, spreading out from the central nervous system 
to the peripheral regions. In the human body, nerve information is capable of being 
sent in both directions; in the thesis, links can work both ways too. 
"The pleasure of the text is that moment 
when my body pursues its own ideas- 
for my body does not have the same 
ideas I do" (Barthes, 1976: 17). 
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Part One: Brainstorm 
Canto 1: The Journey Begins. 
`Fasten your seatbelt, ' Orpheus urges, 
`this could be a bumpy ride to the land 
where lightsome life with dense death converges. ' 
As fast as bits down coax, Ermy and 
Orpheus drive the info superhighway, 
cyber-strangers in a strange-cyberland. 
We are searching for a great soul who may 
be able to help us on our journey, ' 
says Orpheus to his new protege. 
`Do you know where to find him? asks Ermy. 
`Indeed I do. His spirit, if I can 
call it that, is now in purgatory. ' 
`Why is he there if he was a great man? 
I thought that was a place of suffering, 
a limbo before you go to heaven. ' 
`I believe it was his own requesting 
that took him there, and keeps him in a state 
of flux, a perpetual teetering 
on the thorny-hedged edge of death's estate, 
from where he can just see the other side; 
and at this point he can meditate 
on the unknown nature of this divide. 
He will show that life and death intertwine, 
just as is proved by any suicide 
who is internally internecine. 
So before our quest can really begin, 
we must jump to the side of Wittgenstein- 
The shallow yellow sunlight leaks through the gaps around Ermy's deep red 
velvet curtains, and hits his closed eyes like a gently lapping wave. Ermy is 
unencumbered of his slumber, and begins to wake up. Coming round he 
becomes aware of the bed against his body, his knaggy neck, hyperventilating 
slightly, an irritation on the dehydrated skin of his leg, throbbing creaking 
arthritic knuckle, a bum of cardialgia, tender kidneys and the need to urinate, 
heart-pumping-blood-humming-in-his-head, sticky mucosity of his mouth, dry 
lips and swollen tongue, grumbling borborygmus, a blocked nostril, and 
countless other sensations which seem amplified in the first few moments after 
waking, but which subside during the day into the background of what we might 
call awareness, or consciousness, or being. His first thought is a song- 
fragment commingled with his reading from the night before, distorted and 
reworked. 'I btxes me b mwe my hardy-The Hailer opened his eyes very wide on l ft 
this; -btybmmeA -halal he said was, VA-disihen*xrr 
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The other parts of the thesis (including this one), are potentially analogous to 
other parts of the body, but at an extreme and laborious stretch. The thesis is to 
be viewed as a whole which is capable of being dissected and divided, and laid 
out in parts that can function independently for only so long in isolation (this 
Now all that Ludwig feels is the rent in is not altogether unique to this 
his right side, poker-hot metal burning thesis; many things may be layers of cloth, before scorching through skin. 
The shard of shrapnel is not discerning 
and cuts its way through the colon, searing 
mesenteric artery, shattering 
the lumbar vertebra, and exploding 
fatally like a firework of fuchsirr. 
The fragment's force sends the rag doll dancing 
choreic choreography in carmine 
and khaki, until it ends its sad spin 
with sandbag wall, stuffing gone and sanguine... 
lacking in some way when 
taken out of context). A heart 
will beat when removed from 
the body for a short time. 
After that, it is still a heart in 
some senses, but just dead 
flesh in others. It is still seen 
as a human organ and treated 
The last thing Ludwig feels is the rent in accordingly (this treatment 
his right side, poker-hot metal burning varies from culture to culture), layers of cloth, before scorching through skin- 
but it is no longer the blood 
pumping organ of a body. It may represent a person, but it isn't a person. 
1993.32 
Ermy throws back the covers and without thinking, comes to sifting with his feet 
on the floor, thoracic spine hunched, head pulling his neckskin into a curious 
curve, and cracking like a nut the cervical vertebrae. Ermy winces, and exhales his discomfort. He wiggles his fingers, 'by.. what, vggfrg my sa17 He smiles for the first time, casting his eyes downwards into his cheekbones. Now his routine begins. 
Sat once again at the desk where his computer is, Ermy is in full flow. 
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We talk of [mental] processes and states and leave their nature undecided. 
Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them-we think. But that is just 
what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a 
definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better [... ] And 
now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. 
So we have to deny the yet 
This trenchant torment is never-ending uncomprehended process in the 
for this man who once experienced and yet unexplored medium. And 
braved the Eastern Front's ferocious fighting. now it looks as if we had denied 
mental processes. And naturally 
Our first big problem will be to understand we don't want to deny them. 
what we are: re-conceptualizing (Wittgenstein PI §308) 
human beings is the matter in hand. ' 
`It all just sounds pretty agonizing 
to my mind. We know what humans consist 
of, it surely doesn't need revising. 
I have a mind, a body, I exist-- 
what more is there to say? ' Ermy enquires. 
`That's the attitude we need to resist 
if we are to avoid the hellish fires 
that wish to hamper our attempts to reach 
my Eurydice, ' Orpheus suspires. 
`It will be Wittgenstein's job to unteach 
us all of these confused ideas that find 
expression in people's everyday speech. ' 
`So do you deny that I have a mind?? 
'No, not exactly, but it's not really my 
function to tackle questions of this kind. 
We are wasting precious time. We must hie 
if we are to reach our destination. 
Prepare yourself, for Wittgenstein is nigh. 
See him in the throes of cerebration. ' 
There is a problem in trying to 
deny that we, humans, have not 
got what we call `minds'. In 
saying that, it is necessary to use 
the word `mind' while at the 
same time attempting to remove 
it from the equation. And of 
course, most people will say that 
they know that they have a mind, 
although when pressed cannot 
tell you exactly how they know, 
or what the mind is and how it 
works, but they are certain all the 
same, that it exists. However, 
philosophers such as 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and 
Dewey 
set aside the notion of `the mind' common to Descartes, Locke, and Kant - as 
a special subject of study, located in inner space, containing elements or 
processes which make knowledge possible. 
(Rorty 1980: 6) 
The Hatter opened his eyes very wide on hearing 
this; but all he said was, "What is the mind? " 
"Come, we shall have some fun now! " thought Alice. 
"I'm glad they've begun asking riddles. -I believe I 
can guess that, " she added aloud. - 
140 
But why should we want to set it aside? Isn't that tantamount to denying it? We do 
not deny that we have (are) a body, although if we were bloody-minded enough we 
could re-start the debate with an idealist, Berkeleian denial that there is anything 
material that we actually experience, including our bodies. But there is no longer a 
serious need (or room) for such a philosophical standpoint. There is still, it seems, a 
stubborn refusal by some philosophers and many people to let go of the question of 
the `mind' and its relationship to the `body'. 
Alice, however, proceeds to get tangled up in the distorted 
logic and linguistic play of the tea party guests, just as 
before. She doesn't notice that each statement she makes 
takes her into an ever complex series of questions and 
problems. In her naivete she opens her mouth and speaks what 
perhaps she should have kept to herself. Her belief that she 
can answer the riddle is transformed into a spoken sentence 
made up of ambiguous words. What is her belief? How does she 
believe that she can guess? The March Hare asks her to 
synonymize her utterance. Is 'believing' the same as 
'thinking'? Is 'guessing' the same as 'finding out an 
answer'? The March Hare and Mad Hatter disagree with Alice 
that in her saying one thing, she can mean another. But what 
do they mean when they say that she should say what she 
means? Does their use of the word imply that the meaning of 
what she says lies separate to the words that she speaks? It 
is almost as though beyond the spoken words, hidden 
somewhere, is a distinct thing to be signified in a specific 
way, but which is capable of being mistaken for another, 
almost identical thing. I can say what I mean, but not mean 
what I say-if I am meaning to be deceitful, say. Here 'to 
mean' implies that I have an objective, a reason for using 
the words that I say. But for Alice there is no objective 
like this. She is merely expressing that in her opinion she 
can solve a riddle, because she has had some experience of 
this in the past. Why did Carroll italicise the word 'said'? 
Why did he not use the word 'asked'? Or any other word 
denoting a question? The riddle, as the Hatter puts it, is 
rhetorical; it is not for answering. She just assumes that 
it is, through relating the form of the phrase as she hears 
it to the form of previously heard riddles. 
[Rules of language-games] 
See Blue Book p. 27 
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Canto 2: Section 432. 
Just beyond, as Orpheus had outlined, 
a man in uniform, like St Vitus 
dancing, with a calm visage well-defined. 
As in slow-mo, movements anfractuous 
and anguished, are soothed and brought to a close 
by the larynx and lyre of Orpheus. 
Wittgenstein, sinking into a repose, 
opens his eyes, and with poise and great grace 
he lifts a lissom limb, a long-stemmed rose, 
to wipe the dirt and the sweat from his face, 
as furrowed as a field. He caught his breath 
before entreating of the man from Thrace, 
Who are you that has stopped my dance of death? 
What reasons have you for intervening 
my afterlife's task of nocturnal depth? ' 
`I am Orpheus, ' said the prince, leaning 
with an outstretched hand, `and this is Ermy. 
We're here to learn about use and meaning. 
And to know if you feel the same as me. 
And to challenge some age-old conceptions 
about thought, and what happens when we see. 
We need to understand sense perceptions, 
the language of experience, and more 
about psychological descriptions. 
There is much to learn about metaphor, 
and language in general-its power of 
illusion over the philosopher. 
"When we try to say what a 
metaphor `means', we soon realize 
there is no end to what we want to 
mention" (Davidson 1984: 263). 
"Metaphors are the means by which the 
oneness of the world is poetically 
brought about" (Arendt 1973: 164). 
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however, we will not attempt to prove 
or advance any theories-! 'Gott helfe mir! 
Why do you need me? It sounds as though you've 
already done most of the hard work here, ' 
interrupted Wittgenstein, `I advise 
that you think no more, it makes nothing clear 
and can be a dangerous enterprise. ' 
`And this is why we need you to guide us. 
To reach our goal we must philosophize 
on things about which you are dubious, 
or rather, inquisitive as to why 
we have become tangled, ' said Orpheus. 
Trapped like, what was it you once said? A fly 
in a bottle? My love, too, is trapped in 
the Underworld. We can revivify 
Eurydice and save her from ruin, 
as long as we are able to reach her 
ere the last nail is put in her coffin. 
We need you to make sure we do not err. ' 
I"Truth 
sits upon the lips of 
dying men" (Matthew Arnold 
Sohrab and Rustum, 1.656). 
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Canto 3: On Philosophy. 
`First things first, ' said Wittgenstein, We must do 
away with all explanation, instead 
description must take its place. I'll show you 
how by misusing words we are misled. 
If you talk of thinking as a mental 
activity that goes on in your head, 
I would say, that is metaphorical. 
We speak in words that need to be brought back 
from a use that is metaphysical. 
I will try to keep you on the right track 
with questions that shake the ideal you can 
never get outside of, you must turn back. 
A picture holds us captive, a trapan 
which lies in our language, repeated there 
inexorably, to entrap human 
beings in a kind of linguistic snare. 
We must battle against our bewitchment 
by means of language and the vacant stare 
of an introspection experiment. 
As we dissect language, sharper is the 
conflict between it and our requirement, 
which is at risk of becoming empty 
as the conflict becomes intolerable. 
The actual use of language cannot be 
interfered with by philosophy; all 
it can do in the end is describe it. 
A question can be unanswerable, 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
Investigations (1953) and much 
of his later work is centred 
around an examination of the use 
of language, words and concepts 
in philosophy and how this 
conflicts with our usual usage of 
these concepts. From around 
1932 onwards Wittgenstein 
developed an analogic picture of 
language as a game (taking chess 
as his initial model, but 
expanding to reference other 
games and activities). He coined 
the phrase `language- 
game' (Sprachspiel), to describe 
the ways language works - how 
we `play' with words - in our 
interactions with other human 
beings; and it is through these 
`games' that children learn their 
first (and arguably most 
subsequent) words (Wittgenstein 
1953,1958 and 1967)-their 
`natural language'. (Much work and hypothesising has been done on first language 
acquisition, including the work of Roman Jakobson, Noam Chomsky and Roger 
Brown, and hypotheses with such names as the bioprogram hypothesis, critical 
period hypothesis, innateness hypothesis and the language instinct. There can be 
limited discussion of it here. See Akmajian et al 1990 and Trask 1999, for an 
introduction and summary. ) 
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This is a thesis about the divisions (and difficulties) brought about through language; 
both philosophical and everyday, or what Locke called the `civil' use of words 
(Essay III. ix. 3), and demonstrated in mind-body dualism and its insidious influence 
on Western languages, and even 
perhaps, if we do not understand it, 
or it might be badly framed so as to in the linguistic distinctions 
be nonsensical and just generate between (and conceptual 
some confusion in the listeners who 
have the idea that language always 
serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts; to 
express the truth in a meaningful phrase. 
A mental mist seems to enshroud our use 
of language, and this haze distorts our gaze. 
implications of) such lexations 
as `human being' and `human 
body'. In particular, the concept 
and the problem of `Private 
Language' underscores, in a way, 
the following thesis. The term is a relatively new phrase in philosophy, but its roots 
are in the 17th Century writings of the dualist Descartes, the materialist Hobbes, and 
the empiricist Locke. As an extended (yet still brief) outline of a `traditional' account 
of how language works, John Locke will serve as an example. (Another example 
might be the Port-Royal theory of grammar and language of Antoine Arnauld and 
Claude Lancelot, from c. 1660. ) 
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The whole point of a language is to 
communicate. As the Mexican historian 
and translator Miguel Leon-Portilla has 
put it, "In order to survive, a language 
must have a function. " A language 
spoken by one person, or even a few 
hundred, is not a language at all. It is 
like a child's secret code. 
(Malik 2000: 16) 
Cf Nl ýr 
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In his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke 1975; first published 
1690; herein referred to as Essay), Locke held that words exist to convey `Ideas' and 
signify these `Ideas' in our own `Minds'. `Ideas', in a Lockean sense, are: 
It is for us not an aim to produce 
"whatsoever is the object of the 
a system of rules for the use of words understanding when a man 
in unheard-of ways, 'though this does seduce thinks" (Locke Essay I. i. 8; this 
us at times, we must proceed undeterred definition rests on a system of 
on the path that passes from a piece of 
disguised nonsense to the patently absurd. thought derived 
from Descartes, 
but it is not necessary to go into 
the similarities and differences here). These `ideas' come to us through experience 
(Locke denied any sort of `innate idea'), via our senses and sensations, although this 
is not the only way, as in the case of "doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, 
willing" (Locke Essay II. i. 4) and other so-called internal experiences; for Locke, 
Thinking was the Mind turning "its view inwards upon it self' (Locke 1975: 226; 
Essay II. xix. 1). In this `traditional' view of language and thoughts, to explain it in a 
highly simplified form, words and speech are seen as being attached to objects in our 
minds which we all have and access when we use or hear the word (compare the 
Platonic notion that there exist `ideals' independent of our minds). These meanings 
are consensual and stand for `nominal essences' (see Locke Essay III. iii. I5ff) which 
support the language we speak, and therefore the nature of the knowledge we share. 
The whole process is demonstrated when someone makes up a new word (see Locke 
Essay III. vi. 44ff), whereby they connect an utterance to something that they have 
observed (as outlined above, either in the world through the senses, that is 
`Sensation', or `in themselves' as "the operations of [their mind]" (Locke Essay 
II. i. 4), what Locke calls `Reflection'). Each word that exists has a `proper 
signification' which needs to be passed on to other people through communication 
(see Locke Essay III. vi. 51). Or as Wittgenstein explains the traditional, message 
model of linguistic communication: 
[Wittgenstein] should like to say: you regard it too much as a matter of course 
that one can tell anything to anyone. That is to say: we are so much accustomed 
to communication through speech, in conversation, that it looks to us as if the 
whole point of communication lay in this: someone else grasps the sense of my 
words-which is something mental: he as it were takes it into his own mind. 
(Wittgenstein PI §363) 
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What this thesis would like to urge is expressed by Wittgenstein when he writes: 
Sometimes you have to take an expression out of the language, to send it for 
cleaning, -& then you can put it back into circulation. 
(CV 44e: MS 117 156) 
Philosophy is the uncov'ring of It is not considered possible that 
bumps that the understanding has got by 
banging its head against the limits of 
a total re-shaping of the language 
language. Of course we want to clarify, 
and clarify completely, but this means 
that problems should disappear completely. 
Blow up the house of cards to smithereens! ' 
will take place in the light of any 
`new' philosophy - it would be 
hypocritical to expect it to, and 
even more so to back a full-scale 
adoption of a new conceptual 
framework -a clean up is needed. Wittgenstein wrote: 
At present we are combatting a trend. But this trend will die out, superseded by 
others. And then people will no longer understand our arguments against it; 
will not see why all that needed saying. 
(CV 49e: MS 126 64r) 
The point is that these frameworks are unstable, as is the language on which they are 
built. There is a danger in believing that what seems like a viable proposition today 
will be so in the future. How is it that we can proceed taking this into account? There 
is no easy way of generating a new language that can guarantee an unproblematic 
raft of concepts on which it floats (see Wittgenstein PI §492). There is also the risk 
of simply talking the `old language' in a new way: 
perform it afresh so to speak in a manner that suits our times. In doing so you 
really only reproduce [... ] What I mean is not however giving an old style a 
new trim. You don't take the old forms & fix them up to suit today's taste. No, 
you are really speaking, maybe unconsciously, the old language, but speaking 
it in a manner that belongs to the newer world, though not on that account 
necessarily one that is to its taste. 
(Wittgenstein CV 68-9e: MS 134 133; italics in original) 
Language is purpose-built like a building (and as Wittgenstein talks of architecture 
in this context, it can imitate past styles), yet it is built up over time like a city with 
everyday language the central winding alleyways of the old town, surrounded by the 
newer, more ordered suburbs-the languages of science and other specialised 
activities (see PI §18 and BB 81). Language is constantly changing (at an almost 
imperceptible rate). 
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Canto 4: The World Through New Eyes. 
Orpheus and Ermy stand in silence, 
as Wittgenstein continues his lecture, 
`What we do is not some sort of science, 
philosophy, like doing architecture, 
is more work on one's own conception, 
on how one sees things. We can't conjecture 
turbulently, convince through deception. 
We seek perspicuity, a world-view 
made of connections from its inception. 
Everything should lie open to view, 
what is hidden is of no interest. 
And let us forget about "false" and "true", 
for the truth of a statement is the test 
of my understanding of the statement. 
It is what human beings say that is 
This thesis is not the work of a 
scientist. It is not intended to be a 
`scientific' work. There are no 
proofs or theorems to be tested as 
right or wrong. (There is an 
emphasis here on asking questions 
rather than giving answers. ) When 
theories are propounded, it is not 
an attempt to prove or disprove 
them, but to open them up and 
look at them from different 
directions: "Philosophy is not a 
choice between different 
`theories"' (comment attributed to 
true and false. We have form of life agreement. Wittgenstein, cited in Perloff 
If language is to be a means of 
communication there must be agreement 1996: 18). Science can display its 
own form of logocentrism, as in 
the term used by Ludwig Klages, characterised by a mechanistic and rational attitude, 
"which is indifferent or hostile to everything living and vibrant" (Mautner 1997: 327; 
cf. Nietzsche WP §§554 and 555). If science is about facts and truths, then this thesis is 
philosophy in a Wittgensteinian sense: it is about meanings. It is about human 
experience and a description of that experience from a subjective point of view. 
Binkley, in his study of Wittgenstein's language, writes "Philosophical descriptions, like 
aesthetic descriptions [... are] ways of looking" (1973: 
ualy tt,. a, now 
55). 
_ 
ta- jet', 't attxrapply 
Ca*Y Sae ý 1110 
ý' 
0" 
tim, cam, ., yty, uZu 
rer 
ýtrnr", 
ca u 
G3+ruH 
d' ha "'er ca 
e"ý'ý' 
rr dýf y 
riot 
ua+ ä' dph ýy'"'e, `, cý"ývlec 
a 
correCll tv 
W 
ý"ºg,; ro-tra W%g r sa 
ay vr 
a+tiv 
CaMiAl 
Aye co e, tteya+ 
pr,., , two ýp, 
, ý"ýdýprýýýL°"ýofP 
ýp"Cp, 
T5 148 
According to `traditional' views a person is able "to think either in terms of a private 
vocabulary with its private meanings or to think by means of the private meanings of 
words that also have a common meaning in virtue of being part of a public 
vocabulary" (Saunders and Henze 1967: 4). Locke wrote: 
Any words will serve for recording. As to the first of these, for the recording 
our own thoughts for the help of our own memories, whereby, as it were, we 
talk to ourselves, any words will serve the turn. For since sounds are voluntary 
and indifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what words he pleases to 
signify his own ideas to himself: and there will be no imperfection in them, if 
he constantly use the same sign for the same idea: for then he cannot fail of 
having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right use and perfection 
of language. 
(Essay III. ix. 2) 
Even in some of Wittgenstein's early writing we see possible evidence of this sort of 
thinking: 
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language 
(of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. 
(TLP §5.62; italics in original) 
The riddle, when Carroll wrote it, had no answer. It is only 
after much deliberation that some answers have been 
proffered. All of them are successful answers to the riddle 
"Why is a raven like a writing-desk? " The question "What is 
a mind? " does not have one answer either, although like 
Alice, many believe that they can find the definitive answer 
to it. But there is a difference between Carroll's riddle 
and mine-Carroll's supposes that there is a similarity 
between a raven and a writing-desk and links the two; while 
my riddle does not suppose any link between a mind and 
anything else. It is easy to suggest that one physical 
object can be linked to another, but not so easy to link 
that which is usually considered intangible to anything 
else, as many have tried. We want the mind to be something 
special, a something extra just for humans in the likeness 
of Descartes' res cogitans. If I asked "Why is a tree like a 
mind? ", you would seek to find the answer as Alice might. I 
have no formed answer as to why a tree is like a mind, or 
why a mind is like a tree. It could have something to do 
with a conception of the mind as having a branch-like 
structure, but this is not a wholly convincing model. (Try 
inserting the word 'brain' in place of either 'mind' or 
'tree'. ) There may well be constructions that can form 
answers to any of these questions, but I don't know yet what 
they are. 
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However, debate rages over the translation and the sense of the clause in the 
parentheses. Jaakko Hintikka believes it is clear "that a correct translation of the 
words in the brackets [der Sprache, die allein ich verstehe] is `the only language that 
I understand"' (Hintikka in Copi and Beard 1966: 157; Hintikka's chapter `On 
Wittgenstein's `Solipsism", Copi and Beard 1966: 157-61, discusses the particular 
form of `solipsism' used by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus), which removes the strong 
implication of a private language. David Keyt also discusses the problems presented 
by this passage (especially with regards to Wittgenstein's `solipsism'), outlining the 
arguments of Anscombe - "of the language that only I understand" (1959: 167) - and 
Stenius - "which is the only language I understand" (1960: 221) -, and while most 
native German speakers prefer Stenius' translation, Keyt notes, "The most 
conservative conclusion that one can draw is that the parenthetical remark is 
genuinely ambiguous, in which case the proper translation could be settled only by a 
word from the master himself [Wittgenstein, that is]" (in Copi and Beard 1966: 
301fn. ). Brian McGuinness (the translator of the §5.62 quoted above), "no longer 
believes that there is a reference to a private language at 5.62" (in Copi and Beard 
1966: 141 fn. ). The `private language' argument is wrapped up in the philosophical 
concept(s) of `solipsism': the view that only oneself exists, or the problem of other 
minds, or whether other things (that is creatures, or perhaps in certain debates 
machines) have an `inner life', a mind as humans do. In relation to language, "It 
seems to a solipsist that I have to learn what words refer to by connecting them with 
items of my own experience" (Squires in Honderich 1995: 838). 
see''Iyer (1990) 
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When Wittgenstein writes: "When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going 
not only of definitions but of through my mind 
in addition to the 
judgments also. What determines our verbal expressions: the language is 
judgment, our concepts and reactions, of 
itself the vehicle of 
course, is not what one man is doing now, or 
an individual action, but the 
hurly-burly of human actions, or 
the background against which we see any 
action. We see life as a weave, made with 
one pattern interwoven with many 
others. The conceptual world we live 
in, is not always complete, but patterns 
appear almost the same, recurring with 
variations. The actions of humans 
as they are all mixed up together 
demonstrates to us how language functions. 
thought" Wittgenstein PI §329), is 
he suggesting that there are other 
kinds of `thinking' that can be done, 
without language? What about when 
a `thought' is about someone's face? 
What then is `the vehicle of 
thought'? (Remember that the word 
`thought', like `to think', is a tool 
(Wittgenstein PI §360). The word 
`thought' doesn't describe what (a) 
thought is, it is only the use we put the word to that helps us with what it `means'. It has 
different meanings in different sentences: "I thought it was raining"; "I thought about you 
the other day'; "I had the exact same thought"; "I thought for ages about what I should do"; 
"I thought of the answer to the question"; etc.. ) The memory-image or imagination-image is 
not carried by language, we think. It is like a picture of the person's face. But as Wittgenstein 
notes in a series of remarks collected and printed in Zettel (1967; §§621-655), it is not a picture 
yet the experiences of seeing a picture and `seeing' an imagination-image are linked by 
language-games that "are radically different-but [which] hang together" (Z §625). To see a 
picture it helps to have our eyes open, to `see' an image it often helps to shut our eyes (see 
Wittgenstein °Ivy, e#vl Z§626). 
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"A picture is not worth a thousand Are, 
words, or any other number. Words are 
the wrong currency to exchange for a rvOY. 
picture" (Davidson 1984: 263). 
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Many of the terms most used by humans to describe themselves and their 
experience are based on age-old beliefs, that may or may not still be held, but 
which nevertheless have shaped our view of the world and what we are. Cross- 
culturally these things are often different (see Wierzbicka 1999), which should 
indicate that there is no inherent right or wrong in our languages, and therefore 
in what makes us human. Western science is now considered the benchmark for 
proving what is correct about the world, and has gone some way into unlocking 
the so-called secrets of life, but other cultures and other scientific methods come 
up with theories which may or may not be provable (or disprovable) by western 
science. For example, take the human mind. This is a long-contested concept: 
what is the mind? Is it a separate spirit-like thing attached to a body? Is it part of 
the brain? Is it an epiphenomenal property of brain processes? Does it even exist 
at all? How does it work? What happens when one person thinks that they have 
one kind of mind, and another person thinks their mind is something different? 
Each person feels as right as the other, and it makes little difference to their 
ability to control their bodies. A. J. Ayer writes: "It should be clear, [... ] that 
there is no philosophical problem concerning the relationship of mind and 
matter, other than the linguistic problems of defining certain symbols which 
denote logical constructions in terms of symbols which denote sense- 
contents" (1990: 132). If we can accept for just a short while that there is no 
such thing (no substance) as the mind, but that there is a linguistic concept (or 
number of them) we can use in certain situations, we can begin to understand 
that so many of our `ways of describing' are what shape us, and not the other 
way round-but, it must be added that language is not considered as the only 
shaper of our experience of the world. It prompts many fundamental questions, 
or rather, questions about fundamentals: "If I don't have a mind, as I was led to 
WCýof believe, then what am I? " 
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In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wrote: 
The limits of my language mean 
The notion that language is important 
Mel 
4r lvhorf 
ctl 
Wittgenstein and Benjamin Lee Who ý9ßý)yi is f ee ; {j s 
thesis. Whorf writes: 44L, 999.. 'ep°Lý6z' ee#v 7w`gý 
It was found [through linguistic study] that the background linguistic system 
(in other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing 
instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program 
and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, 
for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade [... ] We dissect nature along lines 
laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate 
from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every 
observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic 
flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means 
largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. 
(1956: 212-3) 
The use of the word `mind' should not be viewed with prejudice, although it is 
tempting to balk at its mention following the expressions above. As will be 
discussed elsewhere, certain words are not totally unusable, just to be used with 
caution, used, as Wittgenstein might say, as tools. We must be careful not to become 
muddled: 
we are tempted to say `the mechanism of the mind must be of a most peculiar 
kind to be able to do what the mind does'. But here we are making two 
mistakes. For what struck us as being queer about thought and thinking was 
not at all that it had curious effects which we were not yet able to explain 
(causally). Our problem, in other words, was not a scientific one; but a muddle 
felt as a problem. " 
(Wittgenstein BB 5-6) 
What Wittgenstein prompts us to do is not look for something beyond the word 
which is not there (see also Feyerabend 1993). Just as the word `mind' has its uses, 
so too do other words that present us with such muddles. 
I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there `must 
be' what is called a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, 
etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc. 
(Wittgenstein BB 41) 
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Wittgenstein gives us a rule of thumb: 
If you are puzzled about the nature of thought, belief, knowledge, and the like, 
substitute for the thought the expression of the thought, etc. The difficulty 
which lies in this substitution, and at the same time the whole point of it, is 
this: the expression of belief, thought, etc., is just a sentence; -and the 
sentence has sense only as a member of a system of language; as one 
expression within a calculus. 
(Wittgenstein BB 42) 
Approaches such as extreme linguistic relativity hypotheses, and even Wittgenstein's 
rule of thumb are potentially scary. They risk reducing everything (human actions, 
the world) down to language, words (or worse: nothing). Paul Feyerabend writes: 
utj,, i& wordy 
, ; )e trick& wwA concentration on language alone, or on `texts', can easily lead into absurdity, 
.. What WW s is shown by Austin and by the practice of deconstruction: on the one hand 11 philosophers produce texts, like poets; on the other hand they take it for pr 
granted that their texts reveal a reality beyond the thoughts, impressions, 
a4 memories, figures of speech, etc., etc. from which they arose. (Scientific 
(w2 
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jealists to a certain extent share in this predicament. ) 
AW&If(1993: 
210) 
Anyone who has suffered severe pain 
and tried to describe the experience to a 
friend or to the doctor often finds 
themselves at a loss for words. [... ] 
The reason for this difficulty in 
expressing pain experience, actually, is 
not because the words do not exist. 
There is an abundance of appropriate 
words, but they are not words which we 
use often. There is another reason: the 
words may seem absurd. We may use 
descriptors such as splitting, shooting, 
gnawing, wrenching or stinging, but 
there are no `outside', objective 
references for these words. If we talk 
about a blue pen or a yellow pencil we 
can point to an object and say `that is 
what I mean by yellow' or `the colour of 
the pen is blue'. But what can we point 
to to tell another person precisely what 
we mean by smarting, tingling, or 
rasping? A person who suffers terrible 
pain may say that the pain is burning 
and add that `it feels as if someone is 
shoving a red-hot poker through my 
toes and slowly twisting it around'. 
These `as if' statements are often 
essential to convey the qualities of the 
experience. 
(Melzack and Wall 1996: 36-7) 
We could move into the idea that single signs 
(words) do not signify. Of course, you say, that 
individual words have meaning, but the point, as 
stated above, is more that they only have 
meaning as part of a language which provides a 
context for them and a system of rules for their 
use (see Wittgenstein PI §43 and BB 42, quoted 
above). Whorf too says something similar: 
"Sense and meaning does not result from words 
or morphemes but from patterned relations 
between words or morphemes" 
(Whorf 1956: 67); and "Apparent isolations of 
words in a vocabulary list also derive what 
meaning they have from the patterned `potentials 
of linkage, ' which ramify from them and connect 
them with complex patterns of linguistic 
formulation" (Whorf 1956: 67fn. 4). 
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When describing human behaviour, 
for example "pain", the behaviour and 
outside occasion belong together. 
How do I know you have pain in your hand? 
What is it to know I have pain in mine? 
How do words refer to sensations? And 
do I mean that we can only define 
pain in terms of behaviour? For what 
of toothache, which some call a private pain? 
Let us now ask: `Can a human body have 
pain? ' One is inclined to say: `How can 
the body have pain? The body in itself is 
something dead; a body isn't 
conscious! '... it is as though we saw that 
what has pain must be an entity of a 
different nature from that of a material 
object; that, in fact, it must be of a 
mental nature. But to say that the ego is 
mental is like saying that the number 3 
is of a mental or an immaterial nature, 
when we recognize that the numeral `3' 
isn't used as a sign for a physical object. 
(Wittgenstein BB 73) 
The human capacity for language 
certainly shapes our ways of thinking. 
But most linguists have long since given 
up on the idea that people's perceptions 
of the world, and the kinds of concepts 
they hold, are determined by the 
particular language they speak. It is 
absurd to suppose that all French 
speakers have a common view of the 
world, thanks to a common language. 
(Malik 2000: 16) 
But in forming an answer we contradict the earlier statement 
that there is no answer, or that the mind is a purely non- 
physical thing. "Wittgenstein has found that anything, 
physical or mental, internal or external, that does not 
admit of articulation is indistinguishable from 
nothing" (Price 1973: 60). It seems that which ever way we 
turn we are led to an impasse-if the mind is not physical 
then it is not like anything, and how can we seriously argue 
for the existence of something that is nothing?; or if it is 
like a tree in a sense, then why can't we see or feel it? 
Perhaps the answer to this last question is that we can see 
and feel it. But this is perhaps only because we can say 
that we "know it is there". And if it is anything physical 
then it is most likely the brain. So we come to the 
conclusion that the brain is the mind, and the mind is the 
brain. Maybe, but not quite. We still get an uncomfortable 
feeling that this is not wholly satisfactory either. In his 
Blue Book, Wittgenstein writes 
"On the other hand we can perfectly well adopt the 
expression 'this body feels pain'... " (Wittgenstein Bß 73) 
"The kernel of our proposition that that which has pains or 
sees or thinks is of a mental nature is only, that the word 
'I' in 'I have pains' does not denote a particular body, for 
we can't substitute for 'I' a description of a body. " 
(Wittgenstein BB 74) - last words of Blue Book. 
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The `Private Language' debate centres around the argument not that all languages 
In what sense are my sensations private? - 
that we might call `private' are 
It is nonsense to say that only one possible or not, but that a certain 
can know whether one is in pain or not 
form of `private language' is 
Whether I know something depends on 
whether I am backed up by evidence, 
and if I have grounds to base a doubt on. 
improbable and objectionable. In 
a Wittgensteinian (and 
philosophical) sense what is 
being disputed is that there is any possibility of having a `private language' in which 
The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known 
to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person 
cannot understand the language. 
(Wittgenstein Pl §243) 
In the conclusion to his book, Can There be a Private Language?, Warren Smerud 
(1970) clarifies the differences between the two main kinds of `private language' at 
the same time as giving a summation of his argument: 
If the question [Can There be a Private Language? ] is whether a man could 
invent and use a sign to stand for and record the occurrence of an immediate 
private sensation having no behavioural indicators either contingent or 
criterial, the answer appears to be `yes'. On the other hand, if the question is 
whether it is possible that a man could invent a sign of this kind which not 
only (a) is used by him to refer to such a sensation but which also (b) is 
logically impossible for others to understand, the answer is `no', for if it is 
granted that the sign can be employed to refer to a sensation, then it has a 
meaning, and if a sign has meaning, then it is logically possible that others 
could come to understand it. 
(Smerud 1970: 114-5) 
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This holds for most forms of experience. 
There is no essence of consciousness to 
be discovered; so-called inner contents 
of a hidden inner realm which just you 
have access to. An "inner process" stands 
in need of outward criteria. To 
know what happens when someone understands 
we do not look into his head, but at 
what he does with that which he understands. 
Communication is also like that. 
We are not trying to put something in 
to someone else's mind, and that is that. 
"The first use of language, is the 
expression of our conceptions, that is, 
the begetting in another the same 
conceptions that we have in 
ourselves" (Thomas Hobbes in The 
Elements of I. aw, Natural and Politic, `How 
by Language Men Work Upon Each 
Other's Minds', Chapter 13, §2). 
[Images: see RPP I, §183] 
What is the nature of the raven and the writing-desk? When 
the Hatter says his 'riddle' what is he using to help him? 
Might he just as easily have asked "Why is a lemon like a 
sock? "? The raven and the desk do not need to exist in any 
form for him to be able to use the words in a sentence. He 
does not even need to picture a desk or a black bird, and 
neither do we, even to help us try to make sense of the 
question (although we might try to pull up images of both so 
as to see if there are any physical resemblances). The words 
act in an abstract way. Their existence is simply to prompt 
a tangential probing by the listener into the uses of the 
words themselves, and how other words are connected to them. 
(A meaning blind person would have extreme difficulties 
trying to formulate an answer. ) Suppose that the Hatter (who 
is mad, let us not forget (see RPP I, §§198,216 etc)), had 
a 'picture' of a book and one of an apple come to him and in 
mistakenly (wittingly or otherwise) used the words raven and 
writing-desk instead of book and apple. Firstly, how would 
we ever know that this was the case? (To him a book is a 
raven and so on. ) Secondly, does it mean that the riddle is 
utter nonsense because he is asking for the relationship 
between two things that differ from the things that we think 
they are? (The answering of a riddle is nonsensical in many 
ways because it requires an understanding of the unusual way 
that words work in the rules of riddling, which subvert the 
rules of everyday speech. ) 
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Dance seems like both writing (dependent on seeing) and speech (reliant on hearing; 
although this suggests that sign-language used by deaf persons is not `speech', when 
in one sense clearly it is, or at least, it performs the same sorts of functions as 
vocalised speech) in certain respects, but is obviously neither. Choreography is seen 
as `writing' dance, but dancing is more like speech as a natural human act, but 
without the `clarity' of words. There is obviously a logocentricity at play when we 
watch dance, in that we want it to say something (and to say something about it). 
Dance could then be said to be a form of non-verbal communication. But what is 
communication? What is it to communicate? We can find various answers to these 
questions. `Communication' is yet another word that is fraught with definition 
difficulties and `explained' by theories of `how it works'. It is impossible and 
impractical here to give an account of all the various definitions and theories, 
however a brief overview will be attempted. 
`Communication' can be described in mathematical or scientific terms - as in the 
Shannon-Weaver transmission model of communication (Shannon and Weaver 
1949) - which are often applied or mis-applied generally; or in ways which describe 
specific forms of communication - for example, through the mass media - or in 
interpersonal communication from a sociological, anthropological or psychological 
standpoint - see, for example, Benthall and Polhemus 1975. What is most relevant 
here are those theories that account for the role of technology in the communication 
via linguistic and physical (non-verbal) means. However, it is useful to sketch a 
common understanding of `communication'. 
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The word communication will be used here 
in a very broad sense to include all of 
the procedures by which one mind may 
affect another. This, of course, involves 
not only written and oral speech, but 
also music, the pictorial arts, the theatre, 
the ballet, and in fact all human 
behavior. In some connections it may be 
desirable to use a still broader definition 
of communication, namely, one which 
would include the procedures by means 
of which one mechanism (say automatic 
equipment to track an airplane and to 
compute its probable future positions) 
affects another mechanism (say a guided 
missile chasing this airplane). 
The language of this memorandum will 
often appear to refer to the special, but 
still very broad and important, field of 
the communication of speech; but 
practically everything said applies 
equally well to music of any sort, and to 
still or moving pictures, as in television. 
(Weaver 1949: 92; italics in original) 
Claude Shannon's `A Mathematical 
Theory of Communication': 
The fundamental problem of 
communication is that of reproducing 
at one point either exactly or 
approximately a message selected at 
another point. Frequently the 
messages have meaning; that is they 
refer to or are correlated according to 
some system with certain physical or 
conceptual entities. These semantic 
aspects of communication are 
irrelevant to the engineering problem. 
The significant aspect is that the 
actual message is one selected fiom a set 
of possible messages. The system 
must be designed to operate for each 
possible selection, not just the one 
which will actually be chosen since 
this is unknown at the time of design. 
(1949: 3; italics in original) 
Black warns us that the Shannon- 
Weaver theory can be misinterpreted 
when applied to language and that: 
the basic notions of information 
theory are essentially statistical: they 
provide some interesting insight into 
global features of language, but are 
inapplicable to particular utterances. 
(1968: 15-6) 
McLuhan and Powers claim that 
Shannon and Weaver's model show a 
mistaken understanding for it has, what 
they call, `a left-hemisphere bias' and 
because it: 
ignores the surrounding environment 
as a kind of pipeline model of a 
'hardware container for software 
content. It stresses the idea of inside 
and outside and assumes that 
communication is a literal matching 
rather than making. 
(1989: 75) 
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On the subject of speech, Hobbes wrote, "The general! use of Speech, is to transferre 
our Mentall Discourse into Verbal; or the Trayn of our Thoughts into a Trayn of 
Words" (1985: 101). In the logocentric attitude, spoken language is the primary and 
truest expression of meaning, written language is a mere derivation and supplement 
Take art, for example. By this I mean to speech, which is closest to the 
those activities of human beings 
in which it is hard to say anything 
soul of the speaker; speech is an 
that is as good as: saying nothing. 
Perhaps from Tolstoy's false theorizing 
that the work of art conveys "a feeling", 
we think art serves "to arouse feelings": 
is then, perhaps, perceiving it with the 
senses included amongst these feelings? 
Suppose you tried to separate out the 
feeling which music gives you from hearing 
music. Now, a man makes a hand gesture. 
So he may have meant something or nothing. 
And if the former, was it the movement 
that he meant-or was there another thing? 
authentic expression of the logos 
and writing is an adjunct. If we 
go to the idea suggested 
elsewhere, regarding the gesture, 
it is possible to adapt the 
logocentric attitude in terms of 
physical movement. 
`Making gestures quotable' [... ] An 
actor must be able to space his gestures 
the way a typesetter produces spaced 
type. 
(Benjamin 1973: 148) 
If we ask him, could he reply: "I meant 
something by this movement, which can only 
be expressed by this specific movement"? 
It seems to be a series of blind alleys from which there is 
no escape. We are too busy looking for the way out to stop 
to think "Why do we need a way out of here when we are 
working just fine? ". Think of it this way: if it were proven 
that there was no such thing as a 'mind', would human beings 
cease to be able to function as they do? Would human beings 
stop wanting to fall in love; or climbing tall mountains; or 
having children; or painting pictures; or laughing at jokes; 
or shouting when they stub their toe; or inventing more 
lethal weapons; or writing novels and poetry; or trying to 
solve mathematical riddles, etc.; or doing any of the things 
that humans up until now have done, just because they can? 
One answer is that we will not stop being human IF and (more 
cautiously) when they find 'the mind', but we will be 
complete in some way, more contented. Arguably we will be 
more satisfied and less frustrated by our efforts to define 
ourselves, but how much more complete can we be? 
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The rulebook of language (grammar) is not simple, and is not set in stone either- 
but there are "pragmatic constraints" (Glock 1996: 22), `conventions' of a sort, 
Can we find an expression's meaning by which 
hold language together for 
contemplating the expression pence, the benefit of the human beings 
and the frame of mind it is used in? Why 
(and other organisms, arguably) 
should the intention matter? We might say 
that the work of art compels us to see 
it in the right perspective, but to say 
that the artist wishes that what he feels 
when writing, the other should feel when they 
are reading, starts to sound absurd. What he 
may have felt in writing a poem, say, 
doesn't concern me at all, although I 
can think I understand it in the way 
its author would wish. Ah, but couldn't I 
say that the actor does experience 
something like real longing when they cry? 
who use it. (This could be seen 
to run contrary to a neat 
Chomskyan rule system. ) The 
`game' analogy makes it clear 
that a word's meaning is not any 
object it might stand for, what 
Wittgenstein calls a `meaning- 
body', nor is it an object in the 
mind, a mental entity. Neither is 
meaning 
a process which accompanies a word. For no process could have the 
consequences of meaning. 
(Wittgenstein PI 218e) 
Instead the `meaning' of a word is its use. However, many words are treated as 
though they refer to an object (consider the word `pain', as an example), rather like a 
noun, and this complicates certain matters. The ostensive method of learning a word 
('pointing') applies to some words, but doesn't apply to a good deal of others (what 
is it to point to `a pain'? ). Philosophers after Locke attempted to do a similar thing 
with what they saw as being mental representations of objects (although there is 
some confusion as to whether Locke intended for the word `idea' to refer to a mental 
entity, as such), and similar problems are encountered in relation to discussing 
`identity', `self and `person', as examples. As a summary, Richard Rorty writes: 
Examine expressions like `having an 
idea in one's mind', `analysing the idea 
before one's mind' [... ] To say that we 
are trying to express the idea which is 
before our mind is to use a metaphor, 
one which very naturally suggests itself; 
and which is all right so long as it 
doesn't mislead us when we are 
philosophizing. 
(Wittgenstein BB 41) 
"The mind-body problem, we can now say, was 
merely a result of Locke's unfortunate mistake 
about how words get meaning, combined with 
his and Plato's muddled attempt to talk about 
adjectives as if they were nouns" (1980: 32-3). 
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This is not all, for as Wittgenstein states: 
The meaning of a phrase for us is characterized by the use we make of it. The 
meaning is not a mental accompaniment to the expression. 
(BB 65) 
In other words, when words are put together (as a proposition, a sentence) the result 
is seen by Wittgenstein as 
a move or operation in the game of language; it would be meaningless without 
the system of which it is a part. Its sense is its role in the unfolding linguistic 
activity. 
(Glock 1996: 193) 
Again this brings us back to the concept of `context', and also the idea from 
Wittgenstein outlined in his entry: 
Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? -In use it is alive. Is life 
breathed into it there? -Or is the use its life? 
(PI §432; italics in original) 
In his chapter on `Linguistic Meaning', Grant Gillett writes: 
My expression has a sense in each setting. This requires that you and I have a 
set of forms of representation whose meanings vary according to collateral 
features of use such as context or supplementary communicative devices [... ] 
One could not be counted as understanding the `language' unless one 
understood how to react to any given `utterance'. 
(1992: 122-3) 
At the beginning of what is known as `The Brown Book', Wittgenstein (1958) 
discusses the learning of words and how they have a use as signs, comparable to and 
often inter-linked with gestures (pointing, for example) and other non-verbal signs 
(an arrow, perhaps). He also asks questions of the idea that there are certain feelings 
which accompany words (after William James). Certainly, he says, there are gestures 
which accompany words as we speak them (they may even be able to stand in their 
place), and these will have a set of sensations attached to them, but not every use of 
a particular word will have the same experience. "If in some language the word `but' 
meant what `not' means in English, it is clear we should not compare the meanings 
of these two words by comparing the sensations which they produce" (BB 79). It 
would not be easy, he suggests, to discover the feelings these words give people at 
any given usage. Even uttered more than once within the same sentence would a 
word evoke the same meaning on subsequent uses to the first time? 
162 
Emotions are bodily feelings, hence 
can be at least partially reproduced, 
if James is right, by volunt'ry movements. 
But even so, what is to be deduced 
from this? Are we to understand that an 
emotion is physically induced? 
Possibly one could be sad because one 
is crying, but of course one is not sad 
that one is crying. I'd like to say: One 
no more feels sorrow in one's body than 
one feels seeing in one's eyes. A cry is 
not the description of a state of mind, 
even though a state of mind sometimes is 
inferred from it. Do not be misled by 
the belief that "the expression of pain is 
a cry" has the same meaning as when I 
say that "the expression of thought is a 
proposition". An utterance, like the cry 
`Seeing' is of the eyes, we say, 
and `imaging' (the word as used 
in Wittgenstein Z §629) is done 
by nothing that we can 
identify-, although we might say 
it is the brain (materialist 
conception), or the mind's eye 
('common-sense' conception). 
So the question of what carries a 
mental image if it isn't language 
still remains. But if we were to 
describe the mental image of a 
face we would use words or a 
drawing-neither would 
resemble the image, but might 
it replaces, is not description either. come 
`close' depending on our 
Nor is an expression of sadness like proficiency with either. But what 
the feeling of sadness. And a gesture 
is a `close resemblance' to a 
mental image? Can we hold the mental image still and clear enough to compare it to 
the picture or the sentence? If we were to use pictures to stand for (represent? ) 
mental images, what would these pictures look like? "The mental picture is the 
picture which is described when someone describes what he imagines" (Wittgenstein 
PI §367). 
Grammar does not tell us how language 
must be constructed in order to fulfil its 
purpose, in order to have such-and-such 
an effect on human beings. It only 
describes and in no way explains the use 
of signs. 
(Wittgenstein PI §496) 
"We should not however make the 
mistake of thinking that words, even as 
used by the lower personal mind, 
represent the opposite pole from these 
variable symbols, that a word DOES 
have an exact meaning, stands for a 
given thing, is only ONE value of a 
variable" (Whorf 1956: 259; emphasis 
in original). 
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Suppose that the best picture of the mental image is a movement or a gesture or an 
attitude of the human body (see Wittgenstein PI 178e). We would have to be content 
with the body's portrayal of the mental image, and seek no further interpretation of 
it. We cannot say what the body's portrayal means in any other way than by the body 
it was portrayed on. Can we put it into words? What are the words describing? They 
describe the visible body: the movement, the position of limbs, the speed, the 
`aesthetic qualities' of the movement, the angle of the head, the facial expression, 
and so on. We might say that we can "see emotion" (Wittgenstein Z §225), but what 
we are doing is describing the body's movements as such and such an emotion word. 
To say that a movement is sad is not to see the emotion `sadness', either directly or 
indirectly, but it is somehow "personified" in the body (Wittgenstein Z §225). We 
say we understand a movement when we can describe it, and describing it helps us to 
understand it. If we describe the movement of a person as we would describe a 
picture, we will describe it in the same words that a picture prompts in us. Is to 
describe a picture in such a way a demonstration that we understand it? What is there 
to understand in a picture? "The meaning". "The sense". "The intention of the 
artist". We say that we offer an `interpretation' of the picture (the movement as 
picture). 
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Wierzbicka (1999: 175) on facies: 
One crucial feature that facial 
`messages' have in common with 
verbal utterances is that they, too, 
express meanings which can be 
identified in the same metalanguage 
of universal semantic primes in 
which all verbal meanings can be 
identified. This means, in effect, that 
all facial messages can also be 
expressed verbally. 
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is similar. The gesture-we should like 
to say-tries to portray, but cannot do 
it. How curious it is: we should like 
to explain our understanding of a 
gesture by means of a translation into 
words, and the understanding of words by 
translating them into a gesture. (Thus 
we are tossed to and fro when we try to 
find out where understanding properly 
resides. ) And we really shall be explaining 
words by a gesture, and a gesture by 
words. Not every purposive movement of 
the human body is a gesture. I 
wish to say that we can't adduce the 
"private experience" to justify 
expressing it. Why should I say that the 
"expression" derives its meaning from the 
feeling behind it-and not from the 
circumstances of the language game in 
which it is used? We labour under the 
queer temptation to describe our language 
The use we put descriptions to 
depends on our circumstances, 
the situation we are in, the 
context. What is our 
understanding of a body's 
portrayal of a mental-image and 
what we refer to as 
`emotions' (although we should 
not say that emotions are the 
same as, or even similar to, 
mental-images) based on? Again, 
it is primarily dependent on the 
context of the portrayal: a piece 
of scenery has "life only in the 
play" (Wittgenstein Z §238). It is 
also dependent on our 
world-view, our cultural 
background, our language (again, 
consider that there are gestures that vary across cultures (see Wittgenstein Z §219 
and Wierzbicka 1999)). The sense (meaning) appears to come to us separately from 
the action-perhaps the major cause of our thinking that meaning is connected to a 
movement (any gesture or utterance or sign, for that matter) and resides in a different 
place from the movement, a place that is in the person doing the movement and then 
in us by way of it being transmitted from one body to another (our own). How does 
this occur exactly? 
Wittgenstein PO 203: 
We say `making this gesture isn't all'. 
The first answer is: We are talking 
about the experience of making this 
gesture. Secondly: it is true that 
different experiences can be 
described by the same gesture; but 
not in the sense that one is the pure 
one and the others consist... 
Best writes that it "is said that aesthetic 
meaning does ultimately depend upon 
feeling, but not so much emotional 
feeling as kinaesthetic feeling, i. e. the 
feeling of the movement" (1974: 141). 
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and its use, introducing into our 
descriptions an element of which we 
ourselves say that it is not part of the 
One explanation is that, as Frank 
Biocca (1997) writes, "The body 
language. It is a peculiar 
transmits information to other 
phenomenon of iridescence which bodies through a kind of 
seems to fool us. A poet's words can pierce us. affective contagion». What does 
`affective contagion' consist of and how does it work? Is it the same as what is 
called `kinaesthetic empathy'? 
Kinaesthetic empathy (movement-feeling-meaning) or affective contagion (emotion 
as disease, a virus), or whatever metaphor is dreamt up to `explain' a (mythological) 
transference of `meaning' does not always take into account that the information 
transmitted is often open to interpretation, misunderstanding, non-understanding. In 
the transmission of information from one body to another, at which point does the 
cause of the misunderstanding appear? In the Shannon-Weaver model of 
communication, for example, there is `noise' which distorts the information, or adds 
to the information in non-beneficial ways. Can we talk of the `noise of the body'? 
For a discussion of one `theory' on how 
communication is effected physically, 
see Best 1974: 141-52. Best summarises 
his chapter on kinaesthetic empathy: 
It is sometimes suggested that the 
aesthetic meaning of dance depends 
not on the emotions, but on the 
physical sensation of moving, which 
can be communicated to spectators, 
or other dancers, by causing in them 
a feeling of empathy. But no causal 
explanation can be adequate to 
account for meaning. 
(1974: 200) l 
"Noise in communication is like dirt, 
or like friction, in being 
ineradicable" (Black 1968: 14). 
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The `noise of the body' is the problem that "the gesture-we should like to say- 
tries to portray, but cannot do it" (Wittgenstein PI §434; italics in original). As Best 
notes the "notion of identifying the meaning of dance with kinaesthetic sensations is 
analogous to a theory of linguistic meaning which is still very prevalent, and which 
is notably exemplified by the philosopher John Locke" (1974: 144-5; see, for 
example, Locke Essay III. ii). 
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And that is of course causally connected 
with the use that they have in our life. 
And it is also connected 
with the way in which, conformably to 
use, we let our thoughts roam up and down 
in the familiar surroundings of the words. 
And now, we have to descend into the 
old chaos-we must feel at home there. 
We are getting bogged down in the sodden 
ground. Grasping the difficulty in its 
depth is what is hard. 
The problems arising through a 
misinterpretation of our forms of 
language have the character of depth. 
But what makes it deep? ' 
And down he fell, as one that swoons on sleep. 
"For our forms of expression prevent us 
in all sorts of ways from seeing that 
nothing out of the ordinary is involved, 
by sending us in pursuit of 
chimeras" (Wittgenstein PI §94). 
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Canto 5: Etiam disiecti membra poetae. 
Now with the rules broken, Orpheus and his colleague find the chaos 
that Wittgenstein had spoken about, before 
collapsing exhausted without reaching the end of his deliv'rance. 
But, there are new rules, even in disorder. 
Rules which exist to be broken, or to be read like sign-posts, hanging 
without a path, which they interpret, so that 
they might beat their way through the forest of irrelevant questions. 
The next instalment, after this short canto, 
leads the friends, Ermy and Orpheus, into blindness, blinking bloody 
black tears away from desperate and dismal 
eye-sockets. Their bodies dissected and dispersed (as was the dark prince 
when torn apart by hoards of Thracian women; 
but we shall call this a future past event for our noble hero), 
throughout the world fractured and fragmented too. 
Having rent open the world, and journeyed down into hell in order 
to try to make things better, they find themselves 
faced with new problems: scattered, scarred, schizoid, sclerosed and screaming sombre 
songs for the unified yet isolated 
souls of the techno-generation; a collective intelligence, 
a code, a compartmentalised consciousness; 
binary bodies extended beyond the corpora vilia. 
So, further down the spiral they must travel... 
It's just a war of metaphors, you say - 
but metaphors are not "just" metaphors; 
metaphors are the tools of thought. No 
one can think about consciousness 
without them, so it is important to equip 
yourself with the best set of tools 
available. Look what we have built with 
our tools. Could you have imagined it 
without them? 
(Dennett 1993: 455) 
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Wittgenstein writes in the `Preface' to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1961) that 
the aim of the book [and philosophy per se; see TLP §4.114f. ] is to draw a 
limit to thought, or rather-not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: 
for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both 
sides to the limit thinkable (i. e. we should have to be able to think what cannot 
be thought). 
It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies 
on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense. 
(TLP 3) 
To paraphrase: the book asks "What are the limits of the `thinkable'? " One answer 
to this is that: These limits are the same as the limits, the boundaries, of language, 
beyond which "the attempt to say things can only produce nonsense" (Shand 1994: 
221), and therefore silence is preferable; as Wittgenstein's own summation of the 
book states: "what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk 
about we must pass over in silence" (TLP 3). 
Is dance a way around this? Or rather, does dance fulfil the ability to express the 
inexpressible, the unutterable, by circumventing language and thereby the risk of 
speaking nonsense? 
It is, perhaps, an aim of this thesis to disrupt the apparent links between the views (a) 
of dance as a form of `pure communication' that bypasses verbal language, yet is 
capable of expression (of emotions, of thoughts, of meanings) as though it were a 
language; and (b) of a certain view of language and meaning, that sees words as 
representatives or representations of objects ('real' and `mental'). 
The problem(s) of translation: "any 
translation which intends to 
perform a transmitting function 
cannot transmit anything but 
information - hence, something 
inessential" (Benjamin 1973: 70). 
And this is how it is: if only you do not 
try to utter what is unutterable then 
nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will 
be - unutterably - contained in what has 
been uttered! 
(Wittgenstein in Engelmann 1967: 7& 
83; italics in original) 
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The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is a complex book on many levels. It is a 
treatise about philosophy (or rather the problems with it) as much as it is a 
philosophical work in itself; yet it is often described as a literary work, even by 
Wittgenstein himself. Gottlob Frege, in a letter to Wittgenstein, wrote that "The 
book thereby becomes an artistic rather than a scientific achievement; what is said in 
it takes second place to the way in which it is said" (cited in Monk 1990: 174; italics 
added). It is structured in a distinctive way (similar to the system of Alfred North 
Whitehead and Bertrand Russell's Principia Mathematica, first published in 1910, 
of which Russell wanted Wittgenstein to rewrite the first eleven chapters). 
Supposedly it has no beginning or end, and it operates as a matrix (or series of 
matrices) of inter-linked thoughts, or remarks, although at the same time, a hierarchy 
is set up in the off-shooting nature of the remarks. This system is designed to 
demonstrate the logical links of its statements themselves interesting as many of 
them are merely sentences with an aphoristic tone (frequently described as 
aphorisms), economic and poetic, "there is no babbling in it" as Wittgenstein wrote 
to the editor Ludwig von Ficker (FL 94), although as Glock notes: "They are not 
aphorisms, since they are rigidly fitted into a tight structure" (1996: 363); they often 
suggest whole chapters for which they are simply the titles: "Every sentence of the 
Tractatus should be seen as the heading of a chapter, needing further 
exposition" (Wittgenstein cited in Rhees 1984: 173)-in the same remark to 
Maurice Drury, in 1949, in which he declared that Charlie Broad was right about the 
Tractatus being syncopated and every sentence was a chapter heading, Wittgenstein 
says that his "present style is quite different; I am trying to avoid that error" (cited in 
Rhees 1984: 173). The remarks in the Tractatus are both, at the same time, "as clear 
as crystal" (Wittgenstein RUL 68) and opaque, relying on a prior understanding of 
the work of Frege and Russell and the philosophy of logic. Many of the terms are 
technical and unexplained, and to compound problems of interpretation further, 
often redefined by Wittgenstein or used in different ways at different points in the 
text. 
The problem(s) of translation: "das Übersetzen eines lyrischen Gedichts 
z. B. in eine fremde Sprache ist ganz 
analog einem mathematischen 
Problem" (Wittgenstein RPP 1 §778). 
Russell and Frege take concepts as, as 
it were, properties of things. But it is 
very unnatural to take the words man, 
tree, treatise, circle, as properties of a 
substrate. 
(Wittgenstein Z §704) 1 
171 
In 1929 Wittgenstein gave a lecture in Cambridge on the subject of Ethics, building 
on Moore's definition - "Ethics is the general enquiry into what is good" - stating 
that he, "[Wittgenstein] could have said Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, 
or, into what is really important, or [he] could have said Ethics is the enquiry into the 
meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of 
living" (PO 38); he situates Ethics within the study of Aesthetics; he suggests that 
the language of ethics and religion is based on simile ("[if] we try to drop the simile 
and simply [... ] state the facts which stand behind it, we find that there are no such 
facts" (PO 43); cf. Davidson (1984) on metaphor); he ends the lecture by 
announcing: 
My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to 
write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. 
This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly absolutely hopeless. 
Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate 
meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. 
What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document 
of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting 
deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. 
(PO 44) 
Many of Wittgenstein's investigations into ethics and aesthetics are based on the 
grammar of their expressions, or rather, the different ways in which words are used 
in talk about aestl etical and ethical subjects (see Wittgenstein PO 103-8 and 
LC 1-40). 
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The Tractatus has as its first remark (if read as a conventional text) a statement 
about `the world'. According to the Tractatus "is the totality of facts not 
things" (Wittgenstein TLP §1.1), or as Gordon Hunnings states it: "[Wittgenstein's] 
concern is with the world not as it is known, but as it is determined by the 
facts" (1988: 5; italics in original, cf. TLP §1.11). 
The Tractatus gives a number of definitions of what a `thought' is, for example, 
those which see it as a meaningful utterance: 
A propositional sign, applied and thought out, is a thought. 
A thought is a proposition with a sense. 
(Wittgenstein TLP §§3.5 and 4) 
And those which have been taken to mean it as a projection of a mental entity, with 
what Wittgenstein calls in a letter to Bertrand Russell: "psychical constituents" (RUL 
19.8.19): 
I don't know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must 
have such constituents which correspond to words of Language. 
Does a Gedanke [thought] consist of words? No! But of psychical constituents 
that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents 
are I don't know.,,,., _, 
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Emiy is struggling to understand how the concept of the world as a humanised 
reality meshes with the idea that technology changes the human 
'consciousness'. He once again starts to type: 
McLuhan wrote: 
Media, by altering the environment, evoke in us unique 
ratios of sense perceptions. The extension of any one 
sense alters the way we think and act-the way we 
perceive the world. 
When 
these 
ratios 
change, 
men change. 
(McLuhan and Fiore 1967: 41) 
["Sense ratios change when one sense or bodily or mental 
function is externalized in technological form", McLuhan in 
The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962: 265). ] 
Ong theorised on how "writing has transformed human 
consciousness" (1982: 78). 
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The limits of language (and therefore thought) are given by the essence of language, 
"a single or unified logic; [... ] a single unified universal form of language" (Shand 
1994: 222): "language is a mirror of reality" (Hunnings 1988: 2). 
Language is definable as "the totality of propositions" (Wittgenstein TLP §4.001): 
A proposition is a picture of reality. 
A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it. 
(Wittgenstein TLP §4.01) 
(or in other words: "abstract [entities] designated by declarative sentences in 
particular languages" (Williamson in Honderich 1995: 724), and bearing truth and 
falsity across languages)., Not only is this the case for propositions about `objects' (or 
what a word has a relation to in the world, the `meaning' of a word), but also for so- 
called `non-existent objects'. Conmder 
arv F`ý'stý3, 
What is consciousness? Perhaps it is how we react to the 
world, or rather, how we are able describe it. Rephrase to 
this: It is the human ability to describe what they have 
experienced. Consciousness and related words are terms which 
have a variety of uses in our language. 
Ermy recalls a book he read a while ago. It is in another room, so he gets up 
and walks across the landing, and through the doorway. He scans the shelves. 
He sees the familiar title: A History of the Mind 
Turning to Chapter 16, he skims the page and smiles. On the next page is the 
section he wants. 
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The word `conscious' derives from the Latin con, meaning 
`together with', and scire, meaning `to know'. In the original Latin the 
verb conscire (from which came the adjective conscius) meant 
literally to share the knowledge with other people. This implied, orig- 
inally, sharing the knowledge widely. But, as time went on the 
usage changed, and it shifted to mean sharing knowledge with 
some people but not others, sharing it within a small circle - and 
thus being privy to a secret. Caesar and his generals, for example, 
were conscius of their battle plans. 
There was then a further change in this direction. The circle of 
those with whom the knowledge was shared became tighter 
and tighter - until eventually it included just a single person, the 
subject who was conscious. To be conscius sibi, conscious with 
oneself, had come to mean that the subject was the only one who 
knew something - and by implication that he was unwilling to 
share it with anyone else. By the first century AD Horace could 
write that a man's epitaph should be `nil conscire sibs": to be 
`conscious with himself of nothing', and so to have no guilty 
secrets. 
After the word `conscious' came into English in the Middle 
Ages, its meaning underwent another shift. People wanted to make 
a distinction between, on the one hand, `having private knowledge 
that one would not want anyone else to have access to' (for 
example - as already implied by Horace - knowledge of one's 
own secret actions), and, on the other hand, `having knowledge 
that by its very nature no one else could have access to' (for 
example, knowledge of one's innermost thoughts and feelings). 
The work was therefore split into two words. 
'Ca aaea-domeöxs, ' thinks Ermy as he walks back to his computer. He slides onto the angled seat, 
places the open book at an angle resting against the monitor, and types in a sentence. 
But, leaving aside such special contexts, it is clear that by far and 
away the more common modern English meaning of 'to be conscious' is to 
have knowledge of one's own private feelings and thoughts. 
(Humphrey 1993: 101) 
But here lies the problem. 
The problem of 'knowledge of one's own private feelings and thoughts'. What does it 
mean 'to know' these things? Wittgenstein calls these 'things' the "'content' of 
experience, of experiencing" (RPP I §91). Nicholas Humphrey has suggested "that 
consciousness involves a particular sort of 'thinking about one's own mental 
states"' (1993: 110). And that it is possible to "'just sit and think' and be 
conscious of [... ] thinking - but only because such conscious thoughts (unlike 
unconscious thoughts) involve auditory and visual images, and these in turn have a 
sensory component to them" (Humphrey 1993: 111). What does this mean? 
Wittgenstein: 
Where do we get the concept of the 'content' of an experience from? Well, 
the content of experience is the private object, the sense-datum, the 
'object' that I grasp immediately with the mental eye, ear, etc. The inner picture. - But where does one find one needs this concept? 
(RPP 1 §109) 
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"I have said elsewhere that a proposition `reaches up to reality', and by this I meant 
that the forms of the entities are contained in the form of the proposition which is 
about these entities" (Wittgenstein PO 34; see TLP §2.1511). As Hintikka puts it 
In the Tractatus, all propositions, [... ] were pictures. As pictures, they could 
be compared with reality immediately. 
(in Teghrarian 1994: 23) 
And Mounce writes, "A proposition is like a picture because it represents something 
in the world and it does so because it is made of elements each of which stands for 
something in the world" (1981: 22). The concept of `picture' (Bild) as used by 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus is unusual, and offers commentators much scope for 
interpretation and disagreement. In criticism of Stenius' understanding of the term, 
David Shwayder proffers the interpretation: 
A Wittgensteinian picture is not the kind of thing which is put into a frame and 
hung upon the wall. The picture, for Wittgenstein, is the thought which may be 
expressed by hanging the picture on the wall. 
(1966: 305; italics in original) 
This basic conceptualisation of `picture' in terms of how language describes the 
world constitutes the crux of Wittgenstein's `Picture Theory of Language'. 
Shwayder summarises the picture theory of Wittgenstein thus: 
Every picture is a presentation (Darstellung) that such and such is the case; 
and every presentation that such and such is the case is a picture; a 
presentation that such and such is the case is an act of thinking that such and 
such is the case; in a more fashionable idiom, it is an act, whether or not overt, 
of asserting that such and such is the case; a Satz [proposition, sentence] is an 
overt picture, an overt act of asserting. A picture, at all events, is essentially 
assertional or propositional. 
The main point is the theory of what 
can be expressed (gesagt) by 
prop[osition]s - i. e. by language - (and, 
which comes to the same, what can be 
thought) and what can not be expressed 
by prop[osition]s, but only shown 
(gezeigt); which, I believe, is the cardinal 
problem of philosophy. 
Wittgenstein RUL 71; italics in original) 
(1966: 305-6; italics in original) 
The later Wittgenstein challenges, as does Ryle, the idea 
that there are such private objects: "experiential data that 
are logically independent of publicly observable 
phenomena" (Saunders and Henze 1967: 11), and that in 
talking about consciousness it is not a matter of describing 
these objects as they really are, somehow, in the brain, or 
as an underlying system for language. 
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Sitting at the computer, mouse intermittently fingered, 
keyboard intentionally jabbed, and screen intently eyed, I 
can move from continent to continent in a matter of a few 
hundred milliseconds. Though seeming slow in comparison to 
nerves, which send impulses at the rate of up to 120 metres 
per second, the speed makes the time negligible in terms of 
my perception of it. [Excepting the time I sit waiting for 
connections to be made and information to be downloaded: 
"ours is a brand-new world of allatonceness" (McLuhan and 
Fiore 1967: 63). ] Nervous systems are in fact relatively 
slow at transmitting signals, the short distances involved 
create an apparent speed-the human 'reaction time' is 
approximately half a second. We "can only experience the 
immediate past" (Rabbitt in Gregory 1987: 671): the present 
is made up of experiences from a (very) short time ago. But 
this lag is built into our perception of the world; our 
descriptions of our experiences don't always account for it, 
there is no need to explain it. The synapse is a no-man's 
land; forgotten space between the fronts. The seconds 
waiting for my PC to traverse the "extended nervous system 
of the electronic body" (Kroker and Weinstein 1994: 160) are 
empty, dead; the activities and processes hidden, secret. 
But it should be noted that the Internet is not like our 
nervous system, or our brains, in many respects. As a 
metaphor it is useful up to a point, and should not be taken 
too literally. 
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The study of neural coding is a central issue in the investigation of 
nervous system function. Before we can understand how neural circuits 
process information, we must understand how they represent it. 
Information is conveyed to and processed within the brain primarily in 
the form of action potentials [... ] How does the sequence of action 
potentials fired by a neuron, or group of neurons, represent the 
information that is encoded and conveyed to other neurons? 
(Abbott and Sejnowski 1999: vii) 
The computer's means of data storage and retrieval can be conceived of as 
similar to the way in which human beings' brains function. (See, for example, 
Churchland 1988 and Karmiloff-Smith 1992. ) The raw computerised data is broken 
up and stored in fragments of digital code which need to be reassembled and 
read anew each time they are accessed However, this is not how we experience 
the processes of thought. Our brain, like the computer, hides the piecing 
together of the thoughts making us experience thoughts, usually in an organised 
way no matter how many jumps and connections the train of thought might appear 
to take if we were to write down each step that we are aware of. 
[Here, I would like to describe the connectionist/PDP model of the brain: 
Connectionist AI is exciting [... ] because it provides an alternative 
picture of the way in which the human mind operates, a picture more in 
tune with what is known about the brain. 
(Flanagan 1991: 240) 
In the connectionist approach [... 7 meaning is not located in particular 
symbols; it is a function of the global state of the system and is linked 
to the overall performance in some domain, such as recognition or 
learning. 
(Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1993: 100) 
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) models [... ] assume that 
information processing takes place through the interactions of a large 
number of simple processing elements called units, each sending 
excitatory and inhibitory signals to other units. 
(Rumelhart and McClelland 1986: 10)] 
It is generally agreed that there is a relationship between brain structure and 
storage of what we call memories. Memory is not located in one part of the brain, 
but spread throughout the brain with certain areas being more responsible for 
memory handling and recall than others. Indeed damage to specific regions of the 
brain will usually result in particular kinds of memory loss, impaired behaviour 
and personality changes. These different parts of the brain work interactively to 
construct our responses to new experiences, that is, experiences of the immediate 
past which are dealt with in reference to other experiences stored as memories. 
lust as memories are held in a brain-wide distribution, memory is not a single 
process either. We can talk of and experience short- and long-term memory, 
explicit and implicit memory, learning and consolidation of memories, and memory 
distortion-"Considering the immense complexity of neural circuitry in the brain, 
the expectation that recall should be veridical appears unrealistic" (Mesulam in 
Schacter (ed) 1995: 382). Memory is multilayered; new experiences are laid on top 
of old ones and connected in ways that are beyond our control. Associations and 
connections are immeasurable, unpredictable and indescribable. The hypertext and 
any other computer-based model is close to a brain but different in that 
hyperlinks between nodes are humanly constructed and somewhat set; the experience 
of life and memory recall is aleatoric. Paths on the Internet are traceable and 
mappable, and although my link by phoneline may take me through different nodes 
at different times, the route is not as important as the final destination; in my 
brain and memory processes, although I can say that I have reached a memory that 
I wanted to get to, the route I took may be more interesting than the final 
recollection (is there such a thing as a final destination in a memory process? ). 
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Phillip Zarrilli (1995) outlines the difficulties of describing the experiences of 
performing, using the terms `body and mind', `body-mind' and 
`bodymind' (somewhat confusingly) to explore their integration, overcome the 
separation, and thereby produce what he calls "a psychophysiological paradigm of 
acting" (Zarrilli 1995: 193). Again the muddle created by using a word in a new 
form to replace the ('same') word from another form rears its ugly head. But Zarrilli 
attempts to get rid of any misunderstanding by turning to other cultural models of the 
human being, in other words, other words. "But it is easier to bury a problem than to 
solve it" (Wittgenstein Pl §351). Zarrilli cites David Edward Shaner's use of the 
word `bodymind' as the "presence of both aspects [mind-aspect and body-aspect] in 
all experience" (Shaner 1985: 45; in Zarrilli 1995: 189). Shaner describes the 
relationship as `polar' instead of `dual', 
because mind and body require each other as a necessary condition for being 
what they are. The relationship is symbiotic. 
(Shaner 1985: 43; in Zarrilli 1995: 189) 
It is one short step from here to expressions such as "think with our body and act 
with our mind and vice versa" (Shaner 1985: 46; in Zarrilli 1995: 189). Rejecting 
Cartesian mind-body dualism is hamstrung by failing to account for the web of 
inhesion that seems to connect a word with a meaning. 
Double aspect theory: an ontologically 
monist, yet conceptually dualist theory, 
after Spinoza, that holds that mind and 
body are not distinct substances but 
merely different aspects of a single 
substance (contrasted with attribute). It 
considers certain states as having 
mental and physical aspects, to avoid 
dualism and materialism by identifying 
each aspect without analysing each in 
terms of the other. Cf. Davidson's 
`anomalous monism': "the mental and 
the physical are two irreducibly 
different ways of describing and 
explaining the same objects and 
events" (Davidson in Honderich 1995: 
36). 
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The word `body' seems to present us with problems. If we try to remove the dualistic 
overtones (undertones) and refer to the `bodymind' or some such other contraction 
or construction, we still feel compelled to think of two (separate) aspects of one 
thing. Jonathan Zuess in The Wisdom of Depression writes: 
We usually think of our body and mind as somehow being independent of each 
other. The truth is that they are so inter-dependent that they might really just 
be different ways of describing the same thing. I like to refer to them with a 
single term, the bodymind, because it expresses their essential oneness. 
(1999: 6; italics in original) 
When the word `body' is used it should not be as a means of simply objectifying a 
person, or to imply that there is another element to them which is not being used (the 
mind). In a way, the word body is being used synonymously with the term "human 
being". It may be difficult to accept that if only the word `body' is used it does not 
refer to the whole person. There is no need to clarify to ourselves that a human being 
whose body we see and relate to, does not bear a resemblance to another human 
being. But neither, as Wittgenstein implies, does that say that we should believe him 
to have anything else inside him. 
My attitude towards him [a friend] is an attitude towards a soul [not an 
automaton] I am not of the opinion that he has a soul [... ] If the picture of 
thought in the head can force itself upon us, then why not much more that of 
thought in the soul? The human body is the best picture of the human soul. 
(Wittgenstein PI 178e) 
This simple ambiguity in inference of the word `body' highlights the problems under 
discussion. Wittgenstein writes about the other side of the coin, so to speak: 
We feel then that in the cases in which `I' is used as subject, we don't use it 
because we recognize a particular person by his bodily characteristics; and this 
creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to something bodiless, which, 
however has its seat in our body. In fact this seems to be the real ego, the one 
of which it is said, `Cogito ergo sum'. -`Is there then no mind, but only a 
body? ' Answer: The word `mind' has meaning, i. e., it has a use in our 
language; but saying this doesn't yet say what kind of use we make of it. 
(BB 69-70) 
"I do not know how the sentence `I have 
a body' is to be used" (Wittgenstein OC 
§258). 
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We might start to develop such constructions as boy, mom-, mind or bodymiR4 
to describe ever more aspects and relationships of concepts that all begin with a 
series of linguistically and philosophically produced confusions that it is hard to 
break free from. These are the metaphors we live by. 
Since communication is based on the 
same conceptual system that we use in 
thinking and acting, language is an 
important source of evidence for what 
that system is like. 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1981: 3) 
A simile that has been absorbed into the 
forms of our language produces a false 
appearance, and this disquiets us. `But 
this isn't how it is! '--we say. "Yet this is 
how it has to be! ' 
(Wittgenstein PI § 112) 
Food in sleep shews very like our food 
awake; yet are not those asleep 
nourished by it, for they are asleep. But 
those were not even any way like to 
Thee, as Thou hast now spoken to me; 
for those were corporeal fantasies, false 
bodies, than which these true bodies, 
celestial or terrestrial, which with our 
fleshly sight we behold, are far more 
certain: these things the beasts and birds 
discern as well as we, and they are more 
certain than when we fancy them. 
(Augustine 1969: 36) 
Belief in the body is more 
fundamental than belief in the soul: 
the latter arose from unscientific 
reflection on [the agonies of] the 
body (something that leaves it. 
Belief in the truth of dreams-). 
(Nietzsche 1VP §491) 
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Canto 2: De-scribing the Neu Baud-y. 
Ermy, Orpheus and Wittgenstein have become an alphabet: 
A primordiAl AlphAbeT soUp 
GenerATive 
proCreATive 
They Are now The world 
The world is now Them 
repliCATinG 
Their senses hAve fUsed 
They no lonGer TAsTe 
heAr 
feel 
see 
smell 
speeCh is inAUdible 
movemenTs form Their mode of CommUniCATion 
TrAnsCribinG 
TrAnslATinG 
eleCTrons flow AlonG Their ArTeries And veins 
ArTeries And veins Are ArTifiCiAl And vAporifiC 
GAses Are solid 
And solids Are flUid 
in The neTwork 
The nexUs 
Living things are collections of 
molecules, like everything else [... ] 
What lies at the heart of every living 
thing is not a fire, not warm breath, not 
a `spark of life'. It is information, words, 
instructions. If you want a metaphor, 
don't think of fires and sparks and 
breath. Think, instead, of a billion 
discrete, digital characters carved in 
tablets of crystal [... ] think about 
information technology [... ] The 
information technology of the genes is 
digital. 
(Dawkins 1996: 112) 
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The CirCUiT 
There is no CenTre 
bodies flow from one To The nexT 
inTerConneCTed 
inTerConneCTiviTy: hUmAniTy invisible And divisible 
The nexT is rAndom 
The AIeAToriC CliCkinG of A ChiliAd keypAds 
The GhosT in The mAChine 
mUTATinG 
biTloss 
dAnCer: you TrAnsmUTATion of All GoinG-by inTo GoinG 
The mirror of The soUl CrACked 
A jUmble of frAGmenTs 
AwAiTinG de-frAGmenTATion 
de-sexed 
de-hUmAnised 
de-sTAbilised 
de-exTended 
de-Coded 
de-formed 
de-rAnGed 
de-evolved 
de-pArTed 
devoUred 
Negation of the dancer. "the erasure of the 
body as matter and its substitution as a 
set of codes and signs" (Brown 1994: ii). 
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Orpheus' body turns back to words. He is a song. 
Ermy's body turns to words. He is a story, of sorts. 
Wittgenstein was always words. Sentences, short paragraphs, remarks. He has 
been re-edited. But he is happy with this re-ordering, re-structuring. It is the story of 
himself that he would have written. He is the imagination of himself. He is not just in 
the story-he is the story. 
Our three heroes have dissolved into the world of words and unable to speak for 
themselves, must rely on others to give them voice. Here are fragments of the three as 
they exist in the hyperworld. 
What is new is not that the world lacks 
meaning, or has little meaning, or less 
than it used to have; it is that we seem to 
feel an explicit and intense daily need to 
give it meaning to give meaning to the 
world, not just some village or lineage. 
This need to give a meaning to the 
present, if not the past, is the price we 
pay for the overabundance of events 
corresponding to a situation we could 
call `supermodern' to express its 
essential quality: excess. 
(Auge 1995: 29) 
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The Ballad of the Head of Orpheus. 
Calliope, bearer of the infant 
who would die at the hands of a bacchant, 
assembles up her sisters, the Muses, 
who between them assemble Orpheus 
as he lies in parts, while his blood oozes 
and his viscera become detritus. 
"Oh Orpheus, melanous son of mine, 
whose twilight voice did the bright sun outshine. " 
Decapitated yet ne'er decayed, 
Orfeo's black ivory driftwood head 
floats on the desolate waves of theory. 
Cast about in chaotic entropy 
singing sable songs of metatheory, 
undergoing Wittgenstein's therapy. 
"Oh Orpheus, with your poetry pure 
you could cast a shade and the sun obscure. " 
The Musae, their task all but completed, 
bear once again their kin, now depleted, 
and excavating the earth from a plot 
at the foot of mighty Mount Olympus, 
take the incomplete corpse to the spot 
and wail a threnode for poor Orpheus. 
"Oh Orpheus, never will you return, 
to re-sound a noctilucent nocturne. " 
The nine inter him in the sod and sob, 
while across the watery waste doth bob 
the severed head of their poetic son. 
His deep blue voice, as dark as the benthus, 
but as light as spindrift, off the ocean 
lifted high, mellow and melodious. 
"Oh Orpheus, as rare as an eclipse, 
your demise is as the apocalypse. " 
And so on drifts the head of Orpheus, 
leaving a wake of words, as rubious 
as the blood streaming from his open neck, 
until he is on the shore of Lesbos, 
like the sole survivor of a shipwreck 
with no body, except for his epos. 
"Oh Orpheus, as solemn now as dusk, 
your tragic end has made the world subfusc. " 
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Ermy' s Fit. 
"E rmy... " The voice whispered across the vacuum, 
like vapour or a breath of autumn. 
"E rmy... " Again. 
Ermy is not deaf, but he cannot hear the word. 
Ermy is not blind, but he has no eyes with which to see the 
reflection talking to him. 
Ermy feels nothing, his nerves and skin have dissipated. 
Ermy has no brain, he is all brain, a visceral brain. 
Ermy is liquid silver, his body fluid and flighty. 
Ermy cannot taste or smell the lack of air around him. 
Ermy feels nothing, his neural networks have stopped working. 
Ermy is not dead, but he knows not that he is alive. 
Ermy has no tongue, but he can whisper his own name. 
"E rmy... " The word has no meaning. 
Ermy exists in the limen between the old cortex and the new. 
Ermy is literate and illiterate. 
Ermy is like a hole. 
Ermy is like light. 
Ermy is a quantum. 
Ermy is a photon. 
Ermy assumes new forms with every immeasurable moment that 
passes. 
Time means naught to Ermy. 
One instant an old bearded man, the next a handsome 
youth, a finely honed athlete. 
Another instant he has wings and can fly, and in another 
he'is still, as solid as an alchemist's stone. 
Ermy is a slayer of giants and conveyor of souls. 
Ermy filled Pandora with the ability to beguile. 
Ermy is time-weaver and creator of fates. 
Ermy exists in the space between the warp and the weft. 
Ermy is narcotic. 
Ermy transforms perceptions. 
Ermy urges love. 
Ermy brings fortune and misfortune. 
Ermy the son of thunder, is as quick as lightning. 
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The physiology of release hallucinations 
is perhaps easier to understand if one 
considers sensory deprivation. 
Normally, only some of the sensory 
input that constantly bombards the 
brain is relevant. Most of it is filtered 
out. Experience with sensory 
deprivation-as in John Lilly's famous 
tranquility tank-shows that removing 
all sensory input leads to psychotic 
thinking, perceptual distortions, and 
hallucinations. Milder degrees of 
sensory loss (such as cataracts, hearing 
loss, or the feebleness of touch called 
peripheral neuropathy) lead to less florid 
results. But the rule of thumb is that a 
brain deprived of external input will 
start projecting an external reality of its 
own, readily perceiving things that are 
"not really there. " This release of the 
senses, particularly sight and sound, is 
not as rare as you might think: when 
your hearing is drowned out by the 
white noise of the shower, for example, 
how often have you hallucinated that 
the phone was ringing or that someone 
was calling your name? 
Normal persons deprived of sensation 
progress from having mild to severe 
hallucinations, starting out with what 
looks very much like form constants 
(geometric patterns, mosaics, lines, rows 
of dots) and building to more developed, 
dream-like juxtapositions of perceptions 
the longer they remain in isolation. 
(Cytowic 1998: 133) 
I felt pity for him, but also revulsion 
[... ] I found him terrifying and 
grotesque. What disturbed me most was 
the flickering screen of his face, the 
bleak images of a soul in torment. Or so 
I imagined. Then I began to consider 
what might remain of a "soul" or a 
"self. " Beyond fear and anger, his 
features would at times arrange 
themselves into meaningless emotional 
composites, or degenerate into some 
other, abstract, choreography. I began 
to doubt that there was anything at all 
going on behind that face. 
(Broks 2000: 8) 
mindbody meatbody deathbody stinking 
sagging shitting fetus bursting organs 
hanging buried alive in a coffin of blood 
oh god not me don't let it be me got to 
get out of this bucket of tripe it's sucking 
me down throwing me up take it away 
this pulsing writhing spurting spinning 
body-go-round, BODY 
(Skal 1988: 25) 
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The Hyaerworld: an introduction. 
Taking the term 'hyperworld' from Ted Nelson's Literary Machines (Edition 87.1, 
1987), to describe how 21St Century high-technology (urban) cultures are 
multilayered, and constituted of linked 'texts', superficiality and 
destabilised meanings. 
Cities are composed of layers of signs, different patterns of 
civilisation rest one on top of the other in a vast urban lamination, a 
lasagne of art and design. There is not a single plan, but many. The 
foundations may be the Roman or medieval streets which still dictate the 
general arrangements of the topography. Piled above that, successive 
campaigns of building are eloquent of the different vanities of the ages 
[... ] Right now the surface is a volatile, pixilated, urgent, congested 
rush of people and things where microwaves and white vans fight for air 
and road space... as well as our attention. 
(Bayley 2001: 25) 
Is this a deliberate emphasis on what may be seen as an Occident-centric 
generalisation? The 'hyperworld' metaphor stretches to include the metropolises 
of Japan (indeed parts of Japan may stand as the supreme example of a 
hyperworld), other Asian countries, Russia, Africa and South America, and the 
rest of the developing world keen to compete in a global capitalist market, 
through emulating the 'monoculture' of the West. Theodore Roszak in Where the 
Wasteland Ends describes, somewhat lamentably, such developments: 
The building of megalopolitan complexes is no longer a derivative of 
industrialization [... ] It is the stage on which we have chosen to enact 
the drama of our time; it is our collective mindscape physically 
embodied. The supercity alone guarantees the utmost in artificiality, 
which is the unquestioned goal of progress. 
(1973: 10; emphasis in italics added) 
As Gregory Stock (1993) outlines, the considering and analogising of the 
(human) world in terms of global-interconnectivity and symbiosis is not a 
recent trend. Ancient Greeks such as Aristotle and others after them described 
"human civilization [as] an immense living being" (Stock 1993: xx). The roots 
of the hyperworld lie with the conceptions of the ancient Greeks (although as 
will be pointed out, this may still be late in the evolution of the 
hyperworld). The Greek world was characterised by the growth of the city-state 
(as today it is the re-emergence of the nation-state) and the political, 
intellectual and economic changes this brings. A side-effect of this was 
philosophical writing. As David Melling writes "The programme of colonial 
expansion coincided with the development of widespread literacy in the Greek 
world" (1987: 4); with the Greek alphabet allowing anyone to become proficient 
in not only recording details but developing "new forms of literature [... ] 
exploiting the potentialities of written language" (Melling 1987: 4). Combined 
with wall and vase paintings, with theatre and oratory still major oral 
traditions, the expression and transmission of ideas was metaphorically the 
nervous system of the world-the synapses of which are still firing today, 
albeit weakly. In the, Empire of Rome, as McLuhan points out, the roads were 
most importantly an information network (McLuhan and Powers 1989). But also 
consider the extant graffiti of Pompeii: the word 'graffiti' having evolved 
from the Italian for 'little scratch', which in turn came from the Latin for 
`stylus', which had come from the Greek for the verb 'to write', and has links 
with the act of grafting, that is, the joining of one thing (plant tissue, body 
part) onto another. 
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Global Scarification 
In other terms this could be seen as the scarification of the world's body to 
convey ideas, to mark allegiances, to transplant the mind of one person onto 
the body of someone else: what is formed is a hybrid, a combination of two 
things to form something new, an information-chimera. 
Concepts similar to the emerging idea of a hyperworld can be seen in the works 
of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: the 'noosphere' "an evolving collective 
mind" (Stock 1993: xx); Marshall McLuhan and co-writers: the 'Global 
Village' (1962,1964,1967,1989); Jacque Ellul (1965); Simon Nora and Alain 
Minc (1980); Paul Connerton's social memory (see 1989); and Pierre Levy: 
'collective intelligence' (1997). In these theories, the hyperworld can only 
exist as a result of human interaction. 
Observation 1: the world is changing due to a growing human population's needs 
and wants and whims. Observation 2: human beings are changing due to a growing 
technologically-mediated information-based global-culture. 
The hyperworld concept is also inspired by theories of intertextuality. EXPAND. 
The human being, as reader, is the central focus of any practice of 
interpretation. EXPAND. 
Meaning is bounded only by the limitations of human cognitive and intellectual 
abilities. EXPAND. 
[See Walter Benn Michaels in Tompkins, ]. P. (1980: 185ff. ), esp. on Abrams] 
Humans in the hyperworld use technology as means to any number of ends, but the 
emphasis is on what can be called for the time being, 'information', using 
symbols and signs in the form of pictures and words; and as Ong reminds us: 
"writing (and especially alphabetic writing) is a technology, calling for the 
use of tools and other equipment... " (Ong 1982: 81). 
Technology begets text and interpretation becomes textology. WHAT DOES THIS 
MEAN? Expand... 
This prompts the question, What is (a) text? 
David Harris (1996) warns that there may be a danger in using the textual 
metaphor, but the danger comes not in using it but in believing it is the truth 
(see Davidson 1984). So, as in Valentine Cunningham's In the Reading Gaol, it 
can be argued "that the convergence of writing and worldliness, text and 
context, literature and history" (1994: 2-3) is still a necessary and extant 
consideration in viewing the world as a hyperworld. 
The hyperworld is made up of inter-linked, reader-dependent artefacts and 
actions. Artefacts are inscribed objects, and actions are non-inscribed events, 
or what Connerton (1989) calls 'incorporating practices'. If it is assumed that 
text exists, thereby ignoring the writers who argue for the non-existence of 
the text... EXPAND. 
[It is possible to substitute 'choreography' for 'writing' and 'dance' for 
'literature' in order to develop such an argument for a dance-centred study. ] 
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The hypothesis is that the hyperworld in simple terms can be likened to an 
expanded hypertext system. By hypertext is meant, at the most basic definition, 
non-sequential writing as first outlined by Nelson in 1965. This definition 
needs to be extended to include such terms as links, networks, 
interconnectivity, and discontinuity. There are a number of hypertext models, 
but each one has a basic series of characteristics. Drawing on Landow (1997) 
and culled from Deleuze and Guattari (1988), it can be said that hypertexts 
are: 
1. Formed of networks: constructed so that any point connects to any other 
point by way of links; 
2. An embodiment of anarchy: they violate genres and modes and discrete print 
texts; 
3. Multi-dimensional: thereby being a rejection of linearity; 
4. Rhizomatic: having multiple entryways and exits; 
5. Collections of fundamentally different kinds of information; 
6. Unpredictable and discontinuous: invoking the principle of asignifying 
rupture- "You can never get rid of ants because they form an animal rhizome 
that can rebound time and again after most of it has been 
destroyed" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 9); 
7. De-centralised, yet always a middle: a temporary centre; a short-term 
memory, or antimemory; 
8. Nomadic: free to travel; fluid. 
These characteristics will be examined in relation to the hyperworld as 
distinct from hypertext systems (WHY? ), but using the analogy where 
appropriate. 
It must be noted that a hyperworld is not to be confused with a cyberworld, or 
a virtual world, or the real world. EXPAND! 
In the hyperworld, as in the other examples, people are still bodily present, 
and are little changed physically (apart from the augmentations and prosthetics 
that science has created to improve the quality of experience for many people). 
What is different is human consciousness. 
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In Western cultures, most human beings have progressively moved away from a 
world of natural signs (ascribing meaning to events and objects beyond our 
control, e. g. earthquakes, volcanoes, meteors, the tides, trees and animals, 
rivers and rocks), to one of artificial signs (constructed by people to 
communicate and convey ideas, beliefs and stories). 
But now even these artificial signs are being superseded, in a way, by things 
less real. No: beyond real, "more real than the real" (Baudrillard 1983: 99); 
"that which is always already reproduced" (Baudrillard 1992: 186). Is this the 
world of Baudrillard: the hyperrea77 Or is it that "Reality just is what we are 
currently given to make of it by these various forms of seductive illusion" as 
Norris suggests (1990: 23)? 
Not only have individuals been affected, but the groupings of humans and their 
institutions have evolved new forms. Marshall McLuhan wrote in 1967 that 
"Societies have always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men 
communicate than by the content of the communication" (McLuhan and Fiore 1967: 
8). There is fossil evidence that the human-like animals known as Neanderthals 
(Homo neanderthalensis) were physiologically able to speak in very much the 
same way as 'modern' humans do. There is evidence that Neanderthal culture-was 
more complex than was previously believed, and indeed that they possibly 
interbred with what were our more direct ancestors. This serves to challenge a 
traditional linear account of evolution, and suggests, as Stephen ]ay Gould 
terms it, a "bushy view of evolution" (see Gould 1999). (The same might be a 
possibility of the other early humans, the Asian Homo erectus, who also may 
have coexisted with Homo sapiens. ) It also assumes the ability of both species 
to interact with each other using some form or forms of language. As humans 
developed and evolved so did the languages that they used; and as populations 
diverged, so did the early languages. Early human beings constructed methods of 
indicating to each other the essentials that they required for life, as the bee 
communicates to the hive the direction in which to travel, and for how far to 
go, to get to the nectar-bearing flowers (see Dawkins 1995: 85ff. ). As 
requirements changed, so did the means of communication. As societies grew in 
complexity and number of persons involved, so did the concepts that were 
necessary to keep the society, and what we now term culture, organised Sign- 
and gestural-languages (assuming that they came first, but there is no strong 
suggestion that they existed prior to attempts at verbal communication) were 
made somewhat ineffectual by the need to express more convoluted concepts, and 
to regulate the power within the society through the invention of stories and 
beliefs (see wills 1995). After speech came symbolic forms of communication in 
the shape of stones, not just as functional tools like the handaxe, but beads 
for trade and adornment. From about thirty-two thousand years ago, cave 
paintings and other inscriptions and artefacts allowed more and more complex 
ideas to be expressed. Christopher Wills writes that these iconic objects 
"exemplified a new way of looking at the world in which representations of 
objects rather than the objects themselves had become important" (1995: 299- 
300). It could be said that from the first daubing on a cave wall human beings 
had created a proto-hyperworld, where images replaced the verbal, and meaning 
became both frozen and ambiguous-impossible to determine yet easy to construct. 
"More than any other single invention, writing has transformed human 
consciousness" (Ong 1982: 78). 
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Part 3: Android 
Canto 1: In the midst of death.. . 
Eurydice opens her kohl'd eyes with a coal-black scream. 
The dirt of a thousand decades covers her wan body. 
Her mouth, as dry as a pumice, cracks and lets loose a long expiration. 
The hard but empty breath sputters from her dusty lips, and scatters across the grey 
ground like flakes of flint. 
Scratching through the earth, Eurydice raises her glassy hand, like a flock of larks, in a 
painful rapture through the rupture in the crust. 
She heaves a heavy sentence from her muddy mouth. 
`Where 
am 
I? ' 
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Around her the strident fans of the Underworld force out an infernal rhythm. 
The turbid fug in her ears fogs the turbines' fugue. 
As one awakening from a coma, Eurydice torpid and torrefied, torques her bony body 
in a series of mangled moves. 
Emerging from her spirit ditch, the pale imitation of Eurydice scans the seared 
surroundings. 
Smoke and smog fill the close and cloying chasm. 
Wheels with a killion cogs turn incessant circles, generating heat and the harsh chthonic 
thrum, now clearing a path to Eurydice's eardrums. 
The vicious vibration impacts onto her tympanum like thunder, causing Eurydice to jolt 
her head in a pattern of panic and disorder. 
It is this that brings her awareness flooding back. 
The hum of the snakebite, sharp and shrill, shoots up her saphenous nerve. 
Her leg stiffens and she lurches a willowy hand to rub her knotted calf. 
Now she notices the bulge in her once waspish waist. 
With a wince, unexpectedly, she hisses a sibilant gasp. 
And then her waters break. 
208 
Into the and hell flows her amniotic fluid, evaporating within seconds leaving a livid 
pink stain on her anaemic thigh. 
`Oh, Orpheus! ' 
Eurydice weeps waterless tears, which burn her baked cheeks, caked with chalk and 
clay. 
Huffs of smut billow from geysers all around the expectant woman, as she now begins 
to puff shallow breaths with deep lungs, expectorating green-grey phlegm onto her 
belly. 
Her moans mingle with the metallic music of hell, and her uterus contracts to its own 
tempo. 
After what seems to Eurydice like a million years, the movement reaches its crescendo, 
accompanied by her choric cries. 
`What kind of hell is this? ' 
`Orpheus, come to me my love! ' 
Like a volcano on the verge of eruption, Eurydice's womb is ready to explode. 
The heat inside her belly is unbearable, and with a final push the baby's head breaks 
through the vent of the cervix. 
A few smaller contractions expel the baby, still attached to its mother by the umbilical 
cord and placenta, but now breathing in the parched atmosphere for the first time. 
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The baby lets out a stridulant squall, strange and sepulchral, strained and strong. 
Eurydice, her swollen belly vacant, lifts the infant, still sticky and stuccoed with blood 
and earth, to her chest. 
The baby in her arms is oddly cold, sucking not the milk from her breast, but the little 
heat from the mother's ghostly hands. 
Eurydice looks at her progeny. 
Where there should be fresh flesh is bronzy alloy and opaque plastic. 
In place of one eye is a sloe lens, reflecting in its convex pool of pitch the pallid face of 
Eurydice. 
Under translucent skin, nerves of nylon and steel lie alongside organic nerves, each 
serving their respective parts of the baby-half human, half machine. 
And so, one dead, the other powerless to be born, two new characters burst onto the 
scene. 
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Canto 2: Meccanik Dancing. 
`My baby... ' 
Eurydice hugs the tiny baby, half firm and unyielding, and half soft and responsive to 
the mother's tender touch. 
The baby gently turns its face to its mother, drained and drowsy in the dreary drone of 
hell. 
With latex lips, the babe smiles its first smile. 
Eurydice mirrors her first-born. 
The afterbirth follows the child into the afterlife, and after all her effort, Eurydice drifts 
back into dreams. 
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Orpheus, swart yet pure of heart, leans over Eurydice and places an inky kiss on 
the white rose cheek of his beloved. Her eyes lift their lacy lids, and she gilds him 
with a golden gossamer gaze. Without a word, Orpheus slides his arms under his 
lily-light lover, and carries her to the bed. Eurydice, clinging to Orpheus like a 
vine, kisses his niello neck. He closes his eyes and sighs, and delicately lays 
Eurydice onto the sheets as perfect as petals. He follows her down into an 
embrace. He encloses her and she envelops him. 
212 
Eurydice awakes with a fright. 
She is not sure which is the dream and which is real. 
This the nightmare or that? 
She is shivering, yet sweltering too. 
An oppressive heat weighs on her like lead, and she struggles to move her head. 
`My baby! ' 
With fragile eyes, she glances around for the newborn. 
Through the dry ice Eurydice sees the figure of a young boy, dancing like a chequered 
shade. 
His steps are faltering, yet gritty and graceful. 
Eurydice groans, and despite feeling groggy, grasps at the ground around her and hoists 
herself onto all fours. 
She crawls on her hands and knees across the rough earth, towards her son. 
He continues his cascade of movements, falling like dead flies onto the floor, and rising 
like butterflies through the barely air. - 
His cupreous limbs display a naive concinnity, and with each articulation his joints 
become more confident. 
And with each gesticulation his poise increases in sureness. 
Growing at an accelerated rate, the result of millions of nanomachines working at a 
molecular level, the baby is now approaching adolescence. 
Eurydice can scarcely comprehend what she sees. 
Her offspring, hardly an hour old, dancing, dun and dusted, in the desert of the dead. 
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Canto 3: Unholy Communion. 
Eurydice, bewildered and bewailing, cries out for her lover once more. 
`Orpheus! ' 
The word echoes around the young man, dancing like Pan in the pandemonium. 
His development decelerates to a halt. 
The diabolic son of Eurydice is now of age. 
And as his growth slows, so does his dance. 
Moving now with the speed and control of a cloud on a calm day, Eurydice's son 
would appear motionless to a human. 
Amid the amber ambience of the abyss, the amalgam of machine and man, majestic and 
magnificent in his monstrosity stands proud, befitting his parentage. 
He is fixed in the moment. 
Eurydice, transfixed and tranquil, tries to speak, but like the girl Philomele, cannot. 
There are no songbirds here near sulphurous Avernus. 
The demi-machine, unnamed and unnatural, glides to his mother across the gypsum. 
Two hands, one plaster-white and skeletal, and one of burnt sienna and sclerotic, 
entwine in the erubescent Erebus. 
Mother and son, undead and ungodly, in the Tartarean tenebrosity. 
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Part 4: Silent Running 
Canto 1: An Abundance of Absence. 
This next canto is mostly silent, but for the words that form in jour bead as you read to 
yourself. 
What is the difference between reading inyour head and reading out loud? 
In which case do you hear the words you are reading? 
Do you need to move your lips or tongue, or feel the words in your voice box when you 
read toyoursel 
Is it reading to jourself if you make the sound of the words? 
Imagine that each word you read has a corresponding movement. 
Here is an example sentence: 
Orpheus hears the silent scream of Ermy as their atoms are cast like seeds across the 
barren fields of cyberspace. 
If you were to read this sentence using only the movements, would another person bear 
the words as they saw them? 
Would they translate from the movements to the sounds? 
Would you need to change from the words-as-movements to the words-as-sounds 
(audible or in jour bead) to understand them? 
If you had to move when you read a sentence, would the words be different to you and 
a person who could only see the movements? 
Would you feel as though you were broadcasting your thoughts? 
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How might inflection and other verbal differences be indicated in the words-as- 
movements? 
Is it possible to move sarcastically? 
The word `sarcasm' has its root in the Greek word for `flesh'. 
Could my physical rhythm and tone change just as my verbal rhythm and tone change 
when I want to be sarcastic, loving, cruel, patronising, polite, etc.? 
Is laughter like words-as-movements or words-as-sounds? Or is it like neither? 
If I were to say, "That was funny" in a deadpan voice, would people believe me in the 
same way as though I were laughing naturally? 
What if I were to force a laugh? How does this express my reaction to an event? 
Is it correct to say: "Sometimes my movements are silent expressions of what could be 
called my psychological state"? 
Are certain words the verbal expression of my physical state, for example, if I am in 
pain? 
Are conscious social gestures the same as verbal language? 
When I drum my fingers in time to the beat of a piece of music, am I translating the 
music into movement? 
Would another person be able to tell what the piece of music was by simply looking at 
my fingers? Perhaps. But would they be satisfied with just the visual experience? 
Would my physical action prompt them to hear music? Perhaps, if they were told that 
this was what they had to do. 
Listen to the music of my movements. 
Listen to the words of my movements. 
Intonation "pumps energy from a life 
situation into verbal discourse - it 
endows everything linguistically stable 
with living historical momentum and 
uniqueness" (Volosinov 1976: 106). 
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Canto 2: A Dance of Senses. 
Now back to Orpheus falling through the gloom 
and Ermy unsighted in the hell-black doom 
and Wittgenstein's soul, torn and uncanny; three 
with their odd existence, one which few have known. 
Around them myriads of meaningless signs; 
and Ones and Zeroes rot like fallen leaves; 
and words drop hailstone-like onto their raw flesh, 
spat sounds in horizontal sandstorm flurries. 
Every sensation like a flame on skin. 
Ice pick lobotomies through the eye sockets, 
the three snow-blind, silenced from frost-bitten tongues, 
shiver and shake in the sfumato of Hell. 
The steel desert stretches, like deadly nightshade 
in blacks and blues, beyond the blindsighteds' ken. 
Yet Orphee, poor, poor, porphyric Orpheus 
gathers up his wits, then stops his starts and fits. 
Ermy is writing a speech. 
Time to share some of my ideas on what my ideas actually 
are: how the world is structured and how it relates to my 
ideas; and how ideas can be presented according to concepts 
of hypertext. 
But this is not the talk I wanted to give. In fact, the talk I 
was going to give is not the talk I wanted to give either. I had 
too many things to say, and too many ways in which to say them. 
I thought about telling stories. I thought about reading out 
lists. I thought in analogy and metaphor. 
[Slap face] 
Metaphor is like a slap in the face in the middle of a 
conversation. [Possibly a reference to Davidson 1984. ] I 
thought about truth. I pondered the difference between 
objectivity and subjectivity. I thought about meaning. 
"Meaning is mortal" (possibly Baudrillard 1994: 164). I 
thought about poetry. "I think that meaning in poetry is 
more important than the style of how poems are written" said 
the Dalai Lama (2000: 123). I thought, "That's bullshit. " I 
thought, "The medium is the message. " Except it wasn't me 
who thought that. Or was it? Surely some of it was someone 
else. I wondered about you, the reader of my thesis, the 
listener at my talk, the masses, the elite. I looked for 
ways in, and for ways out. I read books and articles, papers 
and essays. I looked at pictures. I watched TV. I thought 
again about 'presenting the truth. "The truth is out there. " 
I wondered what that meant. And I disagreed. 
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But Ermy, dear depersonalised debris, 
demented and distraught cannot find his self 
and reassemble an undeconstructed 
reconstruction of the person he had been. 
And Wittgenstein too finds himself in pieces. 
A strange jigsaw with infinite solutions; 
an uncountable number of pictures made 
out of the same parts. There is no example 
to guide the jigsaw-artist. A new picture 
at each attempt. A new image of the self. 
Each new image is different to the last, 
but the differences are superficial. 
"We are like sailors who have to rebuild 
their ship on the open sea, without ever 
being able to dismantle it in dry-dock 
and reconstruct it from the best 
components" (Neurath 1983: ??? ). 
I listened to the radio and my favourite music. I thought 
about interpretation. Pierre Levy got there before me: 
What is interpretation? 
The subtle mind attempting to coax the inert body of 
the letter into graceful motion. 
The evocation of an author's breath in the presence of 
dead signs. 
The dangerous reconstruction of the knot of affects 
and images from which the text arises. 
And finally, the production of a new text, the 
interpreter's text. 
-But H the signs eme alive? 
effaces itse-if befult: d fluid and continuous. media... 
(1997: 109-10) 
So, what is interpretation? I read some Rorty and Dewey and 
some Wittgenstein. Not to mention Susan Sontag. 
Not to mention Susan Sontag. 
I've not to mention Susan Sontag. 
I wandered about town. I wondered about town. I wondered 
about the world. "It's a different kind of world - you need 
a different kind of software" [TV Advert]. I went to my 
computer. I turned it on and let it boot up. I thought in 
meaningless sentences. [What makes a sentence meaningful? ] 
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A picture is a surface we can enter. 
A surface we imagine we get into. 
And it appears as one thing, at the same time 
as something else: mere patches on a canvas, 
movements of light and dark patches on a screen. 
The image of the self is not even this, 
it has the illusion of a surface. But, 
we cannot see this image, like a picture. 
We see pictures, but not always see what they 
are of. A picture, like an image, can be 
of anything. The human face could be called 
a picture; its changes represent the course 
Is everything a picture? 
Our culture is perhaps moving, as 
Sherry Turkle (1997) and others 
suggest, towards one of 
simulation. It is also one of 
stimulation. The world is not just 
represented in pictures (moving 
or otherwise), but it is being lived 
of passion. Wittgenstein is just like a face. 
through pictures. And pictures 
Now like the picture he would have painted: don't always represent what is 
the perfect picture of a rose in the dark. 
Not just in the picture-he is the picture. seen, 
but what is heard and felt and 
smelled and tasted and imagined. 
But, this is not to imply that the world is lived in pictures in too literal a sense: 
pictures make up a part of what we experience, and language is what might be said 
to tie all of these experiences together. However, Nicholas Mirzoeff suggests that 
"the visual disrupts and challenges any attempt to define culture in purely linguistic 
terms" (1999: 7). Words, spoken and written, transform what we see into culture: 
"the world-as-a-text has been replaced by the world-as-a-picture" writes Mirzoeff 
(1999: 7) in his assessment of the `picture theory' of W. J. T. Mitchell. But it is only 
in the interaction of pictures and texts in films and theatre (and television and other 
screen-based media) that we find "a nexus where political, institutional, and social 
antagonisms play themselves out in the materiality of representation" (Mitchell 
1994: 91). 
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To Ermy moves Orpheus, who feels his fear 
and senses without seeing, his soma white. 
A restless dance of miserable hands, Ermy 
flapping away, now this side and now that side. 
Self-morphing, ectopic and ectoplasmic, 
ethereal Ermy, a displaced complex 
who can't get himself together without aid, 
amorphous around Orpheus, mind's eye blind. 
The maelstrom continues in its strobic cone 
as Orpheus struggles to strum his lyre's strings, 
and Wittgenstein waits patiently, watching with 
intensely keen, all-seeing yet empty eyes. 
Just as before, Calliope's son plays well, 
and reunites Ermy's once disjointed bod. 
The triumphant triumvirate tremulous 
yet intrepid resume their treacherous trek. 
A performing body is a picture of 
a body. It is an animation. The 
more it is abstracted and made 
strange (through technology, for 
example), the less human it 
becomes. 
To reduce pictures to words- 
and this includes the pictures of 
dancing bodies (real, animated, 
virtual}-denies the power of the 
picture. But there is a challenge 
to the dominance of the visual 
metaphor in many languages. We are experiencing, perhaps, a `pictorial turn': "a 
postlinguistic, postsemiotic rediscovery of the picture as a complex interplay 
between visuality, apparatus, institutions, discourse, bodies and figurality" (Mitchell 
1994: 16). Now we transform performing, dancing bodies to pictures with the aid of 
film, video and digital technologies. Like medical imaging techniques, which 
transform the human being into new bodyscapes and textures without the need for 
dissection, we can see the dancer as a series of dots, colours and shapes, in parts and 
fragments without altering the person in too drastic a way. An x-ray shows us the 
bones of a body, an image which can then be read by a trained interpreter. Magnetic 
resonance imaging can show the body as it functions and can enhance the 
physician's understanding of the patient's ailments. An x-ray can show us the inside 
of a human being in a way that a work of art can never do-even when an artist 
claims that their work shows their `inner being' (or some other such term of 
vagueness), all they are saying is a metaphor for the act 
creative'. 
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Let us forget about `dance' for a short while. (Try not to think about pink elephants for 
a while. ) Let us contemplate this thesis. The object. The artefact. The arte factum. 
What is this article before you? How does it articulate? What does it articulate? Does it 
Part 5: Fahrenheit 451 articulate? Is it articulated? 
Canto 1: Ten Trenches Deep. 
The Stygian stench stings the dry stenotic 
sinuses of Ermy, who is despondent 
and depressed by his decompression sickness, 
the resultant effects of the vile descent. 
But Orpheus comforts his ill companion, 
`Do not despair, dear Ermy, the worst is passed 
as soon as we have traversed these sands that blast 
us like the heat of Helios-he who knows 
all that transpires on Earth, but whose light ne'er rose 
o'er this caliginous kingdom. This opaque 
place, which can the brightest into shadows make, 
is home to a host of lost luminaries. 
They are shallow buried like Polyneices, 
except in this place they are to us alive, 
able to contemplate, to converse and shrive. 
Like Antigone and some say Ismene, 
Or is it dislocated? 
[Shout] THIS BIT IS WRITTEN IN CAPITALS. 
[SOtto VOCe] This bit in very ssull font. 
I thought about text. Texts. I thought in fragments, words. 
"In the beginning was the Word. " I thought about thought. I 
thought about the human mind. 
[Very quickly] What is the mind? Is it a separate spirit- 
like thing attached to a body? Is it part of the brain? Is 
it an epiphenomenal property of brain processes? Does it 
even exist at all? How does it work? What happens when one 
person thinks that they have one kind of mind, and another 
person thinks their mind is something different? Each person 
feels as right as the other, and it makes little difference 
to their ability to control their bodies. 
[Slow down] Richard Rorty wrote that, "We should restrict 
ourselves to questions like 'Does our use of these words get 
in the way of our use of those other words? "' (1992: 177). If 
we can accept, even for just a short while, that there is no 
such thing as the mind, but that there is a linguistic concept 
(or number of them) we can use in certain situations, we can 
begin to understand that so many of our 'ways of describing' 
are what shape us, and not the other way round. 
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This thesis is constrained and presented as a book, with the limitations (not to be read 
as a pejorative) that this format offers. As Walter Ong writes: 
sealed up yet able to breathe eternally 
in a pretence of living, waiting until 
a fate is decided by a tribunal 
and they are thrown into the caustic hellfires 
as torn pages of old books cast onto pyres. 
In the first bowge or trench lies Pythagoras, 
a proponent of metempsychosis 
and perhaps, too, of the Orphic theories on 
the process that is known as bilocation; 
both of which assume that there is a psyche 
detachable from the physical body. 
However, he also thought that numbers held 
the key to understanding much of the world. 
This was inspired by the pitch of instrument 
strings and musical interval measurement 
and the relative ease with which they could be 
expressed as numerical ratios. He 
is still extant, but only just, and it might 
take a great deal of my powers to excite 
him to talk to us beyond a few small words, 
Because visual surface had 
become charged with imposed 
meaning and because print 
controlled not only what words 
were put down to form a text but 
also the exact situation of the 
words on the page and their spatial 
relationship to one another, the 
space on a printed sheet - `white 
space' as it is called - took on high 
significance that leads directly into 
the modem and post-modem 
world. 
(1982: 128) 
The book and linear writing 
control and influence the way 
ideas are expressed, recorded, 
communicated, transmitted, 
interpreted, indicated, signified 
and gesticulated (and here a 
gesture might be more appropriate and successful at getting the meaning across, but a 
book is not very good at articulating a gesture). However, some of the contents of this 
thesis-as-book (the technology of linearity) are not subject to the laws of linear writing. 
When the conventions of linear writing (and the. book) are disrupted and distorted and 
disregarded, questions of validity and value arise, alongside issues of intelligibility and 
(in)coherence. This thesis could be viewed as anarchic or a nullification of the book, 
but it is not an outright damnation of the book as 
"Ein Buch ist ein Spiegel, wenn ein Affe a bygone 
" Pro captu lectoris habent 
suafata1ibe 11 i" (T erentianus hineinsieht, so kann kein Apostel heraus 1ý1 aurusDt Li to ri s, Sy 11 abis, gucken (Lichtenberg 1968: 477). 
But this kind of approach is potentially scary. It reduces 
everything down to language, words. "If I don't have a mind, 
as I was lead to believe, then what am I? " It prompts many 
fundamental questions, or rather, questions about 
fundamentals. 
What is the world we live in? 
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so we will bypass him, as fast as lyrebirds. ' 
And so, on past Pythagoras fly the three, 
and through the iron-grey atmosphere of Hell, 
across the bridge over the first thought-filled trench. 
[Section on the Hyperworld metaphor] 
In the hyperworld there is no regard for the distinction 
between one form of text and another. As in a classic 
postmodern novel, such as Calvino's if on a winter's night a 
traveler (1993), the text shifts from one mode to another - 
one sentence is upset by the next as the reader is 
challenged to attend to the processes of writing and 
reading, the book as an object and as a means of provoking 
thought(s) and ideas. The testing-ground for hyperworld- 
proper is television (or is it the archetypal example of the 
hyperworid? ). On television, even without channel-surfing 
and reference to MN, classic black and white movies are 
buttressed against cookery programmes, documentaries, soaps 
and sport, in a bricolage of texts. Our experience is linear 
in some respects. EXPAND. 
I watched the news at five in the morning. War in the 
Philippines. Worries over GM food in restaurants. Where is 
our Tax going? Flash Flood - Emergency Services Struggle. 
What is the world we live in? 
It is superficial. Mediation blurs with reality. 
[(transference of information)] Time is irrelevant yet all- 
controlling, all-consuming as the present swallows up the past 
and future. The visual dominates the verbal; the so-called 
'mental' rules over the so-called 'physical'. Is the world in 
here [point to head] or out there? [gesture 'around'] 
The printed book is dying a slow death at the hands of 
hypermedia. Books are exenterated every day as their innards 
are ripped open and ripped off, and displayed on the 
internet, often as fragments-a byte here and a byte there 
[cf. Napster, and music and other files on the Internet]. 
There can be seen a disregard for the physical text, it is a 
shock to the system. The printed word is somehow tangible, 
alive, inviolable (cf. Revelation 22: 19). As Ong remarks: 
"Writing makes 'words' appear similar to things because we 
think of words as the visible marks signaling [sic] words to 
decoders: we can see and touch such inscribed 'words' in 
texts and books" (1982: 11). But, he writes also, a printed 
"word is not a real word" (Ong 1982: 75), and he use's 
Lotman's term: 'secondary modeling system', to define it. 
Words on a page (or even on a computer screen, perhaps 
especially on a screen) are "coded symbols" (Ong 1982: 75) 
awaiting a human being to transform them into "sounded 
words, real or imagined, directly or indirectly" (Ong 1982: 75). 
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In his book Of Grammatology, Derrida wrote: "The end of linear writing is indeed the 
end of the book, even if, even today, it is within the form of a book that new 
writings-literary or theoretical [or both in one]-allow themselves to be, for better or 
for worse, encased" (1997: 86). The book is still a useful means of dissemination. It is, 
in a way, a self-contained technology and in the main doesn't require any other 
Beyond, shrouded in steel-mist the ground gives way, 
technology to read it (the 
agape like an orbit in a long-dry skull. hands and the eyes are not 
`Look! Yonder, yawning like a cat's yawling maw 
is our next port of call, we must make a yaw. ' 
technological), to access the 
material it contains; 
Changing tack, Orpheus leads his friends ä droit, 
a sweeping arc, curving deep and long, towards understanding 
(being able to 
the second narrow pit, in which Plato sits, read and interpret and use) the 
head chained to chamber wall, so it can't be turned. 
language of the information 
contained within the book is the main thing that the book requires; and compared to 
many other technologies, a book, by virtue of it being reliant on language and little 
else, will not become obsolete as quickly as modern computer technology does. Of 
course, languages change over time and information and knowledge (paradigms, 
traditions, cultures) shift in adequacy and acceptability, but this rate of evolution is 
relatively slow. It could be said that a book is `intuitive' because of its tactility, its 
organising of space and meaning into a generally uniform and recognisable form, its 
easily navigational structure, its use of the visual "representation of an utterance, of 
words that someone says or is imagined to say" (Ong 1982: 84; italics in original). 
However, this is to imply that there is a `naturalness' about books that makes them 
universal and timeless: not an implication to be proffered lightly. 
Ong goes on: 
Our complacency in thinking of words as signs is due 
to the tendency, perhaps incipient in oral cultures 
but clearly marked in chirographic cultures and far 
more marked in typographic and electronic cultures, to 
reduce all sensation and indeed all human experience 
to visual analogues. 
(1982: 76) 
[Sit down as though to tell a story) 
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The `end of the book' as a concept is not just about the end of the printed artefact, but, 
The bearded Athenian is held restrained, as suggested above, the end 
as he describes uneducated people, of a way of organising and 
those trapped in eikasia, in a fuddled 
perception of reality reflected regarding knowledge. It is a 
in the distorting mirror of a pleasure- 
reaction to the totalisation 
hungry soul, unable to direct his thoughts of a body of writing (of 
to real objects, instead living in the realm 
' ' of of doctrines knowledge of flick ring shadows cast by hell s licking flames. , , 
words as receptacles of 
`Ah, there is Plato, babbling as though fevered, 
asking questions that will never be answered. fixed meaning) in the book: 
I thought we might get some sense from this great Greek, a self-contained work which but his words are misguided and too oblique. ' 
Derrida argues "is 
Ja, ja! ' Interjected Wittgenstein, jabbing 
profoundly alien to the a poker-like finger towards Orpheus. 
`Reading the Socratic dialogues one has sense of writing" (1997: 
the feeling. ach, what a frightful waste of time! ' 18). New technologies, new 
`Let us steal away, ere Plato delays us ways of writing, and 
with debate of definitions, ideas, 
universal patterns in the Divine Mind, reappraisals of the acts of 
knowledge, essences and mistakes of that kind' reading and writing, of the 
written word and language in general, 
have been concomitant with, and indeed have paved the way for, the advent of 
electronic hypertext. They signal [... ] a way of thinking about the way we 
organize, conceive and imagine the world in which we live. To think of the 
world not as a Book but as a hypertext is to conceive of it as a heterogeneous, 
mutable, interactive and open-ended space where meaning is inscribed between 
signs, between nodes, and between readers, not enclosed between the limits of a 
front and back cover, or anchored to some conceptual spine called the author. 
iV . ,«! A,. T ...,,. t, l:.. ,... a n,. -,. _ Inns 01nnn\ 
"Me ideal for a book would be to lay 
everything out on a plane of exteriority [... ] 
on a single page, the same sheet lived events, 
historical determinations, concepts, 
individuals, groups, social 
formations" (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 9). 
The memory palace was a mnemonic system well known to 
ancient scholars and much information was preserved in 
them through the Dark Ages while the Vandals burned the 
books. Like scholars before him, Dr Lecter stores an 
enormous amount of information keyed to objects in his 
thousand rooms, but unlike the ancients, Dr Lecter has a 
second purpose for his palace; sometimes he lives there. 
(Harris 2000: 296) 
What is the world we live in7 
ýýcýY, iviwtautuiu! aaiu FULLU r 177J-Lvvv) 
225 
`What is the point of this trawl through these trenches? ' 
Asks Ermy, `I thought we were on a mission 
to find Eurydice and take her back to 
the real world, whatever that is, and not wait 
or tarry at ev'ry Tom, Dick and Harry 
who has written a word on philosophy, 
and I'm still not clear what that is despite your 
attempts, Ludwig, to explain what it is not 
as much as what it is. I've been on my guard 
for Descartes, but I haven't seen him as yet, 
and frankly I'm getting more and more confused 
as to where we are going and what I am. 
I've been blind and broken into many parts, 
then put back together in alien ways. 
One moment I'm told that meanings don't exist 
and the next I'm asked to interpret something. 
Will you please tell me what's going on, before... 
before I go madl' And with this Ermy stops. 
He looks at Orpheus and Wittgenstein, who 
are somewhat surprised by his sudden outburst. 
But why is all this relevant 
to a study of dance and new 
technology? -Meaning and 
transmission / 
communication; self and 
representation of self in 
technological context; 
criteria of personhood; art in 
the age of digital 
reproduction; layers of 
meaning (hypertextuality & 
intertextuality); notions of 
the body and 
disembodiment; kinaesthetic 
empathy. 
The modern, urban world is dense in signs, in signifiers. 
The world is text. References within references. I walk 
along the street. There is information at every turn in what 
Baudrillard describes as "The Abyss of Meaning" (1983: 9); 
and "a universe where there is more and more information, 
and less and less meaning" (1983: 95). Adverts, abstract 
images and representations of lifestyles, the "you must have 
this" message. Words, slogans and phrases vie to be read; 
tunes, jingles and other noises contend to be heard. Around 
me I see people, vehicles, buildings, plants and animals, an 
assortment of artefacts and images created by other people; 
I hear a mixture of sounds, over-layered, constant, never 
silent; smells, sensations of temperature, light, humidity, 
surface under foot come and go. Gregory Stock writes: 
"Little of it ever rises to conscious awareness, but every 
person's body is always screening, analyzing and integrating 
the data" (1993: 67). At times I will become aware of the 
relevance, importance, pertinence of a particular piece of 
sense-data; connections have been found, language has been 
formed. I can relate my experience to others. A memory is 
made. I remember my past experiences, old thoughts. But does 
interpretation take place? Do I care about meaning? I 
digress. 
[Hypertext as a model for the Hyperworld] 
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`My most sincere apologies, ' says Ludwig, 
`for not hastening this journey to an end. 
But, Ermy, as Saint Augustinus once said: 
quia plus loquitur inquisitio 
quam inventio-enquiring hath more to 
say than discovering. We are travelling 
through the labyrinth of paths that is language. 
Wouldn't you say that is correct, Orpheus? ' 
These to some extent also describe the hyperworld. Some of 
these traits will be touched on in the next few minutes. I 
will demonstrate it in crass ways to sledgehammer it home. I 
will make jumps and leaps, so you had better hold on to your 
hats. Like a broken paving slab, the hyperworld is 
fragmented and segmented: still a paving slab by definition 
but existing in parts which connect at the ruptures. Don't 
step on the cracks, or you may crack up. 
In the hyperworld we make a game of joining the dots to make 
sense in the splintered nexus of being. From the divisions 
of time to the tunnel vision of motorway driving, watching 
television and political thought, we parcel things up, 
compartmentalise. We become sane schizoid, or even, in rarer 
cases, psychotically schizophrenic - the extreme reaction to 
living in a fragmented environment. In a book I've not read, 
Jameson wrote: 
Schizophrenic experience is an experience of isolated, 
discontinuous material signifiers which fail to link 
up into a coherent sequence. The schizophrenic thus 
does not know personal identity in our sense, since 
our feeling of identity depends on our sense of the 
persistence of the 'I' and the 'me' over time. 
(1985: 119) 
[See Waugh 1992: 191] 
Consider the syllogism: 
The cyborg is schizoid. 
We are all cyborgs. 
We are all schizoid. 
To paraphrase and condense Levy: In the knowledge space we 
experience a crisis of identity, we have many identities for 
all of the virtual bodies we create and collective 
intelligences we participate in. "Thus the brain of Homo 
sapiens sapiens turns in upon itself, unveils its obverse 
and transforms itself into a polycosm" (Levy 1997: 156). 
Turn in on yourself for a moment: Try to recall your first 
memory. 
[Pause] 
Here I can either go on with a story about a popular 
farmyard animal, or leap into the rhizomatic, non-linear 
nature of hypertext (and by extension, the hyperworld). You 
decide... 
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`Indeed. But, unbeknownst to you, as we flit 
we are guides to a maze which seems infinite, 
and each apparently random choice we make 
is purposeful and leads to more tracks to take. 
Whilst we do not see each of the new networks 
as they appear, they are made up like patchworks 
by others, each pattern different, each nap, 
each new story's fabric is stitched like a map, 
but a map without a basis in real space. 
All of the routes intersect and interlace, 
without rules and predetermined connections 
and on ev'ry textual journey are lections- 
variant readings, as it were, all special 
to each reader and each individual 
who becomes a part of the constellation 
in which we are but a mere collocation 
of words, nothing more and nothing less than that. 
We could have stopped off to have a lengthy chat 
with Augustine, for Wittgenstein's sake; Kant or 
Locke to discuss meaning and rules of grammar, 
in later trenches we could talk with Nietzsche 
on truth and mythology; thence to Sartre 
to take apart imagination and his 
ontology and views on self-consciousness; 
notion of the transference of `meaning' directly 
another without the need for vision 
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And at last the starting point: 
considering using new 
technology (for example, 
biomedical technology 
capable of generating 
electrical, and other, signals - 
information - out of bodily 
activity - muscular and joint 
movements, the functioning 
of internal organs including 
the chemico-electrical 
activities of the brain - that 
can be transferred into 
another body (in some way, 
such as by electrical muscle 
stimulation) or used to 
generate and control 
mechanical and digital 
outputs. The initial questions 
were an enquiry into the 
from one dancing body to 
Witt 
PZ55272.8 
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a suing towards another gaping chasm 
could allow us to debate pragmatism 
with John Dca ey; and from this point, thread our Way 
to Gilbert Rylc for some meaningless wordplay 
and discussions on category mistakes, 
the kind of absurdities that language snakes 
possible for those easily confused by 
what a word from one context stems to imply 
when it is transplanted into another, 
or treating as literal a metaphor, 
a further furrow contains Canadian 
media professor Marshall McLuhan, 
whosc works on technology and the senses 
could be the node from which a quest commences 
to find an understanding of the new edge, 
for when he said `the medium is the message' 
Secondary and related 
questions were centred 
around concepts of the 
phenomenological 
experience; the `self in 
technologically-mediated 
situations, and in particular 
those that altered the 
relationship of `the body' 
with the environment or 
altered the body through 
technology, such as through 
he was trying to ensure that we don't fall 
prosthetics and so-called 
"cyýrg+ technologies; the into the false belief that content is all, 
that we should regard the manner and method practical implications for by which ideas are communicated- 
these technologies on dance 
performance; and the problems of definition when talking about human beings and 
technology. These issues, it was decided, are described in language that creates 
`philosophical problems' through a reliance on duality, that is, everything is 
discussed as though it exists in a two-part fashion. 
%Vhorf writes: 
The SAE [Standard Average 
European] microcosm has analyzed 
reality largely in terms of shat it calls 
`things' (bodies and quasibodies) plus 
modes of extensional but formless 
existence that it calls `substances' or 
`matter. ' It tends to we existence 
through a binomial formula that 
expresses any existent as a spatial form 
plus a spatial formless continuum 
related to the form, as contents is 
related to the outlines of its container. 
Nonspatial existents are imaginatively 
spatialized and charged with similar implications of form and continuum. 
(1956: 147) 
I want to say. It is piimwily the apparatus 
of our ordinary language, of our word- 
language, that we call language; and then 
other things by analogy or comparability 
with this. 
(Wittgenstein Pl §494; italics in original) 
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look at how something is said, not xbal is said. 
For hours we could commune with the thinking dead, 
asking them questions, playing Language-games and 
switching from analyst to analysand, 
to appropriatc terms from another field, 
till at least some of our psycho-scars have healed 
and our curiosity-thirst has been quenched, 
at which moment the thinkers will be retrenched. 
But you arc right to urge a more rapid pace 
because these discussions arc still taking place, `The sky no longer falls on you from on 
it might be said, in another space and time, high; instead whole territories slide 
an extra-dimension to this simple rhyme. ' away" 
(Baudrillard 1990: 21). 
And so, on these words, three become one once more, 
to leave the rutted and rutil2nt route past 
the hellholes heapcd with writhing philosophers, 
doing near endless headwork on subjects vast. 
Once upon a time, a small chicken by the name of 
Chicken Licken, was at the outskirts of the 
farmyard. She was contentedly pecking at the earth 
searching for grain and grubs, when all of a sudden 
a whisper of wind disturbed the nearby oak tree. The 
large tree's branches shook and the movement 
dislodged a loose acorn. Our heroine was just 
swallowing a small seed when the acorn, out of all 
the places it could possibly go, landed with a 
'click' on Chicken Licken's ickle head. Unseen by 
Chicken Licken, the acorn bounced away from her and 
became obscured from view in a tuft of turf. 
As Chicken Licken is the character in a folk tale 
she has a self-consciousness not usually 
associated with chickens and other animals of 
similar sized brain. Also she is equipped with the 
necessary physical attributes and mental 
capacities for speech and rational thought. so we 
ought not be surprised when, feeling the acorn on 
her head, she paused to make sense of what had 
happened before uttering the words, "0h dear, that 
sensation is one of pain, but more importantly I 
believe it to be a sign that the sky is about to 
fall. I must run to tell the Queen, even though 
I'm not entirely sure what she, or anyone else. 
might be able to do about it. However, as I an the 
character in a folk tale I am compelled to do 
this, otherwise this would be a very short story, 
and pretty dull for all concerned. " 
So, off she set on her mission to warn the Queen. 
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Now, - let us imagine that Chicken Licken is like a human child. 
She has been part of a social group, of other talking chickens 
and farmyard animals, in which she has been exposed to language 
and concepts of interpersonal behaviour. She has a sense of self 
based on the responses of others to her behaviour, and she is 
able to ascribe to her self a range of conceptual specifics, such 
as pain. She is able to reflect on the immediate past and make 
judgments relating to her future actions, perhaps drawing on her 
experiential history. Having grasped a reasonable vocabulary she 
is also well-armed with rules of grammar and word usage. She 
understands the right and wrong times to apply particular words 
and behaviours. She knows what will happen to her in certain 
situations and this is related to her moral self, and an 
awareness of and regard for others. She is able to actively 
organise experience according to both social frameworks and 
shared ways of thinking, and her own internal rules - her 
imagination is obviously strongly developed. 
Until at least 18 months of age a human being lacks what is termed 
Autonoetic Consciousness, that is "the ability to reflect upon 
ones subjective experiences in the past, present, and 
future" (Wheeler 2000: 197). It is essential to the functioning of 
episodic memory and "to awareness of the self as a continuous 
entity across time" (Levine 2000: 200). It also assists in 
decision making and self-regulation, which in turn affect 
behaviour. There "are age-related differences in encoding, 
retention, forgetting, and savings" of memories (Ceci 1995: 95). 
What you held in your memory as a child becomes lost to you as an 
adult because the mechanisms of storage and retrieval are 
different. Indeed, the ways in which young children learn and 
respond to their surroundings change according to the ways in 
which their memory works. So, if you believe that your earliest 
memory is such-and-such an event that occurred in the womb, or the 
pram, cot or before you could talk, chances are that you have at 
some point made it up like a story. 
[Notes on Computer/Brain] 
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Option 2 
The black plastic drawer slides along its runners into the matt-black housing. 
An LED shows the word 'LOAD', the machine purrs and the TV screen announces the 
successful reading of the DVD. A few seconds later the disc's contents are 
being transferred onto the screen, enabling me to view them. With the handset I 
can scroll down a list of options on an interactive menu, which allows me to 
watch previously unseen footage of the movie, listen to commentaries, access 
other special extras or skip to my favourite part of the film. As I watch the 
film, I may be given the chance at certain moments to watch behind-the-scenes 
footage when an icon appears, taking me on a short tangent from the action. The 
commentaries by directors, actors and others involved in making the film give 
me more information about their processes, inspirations, references and 
techniques. The movie is opened up from the inside to reveal its secrets, in 
the hope that I, as viewer, will derive more enjoyment (and perhaps knowledge) 
from it. 
In any hypertext model we see a move towards the importance of the retrieval - 
"utilization of stored information E... ] our ability to access the residue of 
past experience and (in some cases) convert it into conscious 
experience" (Roediger 2000: 53 and 57) - in the reader of the text. The laying 
down, encoding, burning in, of the material is important in hypertext as it is 
in memory, but in both it is the ability to retrieve the material that is of 
the utmost importance. Hypertext prompts the reader to be active in the 
construction of meaningful networks. This transforms the reader into a 
compositor of sorts. To say that the reader becomes an author implies a 
productive role (which may of course take place in certain hypertexts and 
hypermedia), as Landow notes, "Hypertext does not permit the active reader to 
change the text produced by another person, but it does narrow the 
phenomenological distance that separates individual documents from one another 
in the worlds of print and manuscript" (1997: 90). We live in a metaphorical 
library - our own individual hyperworld, our cosmopedia - all the books are 
there, we just browse and select. Think about it. 
When we read a book (but, it should be strongly noted, not all books) from 
beginning to end, the author will have constructed a path for us -a 
narrative - to make us find our way through the text with the least effort on 
our part. We have constructed a linear passage through our lives which is based 
in a certain predictability: birth follows conception and development in the 
mother's womb; certain events and conditions notwithstanding, we grow and 
continue to develop in a number of ways through our lives to produce what Laing 
describes as "a basically ontologically secure person" (1965: 39); death will 
come to us all, marking an end to our human self and changing us from a living 
organism into something else (beliefs about the after-life and our views about 
the nature of death may affect our lives to some degree, but not the actual 
chemical processes of dying and decay). We are so used to reading a linear 
narrative, that often we are challenged when confronted by a non-linear text. 
In the postmodern world, the linear has had a bad press. It takes time and 
skill to construct a linear narrative, and as Michael Schudson writes: 
"Narratives simplify" (1995: 355). And is it easier to remember a story or a 
less-than-linear series of examples, even when linked in some way? Hypertext is 
often used to replace the linear structure of many books. Why this should be 
seen as a necessary reorganising of material is based on an often fallacious 
idea that hypertext is like the mind. In exploring the analogy of hypertext 
with how we think we can see some misconceptions. However, underlying the discussion is the notion that non-linearity is a human way to interpret the 
world. I am not anti-linearity, it simply is that that is not the way I work. 
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What is interesting about the role of my memory when I experience the world is 
the range of choices that it presents me with. When, to coin a phrase, I set my 
mind off on a quest to retrieve a lost or hidden piece of information, a 
memory, I am not like the computer which doggedly and singularly attempts to 
reach its target. I can divert myself, or become diverted, by something on the 
way (although not in the same way that a computer becomes diverted when a node 
is inaccessible and needs to be by-passed). Any point in my journey of recall 
can prompt behaviour based on past experience or my human ability to adapt 
according to my own cognition. This instability in the processes of memory and 
thought is often the key to creativity and artistic practice. The problems this 
instability introduces in the thinker need to be solved in some way; they 
become worked through and expressed in language, the visual and performance 
arts, music, etc.. If the 'basic' processes can be said to be similar in 
computer and hypertext systems, and in the human brain there are significant 
differences in the other levels of operation. While associations and 
connections are somehow in existence in the way the brain uses the information 
it stores, the issue of human cognition does not end there. Vannevar Bush 
(1945) predicted a mechanised information storage system which would be "an 
enlarged intimate supplement to [a person's] memory" - the 'memex'. But in 
Bush's 'memex'-model, it was the individual user who created the associations, 
the links from one piece of information to the next, forming a network 
according to their own personal connections. 
There is so much information, so much (in)activity, that I do not attribute to 
a source or cause every thing I experience - to do so would be unnecessary and 
time-consuming. Neither do I weigh up a number of the possible sources, causes, 
meanings before deciding which is most apposite - although I am-possibly aware 
that there are more interpretations 'waiting' to be applied In the 
conglomeration of signs only a few can hope to attain meaningfulness. Meaning 
is not resident in each sign as a yolk is inside an eggshell. We cannot break 
open the outer layer of a sign to get to the one meaning inside. A sign is more 
like a Schrödinger's box: the range of meanings as they coexist are either dead 
or alive in the box, but we can never really be sure which - both have equal 
weighting when observed from the outside. (Is the study of meaning and 
interpretation as complex as quantum theory? See Penrose 1990. ) To grasp a 
meaning of a sign is to understand how that sign functions in the world. 
To use Wittgenstein's differentiation between 'seeing' and 'seeing as' (see 
Wittgenstein 1953), we can say that we can see a sign but not see it as meaning 
anything to us. EXPAND. 
But what if the sign wasn't made with the intention to mean anything? 
Baudrillard asserts that 
illusion is not false, for it doesn't use false signs; it uses senseless 
signs, signs that point nowhere. This is why it deceives and disappoints 
our demand for meaning, but it does so enchantingly. 
(1990: 52) 
Signs exist in reality and hyperreality at the same time. Any object takes on a 
dichotomous existence: the physical object and the multitude of aspects of 
meaning it can be interpreted as having when encountered by a human being. Let 
us take the book as an example. WHY? [The waning importance of the book and the 
move away from printed text as physical object... ] 
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Moving back to the experiences of people in the hyper-world we can see how there 
is no beginning to the series of links that can be made in the world. We enter 
the melange in the middle, at a random point. Each sign fights with its 
neighbour to be significant; "Real, total war has become information 
war" (McLuhan and Fiore 1967: 138); "The enemy then is mediated 
information" (Rucker et al 1993: 144). In the melee only meaning is the winner 
in a Pyrrhic victory where everything is hype. We are injected with a series of 
mind-altering substances, artificial stimulation. Excitation? Where is the 
excitement in a simulation? If we know that things are false (open brackets: 
what is real? Close brackets), can we derive pleasure from them still? If 
everything we see, hear, experience is un-real are we left without anything? 
The reason, if we can call it that, why signs today are so important, so 
ubiquitous, so hyperbolic is that they are a replacement for the objects they 
resemble. The word 'represent' is not present in the evaluation of hyperworld 
signs. Boundaries blur, subjectivity and objectivity no longer exist as two 
distinct poles. "The other, " Baudrillard writes, 
the object, disappears on the horizons of science. The event, the 
meaning, disappears on the horizons of the media. 
(1990: 85) 
[linking section about watching Television] 
"The fragmenting of activities, our habit of thinking in bits and parts - 
'specialism' - reflected the step-by-step linear departmentalizing process 
inherent in the technology of the alphabet" (McLuhan and Fiore 1967: 45). This 
is exemplified by the Human Genome Project, whereby we have broken up the human 
organism into a mind-numbingly meaningless string of letters. The HGP has 
served to shatter and explode science into even more smaller parts, extending 
our understanding to further and further poles instead of unifying and 
clarifying it. It opens up more questions than answers. What can it really tell 
us about human beings? It doesn't tell us anything directly about human 
experience as it is lived. The enormity of the task has been confused with its 
meaning. As Kohn writes: "The Neanderthals' beads suggest that it might be a 
good idea to look outside the genome when trying to identify what it was that 
gave our ancestors the edge" (1999: 182). 
And before you accuse me of being ignorant, I know about the benefits it can 
potentially offer to improve the life of future generations by leading to 
solutions in genetically transmitted conditions and improving health care, 
developing more efficient and cleaner energy sources, and improving 
agricultural methods, etc. My issue is not with the practical scientific 
outcomes, but with the total objectification of the human being; as simply code 
without identity. We spiral in on ourselves and totally miss the point of what 
is perhaps most special about ourselves. 
And the spiral is not endless; we can never reach the bottom (or is it the 
top? ). That is what is special about human beings - not that we can be taken to 
pieces, have our parts labelled, re-constructed, and improved on. 
Or is it that we can do this to ourselves what makes us special? 
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The paradox(es) of dance: it is not language, although it has developed what we call 
`the language of dance' (but it is a number of `languages'); it is not gestural (non- 
verbal) communication in the same way that other `conscious' gestures are: 
"Shrugging of shoulders, head-shakes, nods and so on we call signs first and 
foremost because they are embedded in the use of our verbal 
language" (Wittgenstein Z §651; italics in original)-where does `unconscious 
physical gesture' come? Can an `unconscious movement of the body' be called a 
gesture? (see Wittgenstein Z §227); it is not generally used to converse yet we can 
talk of one movement answering another, commenting on the preceding movement 
or a dialogue between two dancers; certain forms of dance have rules which are 
agreed on, for example, how a body part should be placed to make the move 
`correct', but these rules are not `grammatical'; the `meaning' of a dance is not the 
dancer's `intention' behind a movement, for no one can say what that is, sometimes 
not even the dancer, and these `intentions' will differ for each movement, even the 
`same' movement, especially from one performance to the next; we talk of dance as 
being a series of movements and we can divide a string of movements up into 
`distinct' parts, but this is equivalent to hearing a foreign language and arbitrarily 
segmenting it into `words' and assuming that each of these has a meaning attached to 
it in isolation from the rest: "Apparent isolations of words in a vocabulary list also 
derive what meaning they have from the patterned `potentials of linkage, ' which 
ramify from them and connect them with complex patterns of linguistic 
formulation"(Whorf1956: 67 
note 4); it is an `external' action (sometimes, but not always) supposed to show the 
`internal' or `emotional', as though language was not good enough to do this (surely 
language is better-at least there are rules for the use of language); dance is not 
universal yet can be moved cross-culturally, but what does this do to its 
`meaning'? -does the same dance performed in two different cultural contexts have 
the same meaning in each? (You might say: That depends on your definition of 
meaning. ) - "Sense and meaning does not result from words or 
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The `rules' for dancing are not really to do with meaning and use in the same way as 
we might say the speaking words is rule-guided. 
They (the rules of dance) are more based in anatomy than in `semantics'. 
Saying a word is to some extent `anatomical' (a large part of it is anatomical), but to 
teach a word is not just to explain to someone how to move the tongue, open the lips 
and vibrate the larynx in a certain way (and how is this action described? only by 
making the sound and getting the other person to imitate until they make the `same' 
noise); learning a word is learning when to say it, as well as how to say it. Learning 
choreographed movement may well be about learning how and when to do a 
movement in a sequence of other movements, but it is possible to teach it without 
any instructions other than physical directions. If language were taught this way, 
people would behave more as parrots in their speech acts than able to use language 
in various situations. In this way, as music is like language, so is dance. 
"Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music 
than one may think" (Wittgenstein Pl §527). "Speech with and without thought is to 
be compared with the playing of a piece of music with and without 
thought" (Wittgenstein PI §341). "Understanding a musical phrase may also be 
called understanding a language" (Wittgenstein Z§ 172). 
What kind of language is dance? 
It could be said: In much dance language is written (implicit) the concept of the 
`language of dance'. 
As we have seen, reference is the 
lesser part of meaning, patternment 
the greater. Science, the quest for 
truth, is a sort of diving madness like 
love. And music-is it not in the same 
category? Music is a quasilanguage 
based entirely on patternment, 
without having developed lexation. 
(Whorf 1956: 261) 
`All dance is nonsense. ' Yet this statement is in 
itself, nonsensical. It is almost the same as 
saying, every dance has a sense. What is the 
sense in 
dance? 
To understand a sentence means 
to understand language. To 
understand a language means to 
be master of a technique. 
(Wittgenstein PI §199) 
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You say that you can describe your movements in a number of ways. You say that it 
is `busy in there' when you dance, and point to your head. You say that you are 
hearing words, doing mathematical calculations, measuring angles and recording 
them. You say that it is a science-like process when you dance: you analyse and 
interpret each position of your body, you say. You can't tell me what each of the 
words are at any given point of the movement, but you know that you can `hear' 
them. You go off afterwards to write them down. They are the movements translated 
into words, you say or don't say. Do you use words to initiate a movement? -Yes 
you do, you say. Do words come out of moving? -Of course they do, you say. What 
words? -All sorts of words, you say; emotion words, anatomical terms, abstract 
sentences rich with meaning. The words are your language for what the dance means, 
you say maybe. Can you recreate the movements from the words? -Oli yes, you say. 
You show me a position of an outstretched arm and intimate the range of things that 
are going on when you do this. I hear the words you say but I am sceptical as to 
whether or not you can be sure about what you are saying can be correct. The 
position is not in a context of a movement, or rather you abstract it from one. It is an 
isolated fragment of another movement, hypothetical yet physical. You act as though 
it is frozen in time and space, suspended for you to examine it from all angles, and 
you claim that this is the process that occurs all the time when you move. 
Life's infinite variations are an 
essential part of our life. And so 
precisely of the habitual character of 
life. Expression consists for us in 
incalculability. If I knew exactly how 
he would grimace, move, there would 
be no facial expression, no gesture. - 
But is that true? -I can after all listen 
again & again to a piece of music that 
I know (completely) by heart; & it 
could even be played on a musical 
box. Its gestures would still remain 
gestures for me although I know all 
the time, what comes next. Indeed I 
may even be surprised afresh again & 
again. (In a certain sense. ) 
(Wiegenstein CV 83-4e: NIS 137 67a) 
`The aim of music: to communicate 
feelings. ' 
Connected with this: We may rightly say 
"he has now the same face as before" - 
although measurement gave different 
results in the two cases. 
How are the words "the same facial 
expression" used? - How do we know 
that someone is using these words 
correctly? But how do I now that I am 
using them correctly? 
(Wittgenstein CV 43e: NIS 122 190) 
This musical phrase is a gesture for me. 
It creeps into my life. I make it my own. 
(Wittgenstein CV 83e: MS 137 67a) 
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Canto 2: Of Vision and Death 
Eurydice flutters like a page in flames 
while her son touches her torrid, tindery cheeks, 
which split and scar with each fingertip stroke, 
like Lot's wife, they turn to rock salt and crumble. 
The curse of looking behind will befall 
those who use the rear-view mirror instead, 
unlike Perseus with reflecting shield 
given him by Athena, they aren't safe; 
the Gorgon's gaze can still petrify 
those who view her in the looking glass. 
But Eurydice is yet to be 
the vexed victim of a harsher gaze: 
the backwards glance of her belov'd, 
so cniel a trick played by Hades 
to deny Orpheus a look 
at his fair wife, Eurydice. 
If she is the past into 
which we all look with sore eyes, 
she is also the future, 
like a suture in those eyes 
which stops us from seeing, 
prevents us from knowing, 
changes our perception, 
alters sense ratios, 
shifts from one mode of 
communication 
to another in 
the blink of an eye 
which will never 
open again 
all ossified 
and calcified 
hard to touch 
difficult 
to locate 
in the dark 
heavy 
grit dry 
ice cold 
grey eye 
falls 
like 
a 
stone 
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Everything is determined, the beginning 
as well as the end, by forces over which 
we have no control. It is determined for 
the insect as well as the star. Human 
beings, vegetables, or cosmic dust, we all 
dance to a mysterious tune, intoned by 
an invisible piper. 
(Einstein in Carey 1995: 274; 
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Part 6: Futureworld 
Canto 1: The Time Machine: An In(ter)vention 
Orpheus speaks. 
`We're nearly at the end of this journey. I know that much, for this instant. In the next 
it might change. Even now, or then, I knew what I knew. Before speaking I knew. 
Nothing changed with my uttering the words: "We're nearly at the end of this 
journey". Except that we got closer to the end. But my saying that protracted the 
journey, and meant that the end was pushed further away at the same time as being 
pulled closer. And so it has been all the time like this. Philosophy itself, in all of its 
guises, is like this too. Whenever a philosopher gets to the end, or thinks they are close 
to an end of their argument, they are not there. How can they be? Just as there is no 
definite beginning to philosophising, there is no finite end. Even the end of 
philosophy is just another false end which leads into a new philosophy, albeit one 
based in negation-at some point even the anti-attitude must become a `conviction' 
which is worn like a mask. The end is like falling asleep: "the exhausted want rest, 
relaxation, peace, calm". The philosopher reaches exhaustion from the travelling, 
without ever reaching a satisfactory goal-even though they may believe that they have 
completed their voyage. They sometimes change direction, and start a new journey, 
driven by the will to truth. The end is a new beginning in a perpetual cycle of stopping 
and starting, each indistinguishable from the other. But always they will lay down to 
sleep, their journey incomplete as it becomes the potential journey for others to take 
up. Philosophy is a relay race which can never be won as it will never be finished. 
Ermy looks again at the clock on his PC. 'TmeisnxTt ut' He sighs. A spasm 
in his upper back reminds him of the weight of his task. 'Imsotird, and Megdso 
much to do stit Ive gat to sire as my thoughts, my Wes raff, print and proofread t all, by to 
make sense of emyting, makeloohý His right hand clutches at the mouse as he 
pauses before left-clicking on the relevant document icon. The software starts 
up and the word processed file comes up on the screen. 
Digital Dialogism: dance at the edge of language. 
This is a thesis about dance. But it doesn't wear this on 
its sleeve. Maybe it is more of a thesis for those 
interested in dance. Maybe it is a thesis for those wishing 
to consider dance from new directions. Maybe it is a thesis 
for the writer to indulge in a 'dance of language', rather 
than 'language of dance'. Maybe it is a thesis about the 
processes of thought. As Nietzsche wrote: "thinking wants to 
be learned like dancing, as a kind of dancing" (in TI, 'What 
the Germans Lack' §7,1968a: 76). This thesis is the result 
of thinking about dance and allowing that thinking to dance 
itself. 
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The future is now here. The future is the present, and the past. To use a time-as-space 
metaphor. we're moving forwards into the past. But this is not a new observation. Just 
an example of the circularity of thought. The present is as brief as the future is infinite, 
as the past is unimaginable. Instantly is not quick enough when you want to live in the 
present. And the present is as throwaway as it is transient. It is as transient as it is 
transparent. We talk of surface and superficiality but ignore the perspicuity that this 
affords. 
Ermy reads through the notes he has made over the last few years. He didn't 
think that this moment would come. The moment at which he has to make his 
ideas known to others, to present his work. He wonders if it says anything to 
anybody else. He ponders on how it is like making a dance piece-putting 
together a sequence of movements which seem to have some kind of meaning 
to the maker, but which are merely shapes in space made by a human being. 
A final thought comes to Ermy. 'TmeisniringoutThefuhreisnavhere' He types. 
We live in a humanised world; ours is a world of myth, of 
language, of imagery. We have invented the mind, emotion, 
thought and spirit. We want easy answers to questions that 
don't have answers. We see ourselves reflected in the stars; 
our stories, our lives, our myths lie beyond our reach, 
painted and written for us by unknown and unknowable gods. 
Digital technology is one of the latest gods we worship, at 
the same time as seeing ourselves as the creators of a new 
entity in our own image. The computer, we intimate, is 
modeled on our brains and use the computer as a model for 
our brains. We live analogically and symbiotically with the 
silicon and human-made extensions of ourselves. We think. To 
be human is to be positioned between the earth's so-called 
nature and an adapted world of our own making. We talk of 
humanising nature and de-humanising ourselves through 
technology. We build our worlds with technology and become 
indissociably connected to the technology. Human beings 
construct their lives in concert with their technologies and 
life breaks down when the technologies break down. When 
humans become more dependent on machines, does this remove 
our humanness? Or does it somehow accentuate it through 
stark contrast with the inhuman technology? We 
anthropomorphise the digital machine as we do our pets, 
because we see in it not the actions of other people but 
actions as though of the machine itself. We differentiate 
and classify and redefine our relationships with objects the 
closer and more intimately they become attached to our 
bodies. Even calling them relationships implies a reciprocal 
return of affection and attention. We invent new terms for 
branches of the human family - the cyborg is made real by 
naming an organism that is steered by or steers a machine, a 
piece of technology, a fragment of humanised nature that 
augments our failing, fragile or inadequate bodies, or 
extends the human qualities we might call mind, memory or 
self, which we characterise in the same pejorative terms as 
we do our bodies - we hold an ideal before us and try to 
hold it, but it is always out of reach; our myths tell us of 
gods, perfect beings, objects that will allow us to achieve 
perfection, immortality or supreme knowledge of thel 
universe; still the quest goes on. 
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Simulacra become the real. New forms of stimulation-virtual, haptic, 
pharmacological-give us new perceptions, conceptions and prompt questions of what 
it means to be physical beings. In the Global Amusement Arcade everything is a game, 
a pastime. A compression of the words `pass' and `time'; from a verb to a noun. 
Something we used to do is now something that we have. But time isn't currency 
anymore-it is valueless. When it is `wasted', we do not feel perturbed by this. It is 
collateral damage. We understand its worthlessness. We do not need to worry about 
time as much as we used to-for example, our lives don't revolve around the same 
tasks that characterise an agricultural society-maybe we are moving to the end of 
time. Maybe time is not simply dying. Maybe... Time is dead. ' 
There is so much more to be said. 
And of course, more to be read: more Derrida, Deleuze & 
Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus, more Lacan, some Teilhard de 
Chardin, Ellul properly, more Davidson (must re-read 'What 
Metaphors Mean' Ch. 7 in Inquiries... (1984)), the list is 
endless -I don't know when to stop... 
Ermy realises that there is never going to be an end to his work, before he' 
reluctantly, and nervously clicks on the Print icon. 'It is finished, ' he says as he bows his head. 
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Canto 2: Die unendliche Geschichte. 
So, this is the moment where it all must reach some kind of ending. The strands of the 
story need to be gathered up and somehow brought to a satisfactory denouement. But 
this is not an easy proposition. I want to write an ending that matches up to all of the 
endings that you, the reader or listener, can imagine. 
I want Orpheus to find Eurydice and to be able to resist the urge to turn round and 
take her out of Hell. But this story has already been written and who am I to change 
the end? 
I want \Vittgenstein to find peace and to be understood. But this story is way beyond 
my control. 
I want Eurydice to become more than a metaphor. But a metaphor will always remain 
a metaphor. 
I want Eurydice's son to give me the answers to a million questions. But questions will 
always want for answers. 
I want Ermy to be real and to realise his value. But Ermy is just an unfinished sketch 
from the imagination, he does not exist in the same way that you do. But, like the 
meaning of a word, he does exist in some strange way, the same yet different for each 
of us. He is not a person like you, yet he can be spoken of as though he is. He is like a 
role in the theatre, an actor can portray it, but never become it. 
But now I am tired of trying to become. 
As Nietzsche wrote: "linguistic means of expression are useless for expressing 
`becoming"'. But in that case, what else is able to express it? Perhaps it is the doing 
that is the expression: "there is no `being' beyond doing, effecting, becoming, `the 
doer' [the performer] is merely a fiction added to the deed-the deed is everything. " 
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Conclusion: The Omega Man 
Canto 1 and Only First and Last and Always. 
Can you see me? 
Where the sky changes from grey to blue, I dance. 
I am the child of Orpheus and Eurydice. 
In the creased skin of an elbow joint, I dance. 
I am nameless. 
When the sea is between ebb and flow, I dance. 
I am the orphan son of a poet. 
At the last crackle of a bonfire, I dance. 
I am not alive and I am not dead. 
In the free fall before crash landing, I dance. 
Can you hear me? 
When a bulb pops, I dance. 
I am the last thing you hear before you fall asleep. 
In the vibrating string of a musical instrument, I dance. 
My voice is like electricity, silent, violent. 
When you can't breathe, I dance. 
I am a cascade of falling leaves. 
Among the streams of information, I dance. 
I am a digital watermark. 
When one door closes, and another opens, I dance. 
I am asynchronous communication. 
Like the worker bee in the hive, I dance. 
I am a daemon. 
Where the meatspace meets cyberspace, I dance. 
An infertile body in a sterile world. 
At the edge of reason, I dance. 
I am unbreakable code. 
In the time between a cry and its echo, I dance. 
I am hidden text. 
As mote floats in a midnight headlight, I dance. 
Can you sense me at all? 
In the vacuum of the heart, I dance. 
I am the half-rhyme in this line. 
Where metaphor lives, I dance. 
Ink, black and obsolete. 
Underneath a patina of green rust, I dance. 
I am pixelated and lo-res. 
To the sound of a dissonant chord, I dance. 
I am a synecdoche. 
Where fast becomes slow, I dance. 
I am the result of a synergism. 
On the fine line, I dance. 
Macabre and morphotic. 
From first to last, I dance. 
I am found before the moment of understanding. 
Always, alone, I dance. 
244 
For the first time in history man, on 
this planet, is discovering that he is 
alone with himself [... ] The 
conventional division of the world into 
subject and object, into inner and outer 
world, into body and soul, is no longer 
applicable. 
(Heisenberg in Carey 1995: 277) 
The community of human destinies is 
experienced in the anonymity of non- 
place, and in solitude. 
So there will soon be a need - perhaps 
there already is a need - for something 
that may seem a contradiction in terms: 
an ethnology of solitude. 
(Auge 1995: 120) 
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In Lieu of an Appendix: Notes to the Poem `The First Unborn' 
It would be a misnomer if this section were called an Appendix. If it were a body part 
it would be the liver, the largest gland in the body, irregularly shaped and a major 
accessory organ of digestion. It is not merely an appendage, but an integral and 
important part of the body of the text. 
The poem was written to be presented in an aural form, and as an attempt to 
poeticise and make `performative' the main themes of the thesis. It was to be 
reference-laden and indirectly direct the reader to some other specific texts, and many 
more texts that cannot be accounted for or predicted. It is after deliberation that this 
key for `un-locking' the poem has been forged (see CV 62e: MS 133 12), as this is an 
academic work after all. 
In order not to disrupt the flow and `look' of the text, the poem is printed in the 
thesis as an un-annotated piece of writing, but many of the deliberate references are 
relevant and interesting. There are also points of contact with the writer's direct 
experience of writing: for example, lyrics of songs being listened to at the time which 
found their way in to the poem; chance encounters with quotations from other works 
of literature, philosophy and science. Wittgenstein writes that the "lesson in a poem is 
overstated, if the intellectual points are nakedly exposed, not clothed by the 
heart" (CV 62e: MS 133 6). A fine example of poetry that clothes its points, or at 
least its references, and then strips itself bare by supplying notes is Eliot's `The Waste 
Land' (first published in 1922; 1972: 25-51). A piece of literature that is more 
guarded in its use of references is Eco's The Name of the Rose (first published as Il 
nome della rosa in 1980; 1984), which alludes to Sherlock Holmes, Jorge Luis 
Borges and Wittgenstein: "But let us not forget that there are also signs that seem 
such and such and are instead without meaning, like blitiri or bu-ba-buff.... " (Eco 
1984: 107); "Can I say `bububu' and mean `If it doesn't rain I shall go for a walk'? - 
It is only in a language that I can mean something by something. This shews clearly 
that the grammar of `to mean' is not like that of the expression `to imagine' and the 
like" (Wittgenstein PI 18e; unnumbered passage). (For more on these works and 
their intertexts see, for example, Hutcheon 1988 and 1989, and Allen 2000. ) 
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Cantos 3 and 4 of `Part One: Brainstorm' are formed from the writings of 
Wittgenstein, and these are referenced in detail here, with the original German 
writings (if written originally in German and not in English) on transparent sheets 
which can and should be placed over the relevant pages. This is an acknowledgement 
of Wittgenstein's own wishes and the problems of translation: "the relative values of 
words which are roughly synonymous in German are not mirrored in the English 
counterparts of these words" (Winch in Wittgenstein 1998: xviii). There are many 
other references to Wittgenstein's life and works in the poem, and these are given 
following the conventions outlined in `On the Referencing of Major Philosophical and 
Literary Works', except that it has not been deemed necessary to place the name 
`Wittgenstein' in front of each reference. Not all of the translations have the German 
to accompany them, and where a quotation is close to word-for-word in the 
published text, only the work and section or page reference is given. 
The references to Greek mythology are un-noted here. The major source was 
Guirand (1968), although Graves (1992) was referred to in passing, along with any 
Homer that was available (not in Bibliography). Certain liberties have been taken with 
the mythologies. 
The film and song references are not included in the Bibliography, but the details 
given here should be sufficient to find the source. Some poetic references are given in 
a form (title, verse, line, etc. ) that will make it possible to find the line in any edition 
of the poets' works. 
Caveat: 
One no longer loves one's knowledge enough when one has communicated it. 
(Nietzsche BGE § 160) 
Knowledge is not translated into words when it is expressed. The words are 
not a translation of something else that was there before they were. 
(Wittgenstein Z§ 191; italics in original) 
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Page 112 
[Page numbers given refer to the page in the thesis on which the quotation ends (some of 
them start on one page and end on another). ] 
THE FIRST UNBORN 
'The First Unborn': The title of the poem is a play on the phrase 'the first born'. It is 
nonsensical, yet aspires to be meaningful. It is, to use Sorrell's word, a 
"nonphrase" (Sorrell 1992: 147). [Cf. Sterne's Tristram Shandy, vol. 1, book 14.1 
Page 113 
Prologue: Alphaville 
Canto 1: The Meeting.. 
'Alphaville': Alphaville (a film directed by Jean-Luc Godard, 1965), the automated city 
where love and tenderness - human qualities - are forbidden (suggesting that through 
technology we are dehumanised). This is the Underworld, Hades, Hell into which the 
human character (Lemmy Caution) must travel in order to regain humanity (the search 
for the thing that we love). 
'Boys wait and bleed without making a sound': 'Wait and Bleed', a song title on the 
eponymous debut album by Slipknot (Roadrunner Records, 1999). Also, a veiled 
reference to the fatal stabbing of Damilola Taylor on the 27th of November 2000. 
'brains of plastic': Based on a line from Marilyn Manson 's song 'GODEATGOD', on Holy 
Wood: "but you are plastic and so are your brains" (nothing; /interscope records, 2000). 
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'he traces /a long-forgotten shape': Here Orpheus points to the constellation of Lyra, 
supposedly his lyre carried to the heavens either by Zeus's vulture or the Muses. Lyra 
can be seen between June and October in the Northern Hemisphere (best viewed in 
August at 2100hrs). The lyre is the instrument mythically invented by Hermes and 
given to Apollo, his half-brother, who in turn gave it to his son Orpheus. 
'(But is meaning just a human-made lie? )': 'Meaning'. The word that prompted this whole 
problem. Any idea that meaning is an easily definable and transferable entity or concept 
is mistaken (cf. the Conduit Metaphor of communication (see Brook and Boa11995: 115- 
6) and Saussurean structuralism). The meaning of a word is different in so many ways to 
the meaning of a dance movement or physical gesture and these are different to the 
meaning of a picture which differs from the meaning of a road sign, and so on. Meaning is 
in a way determined by rules, but these rules are arbitrary, as are the rules of grammar 
(of writing, of dance). To suggest that anyone can get outside of the rules of grammar 
and provide a meaning for anything is thoroughly misleading: "the grammar 
determines the meaning of the word" (Wittgenstein PO 307). But even this does not 
fully answer the question: 'What is meaning? ' A word, for example, has a range of 
meanings, through time and across contexts; the same word is never the same word in a 
new utterance. 
It may be believed that dance magically communicates meaning from one person - the 
dancer - who expresses, for example, an inner emotion that is intended (wilfully, 
consciously) as the meaning of the movement, to another - the viewer (the list of 
examples could be read for hours, see Horst and Russell 1961, Wigman 1973, 
McConnell 1977, Hawkins 1992 and Mackrell 1997). This emotion could be considered 
to be of a certain kind or quality, perhaps anger, love, sadness, hate, etc., and can be 
248 
read (felt, experienced) as such. However, this belief is tied up with the common 
misconceptions that Best outlines in relation to the meanings and definitions of words 
(for example see Best 1974: 15). It should not be said that dance is capable of expressing 
meaning or emotion in a (de)finite way; that a dance movement contains meaning per se. 
This conception is misguided, as is the idea that dance is a language (as suggested by 
many writers, including Humphrey 1959 -a book particularly ripe for deconstruction - 
and Haskell 1965; again the list could be long, and it is not restricted to mid-20th 
Century texts: see Claid 2001, for example). 
It could be said, "Dance is a language if 'definitions' are ascribed to each movement, 
and then these 'definitions' taught to others. " But what are these definitions to be? They 
are not emotion, although we might feel emotion when they are done; 'emotion' is 
linked to a movement in the same way that it is linked to the word 'emotion'. 
Wittgenstein writes that "the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not 
describe it" (PI §244), it doesn't mean pain; and Hacker writes: 
In the place of the descriptivist, cognitivist, conception, Wittgenstein proposes a 
completely different picture - an expressivist, naturalist one. The verbal expression 
of pain is grafted on to the natural expressive behaviour in circumstances of 
injury [... Wittgenstein writes: 'Language] is a refinement, 'in the beginning, was 
the deed". 
(1997: 36; italics in original) 
(Wittgenstein quotation from CV 36e: MS 119 146, incorporating a line from Goethe's 
Faust: Part One, 1949: 71. ) 
Even gestural movements are dependent on the use of other (verbal) languages, each 
movement does not itself convey meaning: "Shrugging of shoulders, head-shakes, nods 
and so on we call signs first and foremost because they are embedded in the use of our 
verbal language" (Wittgenstein Z §651). Nodding the head can signify a positive 
response; it can be used in place of or accompany the word "yes". However, in another 
culture, nodding the head may be the gesture to accompany a negative response, the 
word "no". Or similarly, it may be an involuntary gesture of a person with a nervous 
affliction, or the voluntary action of someone with a stiff neck. Another example is that 
of using the thumb to signify a favourable personal situation or acceptance of 
something or an acknowledgement of someone's having asked something of you. It can 
also "mean" let him live (or die) or please pick me up in your car or the complete 
opposite of any positive usage (in that it may be used as a gesture of disdain). Richard 
Rorty writes: "For Wittgenstein, what makes things representational or intentional is 
the part they play in a larger context-in interaction with large numbers of visible 
things" (1980: 27). It is quite often the surrounding context that provides the way we are 
inclined to read a gesture. In the case of dance this should not be overlooked. Berger 
and Luckmann, in their discussion of the human production (and use) of signs write: 
Signs are clustered in a number of systems. Thus there are systems of 
gesticulatory signs, of patterned bodily movements, of various sets of material 
artifacts, and so on. Signs and sign systems are objectivations in the sense of 
being objectively available beyond the expression of subjective intentions 'here 
and now. This 'detachability' from the immediate expressions of subjectivity also 
pertains to signs that require the mediating presence of the body. Thus 
performing a dance that signifies aggressive intent is an altogether different thing 
from snarling or clenching fists in an outburst of anger. The latter acts express my 
subjectivity 'here and now', while the former can be quite detached from this 
subjectivity -I may not be angry or aggressive at all at this point but merely 
taking part in the dance because I am paid to do so on behalf of someone else 
who is angry. In other words, the dance can be detached from the subjectivity of 
the dancer in a way in which the snarling cannot from the snarler. Both dancing 
and snarling are manifestations of bodily expressivity, but only the former has 
the character of an objectively available sign. Signs and sign systems are all 
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characterized by 'detachability', but they can be differentiated in terms of the 
degree to which they may be detached from face-to-face situations. Thus a dance 
is evidently less detached than a material artifact signifying the same subjective 
meaning. 
(1991: 51; italics in original) 
Is it possible that dance is a language when interpreted as, that is, called one by a 
viewer? Anyone could say that anything is a language in this case. Is it paradoxical to 
say that dance is not a language, but can be perceived and conceived of as one by both 
dancer and viewer? Not paradoxical, simply ridiculous. Perhaps what should be said is 
that there are certain (human made) rules that can be applied to dance movement, 
which then give it the function of being a substitute, a proxy language (is this not what 
sign-language used by deaf people is? ). As in the case of Wittgenstein's builders (see 
Wittgenstein PI §2; and Wittgenstein BB 77ff. ) sense and meaning are only apparent and 
determined in accordance with the situation and shared understanding of the 
interlocutors. Would a dancer have to supply a dictionary or lexicon as a key to what 
their movements mean, and get everyone watching to agree to these, for the dance to be 
counted as using a language? Is this the case with verbal language? No. A culture, a 
form of life, that uses language doesn't need a dictionary to be able to converse 
(although dictionaries exist to help people converse, that is, use language). We can 
invent a new language (verbal, written, or physical) but until it is used by human beings 
it does not live. Wittgenstein writes: 
Esperanto. Our feeling of disgust, when we utter an invented word with invented 
derivative syllables. The word is cold, has no associations & yet plays at 
'language'. A system of purely written signs would not disgust us like this. 
(CV 60e: 132: 69) 
Language has history, myths (see PO 199 and note below) incorporated into it (see CV 
60e: MS 132 62 and cf. Vygotsky 1986; see below). It has been said that the 
materials of the dance are not neutral, they carry meanings or significances which 
are independent of the dance situation. The basic movement material of the 
dance is impregnated with meanings with which the choreographer, performers 
and audience have to come to terms with. 
(Hodgens in Adshead 1988: 65) 
The basic premise is suggestive of correctness (philosophy, according to Northrop and 
cited by Hawkins in his collection of 'statements on dance', "is simply looking at one's 
basic premises", 1992: 59; yet Hawkins seems to neglect this simple act in his writings), 
but how can the meanings or significances be 'independent of the dance situation'? 
Obviously the socio-cultural background will influence the movement of its dancers, as 
will other experiences (for example, dance training) and attitudes, but to say that these 
are impregnated into the dance as independent meanings (surely an oxymoron of sorts) is 
misleading and implies a given and non-interpretational set of meanings. Why must we 
'have to come to terms with' - what does this mean here? - anyone else's meanings, 
when we are either willing or able to assign our own meanings to a dance? 
We see a woman raise her arms and lower them repeatedly in rapid succession. 
Obviously there are a multitude of ways in which this could be done, in terms of 
quality, range of movement, where it appears the movement originates physically, etc., but for the sake of this example, let us say that she resembles someone struggling to keep her head above water. It might then mean that she is drowning. (Is she in the sea? Is she screaming "Help me"? ) It might also be taken to mean that she is mimicking, or 
even feigning, drowning. If she is not in water but on a stage, we might assign to her 
movements the meaning that if she were in water we might believe her to be drowning. Or on seeing this same action we might assume that the woman, even though on the 
stage in the middle of a dance show is having some kind of seizure brought on by the heat and lighting effects. We are aware that people who have perhaps never seen 
250 
theatrical acting before have understood the stage-action to be real, not merely a 
representation of reality: for example, 
A nineteenth-century touring company was travelling through the United States 
with a production of Othello. In Chicago, lago's behaviour so enraged a man in 
the stalls that he stood up with a cry of 'You rascal! And shot him dead. 
(Donaldson 1985: 12) 
Furthermore, it is not enough to say of dance that it is a basic form of expression (for 
example, "man's first means of self-expression" Haskell 1965: 21), and in this imply that it 
'expresses' things (as words do) in a way understandable by all human beings, that is, 
universally across cultures. Wittgenstein uses facial expressions as an analogy for our 
believing the sincerity of what someone says. He writes that it is due to a number of 
factors that determines whether we characterise a face as friendly, just as there are 
many factors (for example, gestures and tone of voice) to our believing the meaning of 
what somebody says. There is not one thing behind the words, or face, that allows for 
believing or not believing something. "If by 'believing' we mean an activity, a process, 
taking place while we say that we believe, we may say that believing is something 
similar to or the same as expressing a belief" (Wittgenstein BB 146). There is no 
separation between the meaning and the movement in dance, as there is no distinction 
to be made between a word and its meaning. Wittgenstein continues to discuss meaning 
and demonstrates that 'means of expressiveness' are not to be confused in our 
understanding of them, through our similar usage of verbs such as 'speaking' and 
'thinking', as accompaniments to something aside from themselves: "such means of 
expressiveness as the play of facial expression or gestures which can be said to 
accompany speech, nobody would dream of calling thinking" (BB 148). Along the same 
lines, David Best in Expression in Movement and the Arts writes, 
it is conceivable that, in time, a robot may be developed which could be 
programmed to dance. The dances could still be emotionally expressive even 
though the robot is incapable of feeling [... The robot's performances] can be 
understood as expressive only as extensions of the concept of human expression. 
(1974: 169; my italics) 
Clearly there are other dance forms, and movements within ballet, that are mimetic or 
supposed to portray other actions. Some dances are storytelling devices, wherein 
movements are meant to represent part of a tale, or a character's actions or emotions. 
Even these movements constitute a language only in the context of the dances they 
appear in. A Noh gesture representing sadness when done outside of a Noh theatre 
refers back to the meaning it carries on stage, but even to a Noh actor who sees me 
doing it as a mark of my sadness, it would probably not communicate this in the same 
way as my crying tears. And to someone not versed in Noh, it is doubtful as to how 
much it would convey my intended meaning of 'sadness' if viewed in isolation of any 
other signifiers (if this is possible). 
It is also wrong to confuse technical language with the so-called 'language of 
dance' (perhaps not helped by titles of books such as The Language of Dance (Wigman 
1966) and The Language of Ballet (Mara 1966; nota bene: apparently it is French-"a 
universal language in use throughout the world wherever the art is taught" (1966: v)). Analogously, Susannah Fiennes, a painter, in a critique of National Gallery exhibition of Rembrandt, seems to mistake an understanding of a technical vocabulary of painting for the "language of art" as encapsulated and communicated in a painting. Criticising 
the gallery's use of literal description and lack of in-depth and searching analysis of a 
painting, she proposes that a painting's meaning can be best (and only) understood by 
viewing it "from the painter's perspective" (1999: 80; see notes below regarding 'intention'). She is saying, in a rather elitist tone, that this is where the meaning is 
contained and that those of us "with no education in the language of painting" (1999: 80) are missing the point. I might not fully understand how to apply oil paint to a 
canvas in order to represent a face, but that does not stop me from interpreting 
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someone else's attempts at this representation. Yes, if we have a command of the 
grammar of this "visual language" (1999: 80), we may be able to explain the reasons 
why and how it works in some pictures and not in others, but we should not assume 
that we can understand the meaning of a picture, simply because we can describe it 
formally and technically. (Substitute 'dance' for 'picture'. ) 
Relating the dialogism of Bakhtin to Einsteins relativity theory, Holquist writes 
Dialogism argues that all meaning is relative in the sense that it comes about only 
as a result of the relation between two bodies occupying simultaneous but different 
space, where bodies may be thought of as ranging from the immediacy of our 
physical bodies, to political bodies and to bodies of ideas in general (ideologies). 
(1990: 20-1) 
In this conception of meaning is another aspect, also simultaneously experiencing the 
relation of the two bodies: the observer, "an active particpant" (Holquist 1990: 21). 
Page 125 
Canto 2: Some Exposition. 
Page 132 
'binary code': "the DNA of digital life" (Hale 1996: 43). 
'genome race': The Human Genome Project. The HGP website (U. S. Department of Energy 
2001) states: 
Begun in 1990, the U. S. Human Genome Project is a 13-year effort coordinated by 
the Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health [... ] Project goals 
are to 
" identify all the approximately 30,000 genes in human DNA, 
" determine the sequences of the 3 billion chemical base pairs that make up 
human DNA, 
" store this information in databases, 
" improve tools for data analysis, 
" transfer related technologies to the private sector, and 
" address the ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI) that may arise from the 
project. 
Several types of genome maps have already been completed, and a working draft 
of the entire human genome sequence was announced in June 2000, with analyses 
published in February 2001 [Publication of Initial Working Draft Sequence 
February 12,2001]. 
'the robots we entrust with human lives': Not literally and totally, however, 
Man's desire to seek his own obsolescence has taken another leap forward with 
the development of a sophisticated robotic surgeon. Called Aesop, this little 
fellow has a far steadier hand than the traditionally timorous surgeon's assistant 
[... j Aesop is the result of a project between the French Research Institute of 
Digestive Cancers and the European Institute of Telesurgery. The idea of 
automotive surgery has impressed the EFTS so much that it has developed an 
operation simulator, which enables surgeons to practise on 3-D computer images 
of organs instead of on animals. 
(Anon. 2000: 6) 
'while ENS makes their muscles flex': 'Electrical Nerve Stimulation'. Having, experienced a rudimentary use of muscle stimulation using a TENS (Transcutaneous Electrical Nerve Stimulator) machine attached to my arm (8 March 1999 in Nottingham), I was prompted to consider a number of things. Many of these are still to be fully explored, 
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but this was my initial query: What does the starting stimuli for movement matter to its 
interpretation? We can't see a non-cyborg dancer's impulse to move, but we do not 
question that there is an impulse behind the movement. It may be somehow rationally 
initiated, or purely from physical memory. This gives the movement an authenticity, a 
genuineness that we accept. However, in the case of Stelarc and electrical muscle 
stimulation, because we can't see the impulse from the electrode (although we can see 
the muscle stir as the current builds), we seem to want to question the movement's 
authenticity, and therefore its meanings. According to Stelarc (in conversation with 
Deveril), there is a tendency in an audience to disbelieve a movement's raison d'etre 
when electrically stimulated from an exogenous source. It is as though any movement 
not created from within the dancer cannot be real, authentic, or meaningful, as though 
all other dance movements are. There is still much to be investigated in this region, and 
the implications of direct body interactions are yet to be explored. Experimentation 
with technologically linked bodies may lead into the areas of kinaesthesis and 
kinaesthetic empathy [Moore and Yamamoto write: "Kinesthesis (the "muscle sense" or 
"sixth sense") is defined as the sensual discrimination of the positions and movement of 
body parts based on information other than visual, auditory, or verbal. Kinesthetic 
perception involves judging changes in muscle tension, body position, and the relative 
placement of body parts" (1988: 48); and "Kinesthetic empathy involves physical 
identification with the movements one observes being executed" (1988: 53). It must be 
noted, however, that there is some debate as to whether kinaesthetic empathy is a 
psychological or physiological phenomenon, if a phenomenon at all, for example, see 
Best 1974]; consciousness; gestures/non-verbal communication [See for example 
Kurtenbach and Hulteen's chapter 'Gestures in Human-Computer Communication in 
Laurel 1990: 309-17; and books such as LaFrance and Mayo 1978, as a starting point]; 
haptic and tactile expression; somaesthesia and more precisely protopathic and 
erotogenic (and other pleasurable) experiences; etc.. 
Page 133 
'I am like Fogg and you are Passepartout, / but it won't take eighty days to reach Hell': 
The main characters in Jules Verne, Le tour du monde en quatre-vingt fours, first published 
in 1873. 
Page 136 
Canto 3: Preparing for the Tourney. 
'a composite poet: Dante-Virgil': An idea taken from the poem The Bus to Hope by Brian 
Lewis (1998). 
'Like Jesus resurrecting Lazarus': The brother of Mary and Martha, see The Bible, John 11- 
12. 
'Descartes'/ ghost': The 17th Century French philosopher whose saying "cogito ergo sum" 
is possibly the most famous philosophical dictum of all time (see Descartes 1997 or any 
other edition of his major works). It is responsible for much confused thinking. A ghost, 
of course, is a non-existent human fantasy creature and reference to it here is purely 
metaphorical and should not be confused for a statement of belief in spirit entities. See Ryle (1949; Chapter I: 'Descartes' Myth') and note below on 'The Ghost in the Machine'. Wittgenstein: "Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there, we should like 
to say, is a spirit" (PI §36) ["Wo unsere Sprache uns einen Körper vermuten laßt, und kein Körper ist, dort, möchten wir sagen, sei ein Geist"]. 
'in our everyday words': This is a key theme of the thesis hidden in an abstruse way. The idea is most neatly summed up in a sentence of Wittgenstein's: "An entire mythology is laid down in our language" ["In unserer Sprache ist eine ganze Mythologic 
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niedergelegt"] (PO 199) [(PO 198)]. Wittgenstein also writes 
People are deeply imbedded in philosophical, i. e. grammatical confusions. And 
to free them from these presupposes pulling them out of the immensely manifold 
connections they are caught up in. One must so to speak regroup their entire 
language. 
(PO 185) 
Die Menschen sind tief in den philosophischen d. i. grammatischen Konfusionen 
eingebettet. Und, sie daraus zu befreien, setzt voraus, dass man sie aus den 
ungeheuer mannigfachen Verbindungen herausreisst, in denen sie gefangen sind. 
Man muss sozusagen ihre ganze Sprache umgruppieren. 
(PO 184) 
Page 138 
Part One: Brainstorm 
Canto 1: The Tourney Begins. 
'Brainstorm': Brainstorm (a film directed by Douglas Trumball, 1983) in which a machine 
allows a person to experience another person's sensations (a similar premise to Strange 
Days, a film directed by Kathryn Bigelow, 1995). A book by Daniel Dennett: Brainstorms 
(1997); see the essays 'Conditions of Personhood' (pages 267-85; also in Rorty 1976) and 
'Where Am I? ' (pages 310-23), in particular. 
'As fast as bits down coax': 
She grabs her breath. 'So you ask me how I feel? I feel lazy. And slow. And 
antique. And I'm scared of all these machines. I shouldn't be, but I am. I'm not 
sure I completely like the new world: 
(Coupland 1998: 153) 
Recent technological advances have moved at speeds beyond the comprehension of 
most people. In the last sixty-five years, computers have 'evolved' from behemoths of 
limited brain, to small, commonplace objects that are capable of completing sequences 
of immense calculations at an alarming rate. (For information on machine evolution see 
Mazlish 1993, Dyson 1997, and parts of Jeffrey 1999. ) Kurzweil informs us that today "A 
$1,000 desk-top personal computer can perform about 450 calculations per 
second" (1999a: 1), and by 2009, $1,000 will buy a machine capable of 1 trillion 
calculations per second. Hans Moravec (1998) in'When will computer hardware match 
the human brain? ' writes: 
In 1990,1 MIPS [Million Instructions per Second] cost $1,000 in a low-end 
personal computer [... ] Since 1990, the power available to individual Al and 
robotics programs has doubled yearly, to 30 MIPS by 1994 and 500 MIPS by 1998 
[... ] The most powerful experimental supercomputers in 1998, composed of 
thousands or tens of thousands of the fastest microprocessors and costing tens of 
millions of dollars, can do a few million MIPS. They are within striking, distance 
of being powerful enough to match human brainpower, but are unlikely to be 
applied to that end [... ] At the present rate [of development], computers suitable 
for humanlike robots will appear in the 2020s. 
Coupland writes: "what is it that we are now doing or creating that will transform us into 
whatever it is that we are slated to next become? " (1998: 269-70). This is a pertinent question, 
one that underpins this current train of thought. There are people doing and creating, for example scientists experimenting with cloning procedures, who are shaping the future of the human race in ways we cannot fully predict or understand. We can only begin to philosophise about how future humans (or post-humans, or transhumans) will 
contemplate and cogitate on their immediate experiences of the world and others. These 
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experiences could lead to a change in human relationships and the fabric of society as a 
whole. The 'Technology Postulate', which argues that within the next seventy years we 
will see such advances as nanotechnology, space colonisation and consciousness 
uploaded into computers, or other developments with great repercussions for human 
and machine existence, "is the antithesis of the assumption that the human condition is 
a constant" (Bostrom 1998). Article 1 of The Transhumanist Declaration states: 
Humanity will be radically changed by technology in the future. We foresee the 
feasibility of redesigning the human condition, including such parameters as the 
inevitability of ageing, limitations on human and artificial intellects, unchosen 
psychology, suffering, and our confinement to the planet earth. 
(Bailey et al Date unknown) 
Cf. Nietzsche and the Übermensch. 
'I believe it was his own requesting / that took him there': See diary entry (4.5.16) in 
McGuinness 1988: 240. 
Page 140 
'I have a [... ] say? ' Ermy enquires': "We have minds, we have bodies; but we are persons, 
human beings, neither minds nor bodies, nor a mixture of the two" (Binkley 1973: 10). 
Wittgenstein considers the human being to be a person, and vice versa. This seems to be 
a complicated and convoluted way of saying very little. The Wittgensteinian writer, 
Grant Gillett suggests that the word 
'Person' is, of course, used in interactions where one learns what people are like 
and has an especially rich meaning and pervasive role in thinking about one's 
own life and experience [... ] To understand the 'fundamental idea' of a person is 
therefore not only to know something but to be something 
(1992: 39) 
Wittgenstein expands on this when he says that 
it is when I talk about the world that I appear on the scene, in the glory of my self 
if you like. But until I speak or act, I am not to be found; and then it is this human 
being that you encounter. The only satisfactory representation of the self is, after 
all, der Mensch, the human being. 
(attributed to Wittgenstein by Gillett 1992: 37) 
It is when a human being begins to consider themselves as an'I', when they recognise a 
self, that is: when they talk and participate in human social acts, a 'person' is first born. 
Jeffrey Thomas Price writes that in Wittgenstein s writings "There is no attempt to 
delineate a nature of man; investigation of the person instead concludes that his very 
appearance is in his imaginative expression' (1973: 16). Verbal language is the principal 
means of expression concerning Wittgenstein, as it is perhaps our most unique feature 
when compared with other animals, but it is not the be all and end all of human 
expression. That is not to say that we are in any sense better than animals, only that we 
can define an organism as a human being when it conforms to a list of criteria denoting human beings. Wittgenstein doesn't go so far as to prescribe a list of criteria in any detail, but his Philosophical Investigations states: "only of a living human being and what 
resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious" (PI §281). For Wittgenstein, sensations 
are, in a way, public; for they are articulated in a public realm, through language and behaviour: 
'Toothache is not a behaviour but an experience'. 'We distinguish between 'behaviour' and 'experiences". [']Dancing is a behaviour, toothache an 
experience. ' These are grammatical statements. About the use of the words 'dancing' and toothache'. 
(Wittgenstein PO 279) 
255 
Wittgenstein suggests "that there is a great variety of criteria for personal 'identity"' (PI 
§404; italics in original). When a person says 'I am in pain' it is to draw attention to 
themself (PI §405). Holquist in his discussion of the Russian dialogist(s) Bakhtin and 
Voloshinov writes of the word T: 
its task is to indicate the person uttering the present instance of the discourse 
containing 'I, ' a person who is always changing and different. 'I' must not refer to 
anything in particular if it is to be able to mean everybody in general. In 
Jakobson s suggestive phrase, 'I' is a 'shifter' because it moves the center of 
discourse from one speaking subject to another: its emptiness is the no man's 
land in which subjects can exchange the lease they hold on all of language by 
virtue of saying 'I. ' 
(1990: 23) 
Glock describes Wittgenstein's attitudes to the 'I' being a referring expression, but one 
that doesn't work in the same ways as other person-referring expressions (for example, 
proper names): "the use of 'I' is analogous not to a magic arrow that always hits its 
target [... ] but to drawing a bull's-eye around an arrow already stuck in the 
wall" (Glock 1996: 163). (For more on 'shifters' see Jakobson 1990; the word was taken 
from an earlier writer, Jespersen, and the dissolution of the 'I' can be found in the 
writings of Husserl and Russell, among others. ) 
Compare the preceding Wittgensteinian ideas with Amelie Rorty's concluding 
paragraph: 
Humans are just the sorts of organisms that interpret and modify their agency 
through their conceptions of themselves. This is a complicated biological fact 
about us. Whether there are other sorts of entities that do this is in part but not 
wholly an empirical question. The fullest analysis of the concept of person would 
investigate the biologically adaptive functions of the various cultural grafts: the 
obsessions with unification and choice, salvation and simplicity, isolated integrity 
and achievement. From this larger perspective, we might be able to see how the 
cultural history of the various versions of the concept of a person has been 
modified by and has in turn modified its biological base. 
(Rorty 1976: 323) 
This allows for cultural and biological changes, and suggests that the concept of the 
person is dependant on more than just looking at the human body in isolation from its 
environment and social context. For Wittgenstein, many of these issues "are best 
approached through an investigation of the role of human expression in 
experience" (Price 1973: 61). And of course, this experience is subject to numerable 
changes. Amelie Rorty's chapter, 'A Literary Postscript: Characters, Persons, Selves, 
Individuals' (1976: 301-23), argues that personhood as a concept is not static. Through 
history and from society to society, the concept 'person' has adapted to accommodate 
views on a host of related concepts, for example, mind, soul, responsibility, 
individuality, and the self. The stages Amelie Rorty refers to in the chapter title are not 
totally distinct from one another or easily placed in a chronological order. Also they are 
taken in the main from literary sources, which reflect their socio-cultural context and 
serve to express and exemplify their worldview. Am6lie Rorty writes that 
Our idea of persons derives from two sources: one from the theater, the dramatis 
personae of the stage; the other has its origins in law. An actor dons masks, 
literally personae, that through which the sound comes, the many roles he acts [... ] The idea of a person is the idea of a unified center of choice and action, the 
unit of legal and theological responsibility. 
(Rorty 1976: 309) 
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In Amelie Rorty's account, before the concept of 'person' came literary characters (for 
example, Greek mythological-characters) and figures: 
Characters are, by nature, defined and delineated. If they change, it is because it 
is in their character to do so under specific circumstances. 
(Rorty 1976: 304) 
Figures are defined by their place in an unfolding drama; they are not assigned 
roles because of their traits, but rather have the traits of their prototypes in myth 
or sacred script. 
(Rorty 1976: 307) 
Rorty also suggests that "In contrast with the wholly external perspective on characters, 
the concept of a figure introduces the germ of what will become a distinction between 
the inner and outer person' (Rorty 1976: 308); a dangerous distinction in dualism, 
leading to the mind-body problem. However, 
In the theory of character there is no mind-body problem: without reducing 
either to the other, physical and psychological traits are fused as different aspects 
of a single organism. Mind is the organization of the living body, whose 'parts' 
are identifiable through their functional activity. What cannot see is not really an 
eye, but only the sort of flesh that normally is eye-flesh. Soul is not a separate 
substance lodged in the body; it is the living principle, the organic force of some 
sorts of substances. 
(Rorty 1976: 304-5) 
Page 142 
Canto 2: Section 432. 
'Section 432: That is PI §432 (italics in original): 
Jedes Zeichen scheint allein tot. Was gibt ihm Leben? -Im Gebrauch lebt es. hat es 
da den lebenden Atem in sich? -Oder ist der Gebrauch sein Atem? 
Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? -In use it is alive. Is life 
breathed into it there? - Or is the use its life? 
Vologinov writes, for example, "Every sign as sign (... ] even the sign of individuality, is 
social" (1986: 34). 
Devitalised or un-vitalised signs are ubiquitous in modern societies. 
Illusion is not false, for it doesn't use false signs; it uses senseless signs, signs that 
point nowhere. This is why it deceives and disappoints our demand for meaning, 
but it does so enchantingly. 
(Baudrillard 1990: 52) 
Signs exist in reality and hyperreality at the same time. Any object takes on a 
dichotomous existence: the physical object and the multitude of aspects of meaning, it 
can be interpreted as having when encountered by a human being. 
Baudrillard also writes: 
Every event is today virtually inconsequential, open to all possible 
interpretations, none of which could determine its meaning: the equiprobability 
of all causes and of all consequences - multiple and aleatory imputation. 
(1990: 17) 
There is so much information, so much (in)activity, that we do not attribute to a source 
or cause every thing we experience-to do so would be unnecessary and time- 
consuming. Neither do we weigh up a number of the possible sources, causes, 
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meanings before deciding which is most apposite-although we are possibly aware that 
there are more interpretations 'waiting' to be applied. In the conglomeration of signs 
only a few can hope to attain meaningfulness. Meaning is not resident in each sign as a 
yolk is inside an eggshell. We cannot break open the outer layer of a sign to get to the 
one meaning inside. A sign is more like a Schriidinger's box: the range of meanings as 
they coexist are either dead or alive in the box, but we can never really be sure which- 
both have equal weighting when observed from the outside. (Is the study of meaning 
and interpretation as complex as quantum theory? See Penrose 1990; cf. Wittgenstein's 
'beetle in a box' Pl §293. ) To grasp a meaning of a sign is to understand how that sign 
functions in the world. Wittgenstein warns us that "Perhaps we have to say that the 
phrase 'interpretation of signs' is misleading and we ought to say 'the use of signs'" (PR 
§32). 
'like St Vitus / dancing': The patron saint of epilepsy and nervous disorders, and of 
dancers. The condition of Sydenham's Chorea is sometimes referred to as St Vitus's 
Dance. Wittgenstein, as he got older, was troubled by "nervous 
instability" (Wittgenstein in a letter to Norman Malcolm, cited in Monk 1990: 523). He 
died in 1951 of prostate cancer. 
'my afterlife's task of nocturnal depth? ': Based on a phrase from a poem by Wittgenstein's 
friend, Paul Engelmann (1967: 75). 
Page 143 
'we have become tangled': See PI §125 and PR §2 
Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking, which we have tangled up in an 
absurd way [... ] The complexity of philosophy is not in its matter, but in our 
tangled understanding. 
'A fly / in a bottle? ': See PI §309. 
Page 144 
Canto 3: On Philosophy. 
'We must do [... ] take its place': PI §109 "Alle Erklärung mug fort, und nur Beschreibung 
an ihre Stelle treten". 
'by misusing words [... ] that is metaphorical': BB 6 and 41. Cf. Davidson 
First person authority, the social character of language, and the external determinants of thought and meaning go naturally together, once we give up the 
myth of the subjective, the idea that thoughts require mental objects. 
(1990: 394) 
'We speak in [... ] that is metaphysical': PI §116 "Wir fürhen die Wörter von ihrer 
metaphysischen, wieder auf ihre alltägliche Verwendung zurück". 
'I will try [... ] must turn back': PI §103 "Das Ideal, in unsern Gedanken, sitzt unverrückbar fest. Du kannst nicht aus ihm herastreten. Du mußt immer wieder zurück". 
`A picture holds [... ] of linguistic snare': PI §115 "Ein Bild hielt uns gefangen. Und heraus konnten wir nicht, denn es lag in unsrer Sprache, und sie schien es uns nur unerbittlich 
zu wiederholen", PO 185 and CV 25e: MS 112 231 "Die Sprache hat für Alle die gleichen Fallen bereit". 
'We must battle [... ] means of language': PI §109 "Die Philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung unsres Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer Sprache", and McGuinness, 1988: 227. 
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'and the vacant stare / of an introspection experiment': PI §412 "Mein Blick war 'vacant'" 
and PI §413 "einen Fall von Introspektion'. 
'As we dissect [... ] conflict becomes intolerable': PI §107 
Je genauer wir die tatsächliche Sprache betrachten, desto stärker wird der 
Widerstreit zwischen ihr und unsrer Forderung [... ] Der Widerstreit wird 
unerträglich. 
`The actual use [... ] is describe it': PI §124 "Die Philosophie darf den tatsächlichen 
Gebrauch der Sprache in keiner Weise antasten, sie kann ihn am Ende also nur 
beschreiben'. 
Page 145 
'A question can [... ] be badly framed': PI §321 
Was geschieht, wann ein Mensch plötzlich versteht? '-Die Frage ist schlecht 
gestellt. 
'so as to / be nonsensical': BB 8. 
'the idea that [... ] to convey thoughts': PI §304 
Das Paradox verschwindet nur dann, wenn wir radikal mit der Idee brechen, die 
Sprache funktioniere immer auf eine Weise, diene immer dem gleichen Zweck: 
Gedanken zu übertragen. 
`to / express the [... ] use / of language': BB 17, and CV 65e: MS 134 27 "Ist es wirklich 
möglich, solange eine philosophische Trübe das verschleiert, was das Staunenswerte 
oder Amgestaunte ist? ". 
Page 146 
`It is for [... ] unheard-of ways': PI §133 "Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem für die 
Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise verfeinen oder vervollständigen". 
'though this does [... ] the patently absurd': PI §464 "Was ich lehren will, ist: von einem 
nicht offenkundigen Unsinn zu einem offenkundigen übergehen". 
Page 147 
'Philosophy is the [... ] limits of / language': Pl §119 "Die Ergebnisse der Philosophie sind 
die Entdeckung irgend eines schlichten Unsinns und Beulen, die sich der Verstand beim 
Anrennen an die Grenze der Sprache geholt hat", and CV 13e: MS 110 61 "Die Grenze 
der Sprache zeigt sich in der Unmöglichkeit die Tatsache zu beschreiben, die einem Satz 
entspricht (seine Übersetzung ist) ohne eben den Satz zu wiederholen". 
'Of course we [... ] should disappear completely': Pl §133 
Denn die Klarheit, die wir anstreben, ist allerdings eine vollkommene. Aber das 
heißt nur, daß die philosophischen Probleme vollkommen werschwinden sollen. 
'Blow up the house of cards to smithereens! ': PI §118 
Woher nimmt die Betrachtung ihre Wichtigkeit, da sie doch nur alles 
Interessante, d. h. alles Große und Wichtige, zu zerstören scheint? [... ] Aber es 
sind nur Luftgebäude, die wir zerstoren, und wir legen den Grund der Sprache 
frei, auf dem sie standen. 
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Page 148 
Canto 4: The World Through New Eyes. 
'What we do is not some sort of science': CV 33e: MS 118 113r 
Leute haben mir manchmal gesagt, sie könnten das & das nicht beurteilen, sie 
hätten nicht Philosophie gelernt. Dies ist ein irritierender Unsinn, es wird 
vorgegeben, die Philosophie sei irgend eine Wissenschaft. 
Richard Rorty 
views science as one genre of literature - or, put the other way around, literature 
and the arts as inquiries, on the same footing as scientific inquiries [... ] Some of 
these inquiries come up with propositions, some with narratives, some with 
paintings. The question of what propositions to assert, which pictures to look at, 
what narratives to listen to and comment on and retell, are all questions about 
what will help us get what we want (or about what we should want). 
(1982: xliii; italics in original) 
'philosophy, like doing [... ] one sees things': CV 24e: MS 112 46 
Die Arbeit an der Philosophie ist - wie vielfach die Arbeit in der Architektur - 
eigentlich mehr die Arbeit an Einem selbst. An der eignen Auffassung. Datan, 
wie man die Dinge sieht. (Und was man von ihnen verlangt. ) 
and CV 14e: MS 153a 90v 
Der Denker gleicht sehr dem Zeichner. Der alle Zusammenhänge nachzeichnen 
will. 
'We can't conjecture / turbulently': PO 194 ("turbulenten Mutmassungen") and PO 195. 
'We seek perspicuity[... ] from its inception': PO 175 and PI §122 
Der Begriff der übersichtlichen Darstellung ist für uns von grundlegender 
Bedeutung. Er bezeichnet unsere Darstellungsform, die Art, wie wir die Dinge 
sehen. (Ist dies eine `Weltanschauung'? ) 
'Everything should he [... ] of no interest': P1 §126 
Die Philosophie stellt eben alles bloß hin, und erklärt und folgert nichts. -Da 
alles offen daliegt, ist auch nichts zu erklären. Denn, was etwa verborgen ist, 
interessiert uns nicht. 
'the truth of [... ] of the statement': OC §80 "Man prüft an der Wahrheit meiner Aussagen 
main Verständnis dieser Aussagen'. Richard Rorty writes 
a pragmatist theory about truth [... ] says that truth is not the sort of thing one 
should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about. For pragmatists, 
'truth' is just the name of a property which all true statements share [... ] 
Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said about this common feature [... ] 
They see certain acts as good ones to perform, under the circumstances, but 
doubt that there is anything general and useful to say about what makes them all 
good. 
(1982: xi i) 
'It is what [... ] of life agreement': PI §241 
Richtig und falsch ist, was Menschen sagen; und in der Sprache stimmen die Menschen überein. Dies ist kleine Übereinstimmung der Meinungen, sondern der Lebensform. 
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Page 151 
If language is [... ] of / judgments also': Pl §242 "Zur Verständigung durch die Sprache 
gehört nicht nur eine Übereinstimmung in den Definitionen, sondern (so seltsam dies 
klingen mag) eine Übereinstimmung in den Urteilen". 
'What determines our [... ] see any / action: Z §567 "Nicht, was einer jetzt tut, eine einzelne 
Handlung, sondern das ganze Gewimmel der menschlichen Handlungen, der 
Hintergrund, worauf wir jede Handlung sehen, bestimmt unser Urteil, unsere Begriffe 
und Reaktionen'. 
'We see life [... ] with many / others': Z §§568-9 
Wenn das Leben ein Teppich wäre, so ist dies Muster (der Verstellung z. B. ) nicht 
immer vollständig und vielfach variiert. Aber wir, in unserer Begriffswelt, sehen 
immer wieder das Gleiche mit Variationen wiederkehren. So fassen es unsere 
Begriffe auf. Die Begriffe sind ja nicht für einmaligen Gebrauch" and "Und ein 
Muster ist im Teppich mit vielen andern Mustern verwoben. 
'The conceptual world [... ] recurring with / variations': Also Z §568. 
'The actions of [... ] how language functions': Z §567 
Wie önnte man die menschliche Handlungsweise beschreiben? Doch nur, 
insofern man die Handlungen der verschiedenen Menschen, wie sie 
durcheinanderwimmeln, schilderte. 
Page 155 
'When describing human [... ] occasion belong together': Z §492 
Das Benehmen des Schmerzes und das Benehmen der Traurigkeit. -Man kann 
diese nur mit ihren äußeren Anlässen beschreiben [... ] Benehmen und Art des 
Anlasses gehören zusammen. 
and see Z §§5324 and PI §246. 
'How do I know you have pain in your hand? ': See Z §536 and PO 328. 
'What is it to know I have pain in mine? ': See PI §303 and Z §538. 
'How do words refer to sensations? ': PI §244 "Wie beziehen sich Wörter auf 
Empfindungen? " 
'And / do I [... ] a private pain? ': See PO 254-5 and 347. 
Page 156 
'In what sense are my sensations private? ': Pl §246 "In wiefern sind nun meine 
Empfindungen privat? " 
'It is nonsense [... ] pain or not': See PI §408 and OC §504. 
'Whether I know [... ] up by evidence': OC §504 
Ob ich etwas weiß, hängt davon ab, ob die Evidenz mir recht gibt oder mir 
widerspricht. Denn zu sagen, man wisse, daß man Schmerzen habe, heißt nichts. 
'and if I have grounds to base a doubt on': See OC §122. 
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Page 157 
'This holds for [... ] to / be discovered': See PI §§92 and 371 "Das Wesen ist in der 
Grammatik ausgesprochen" ["Essence is expressed by grammar. "] 
'so-called inner contents': See P1217,231,293 and RPP I §896. 
'of a hidden [... ] of outward criteria': PI §580 "Ein 'innerer Vorgang' bedarf außerer 
Kriterien". 
'To / know what [... ] into his head': See Z §36. 
'but at / what he does with that which he understands': See PI §§152-5 and 363. 
'Communication is also [... ] that is that': See Glock 1996: 373. 
Page 160 
'Take art, for [... ] as: saying nothing': CV 26e: MS 156a 57r "In der Kunst ist es schwer 
etwas zu sagen, was so gut ist wie: nichts zu sagen". 
'Perhaps from Tolstoy's [... ] conveys "a feeling"": CV 67e: MS 134 106 "Aus Tolstoys 
falshem Theorisieren, das Kunstwerk übertrage >ein Gefühl<, könnte man viel lernen". 
See also Dewey: 
I can but think that much of what Tolstoi says about immediate contagion as a 
test of artistic quality is false, and what he says about the kind of material which 
can alone be communicated is narrow. But if the time span be extended, it is true 
that no man is eloquent save when some one is moved as he listens. Those who 
are moved feel, as Tolstoi says, that what the work expresses is as if it were 
something one had oneself been longing to express. Meantime, the artist works to 
create an audience to which he does communicate. In the end, works of art are 
the only media of complete and unhindered communication between man and 
man that can occur in a world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of 
experience. 
(1958: 104-5) 
'we think art [... ] amongst these feelings? ': CV 42e: MS 162b 59r "Wenn die Kunst dazu 
dient >Gefühle zu erzeugen<, ist, am Ende, ihre sinnliche Wahrnehmung, auch unter 
diesen Gefühlen? ". 
'Suppose you tried [... ] from hearing / music': PO 202. 
'Now, a man [... ] there another thing? ': Z §29 
Also er konnte etwas meinen oder auch nichts meinen. Und wenn das erstere: 
dann eben seine Handbewegung, -oder etwas Anderes? Hat er mit seinen Ausdruck etwas Anderes als diesen gemeint, oder hat er nur seinen Ausdruck- 
gemeint? 
'If we ask [... ] this specific movement"? ': Z §30 "'Ich habe etwas mit dieser Bewegung 
gemeint, was ich nur durch diese Bewegung ausdrücken kann"'. 
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Page 161 
'Can we find [... ] is used in? ': OC §601 
Es ist immer die Gefahr, die Bedeutung durch Betrachtung des Ausdrucks und 
der Stimmung, in welcher man ihn gebraucht, erkennen zu wollen, statt immer 
an die Praxis zu denken. Darum sagt man sich den Ausdruck so oft vor, weil es 
ist, als müßte man in ihm und in dem Gefühl, das man hat, das Gesuchte sehen. 
`Why / should the [... ] author would wish': CV 67e: MS 134 106 
Und schon erst recht unsinnig ist es, zu sagen, der Künstler wünsche, daß, was er 
beim Schreiben, der Andre Beim Lesen fühlen solle. Ich kann wohl glauben, ein 
Gediht (z. B. ) zu verstehen, es so zu verstehen, wie sein Erzeuger es sich 
wünschen würde, - aber was er beim schreiben gefühlt haben mag, das kmmert 
mich gar nicht. 
Page 163 
'Ah, but couldn't [... ] by volunt'ry movements': RPP I §727 
Würde ich aber nicht doch sagen, daß der Schauspieler etwas der wirklichen 
Sehnsucht Ähnliches erlebt? Ist eben nicht doch etwas an dem, was James sagt: 
daß die Gemütsbewegung aus den Gefühlen des Körpers besteht, und daher, 
wenigstens teilweise, durch willkürliche Bewegungen reproduziert werden kann? 
and see Z §655. 
'But even so[... ] one is crying': RPP II §323 "Es wäre ja möglich, daß man traurig, ist, weil 
man weint, aber natürlich nicht darüber, daß man weint". 
'I'd like to [... ] in one's eyes': Z §495 
Fast möchte ich sagen: Man fühlt die Trauer so wenig im Körper, wie das Sehen 
im Auge. 
and see RPP 1 §451, and Schulte, p. 122. 
`A cry is [... ] inferred from it': RPP II §723 "Ein Schrei ist nicht die Beschreibung, eines 
Seelenzustandes, obwohl man aus ihm auf einen Seelezustand schlieen kann". 
To not be [... ] is a/ proposition"': P1 §317 "Irreführende Parallele: Der Schrei, ein 
Ausdruck des Schmeres-der Satz, ein Ausdruck des Gedankens! " 
'An utterance, like the cry / it replaces, is not description either': See RPP II §728. 
'Nor is an [... ] feeling of sadness': PI 209e 
The epithet 'sad', as applied for example to the outline face [see PI 204e], 
characterizes the grouping of lines in a circle. Applied to a human being it has a different (though related) meaning. (But this does not mean that a sad expression 
is like the feeling of sadness! ) [(Das heißt aber nicht, daß der traurige 
Gesichtsausdruck dem Gefühl der Traurigkeit änlich sei! )] 
Page 165 
'And a gesture [... ] but cannot do / it': PI §434 "Die Gebärde versucht vorubilden-möchte 
man sagen-aber kann es nicht". 
'How curious it [... ] gesture by / words': Z §227 
Es ist sonderbar: Unser Verstehen einer Geste möchten wir durch ihre Übersetzung in Worte erklären, und das Verstehen von Worten durch 
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Übersetzung in eine Geste. (So werden wir hin und her geworfen, wenn wir 
suchen wollen, wo das Verstehen eigentlich liegt. ) Und wirklich werden wir 
Worte durch eine Geste, und eine Geste durch Worte erklären. 
'Not every purposive [... ] is a gesture': CV 49e: MS 126 15r "Nicht jede zweckmäßige 
Bewegung des menschlichen Körpers ist eine Geste". 
'I / wish to [... ] "private experience" to justify / expressing it': PO 278. 
'Why should I [... ] it is used? ': PO 281. 
Page 166 
'We labour under [... ] to fool us': PO 282. 
Page 168 
'A poet's words [... ] of the words': Z §155 
Worte eines Dichters können uns durch und durch gehen. Und das hängt kausal 
natürlich mit dem Gebrauch zusammen, den sie in unserm Leben haben. Und es 
hängt auch damit zusammen, daß wir, diesem Gebrauch gemäß, unsere 
Gedanken dorthin und dahin in die wohlbekannte Umgebung der Worte 
schweifen lassen. 
'And now, we [... ] at home there': CV 74e: MS 136 51a "Beim Philosophieren mug man in's 
alte Chaos hinabsteigen, & sich dort wohlfühlen". 
'We are getting bogged down in the sodden / ground': See CV 77e: MS 136129b "Bacon ist 
in seiner Philosopie stecken geblieben, & diese Gefahr droht auch mir" and Dante, 
Inferno, Canto III, 1.133. 
'Grasping the difficulty in its / depth is what is hard': CV 55e: MS 131 48 "Die 
Schwierigkeit tief fassen, ist das Schwere". 
'The problems arising [... ] character of depth': PI §111 "Die Probleme, die durch ein 
Mißdeuten unserer Sprachformen entstehen, haben den Charakter der Tiefe". 
'And down he fell, as one that swoons on sleep': Dante, Inferno, Canto III, 1.136. 
Page 169 
Canto 5: Etiam disiecti membra oetae 
'Etiam disiecti membra poetae': "Even in his dismembered state, the limbs of a poet", 
Horace, Satires, I. iv. 62. 
'find the chaos': Nietzsche writes in The Twilight of the Idols, 
I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of 
integrity. 
(TI, 'Maxims and Arrows', §26) 
The world, the hyperworld, is anarchic. Any ruling body (political organisations set up to maintain, by force or more subtle forms of coercion, the society on whose behalf it believes it operates), try as it may, cannot control the range of images and messages we 
are exposed to; neither can it regulate how we interpret them. The subversion of a state hegemony by the images and texts of the hyperworld is a revolution on all fronts. But the state can apply it to its own ends, employing the anarchic principal to (mis- and 
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dis-)inform; the state, Kroker and Weinstein argue, "remains behind to sequester those 
who cannot, or will not achieve escape velocity into hyperspace" (1994: 83): anyone who 
is not aware and able to converse in the hyperworld becomes subsumed into the non- 
technomass. The hyperworld also suggests the resurgence of nihilism, the rejection of 
justification of morals, meaning and values that represent the absolutist standpoint. 
Where once there was truth, now there is dissimulation; where there were relationships, 
now there is dissociation (social, mental). The dissipation of society has resulted in the 
dissipation of individuals. If there is, as Kroker and Weinstein (1994) suggest, a 
technological class on its way to a virtual dass (if they are not that already), it is a 
disparate one linked only by the media-net: "The worldwide communication complex 
that generates an electronically fabricated environment of image and 
information' (Kroker and Weinstein 1994: 160). In effect it is a new form of intertexture: 
an interwoven system of telematic devices; individuals connected by mass-media. But 
not everyone needs to join the virtual class, to blast off into hyperspace, to participate in 
the hyperworld. McLuhan writes that "the electric puts the mythic or collective 
dimension of human experience fully into the conscious wake-a-day world" (1962: 269). 
History has traditionally purported to be linear. How can this be? Nothing occurs end 
to end without a relationship to a host of other occurrences. While there may 
retrospective simplification of events (perhaps this is all history can hope to be), it 
would be difficult to write an all-encompassing linear account of a given series of 
events. In writing linear history there will (must) be bias and omissions. A hyper- 
history could begin to join together in a web, allowing the historian to investigate and 
infer from the collected events for relationships and causes (although in the age of 
simulation, cause and effect become debatable concepts, as Baudrillard implies). New 
Historicism has already redefined the nature of history, and the nature of historical 
texts (non-literary fictions): history is mediated through texts. These texts interconnect 
in more than one dimension, as it were, with some above and some below, or at any 
given point in the nexus. Any act of interpretation is an act of archaeology: the scraping 
away of the dust of time to bring something into the present and to evaluate it 
according to your own prejudices (cf. Foucault on "the archaeological analysis of 
knowledge itself' cited in Landow 1997: 44). This can be related to Connerton's 
statement: 
what the historian deals with are traces: that is to say the marks, perceptible to 
the senses, which some phenomenon, in itself inaccessible, has left behind. Just to 
apprehend such marks as traces of something, as evidence, is already to have 
gone beyond the stage of merely making statements about the marks themselves; 
to count something as evidence is to make a statement about something else, 
namely, about that for which it is taken for evidence. 
(1989: 13) 
`Rules which exist [... ] which they interpret': See PI §198. 
'beat their way [... ] irrelevant questions': CV 77e: MS 136 117a 
Ich frage unzählige irrelevante Fragen. Möge ich durch diesen Wald mich 
durchschlagen können! " 
["I ask countless irrelevant questions. If only I can beat my way through this forest! "] 
Also, see Dante, Inferno, Canto XIII: "The Poets enter a pathless Wood" (1949: 149). 
With regards to old philosophical questions, Richard Rorty writes, So pragmatists see the Platonic tradition as having outlived its usefulness. This does not mean that they have a new, non-Platonic set of answers to Platonic 
questions to offer, but rather that they do not think we should ask these questions 
anymore. 
(1982: xiv) 
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The old definitions (for example, mind, body, true, good) are not totally relevant any 
more. We cannot say with certainty what is and what isn't, in any sense. 
In many 
philosophical writings, mind and body are still the main defining attributes of 
human 
beings. Often the words are different, and more often the concepts and beliefs are 
different, but behind each new definition lies a desire to reach the ultimate answer of 
the question, "What is it that makes us 'Human'? " Of course, each philosopher believes 
to some extent that their philosophy has provided the answer; the next philosopher 
might not agree and proffer another argument. 
There is no way out but through. We are stuck in an impasse of terminology and 
definitions. To break out of these constraints it is necessary for us to break down the 
walls of other people's experience and opinions which prevent us from moving 
forwards. Try as we might to fit into a mould of respected scientific or philosophical 
thought, there is not one which wholly satisfies the uses to which we want to put it. Just 
as we begin to believe one theorist, another comes to knock the first over. We then 
realise that we have been seduced by them both, conned into thinking that we can 
find 
universal answers to the questions we have been asking. We are too set in a way that 
dictates how we describe the world and ourselves as part of, or distinct from, that 
world. Following Richard Rorty and the pragmatists, we should not be asking these 
questions anymore. We should not need to have to ask questions like: Am Ia mind in a 
body? Or of a body? Or a body that has a mind? Or a body that is a mind too? This 
notion of two somehow separate parts, even if they may be what Antonio Damasio 
describes as "an indissociable organism" (1995: xvi), is precisely the barrier we face in 
trying to figure out how any entity can and should be described. 
We can discard the mind-body problem in favour of Rorty's assertion: "I do not think 
there is a problem" (1980: 7). However, this now leads from one impasse into another 
wall shored up with questions like: Is it now impossible to talk about my experiences as 
a living human, now that my vocabulary is deficient? Can I discuss still the changes in 
human experience due to technology if my fundamental concept of a human is 
indescribable? Does this new cybernetic organism class as human or machine, or 
neither? Am I in danger of creating a new problem: the human-machine problem? 
These can be answered "No", "Yes', "Neither", and "Yes. But I can refuse to recognise 
it as a problem". 
'Their bodies dissected [... ] fractured and fragmented': Lacan writes 
This fragmented body [... ] usually manifests itself in dreams when the movement 
of the analysis encounters a certain level of aggressive disintegration in the 
individual. It then appears in the form of disjointed limbs, or of those organs 
represented in exoscopy, growing wings and taking up arms for intestinal 
persecutions [... cf. * the paintings of Hieronymus Bosch]. 
(1977: 4) 
'a collective intelligence': See Levy: 
What is collective intelligence? It is a form of universally distributed intelligence, 
constantly enhanced, coordinated in real time, and resulting in the effective 
mobilization of skills. [... ] The basis and goal of collective intelligence is the 
mutual recognition and enrichment of individuals rather than the cult of 
fetishized or hypostatized communities. 
(1997: 13; italics in original) 
'corpora vilia': Plural of 'corpus vile', a person or thing fit only to be the object of an 
experiment; literally 'worthless body'. 
'further down the spiral': Nine Inch Nails 'remix EP' title (tvt/interscope records, 1995). 
Also, thinking of the metaphor for depression, and the spiralling double helix of DNA. 
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Page 181 
Part 2: Crack in the World 
Canto 1: Into the Void. 
'Crack in the World': The title of a film directed by Andrew Marton (1965) in which 
scientists unleash apocalyptic chaos on the Earth after trying to use the power of the 
planet's core. 
'Into the Void': Nine Inch Nails song title on The Fragile (nothing/interscope records, 1999). 
Page 183 
'a mysterious flame': See Z §§125-6. 
'the ends of fossilised forelimbs': Inspired by Dante, Inferno, Canto XIII. 
'empty tubes': See CV 13e: MS 153a 12v "It is humiliating; having, to present oneself as an 
empty tube only inflated by the mind" ["Es ist beschämend sich als leerer Schlauch 
zeigen zu müssen der nur vom Geist aufgeblasen']. 
'the hollow': A Perfect Circle song title on Mer de Noms (Virgin Records, 2000). 
Page 185 
'Ermy sucks in / the sound': See Koestler 1975: 199; "life sucks information from the 
environment as it feeds on its substances and synthesises its energies". 
'synaesthetic': See Cytowic 1998. 
'eyes grow tired': See Laidlaw in Dery 1994: 92. 
'from fly / to human': See Ridley 1999: 179. 
Page 186 
awakening / from his / stunning slumber': See Dante 1949: 91. 
`The limitlessness / of [... ] in complete 
Grenzenlosigkeit des Gesichtraumes ist 
vollständiger Dunkelheit". 
/ darkness': PR §224 and Z §616 "Die 
am klarsten, wenn wir nichts sehen bei 
Page 187 
'with wither'd eyes': Inspired by line from Tool song, 'Third Eye' on I£nima (Volcano, 
1996): "And wiping the webs and the dew from my withered eye". 
Page 188 
'protean / protagonists': Purely alliterative, then I read Hutcheon: "Here the only 
wholeness attained is that of the media monster the public makes of the protean 
protagonist" (1989: 109). 
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Page 189 
'dah dit dit dit dit [... ] dah dah dit dit': You can work it out with a little knowledge of the 
Morse code. 
'constant data / nonstop / enveloping': See McLuhan and Fiore 1967: 111. 
Page 190 
'Who / is / speaking / here / with / this / mouth? ': OC §244 "Wer spricht hier mit diesem 
Munde? " 
'The other speak': See PO 228 [LPE 283]. 
'But how do [... ] experience of / speaking? ': PO 228. 
'I have / consciousnessless': A play on Wittgenstein's RPP 1 §938. 
'I have a body': OC §244 "Ich habe einen Körper". 
'Is this body my body? ': PI §411 "Ist dieser Körper mein Körper? " 
'I cannot / describe / the feeling / of the / movement': See, for example, PI 185-6e, RPP I 
§§385ff. and PO 204, also see Koestler 1975: 287-8. 
Page 191 
'With a clean [... ] arch of the arm': Inspired by the experience in 1999 of having electrodes 
attached to my right arm, and the control by the machine of my limb. 
Page 196 
Canto 2: De-scribing the Neu Baud-y. 
'Baud-y': Baud "(pronounced 'bod')" (Hale 1996: 41); according to Wired Style, "a speed of 
data transmission. [... It was] originally a unit of telegraph signaling speed - the number 
of wave cycles per second" (Hale 1996: 40). One unit interval per second of electronic 
code equals one baud, although "modem higher-speed modems pump more than 1 bit 
per transition, so 600 baud could equal 1,200 bps" (Hale 1996: 41). 
'Ermy, Orpheus and Wittgenstein have become an alphabet': "A succession of fragmented 
bits having no real meaning, except what we read into them" (McLuhan and Powers 
1989: 131). 
'A primordiAl AlphAbeT soUp': The letters A, C, G, T and U: the initials of the five bases 
in DNA and RNA-adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine in DNA, with uracil 
replacing thymine in RNA. 
'The world is now Them': See Kroker and Kroker 1996: 139. 
'movemenTs form Their mode of CommUniCATion': This is the crux of the thesis. This 
statement encapsulates a number of problems and issues. It can be demonstrated by 
running a number of arguments simultaneously: 
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Movements are pre-lingual. Physical Language, in which our 
actions and behaviour (including meanings almost exclusively 
crying and other non-lingual arise in consciousness, is but a 
verbalisations) are independent of form-a highly specialised 
language, but this does not mean that form-of gesture [ ... ] 
they are devoid of meaning. They can consciousness of meaning is so 
all be expressive. But certain acts are bound up with self- 
expressive only consciousness [... ] Thus the 
in reflective interpretation on the consciousness of meaning at 
part of some observer [... ] least at this stage is a 
Emotional discharge is a consciousness of one's own 
necessary but not a sufficient attitudes of response as they 
condition of expression [... ] answer to, control, and interpret 
There is no expression without the gestures of others. 
excitement, without turmoil [... ] (Mead in Thayer 1982: 349) 
What is sometimes called an act 
of self-expression might better some people, suffering from 
be termed one of self-exposure; deafferentation, have to compensate for 
it discloses character-or lack of their lack of unconscious body language. 
character-to others. In itself, it They devise and learn a small range of 
is only a spewing forth. hand and arm gestures, which they use 
(Dewey 1958: 61-2) "to deceive others into reacting in terms 
of an unconscious language: it is an act in 
more than one sense" (Cole and Paillard 
1998: 260). 
The Problems of Understanding, Physical 'Utterances': 
A friend was visiting his grandchildren and his little granddaughter asked: 
"Have you brought your 'Smile' with you, Grandad? " 
He said: "Of course, I've got a smile for you any time. " " She said: "No, not that, " 
and put her fingers up to her face. 
She was asking if he'd brought his camera. 
P Thorpe, Leeds 
(Thorpe 1999: 39) 
If I was talking, to you, conversing verbally in certain (con)texts, I would know that you 
have understood by what you say and do in response to my utterances, which have a 
propositional content (see Wittgenstein PI §§152-5 and 363). When I use movement 
(dance) and gesture, how do I know if I have conveyed the meaning I intend for you to 
understand? Conversely, how do you know if you have understood the meaning that I 
am intending? (There are a number of considerations here which have been glossed 
over, for example, see Schulte 1993: 42. ) But this is not about communication in a social 
context: dance is an artistic/aesthetic expression. The first of Mead's three elements of 
consciousness: social situation, is not wholly appropriate. The other two: the 
relationship between the stimulation and the response and the feel of one's attitudes, in 
this case but not in all artistic communications or expressions, have some bearing (See 
Mead 1910). Mead argues, that if a gesture has an "idea behind it and it arouses that 
idea in the other individual, then we have a significant symbol" (Mead 1934: 45). 
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Because the objects of art are 
expressive, they communicate. I 
do not say that communication 
to others is the intent of an 
artist. But it is the consequence 
of his work-which indeed lives 
only in communication when it 
operates in the experience of 
others. If the artist desires to 
communicate a special message, 
he thereby tends to limit the 
expressiveness of his work to 
others-whether he wishes to 
communicate a moral lesson or a 
sense of his own cleverness. 
Indifference to response of the 
immediate audience is a 
necessary trait of all artists that 
have something new to say. But 
they are animated by a deep 
conviction that since they can 
only say what they have to say, 
the trouble is not with their 
work but those who, having 
eyes, see not, and having, cars, 
hear not. Communicability has 
nothing, to do with popularity. 
(Dewey 1958: 104; italics in original) 
Asses have ears as well as pitchers. 
Children, and even the densest 
minds, hear and understand 
many a word and hint which the 
speaker supposed would pass 
unheeded. 
(Brewer 1978: 69) 
Ass-eared [... ] Apollo and Pan 
had a contest, and chose Midas 
to decide which was the better 
musician. Midas gave sentence 
in favour of Pan; and Apollo, in 
disgust, changed his ears into 
those of an ass. 
(Brewer 1978: 70) 
Balaam. Matter kept in type for 
filling; up odd spaces in 
periodicals. These are generally 
refuse bits-the words of an oaf, 
who talks like "Balaam's 
ass. " (Numb. xxii. 30. ) 
(Brewer 1978: 88) 
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Generally speaking, the relation between the gaze and what one wishes to see 
involves a lure. The subject is presented as other than he is, and what one shows 
him is not what he wishes to see. It is in this way that the eye may function as 
objet a, that is to say at the level of the lack (- 4). 
(Lacan 1998: 104) 
SYN- CRETISE 
The Lure 
As a dancer I try to make you listen to 
my body. But meaning as we know it 
in language is ill-suited to being 
conveyed through gesture. The gesture 
is linked to the meaning, but it has 
encoded it, hidden it in a maze of 
metaphor. A gesture can have 
meaning - it can be a symbolic act - but the gesture is not always 
transparent, the meaning not always 
apparent. For Lacan, the (terminal) 
moment of seeing "enables us to 
distinguish between a gesture and an 
act" (1998: 114). It is temporal and its 
signification is inscribed behind it. It is 
reliant on a spectator, on the presence 
of the gaze, the eye that kills the 
gesture - stops it dead. 
The evil eye is the fascinum 
[bewitching], it is that which has 
the effect of arresting movement 
and literally, of killing life [... ] 
The moment of seeing can 
intervene here only as a suture, 
a conjunction of the imaginary 
and the symbolic, and it is taken 
up again in a dialectic [... ] 
forward movement, which is 
concluded in the fascinum. 
(Lacan 1998: 118; italics in original) 
My pauses, the breaks in my 
movement are not punctuation - they 
are an invocation against the evil eye. 
The power relationships ebb and flow. 
I have an evil eye also. The gaze moves from me to you, the audience, and back again. As my body language fails 
me, I lose your gaze - the very thing that kills me also keeps me alive. I die. 
CRISIS 
The Seizure 
As a dancer I try to make you listen to 
my body. My movements, at once 
"natural" and "un-natural", are 
transformed into conveyances, 
receptacles of meaning. My action/ 
ivitie)s are the materials from which I 
create my art-"Only where material 
is employed as media is there 
expression and art" (Dewey 1958: 63). 
Expressive acts can be either artificial, 
artful or a[esthe/rtis]tic. The difference 
is superficial/surface and intentional. 
The act of expression that 
constitutes a work of art is a 
construction in time, not an 
instantaneous emission. [... j It 
means that the expression of the 
self in and through a medium, 
constituting the work of art, is 
itself a prolonged interaction of 
something issuing from the self 
with objective conditions, a 
process in which both of them 
acquire a form and order they 
did not at first possess. 
(Dewey 1958: 65; italics in original) 
My full body, the total organism that is 
me, my whole being is involved. I am 
not simply a reflecting mirror, but "an 
organized body of activities" (Dewey 
1958: 256). And the eye is only part of 
the whole organism: the causal aid, the 
"through" (Dewey 1958: 123; italics in 
original), to my perception and 
production of qualities and 
meanings- the "total organic 
resonance" (Dewey 1958: 122). 
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'GAses Are solid': The word 'gas' is derived from the Greek word khaos, atmosphere. 
'Chaos': complete disorder; utter confusion; the disordered formless matter supposed 
to have existed before the ordered universe; an obsolete word for abyss. 
Page 197 
'There is no CenTre': McLuhan and Powers suggest that 
Culture becomes organized like an electric circuit: each point in the net is as 
central as the next. Electronic man loses touch with the concept of a ruling center 
as well as the restraints of social rules based on interconnection. 
(1989: 92) 
'bodies flow from one To The nexT': As with the notion of there being no centre, 
'inTerConneCriviTy: hUmAniTy invisible And divisible': For Sartre 
the body is the in-itself as nihilated. The body is not merely matter added to 
consciousness, nor is the body an obstacle to consciousness. Rather, the human 
reality [... is] simultaneously, totally consciousness and body. 
(Catalano 1980: 169) 
'The GhosT in The mAChine': Gilbert Ryle's deliberately abusive term for what he calls 
'The Official Doctrine' "about the nature and place of minds [... ] which hails chiefly 
from Descartes" (1949: 13). He draws our attention to the absurdities in this dogma: 
My destructive purpose is to show that a family of radical category-mistakes is 
the source of the double-life theory. The representation of a person as a ghost 
mysteriously ensconced in a machine derives from this argument. Because, as is 
true, a person's thinking, feeling and purposive doing cannot be described solely 
in the idioms of physics, chemistry and physiology, therefore they must be 
described in counterpart idioms. 
(Ryle 1949: 19-20) 
However, Arthur Danto writes: 
the mind/body problem is solved by the recognition that, as embodied-or, if 
you prefer, as enminded-the body has just the attributes the mind has, so the 
mind/body relationship is just the mind/mind relationship. The real problem is 
the body/body relationship, that between the minded body and the mindless 
one, to which I am, to which we each are, bound certainly and united but not, 
perhaps, tightly bound and united. Descartes's model, in any case, is remarkably 
different from that attributed to him a generation ago by Gilbert Ryle in the spirit 
of metaphysical caricature, as of a ghost in a machine. The mind, construed as 
embodied-as enfleshed-might perhaps stand to the body as a statue does to 
the bronze that is its material cause, or as a picture stands to the pigment it gives 
form to-or as signified stands to signifier, in the idiom of Saussure. And to the 
degree that 'inside' and 'outside' have application at all, it is the mind that is 
outside, in the sense that it is what is presented to the world. But in fact the 
structure of geometrical relationships ought to be dropped altogether, as leading 
us into disfiguring metaphors, and the connection between the two bodies 
addressed in the spirit of awaiting a model rather than beginning with one. 
(1999: 197; italics in original) 
See also Koestler 1975: 202ff. 
'mUTATinG': Metaphormosis. 
'biTloss': Wired Style. 
The loss of bits, or data, from a transmission. Also used colloquially to mean loss of memory or information. 
(Hale 1996: 41) 
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'dAnCer: you 'I'rAnsmUFA'I'ion of All GoinG-by inTo GoinG': Rilke 1946: 123. 
'The mirror of The soUl CrACked': The use of the mirror as a metaphor is too widespread to 
begin to describe here. However, the use of it in describing the development of the psiiclir 
is pertinent. 
In [Lacan's] view, the oedipal child enters a world of 'signs' which convey to him 
the meanings of self, gender and the body, just as he is similarly confronted by 
language and grammar which he must assimilate in order to become part of the 
linguistic community [... ] He described three developmental stages: first, a 
primordial period of unconscious infantile 'desire'; then the world of 'the 
imaginary' emerging from the 'mirror stage' in which the child first confronts his 
image and narcissistically and therefore incorrectly, assumes this to be his true 
self; and finally the 'symbolic order', arising through the contact with language, 
the'no(m) du pore'. 
(Bateman and Holmes 1995: 14-5) 
Jacques Lacan writes: 
We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense 
that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the 
subject when he assumes an image - whose predestination to this phase-effect is 
sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term im age. 
(1977: 2; italics in original) 
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'A jUmble of frAGmenTs': Laing writes, 
The more he I the 'self-conscious' persons keeps his'true self' in hiding, concealed, 
unseen, and the more he presents to others a false front, the more compulsive this 
false presentation of himself becomes. Ile appears to be extremely narcissistic and 
exhibitionistic [... J here the 'self' has become an invisible transcendent entity, 
known only to itself. The body in action is no longer the expression of the self. The 
self is not actualized in and through the body. It is distinct and dissociated. 
(1965: 114) 
'AwAiTinG de-frAGmen'I'ATion': Like this thesis. What would it tx' like it human beings 
were able to defragment their'memory'? We would not talk of 'memory' and 'memories' in the same way. Our whole conceptual foundation for 'remembering' would be different. 
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Page 198 
'He is the imagination of himself: Inspired by comedian Bill Hicks speaking at the 
beginning of 'Third Eye' by Tool (¬Enima, Volcano 1996). 
Here is a special magic which imagination works. It does not only project 
symbols, but finds them in the world. 
(Roszak 1973: 368; italics in original) 
Imagination: the ability to produce novel ideas (novel to the thinker) that are not based 
directly on memory, although there is usually some level of experience involved. "The 
term idea, form, is visually based, coming from the same root as the Latin video, to see, 
and such English derivatives as vision, visible, or videotape" (Ong 1982: 80). The 
imagination, as Wills (1995) implies, can be a powerful controlling device. The 
imagination allows individuals to create reasons why others should do as they want- 
religion is this exemplified to the extreme. Imagination is the seedbed of the human 
(hyper)world. 
"Imagination is that ratio among the perceptions and faculties which exists when they 
are not embedded or outered in material technologies" (McLuhan 1962: 265). 
See Wittgenstein PO 131: "imagination is not like a painted portrait or plastic model, 
but a complicated pattern made up of heterogeneous elements: words and pictures". 
'He is not just in the story-he is the story': See Z §233. 
Page 199 
The Ballad of the Head of Qrpheus. 
'The Ballad of the Head of Orpheus': See Milton, Lycidas, 11.58-63: 
What could the Muse herself that Orpheus bore, 
The Muse herself for her enchanting son, 
Whom universal nature did lament, 
When, by the rout that made the hideous roar, 
His gory visage down the stream was sent, 
Down the swift Hebrus to the Lesbian shore? 
'Cast about in chaotic entropy': "Entropy is the tendency of things to degenerate to 
increasing levels of complexity and/or chaos" (Pearce 1997: 280). "Now entropy 
('transformed energy') is the name for degraded energy which has been dissipated by 
friction and other wasteful processes into the random motion of molecules, and which 
cannot be retrieved [... ] entropy is a measure of energy waste, of order degraded into 
disorder" (Koestler 1975: 199). Koestler continues to describe 'negative entropy' (the 
building-up of complex systems out of disordered, simple elements), and equating 
entropy with 'noise' as used by communications theorists. 
274 
Page 200 
Ermy's Fit. 
'Ermy's Fit': See Milton, Paradise Lost, III, IL600-5 
That stone, or like to that, which here below 
Philosophers in vain so long have sought, 
In vain, though by their powerful art they bind 
Volatile Hermes, and call up unbound 
In various shapes old Proteus from the sea, 
Drained through a limbic to his native form. 
The play on Hermes name for 'Ermy' should be obvious by this point. Hermes, son of 
Zeus and Maia was, in one of his incarnations, the conductor of souls (Psychopompus) 
into the underworld. The name's etymology, as described in Guirand (1968), is 
uncertain: just in the Greek it could be related to a word that conveys movement, a 
stone or rock, or the verb 'to protect'. 
'like vapour or a breath of autumn': Possibly from Homer, in Guirand 1968: 124. 
'Ermy feels nothing [... ] skin have dissipated': Stelarc has written that "As interface, the 
skin is inadequate" (Stelarc in Richard, Klanten and Heidenreich 1998: 70). And earlier 
in 1921, in reference to tactile pictures, Marinetti wrote that "Human beings speak to 
each other with their mouths and eyes, but cannot reach a point of true sincerity 
because of the insensitivity of their skin which is still a mediocre conducter of 
thought" (see Tisdall and Bozzolla 1993: 198). But touch is still a primary sense in 
perceiving the world and others. Damasio describes the importance of the skin in 
neural representations of the body, and as "an interface turned both to the organism's 
interior and to the environment with which the organism interacts" (1995: 231). 
(Damasio talks of skin as the "body boundary" (1995: 231). Merleau-Ponty (1962: 98) 
refers to "The outline of my body [as] a frontier which ordinary spatial relations do not 
cross, " and goes on to discuss 'body image'. ) As Clark writes in reference to Mackay's 
touch experiments in the 1960s: "We use touch to explore surfaces [... ] so as to probe 
and reprobe the local environment [this view] extends quite naturally to vision and to 
perception in general" (1998: 30; italics in original). Indeed, Dennett writes that 
Our senses of taste and smell are yoked together phenomenologically, and so are 
our senses of touch and kinesthesia [... ] We 'feel' things by touching them, 
grabbing them. 
(1993: 46-7) 
[NB Dennett is not referring to synaesthesia] 
Other writers talk of the nature of touch and how we use it to shape our worlds in our 
minds. But there seems to be a difference in touching objects and touching other people, 
even touching ourselves throws up a barrage of thought. When I touch my left hand 
with my right hand, as Merleau-Ponty debates, which hand is touching which? (See for 
a further and fuller explanation Merleau-Ponty 1962. Also, this is similar to what Sartre described in Being and Nothingness: "when I touch my leg with my finger, I realize that 
my leg is touched [... ] To touch and to be touched, to feel that one is touching and to feel that one is touched" (1969: 304). ) If my hand is directed to touch my other hand by 
someone else who can then feel my hand with their own, without actually touching it, 
what sense can be made of this? If one of my hands is a machine, a robot hand, what happens then? It is all well and good for Stelarc to control the movement of his Third Hand, but how does the Hand's 'experience' affect him? If my skin begins to be 
replaced by new materials or has extensions added to it, will my sense of touch be 
modified too? And how will my brain cope with this change? Robots are already learning to touch and develop "a kind of robot version of the kinesthetic sense" (Clark 1998: 19). (For more on Robots and Tactility see Webster 1988 and Rosheim 1994, as 
examples. Clark has a chapter entitled 'Evolving Robots' (1998: 87-102). ) For them, as for us, the world and their position in it will form as they evolve. There is 2-way 
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feedback, as Damasio (1995) describes, between the evolving body and evolving mind. 
He also writes 
In the beginning, there was no touching, or seeing, or hearing, or moving along 
by itself. There was, rather a feeling of the body as it touched, or saw, or heard, or 
moved. 
(Damasio 1995: 232; italics in original) 
'a visceral brain': An old name for the limbic system, see Koestler 1975: 283; although not 
used here in this sense exactly. 
'Ermy is not dead, but he knows not that he is alive': "The unembodied self becomes 
hyper-conscious" (Laing 1965: 69). 
'Ermy is a photon : See Deutsch 1997: 35ff. The other descriptions of Ermy are based on 
representations of Hermes. 
Page 201 
The ligsaw Puzzle. 
'The Jigsaw Puzzle': Wittgenstein writes, 
And now we observe a phenomenon, - which we might interpret as the 
expression of the experience: seeing a figure now this way now that. Now we 
shew them, e. g., a puzzle picture. They find the solution; and the they say 
something, point to something, draw something etc., and we can teach them our 
expression: 'Now I always see the picture this way. ' 
(RPP I §99) 
Wittgenstein makes a number of references to jigsaw puzzles (puzzle pictures) in his 
writings. It seemed apt. As it did to write it as a detective story, given Wittgenstein's 
penchant for the genre. This start to a story also touches on a whole range of 
Wittgensteinian issues concerning faces (and drawings of), expressions, meanings and 
seeing and seeing-as. The following section of poetry was discarded and was intended to 
raise some Wittgensteinian questions about seeing and meaning (it draws the example 
of the tree from Wittgenstein's On Certainty (1969), although he uses it in other 
collections of writings too): 
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'Tell me what you see there, ' Wittgenstein said, 
pointing to an object Ermy could see 
some way in the distance and dead ahead. 
'Well, it's far off, but I think it's a tree, ' 
Ermy replied, confused by the request, 
'but I can't really say with certainty. ' 
'And now, ' said the first, 'a little test. 
If you had never seen a tree before, 
how would what you can see now be expressed? ' 
'I don't know. It might depend on whether 
I have seen anything that looks something 
like it, and then I'd link them together. ' 
'Would your new word then have the same meaning 
as my word for 'tree'? And how can you tell 
exactly to what I was just pointing? 
Have you just had a different visual 
experience to me? Or does it not 
matter that you lack the concept at all? ' 
And so it ends, rather abruptly, with Wittgenstein posing the problem of linguistic 
concepts and sensory experience. What is intriguing about the notions of seeing and 
what Wittgenstein called seeing-as are how they have a bearing on the role and value of 
artistic activities and human interaction with them. I say `interaction' because of the 
connectivity of human beings with the objects of art, even when those objects are difficult 
to place in a physical relationship with other things. This is meant to imply and not 
imply at the same time, that the meanings and interpretations of a work of art are 
inextricably bound up with the material of the work of art. It is akin to asking, the 
problematic question: where are the artistic qualities of any work of art? A novel in 
book-form is an object, but the object itself is not the work of art. A movement in a 
dance piece is not an object, although it is the work of art, not the body on which it is 
performed (although we may judge the body, and the book-as-object come to think of it, 
to have aesthetic and artistic merit). And what happens when the movement is not on a 
physical human body, but some abstracted version of the body -a film or video screen, 
a virtual avatar? They are all still open to seeing and seeing-as, and still "in some 
respects I stand towards [them] as I do a human [being]" (PI 194e). But, just as it is 
desirable to avoid any suggestion that there is an artistic essence, or something that 
makes art art, any suggestion that when we see a work of art it somehow generates an 
individual, internal interpretation or meaning should be avoided too. 
The term 'work of art' now promotes discomfort. Wittgenstein writes: "The work of art 
compels us - as one might say - to see it in the right perspective" (CV 7e: MS 109 28). Wittgenstein himself was unsure about the word 'right' in this context, and to say that 
the artwork in itself does the compelling is also somehow wrong, but to talk of any 
intention on anything's or anyone's part is also mistaken. And let us not forget that we 
do not see everything as art. Indeed, we do not see everything as something. To take an 
example from Wittgenstein, when one sees a knife and fork, what does one see it as? He 
writes: "One doesn't 'take' what one knows as the cutlery at a meal for cutlery" (P1195). 
But, one might see the pattern on the fork's handle as flowers and judge it to be artistic. 
Does one see the fork now as a work of art, even though one uses it as any other fork? Can one see it as anything but a fork? The object doesn't change in any way, so what does? Wittgenstein refers to the experience of "noticing an aspect" (PI 193) when we see 
something now as one thing, then as another even though the thing we see has not 
changed in form. Why is this all so problematic? Wittgenstein suggests that the 
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question whether what is involved is a seeing or an act of interpreting arises 
because an interpretation becomes an expression of experience. And the 
interpretation is not an indirect description; no, it is the primary expression of the 
experience. 
(RPP 1 §20) 
In his book The power of Babel, Michel Pierssens writes: 
For us, everything always begins.. . with a sudden break which announces itself... 
as the epiphany of a new structure in the movement of an instantaneous 
revelation. A new meaning presents itself in a total rearrangement of everything 
we thought we knew 
(1980: 35) 
What Pierssens is suggesting is that when we experience a work of art and find in it 
meaning (or should that be meaningfulness? ), we have an epiphany. Perhaps. This may 
happen very rarely to the average person, that they have a sudden and great revelation 
about a work of art. And what does this revelation consist of? Koestler writes, 
Routine thinking involves a single matrix, artistic experience always involves 
more than one. Rhythm and metre, rhyme and euphony, are not artificial 
ornaments of language, but combinations of contemporary, sophisticated frames 
of reference, with archaic and emotionally more powerful games of the mind. The 
same is true of poetic imagery: visual thinking is in earlier form of mental activity 
than thinking in verbal concepts; we dream mostly in pictures. In other words, 
creative activity always implies a temporary regression to these archaic levels, 
while a simultaneous process goes on in parallel on the highest, most articulate 
and critical level: the poet is like a skin-diver with a breathing tube [... ] the poet's 
voice is bi-vocal, as he bisociates sound and meaning. 
(1975: 194-5) 
('bisociation' is Koestler's term for "sudden leaps of creative imagination", 1975: 181) 
In 'Ecclesiastes', Solomon asks us: 
Who is like the wise man? And who knows the interpretation of a thing? A man's 
wisdom makes his face shine, and the hardness of his face is changed. 
(The Bible, Ecclesiastes 8: 1) 
Who indeed does know the interpretation of a thing? What is this supposed to mean? It 
is so opaque that it cannot be seen through. It reads as though it were a Zen koan-a 
statement designed to prompt the pupil to look at things in a new way, from a different 
angle. Is being wise the ability to know an interpretation? We can know what interpretations someone else might have given to something-if they tell us in some 
way-but we do not just know interpretations, we make them, we give them; an interpretation comes into being when we interact with, respond to or simply react to a thing. What our my reaction to a thing? It can be one of many examples. What does it 
suggest when someone says "I am responding to a painting, to a story, to a piece of 
music"? Are they giving an answer to the questions that it poses? What if these questions 
are rhetorical? Are the answers a waste of time? Can anyone enter into a dialogue with 
any of these things? Isn't a picture or a story an inanimate thing, something inert, incapable of interaction? But we sometimes say that a picture or story was brought to life What does this mean? It is used to describe our living experience of a piece of art that in some way inspired us-not to say that the thing literally came to life. If a work of 
art, whatever it is, is lifeless, it does not inspire us to continue our experience of it; it is boring, not dead (cf. Z §234). But what about a piece of music, can this be called a thing? The word piece implies a bit of something-a piece of cake is a tangible object which I can say exists in my larder, but where does a piece of music exist? Is it in the manuscript? Is it the original recording? Is it on the CD or DVD? And these assume that the music has been in some way recorded-what about when it is experienced being 
played live? In all of these cases a human being senses what might be called sound 
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waves against the eardrum mediated via the auditory nerves to the brain where it is 
heard as music. Whatever interpretation there may be related to the sound comes not 
with the vibrations or electrochemical impulses. It occurs imperceptibly after these 
events, as though alongside these events (see Z §165). Humans see, humans hear, 
humans feel, humans taste, humans smell and humans interpret these sensations all in 
one go, as it were (to put it crudely): "It is wrong to call understanding a process that 
accompanies hearing" (Wittgenstein Z §163). A work of art fuses seeing with seeing and 
hearing with hearing and so on (cf. RPP 1 §436 "The theme and the language are in 
reciprocal action"; and CV 60e MS 132 59 "The theme interacts with language"). This 
too, is the object of the koan, according to Suzuki and the Zen Buddhists: to synthesize 
the dualism of the senses, to experience enlightenment, to attain satori. But to say that 
there is a dualism of the senses, or even to talk of fusion, is a mistake in a way, because 
we don't experience them as unlinked. Or do we? The late 19thand early 20thCentury 
writer, Raymond Roussel experienced enlightenment: "the moment in which he 
discovers the truth of his destiny in a total fusion of his body with that of 
writing" (Pierssens 1980: 37). But what do you we expect of a romantic nineteen year 
old? Just because a poet (or a philosopher, or a psychologist, or a scientist) says 
something, that doesn't make it right, or a measure of everyone's experience, or 
anything more than a description using metaphor and allegory. 
'a solitary piece of jigsaw puzzle': If anybody is interested, the piece of the jigsaw puzzle 
that the Detective finds and describes is a fragment from a picture by Gustav Klimt. 
Painted in 1904-5, the portrait in oils is of Margaret(e) Stonborough-Wittgenstein, 
Ludwig's sister (called Gretl by the family), for her wedding. Wittgenstein's father, 
Karl, was a great patron and collector of the arts, supporting Klimt on a number of 
occasions. Ludwig knew the painting, it had hung in the family home briefly before 
being rejected by its subject, although his views on it are not dear. Gretl was a big 
influence of Ludwig, being very intellectual herself and well-read and opinionated on 
matters of religion and science. Ludwig designed a house and its fittings for his sister 
Grell between 1925 and 1928 (the building still stands on Kundmanngasse in Vienna). 
Page 207 
Part 3: Android 
Canto 1: In the midst of death 
'Android': Title of a film directed by Aaron Lipstadt (1982). The temptation was resisted to 
call this section 'Cyborg' (also the title of a film). On the website entitled Cyborgs - Humans and Technology, Jeff Deaner (1999) writes 
Webster's New World Dictionary, Third Edition defines a cyborg as '[cy Iborg (sUborg); contraction of 'cybernetic organism'] a hypothetical human being 
modified for life in a hostile or alien environment by the substitution of artificial 
organs and other body parts: After reading that definition I've decided that the 
dictionary definition is not always applicable. 
This is quite 'right. The word 'cyborg' should only be viewed in family resemblance terms. There are as many notions of what a cyborg is, or could be, as there are people 
who think about cyborgs. Clynes' and Kline's 1960 article 'Cyborgs and Space' was the first to include a definition based on a potential practical application beyond the Earth's 
atmosphere: 
For the exogenously extended organizational complex functioning as an integrated homeostatic system unconsciously, we propose the term "Cyborg. " The Cyborg deliberately incorporates exogenous components extending the self- 
regulatory control function of the organism in order to adapt it to new 
environments [... ] The purpose of the Cyborg, as well as his own homeostatic 
systems, is to provide an organizational system in which such robot-like 
problems are taken care of automatically and unconsciously, leaving man free to 
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explore, to create, to think, and to feel. 
(reprinted in Gray 1995: 30-1) 
To restate the history of the term and the literature surrounding it is not possible here 
(see Gray 1995 for a more detailed account). As Haraway (in Gray 1995: 373) remarks 
"Cyborgs do not stay still"-that is to say that they have changed, and keep changing 
in concept and form. From the use of a tool or a pair of spectacles through prosthetic 
limbs to more specialised medical equipment, it is argued that humans have been and 
are cyborgs, in prototype at the very least (see Chislenko 1995, for a less-than-serious 
account of the cyborgization of humans). It is no longer acceptable to refer 
unquestioningly to the mind-body split, especially as now we are looking at a new 
division: body-machine. "We might also speak of a human/machine compression, this 
compression signifying a new qualitative leap in the evolutionary process, as some 
researchers have suggested, Moravec (1988) and Ursua (1988) [? ] among others" as 
Figueroa-Sarriera (in Gray 1995: 129) writes. 
However, it still seems too Cartesian to define this duality in such a way that it can be 
argued that never the twain shall meet. Some bodies rely on a direct link with 
technology from dialysis machines and iron lungs to pacemakers, cochlea implants and 
other internal devices. These latter aids cannot even be seen, and like our own organs 
exist purely for the sake of continuing the existence of the body as a whole. And this 
body is 'only' a transitory environment for genes (for an expansion on this argument 
see, for example, Dawkins 1996: 177). Cyborg is not just a term to define an entity of 
both human and machine 'parentage'; it has also been used as a metaphor to describe 
the relationship (of individuals and of society) to technology. In the Metabody text 
'Roborg: Myths, Robots and Procreation, J. J. Cook (1997) writes: 
the cyborg, [has] become elemental to the metaphorical map of our world. The 
objectified machinic and cybernetic body, augmented, transparent, implanted 
and analysed, is more easily incorporated into the body of the subject-machine as 
cyborg, and avatar/golem, its digital equivalent. 
In the overall picture of human reality at the end of the Twentieth Century, the cyborg 
has a special place for writers of fiction, science and cultural theory. To say, "we are all 
cyborgs" (Haraway 1991: 150), is to imply many things, not least of all that our bodies 
are not all that they seem. The evolutionary path is being diverted as far as humans are 
concerned. But what about the evolution of machines? Manuel de Landa writes 
If we disregard for a moment the fact that robotic intelligence will probably not 
follow the anthropomorphic line of development prepared for it by science 
fiction, we may without much difficulty imagine a future generation of killer 
robots dedicated to understanding their historical origins. We may even imagine 
specialized 'robot historians' committed to tracing the various technological lineages that gave rise to their species. 
(1991: 2-3) 
Dawkins asks, 
Could it be that one far-off day intelligent computers will speculate about their 
own lost origins? [... ] Will a robotic Cairns-Smith write a book called Electronic 
Takeover? " 
(1996: 158) 
It could be said that human beings are not the final, once-and-for-all, dominant species 
on the planet, but that we are merely a stepping stone, a future missing link, and the 
writers of our own heroic downfall. Our tragic flaw? Perhaps it will be our inability to 
adapt 'psychologically' beyond our physical limitations, or 'psychologically' when we do go beyond our physical limitations. Until now we have prided ourselves on our capacity to command adverse conditions, and on our attempts to improve on the natural world. Our natural environment frequently gets the better of us, often through its sheer unpredictability and brute force, yet we still try to overcome it by inventing 
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new devices to improve our chances for survival. The more advanced the devices, 
seemingly the less control we have over them. Nature, Dyson, suspects, "is on the side 
of the machines" (1997: ix). We live in a technocratic world, where to understand 
technology confers power. Gray, Mentor and Figueroa-Sarriera write that 
we certainly all live in a 'cyborg society' [... ] Cyborg society also refers to the full 
range of intimate organic-machinic relations 
(in Gray 1995: 3; emphasis in original) 
Also in a high-tech culture it "is not dear who makes and who is made in the relation 
between human and machine" (Haraway 1991: 177). It is not now wholly nature that 
determines our life, but technology, our relationships with machines. Take for example 
this recent description of how technology will have an impact on humans: 
The prevalence of highly intelligent visual navigation devices for the blind, 
speech-to-print displays for the deaf, nerve stimulation and orthotic prosthetics 
for the physically disabled, and a variety of neural implant technologies, has 
eliminated the handicaps associated with most disabilities. 
Kurzweil (1999b: 2) 
If an approximate date were to be put on the above prediction, what might it be? Ray 
Kurzweil, "the world's leading authority on artificial intelligence" (1999b: flyleaf) 
estimates 2029. 
Kevin Warwick, "the world's leading expert in cybernetics" (1997: flyleaf), claims "that 
it is possible for machines to take over from humans" (1997: 8; italics in original). This 
seems like a far-fetched prophesy, and is based on an assumption that machines can 
and will develop 'intelligence' and 'consciousness'. (Both of these terms carry a great 
weight of explanations, theories and beliefs as to how they are defined, measured and 
quantified. ) Warwick imagines that it is feasible for machines to have developed 
intelligence equivalent to or more than that of humans by 2050. Moravec predicts that 
this will be the case sometime in the 2020s. Kurzweil concurs that by 2029 machines will 
"claim to be conscious" (1999b: ix), and by 2099 there will "no longer [be] any dear 
distinction between humans and computers" (1999b: x), in terms of what we know of as 
the'mind'. 
As a metaphor, the cyborg helps us start to cross the psychological border between 
machines and us. Physically the border is becoming increasingly blurred. Despite this, it 
is often hard to imagine where or when there will be no border at all - TOTAL FUSION. For writers such as Moravec, in the near future "the biological body assumes a 
character fundamentally scatological and disposable" (in Gray, 1995: 132), and the 
mind can be uploaded into an entirely inorganic simulated neural network. Now, 
instead of the gene, it is the meme that carries the meaning of existence. This moves us 
close to "a reformulation of Cartesian dualism" (Figueroa-Sarriera in Gray, 1995: 133), or 
as Figueroa-Sarriera suggests, the Platonic view of the mind and body: Plato saw the body as made from the four elements - earth, water, fire and air - and a soul (see, for example, Melling 1987: 69-74 and 152-3; Philebus, and principally Phaedo, are the works in which Plato argues for the external from the body and immortal existence of the 
soul). The mind in these terms is and can be separated from the body. As Damasio 
describes (1995: 249-50), this was Descartes' biggest error. If by the end of the next 
century "most conscious entities [do] not have a permanent physical 
presence" (Kurzweil 1999b: x), this would change the value and meaning of any act that is now purely physical; it might become purely metaphorical to refer to 'dance'. Even 
now the word is used to describe mental acts of thought processing and argument formulation. The copy on the back of Andy Clark's book Being there: putting brain, body, 
and world together again (1998) is an example: "Brain, body, and world are united in a 
complex dance of circular causation and extended computational activity". 
Following the example of Antonio Damasio (1995), the replacement of the body in the functioning of the brain and in emotional response, is an important argument against 
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'brain in a vat' and total consciousness uploading theories. Basically, Damasio argues, 
"our minds would not be the way they are if it were not for the interplay of body and 
brain during evolution, during individual development, and at the current 
moment" (1995: xvi). The brain is seen as connected to the body proper to form "an 
indissociable organism" (1995: xvi), and the mind is affected by the body's interaction 
with the external environment through the sense organs. Damasio simply describes 
how the brain has evolved in such a way that its perception of the body proper from 
moment to moment is now a background process (see 1995: 2334). However, the brain 
that "exists now is dominated by non-body images" (1995: 234), but with the body still 
providing essential information for the conscious brain. 
Charlie Laughlin offers an argument against Moravec's view of the future. Through the 
application of biogenetic structural theory, which is "an exploration of a perspective 
that integrates the anthropology of human culture with the study of the human 
brain" (Laughlin 1996a), Laughlin makes 
the fundamental assumption that human consciousness and culture are 
functions of the nervous system. This perspective requires us to pay particular 
attention to the physiology and engineering of the cyborg, and to watch carefully 
the impact of technology upon the structure and function of the mind and the 
body. For instance, there cannot be a cyborg without solving the direct brain- 
machine interface problem. Interfacing is difficult enough when dealing with the 
replacement of limbs with prosthetic devices, but it becomes exceedingly 
complicated when it involves direct brain to computer interfacing. Cyborg 
consciousness is not now, nor will it ever be, a simple matter of 'downloading' 
human consciousness out of a brain and into a machine. 
(1996b; emphasis in original) 
These are sobering words for anyone who considers becoming a cyborg capable of 
machine-based self-consciousness in the near future. For the time-being, perhaps, we 
can concentrate on those aspects of cyborg technology which are already in use and 
determine how these new tools can help us create new cultural products (as Tim Oren 
writes, "Technologists Should Be Listening to Artists", in Laurel 1990: 479). The 
limitations and frustrations presented to us by the basic nature of the tools should help 
us look for creative possibilities to increase their potential. David Tomas writes: 
"Perhaps an art of the cybernetic automaton is nothing more than this [based on a 
Nietzschean argument] 'art' of balancing between a past history of the body and the 
future of a different kind of body" (in Gray 1995: 265). In his chapter 'Art, 
Psychasthenic Assimilation, and the Cybernetic Automaton, Tomas (in Gray, 1995: 260) 
favours "Beaune's term 'cybernetic automaton' to describe the type of hybrid organic/ 
machinic entity" that appears in a performed installation. "An installed and performed 
cybernetic automaton is thus a kind of transparent representational interface and 
threshold between an organic world and the world of machines" (Gray 1995: 260-1; 
italics in original). 
Following this brief excursion into human-machine relations, which serves merely to demonstrate the range of material on the matter, David J. Hess in The Cyborg Handbook 
(Gray 1995: 373) gives a description of the 'cyborg' that will suffice as a definition: "any identity between machine and human or any conflation of the machine/human boundary". 
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'In the midst of death': Play on the line "In the midst of life we are in death" from The Book 
of Common Prayer (from 'The Order for the Burial of the Dead'). See also CV 44e: MS 127 
77v. Page 208 
'spirit ditch': Title of song by Sparklehorse on Vivadixiesubmarinetransmissionplot (Capitol 
Records, 1995). 
Page 210 
'nerves of nylon and steel': Based on a line from a Bauhaus song, 'Nerves' on In the Flat 
Field (4AD, 1980). 
'And so, one dead, the other powerless to be born': Play on a line by Matthew Arnold 
(1950: 302; first published in Fraser's Magazine, April 1855), The Grand Chartreuse, 1.85. 
Page 211 
Canto 2: Meccanik Dancing. 
'Meccanik Dancing': XTC song title on Go 2 (Virgin Records, 1978). This thesis originally 
focused on what was termed 'the cyborg dancer'. Early text read: 
Body> Machine> Nerves> Circuitry> Emotions> Processing> 
(Artificial) Intelligence> Pain> Damage> Movement> Stasis> 
Sin> Synthesis> Synthetic> Systematic> So much for mind-body 
dualisms What about mind-machine duality? > Body-machine 
symbiosis? > 
Imagine a race of sentient hermaphroditic animals that live 
in tandem with quasi-intelligent machines> They have only one 
eye and ear[; ] spatial awareness is reduced and limited to 
mono-directional perception> The right hand has only four 
functional digits[; ] the left is a withered simulacrum of a 
hand> Legs are distorted and swollen[; ] movement is slow and 
jerky> Most of the nutritional sustenance is derived from 
pre-digested food matter to aid assimilation[; ] colostomy 
bags siphon off the waste> They live amidst the discarded 
components of technological equipment/ no longer required in 
the creatures' cohabiters/ the computers> The brains of these 
organisms are highly specialised/ all extraneous cerebral 
activities have been made obsolete/ or are downloaded from 
the computers' memory banks> Neural sensations are controlled 
exogenously/ and pumped directly into the brain[; ] the world 
is seen/ felt/ smelt/ tasted and explored virtually> And why 
not? > The real world is an unpleasant place to visit/ a 
landfill site of global proportions> >> 
For me, the use of technology in creating and then presenting performance is to expand 
the possibilities of the body and the ways in which the audience can participate in the 
theatrical event. I am interested in the use of technology to transfer movement from one 
person to another person because it is direct and not open to (human) mistakes and 
variations. If a body transmits a sequence of movements via an electrical interface, it is 
controllable and directional. The choreographer can get it into someone else's body 
without having to rely on verbal description or ostensive means. The only meanings that 
are then open to interpretation are those given to the dance by the audience as they watch. The dancer also becomes like the audience-free to place whatever interpretation onto the 
movement that they come up with, without having to worry about whether they arc "expressing" what the choreographer intends. But what to call this new performer? 
For simplicity's sake, the name `cyborg dancer' will be used to describe the range of 
possibilities in technologically extended and augmented performers. The cyborg dancer is 
a future possibility. The cyborg dancer will come to be recognised through its use of 
prosthetic and robotic extensions; in-built motion sensing capabilities; input-output 
devices for connecting up to other cyborgs and machines proper; increased muscular 
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power and precision; a downloadable kinaesthetic memory; new vocabularies of 
movement to convey information to new digital audiences; a potentially limitless range of 
'body'-types; and the ability to withstand new environments such as space beyond the 
earth's atmosphere ä la Clynes' and Kline's original. There is no wish to dispense with 
the physical performer, or to concentrate for any length of time on virtual applications. 
This is about performance in real time and space. The body, `the meat', is not yet fully 
obsolete-only partially so. The cyborg has not yet taken over the planet, yet it is finding 
form more rapidly as technology advances. The human senses are still stimulated, in the 
main, by `real' stimuli. In the sphere of dance, the eyes, long since assisted in seeing by 
lenses, are the main link between the performers and the spectators. Up until recently to 
be an audience member at a dance event, from a live performance, to watching a video- 
dance, including the new virtual and cyber-dances, has been essentially a visual 
experience. It is fine for the average person, able to view dance, but what about the 
visually impaired? Where does the dance exist for them? It doesn't. A sighted reader of a 
dance is also a physical reader, but so is a blind person a potential physical reader of the 
dance. Blind people can use dance, contact improvisation is a good example, to interact 
corporeally with other people and feel sensations beyond their normal realm of 
experience, which can only be seen as beneficial to their overall well-being [... ] 
Through cyborg and other technologies the body can begin to re-invent itself to meet the 
demands of the new information technologies. What are the implications for dancers, 
choreographers and audience members of these new technologies? 
Just as our relationship with our environment is being transformed through technology, 
the relationship between the performer and the performance space is changing. With 
developments such as the Intelligent Stage at Arizona State University, the performer can 
now act as a `trigger' for sound, staging and lighting effects by moving through invisible 
sensors, for example, a video-based system that detects movement through specific areas 
or follows the colours of a performer's costume. The performer can also have a different 
method of controlling their environment through using a range of sensors actually 
attached to their body or clothing. These might be in the form of proximity sensors or 
muscle activity sensors (... ] 
Lighting and music, traditionally run from the theatre's control box, can now, 
thanks to technology borrowed from medicine, be shaped by brain wave patterns, 
blood pressure and each and every movement. The dancer as manager of his stage 
environment - artist's dream or aesthetic bluff? 
(Anon. 1997: 7) 
[... ] Susan Kozel and Kirk Woolford's performance installation Figments -a live intervention (1999), previewed in Chichester [... ] uses ultra-sonic motion capture to 
create the animated image of the body viewed on screens in the performance space and in 
television goggles worn by the performer. These projections allow the performer to dance 
with an abstract representation of their own movement, drawing whatever inspiration they 
want from the lines and dots before them. In this case the projection can be said to have a direct link with the performer, in a way that a more filmic projection might not. 
Having experienced this piece as both audience member and dancer, the relationship between the projected image and the dance was clearer for me when I was performing. The image was anthropomorphised and made personal to me, as I looked for links between the abstract lines and my movements. I performed a duct with the image, taking 
some of my impetus from the angles, positions and speed of the on-screen graphics, either 
to echo it or to cut across what I interpreted the image to be suggesting in a juxtaposition 
of slow and fast, smooth and staccato. When the image was in the television goggles, the 
emphasis of the performance changed and became a more personalised dance still. There 
was even less awareness of the audience, despite their being only a matter of feet away, 
and whichever way I moved, I was still able to see the computer image before my eyes. Spatial awareness and my relationship with the room changed (the sense of up and down 
284 
was lessened too, although the floor remained a reminder of where I was); as I tipped my 
head in all directions, trying to escape the image almost, I became internalised. The 
encumbrance and awkwardness forced on me by the fixtures and the wiring of the ultra- 
sound equipment, and the costume of a heavy knitted-rope skirt, acted as a yoke to my 
awareness, an extra part of my body over which I had little actual control, like a limb 
devoid of blood. 
To an observer my movements might seem limited, but once these limitations are known, 
a vocabulary and range of movements becomes a natural part of the performance. The 
cables aren't an augmentation to assist my movement in a mechanical way, but they are 
an extension of me and one which feeds me information from which I can derive artistic 
stimulation and an altered sense of what my body can and cannot do. With the feedback 
from the images I found myself wanting to take up positions and move in ways that I 
would not have found without them. Again, the audience soon adapts to my strange ways 
of moving; aware that I am a human being yet somehow different. I am many things at 
one time, generating an almost infinite number of possible meanings. 
To the audience, I am different and other, yet familiar and safe. I am not intending to 
foreground this difference: it just happens. I am not intent on provoking specific 
meanings: they either occur to the audience or they don't. There is no language: only 
abstract movements in a space made strange by my presence. The role of the visual sense 
is central not only to the audience, more aptly spectators, observers, viewers; but also to 
the performer who would be missing out on the most apparent raison d'etre of the piece: 
to see the representation of them and to interact with it. The audience of Figments (and 
other pieces like it) is watching the process of the dancer creating the dance. The 
accidents and faltering movements as the dancer finds their feet, as it were, are the 
important parts of the piece: they alert us to the fact that it is being made there and then, 
unrehearsed and not complete (but not any less because of it). 
The Russian Viktor Shklovsky wrote in 1917 that 
Art exists to help us to recover the sensation of life, to make the stone stony. The 
end of art is to give a sensation of the object as seen, not as recognised. The 
technique of art is to make things `unfamiliar', to make forms obscure, so as to 
increase the difficulty and duration of perception. The act of perception in art is an 
end in itself and must be prolonged. In art, it is our experience of the process of 
construction that counts, not the finished product. 
(in Watney 1982: 161) 
It takes time, as Shklovsky argues, to recognise something in the dance to which we can 
ascribe meaning. Of course, Shklovsky is talking of the "poetic" arts and his views on art 
and perception are "rooted in a fundamentally bourgeois abstraction of 'thought' from the 
rest of material life, with a strongly idealist emphasis on the determining primacy of 
ideas" (Watney 1982: 173), but the quote is relevant because, to appreciate the 
strangeness and art inherent in this piece it is necessary both to separate and combine that 
which we `recognise' - the human dancer - and that which we don't-the technological 
extensions, the costume, the projected image and the movements themselves. This is 
primarily achieved visually. 
David Tomas writes: 
performed installations use a human body, but restructure its presence in such 
a way as to reduce it to the status of a mere component in an economy of 
artifacts and environment. The human body is transformed, under these 
circumstances, into an unusual entity since its new spatial position, its site 
specificity or 'installed' sense of situated and objectified self, is the direct product 
of this economy (... ] A performed installation can therefore be considered, from the point of view of its systemic powers of representational/pcrceptual 
transformation, as well as through its power to separate body and consciousness, to 
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function as a special kind of mimetically integrated technology - ultimately, a 
complicated imaging system through which a living human body is radically 
refashioned. 
(in Gray 1995: 257-8; emphasis in original) 
I reject the strict assertion that vision is all that is necessary to understand a performance. 
Even in the act of `seeing' there are other processes at play: 
To make sense of what you're seeing [... ] you sometimes need to know what the 
eyes register, what you're touching, your relation to gravity and motion, and the 
position of your joints. What we call `seeing' involves all this, and dramatically 
illustrates the relationship between perception and the whole body. 
(Leonard 1981: 41) 
Similarly, as Janet Adshead reminds us, in Wittgensteinian terms, 
Making sense of a dance requires, then, that an interpretation is made, derived 
from a rigorous description of the movement and supported by additional 
knowledge of the context in which the dance exists [... Adshead et al's] premise is 
that a satisfactory analysis which starts from the dance has yet to be fully worked 
out. 
(1988: 13) 
In the Metabody text `Animorphosis' Jeffrey Cook (1997) writes: 
Art is also about transformation; through artifice and association of body, 
materials and spaces, through bodies moving in space and time on stages and 
screens, through the experiences of the audience, and all the so-called "bodies of 
the text" in the wider sense. And the body, like art, can stand for more than itself, 
rather than just standing in for something else; the star, the politician, the soldier, 
the worker and boss, the scientist, the artist. Such extended bodies stand for; the 
ideal life, the body politic, the state, the corporation, science, and art, self-similar 
with the individuals that make them up, a fractal flesh that binds, the waves of 
associations rippling outwards and inwards in a metasocial orchestration of 
knowledge and society. 
An early proponent of technology in performance, The Bauhaus School of Weimar 
Germany succeeded [see Schlemmer's article `Man and Art Figure' in Schlemmer et at 
1979: 15-46. For a general introduction to the Bauhaus see Goldberg 1988 and Whitford 
1984], according to Birringer, in concentrating 
the viewer's perception, in an unfamiliar way, on the kinesthetic apprehension of 
movement and image [... ] the performer becomes aware of an altered, redesigned 
body topography (her/his perceived body), and the viewer becomes aware of the 
deformation of sentience, familiar physiology, and movement connotations. 
(1998: 45-6) 
Through this verfremdungseffekt [translates approximately into `Alienation Effect': a device for preventing an audience's simple identification with the characters on stage. See Brecht 1978: "The artist's object is to appear strange and even surprising to the 
audience" (1978: 92)], the concepts of self, body, reality and meaning are explored and 
open for debate, where they were once "conventionally implicit" and somewhat 
unchallenged by the majority. In the same way, as The Cyborg Handbook tells us: Cyborgs also remind us that we are always embodied, but that the ways we are 
embodied aren't simple [... ] some of us may feel like `cogs' in a machine, but we 
are really bodies hooked into machines, and bodies linked to other bodies by 
machines. 
(Gray, Mentor and Figueroa-Sarricra in Gray 1995: 6) 
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The American artist Gene Cooper demonstrates how our bodies are no longer separate 
from our technological environment. He mediates the environment for an audience by 
connecting his body to weather tracking systems and computers which then transfer 
information about thunderstorms to electrical nerve stimulators. If we can view our body 
as an object and an instrument with an interlocking relationship with the world and other 
objects in it, we must then begin to alter what we view as us, the parts of our body. [The 
idea of the body as an `instrument' is wide-reaching and used as a metaphor by writers 
such as Sartre. He posits that our bodies are themselves, in fact, objects: "the discovery of 
my body as an object is indeed a revelation of its being" (1969: 305). Cf. Wittgenstein and 
words as instruments; see Hunter 1990. ] Lupton writes: 
Grosz (1994: 80) notes that inanimate objects, when touched or on the body for 
long enough, become extensions of the body image and sensation. They become 
psychically invested into the self; indeed, she argues, `[I]t is only insofar as the 
object ceases to remain an object and becomes a medium, a vehicle for impressions 
and expression, that it can be used as an instrument or tool'... they may become 
`intermediate' or `midway between the inanimate and bodily' (Grosz, 1994: 81). 
(1995: 98-9) 
Some years after the Bauhaus, Artaud in his manifestos for a Theatre of Cruelty proposed 
the use of puppets and other extensions to create a cathartic and socio-political theatre 
that connects to the audience in an almost physical sense, using lighting, movement, 
sounds and voice to convey symbolic meaning: "In our present degenerative state, 
metaphysics must be made to enter the mind through the body" said Artaud in his First 
Manifesto (1977: 77). He also wrote that "Direct contact will be established between the 
audience and the show, between actors and audience" (1977: 74), by having a new type of 
performance space in which the audience is in the midst of the action. However, despite 
Artaud, Grotowski and others, in most contemporary Western theatrical performances the 
relationship between the performer and audience remains fundamentally the same as it 
has been for many years-one party acts, the other reacts somewhat passively at a discrete 
distance-but some artists are looking for new ways in which to prompt a more active 
audience [... ] 
(presented on the 2nd May 2000; adapted 2001) 
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... encloses her and she envelops him': Cf. Milton, L'Allegro, 11.146-51: 
That Orpheus' self may heave his head 
From golden slumber on a bed 
Of heaped Elysian flowers, and hear 
Such strains as would have won the ear 
Of Pluto to have quite set free 
His half-regained Eurydice. 
Macquarrie discusses the role of the sexual act "whereby two persons interpenetrate 
each other's existences in innumerable ways and are involved in a 'total contact"' (1972: 117). Through sharing of the "climactic 'ecstasis"' (Macquarric 1972: 117), two beings 
attempt "a total sharing of being" (Macquarrie 1972: 116). Now with concepts such as Cybersex we must consider ecstasis through ectasis. See Heim's 'The Erotic Ontology of Cyberspace' (1993: 82-108; also in Benedikt 1991), and Margulis and Sagan: "If orgasm is the experience of a wave of pleasure passing through the individual body, related through reproduction to gradient reduction [Margolis' and Sagan's theory of sex includes a discussion of the Second Law of Thermodynamics], so the pleasure of 
electronically linking to distant others expands the gradient-reducing and reproductive 
activities of collective bodies" (1997: 222). 
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'dancing like a chequered shade': Paraphrase of Milton, L'Allegro, 1.96. 
'nanomachines': See Drexler 1986 and Drexler et at 1991; "An artificial molecular machine 
of the sort made by molecular engineering" (Drexler et at 1991: 295). This being a 
mythological investigation into the future (if that is not an oxymoron), the notion that 
self-replicating machines and assemblers at the molecular or atomic level is used 
without question. However, this is not to suggest that Drexler and other writers on 
nanotechnologies have proffered a watertight case for such phenomena. As Lyle 
Burkhead in Nanotechnology without Genies writes: 
to create a universal assembler, you have to do everything the biologists have to 
[... ] plus design a new kind of replicating entity, and all the necessary atomic 
machinery. After you have designed the new atomic machinery -- which is going 
to be as complex as biochemistry -- you still have a long, long way to go 
(1999; emphasis in original) 
Page 214 
Canto 3: Unholy Communion. 
'And as his growth slows, so does his dance': Baudrillard writes, 
Communication is too slow; it is an effect of slowness, working through contact 
and speech. Looking is much faster; it is the medium of the media, the most rapid 
one. Everything must come into play instantaneously. We never communicate. In 
the to-and-fro of communication, the instantaneity of looking, light and seduction 
is already lost. 
But against the acceleration of networks and circuits, we will also look for 
slowness - not the nostalgic slowness of the mind, but insoluble immobility, the 
slower than slow: inertia and silence, inertia insoluble by effort, silence insoluble 
by dialogue. There is a secret here too. 
(1990: 8) 
'amalgam of machine and man': Stelarc displays Moholy-Nagy's belief that art, when 
combined with technology, is capable of transcending the "limits of [humans' functional 
mechanism] biological capacity" (Moholy-Nagy 1969: 30). He is notable in being one of 
few artists, if not the only artist, to have taken the concept of cyborg to literal extremes; 
as Birringer puts it: "the metaphor of the cyborg [... ] is actually being choreographed in 
Stelarc's performances" (1998: 61 and 63). 
Stelarc uses the word 'choreography' for defining the effects of a range of movement- 
inducing stimuli. He is more concerned with movement-for-movement's-sake, or rather 
as an outcome, a visible effect of the processes he uses than with using the movement as 
a medium of expression. His performances, do however, open up a series of questions 
and concerns about the physical body. At a talk in Nottingham (8 March 1999), Stelarc 
metaphorically positioned the body between zombie and cyborg; it occupies this middle 
ground yet has a foot in both. We have a fear of being like a zombie, but Stelarc argues 
that the body now acts without free will.. The body now cannot contend with the speed 
and other capabilities of new technology; it is obsolete. Through cyborg and other 
technologies the body can begin to re-invent itself to meet the demands of the new 
information technologies {it should be noted that Stelarc uses the term 'the body' when describing himself in the course of his work). 
In Stelarc's performances the parameters of the physiology and psychology of the body 
are broken down and expanded. He argues that the body becomes a 'mind in the 
world': an 'absent body' from which physicality recedes: Figueroa-Sarriera in The Cyborg Handbook writes, "With the precariousness of the physiological substrate as a 
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given, the disappearance of the body and the externalization of the mind are 
proclaimed to be inevitable phenomena in the evolutionary process" (in Gray 1995: 
134; emphasis in original). Stelarc's performance s can be seen as microcosmic displays 
of what is occurring to our everyday technologically mediated bodies. Our relationship 
with technology now recreates the body as a 'split body'. Bojana Kunst writes, "in 
contact with technology, the body becomes fragmented, endlessly fluid and loses its 
identity" (1997: 42). The body is now experienced "as alien to itself" (Stelarc in 
conversation with Robert Ayers, Ayers 1998: 9). Zebington (1997a) writes that "[if] 
technology is an extension of the body, Stelarc's recent performances and metabody 
further the exploration of what new forms these extensions might take. " 
Metabbody [sic] is an augmentation of the rituals of connection between the 
human body and technology, extended to the manipulation of digital bodily 
representation existing within the metaspace of local and remotely distributed 
computer systems [... ] Metabody is an extended body and promethean 
paradigm: symbolic space and remote physical organism are synthesised into a 
form beyond either. 
(Zebington 1997b) 
In Stelarc's Fractal Flesh (1995) and his use of the Third Hand extension (1976 onwards), 
we see electrical impulses to and from Stelarc's arm, leg and abdominal muscles, with 
movement induced in his own limbs and his Third Hand. Voltage is squirted into his 
arm, in Fractal Flesh, under the remote guidance of other people connected to him via 
the Net. He describes this "as the DISPLACING OF MOTIONS from one Net-connected 
physical body to another" (Stelarc Date unknown; emphasis in original). At present 
there is not direct transmission from the musculature of one body to that of another, 
although this is, in theory, a future possibility. What is interesting here is the notion that 
a thinking body can transmit movements and gestures to a second body which acts 
"WITHOUT EXPECTATION, producing MOVEMENTS WITHOUT 
MEMORY" (Stelarc Date unknown; emphasis in original). A movement without 
memory can be taken to mean the movement of a person's body devoid of inherent, 
predetermined motivation (cf. Humphrey: "A movement without a motivation is 
unthinkable" (1959: 110). Each movement is therefore a new 'expression' (a 'non- 
expression' perhaps, or an expr-ession of volition, without the will exercising itself. The 
only premeditation has occurred on behalf of the recipient of the impulse liven to them 
by a second party, external to them. Kaplan writes on Moholy-Nagy's concept of the 
Anonymous Hand (the removal of the artist's 'signature' and therefore "reference, 
author, or personality" (Kaplan 1995: 11)). In this theory we can see a "move away from 
the manual and personal touch and the loss of control over the hand as well as the 
McLuhanesque move towards technological extensions as prosthetic 
substitutes" (Kaplan 1995: 146). 
Page 215 
Part 4: Silent Running 
Canto 1: An Abundance of Absence 
'Silent Running': Another film (directed by Douglas Trumbull, 1971) in which a human 
must risk insanity in outer space to save himself. 
'An Abundance of Absence': Much of this short canto is based on ideas found in Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume I (1980b), e. g. RPP I §§578, 583 and 629. It suggests that the concepts of 'inner' and 'outer' are not relevant when 
considering the processes of thought and understanding. It raises the questions: "Does 
one think in words as one dances, in such a way that the movements are tied to the 
words? And if one does, how are these words tied to the movements? " Of course, these thoughts are not to be confused with being the meaning of the movements. The problem 
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of 'intention' is a common theme in the thesis and poem (see note above re. CV 67e: MS 
134 106). Wittgenstein is dear on this issue: RPP 1 §579 
'I'd like to know what he's thinking of. ' But now ask yourself this - apparently 
irrelevant - question: 'Why does what is going on in him, in his mind, interest me 
at all, supposing that something is going on? ' (The devil take what's going on 
inside him! ) 
(RPP 1 §579) 
The idea that a word is bound to one meaning is also wrong, following Wittgenstein: 
meaning is not "a halo that the word carries round with it and retains in any sort of 
application" ["eine Aura, die das Wort mitbringt und in jederlei Verwendung 
hertibernimmt"] (1980a: 44e and 44; see CV 50e: MS 127 41v and cf. PI §97: "Thought is 
surrounded by a halo"). Meanings grow out of words (and, it could be said, music and 
movements) like oak trees out of acorns (see CV 60e: MS 132 62). Wittgenstein writes of 
the experience of understanding a musical phrase and asks what the expression of this 
understanding might be: 
what does it consist in, following a musical phrase with understanding, or, 
playing it with understanding? Don't look inside yourself. Ask yourself rather, 
what makes you say that's what someone else is doing. And what prompts you to 
say he has a particular experience? Indeed, do we ever actually say that? 
Wouldn't I be more likely to say of someone else that he's having a whole host of 
experiences? 
(CV 58e: MS 132 51) 
The relationships between the feelings one gets listening to music and the feelings that 
accompany dance are complex yet connected, it would seem. To respond to 
(experience, describe and interpret) a piece of music or to a piece of dance requires a 
number of abilities and knowledge of what is appropriate in the given circumstances. 
The ambiguities of music and dance are inherent to those forms of expression and as 
Wittgenstein suggests in Z §§29 and 30 (see above), sometimes only the expression itself 
will stand as an interpretation (but this is surely not an interpretation as we understand 
the word in other contexts), or rather, a response in kind or as ambiguous as the initial 
expression. Consider the repetition of a musical (or movement) motif: 
The peculiar feeling that the recurrence of a refrain gives us. I should like to make 
a gesture. But the gesture isn't really at all characteristic precisely of the 
recurrence of a refrain. Perhaps I might find that a phrase characterizes the 
situation better; but it too would fail to explain why the refrain strikes one as a 
joke, why its recurrence elicits a laugh or grin from me. If I could dance to the 
music, that would be my best way of expressing just how the refrain moves me. 
Certainly there couldn't be any better expression than that. 
(RPP 1 §90; italics in original) 
'If you were [... ] they saw them? ': See Z §6. 
Page 216 
`Is it correct [... ] my psychological state"? ': "The human body is the best picture of the human soul" (Wittgenstein PI 178e) ["Der menschliche Körper ist das beste Bild der 
menschlichen Seele"]. See also RPP 1 §267 "The expression of soul in a face" ["Der 
seelenvolle Geischtsausdrucle']; CV 56e: MS 13180 "The human being is the best picture 
of the human soul" ["Der Mensch ist das beste Bild der menschlichen Seele"] and CV 26e: MS 156 49r "The face is the soul of the body" ["Das Geischt ist die Seele des Körpers"]. Finch writes: 
In this physiognomic conception of the human being as the one body-soul, it looks as if we actually see the soul in the expressiveness of the body. It almost 
seems as if Wittgenstein has reversed the ancient Aristotelean view that the soul is the form of the body, turning it into the Goethean formula that the body is the 
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visible expression of the soul. When we look at people in a deep enough way we 
actually see them as ensouled. Their postures, their walks, their expressions and 
gestures, their voices, clothes, etc. Sometimes in an unexpected moment, when 
we look deeply, or as someone passes in front of us, we may get a total sense of 
that person from all these bodily clues. 
(1995: 142) 
'When I drum [... ] music into movement? ': See CV 42e: MS 162b 59v "Piano playing, a 
dance of human fingers" ["Das Klavierspielen, ein Tanz der menschlichen Finger. "] 
Page 217 
Canto 2: A Dance of Senses. 
'Ice pick lobotomies through the eye sockets': See Breggin 1993: 38. 
'blindsighted's ken': "blindsight Absence of visual awareness despite the presence of 
visual capacity [... ] the phenomenon casts doubt on the relation usually assumed 
between consciousness and perception" (Hornsby in Honderich 1995: 96). 
Page 218 
'But Ermy, dear depersonalised debris': "Depersonalisation Disorder is characterized by a 
persistent or recurrent feeling of being detached from one's mental processes or body 
that is accompanied by intact reality testing" (American Psychiatric Association 1994: 
477). 
'A new picture / at each attempt. A new image of the self : After PI §301 "Eine Vorstellung 
ist kein Bild, aber ein Bild kann ihr entsprechen' ["An image is not a picture, but a 
picture can correspond to it. "] and see Z §621. Or rather: "To imagine is not to picture, 
but we can sometimes illustrate what we imagine with a picture" (Hunter 1985: 117). 
Page 219 
'Each new image [... ] on a screen': See Z §233. Lakoff has said that 
Humans think in terms of what are called 'image schemas' - these are schematic 
spatial relations [... ] Different languages organize these schemas in different 
ways. The schemas are embodied; they are not just disembodied symbols. 
(in Brook and Boa11995: 121; cf. Whorf 1956) 
`The human face [... ] course / of passion': Z §490 "Man könnte auch das menschliche Gesicht ein solches Bild nennen und den Verlauf der Leidenschaft durch seine Veränderungen darstellen". 
'the perfect picture of a rose in the dark': See PI §§514-5 and Z §250. 
Page 220 
'A restless dance [... ] now that side': Dante, Inferno, Canto XIV, U. 40-1. 
'mind's eye': There is much written about the use of ocular metaphors to describe 'thought 
processes', for example, see Ryle 1949 and Rorty 1980. 
'all-seeing yet empty eyes': Merleau-Ponty writes, 
The enigma is that my body simultaneously sees and is seen. That which looks at 
all things can also look at itself and recognize, in what it sees, the 'other side' of its power of looking. It sees itself seeing; it touches itself touching; it is visible and 
sensitive for itself. 
(1964: 162-3) 
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If I think about my relationship to my sight, I realise that I can only see certain aspects 
of my body: those that fall in my line of vision. In dreams I am exogenous to my body, 
in that I appear in my dreams as a filmic representation of myself. This is interspersed 
with point of view shots, but from a bodiless set of eyes. On stage I imagine myself as 
though in a dream. I imagine that my view is like that of a camera able to take in all 
angles of me at one moment. I (my/self) am divorced or detached from my body. Or, 
rather, this is the impression/description I create to explain the processes. 
Wittgenstein: 
All our forms of speech are taken from ordinary, physical language and cannot be 
used in epistemology or phenomenology without casting a distorting light on 
their objects. 
(PR §57) 
I see myself. 
I see myself in two dimensions. 
I see myself represented as a picture. 
I see myself torn to pieces. 
I see myself put back together. 
I see myself put back together all wrong. 
I see myself hiding. 
I see myself obscured from view. 
I see myself behind myself. 
I see myself but can't see myself. 
I see myself in confusion. 
I see myself as a dancer. 
I see myself as a cripple. 
I see myself held together by metal. 
I see myself held together by stitches. 
I see myself falling apart. 
I see myself dancing. 
I see myself stationary. 
I see myself still. 
I see myself still dancing. 
I see myself out of time. 
I see myself out of step. 
I see myself out of luck. 
I see myself out of it all. 
I see myself riding on the back of someone else. 
I see myself weighed down. 
I see myself able to fly. 
I see myself grounded. 
I see myself with the landing lights on. 
I see myself with the lights off. 
I see myself not at home. 
I see myself in the mirror. 
I see myself in my eyes. 
I see myself through my eyes. 
I see myself not reflected at all. 
I see myself as someone else. 
I see myself as you see me. 
I see myself as 2-dimensional. 
I see myself as two people. 
I see myself see myself. 
I see myself. 
I see myself. 
(Deveril Garraghan, text for Travelling Backwards (1998), a stage 
show performed in Sheffield and Leicester. ) 
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Lacan writes 
I warm myself by warming myself is a reference to the body as body-I feel that 
sensation of warmth which, from some point inside me, is diffused and locates 
me as body. Whereas in the I see myself seeing myself, there is no such sensation of 
being absorbed by vision. 
(1998: 80; italics in original) 
(Also see Wittgenstein Z §495) 
Wittgenstein says that the psychological verb to see does not signify phenomena, but 
that psychologists observe the phenomena of seeing (see Wittgenstein Z §471). However, 
any "hope of clarifying our psychological concepts by means of scientific and 
experimental techniques has no tenable basis, as we know too little about the relations 
between the relevant concepts and techniques and are in no position to learn anything 
about those relations by applying these techniques" (Schulte 1993: 79). We should not 
be looking to experimental methods in order to clarify our concepts, Wittgenstein 
argues, because they are not based in anything that can be measured and quantified or 
viewed directly-it is how we talk about and express these processes that is more 
important than what actually goes on. The act of seeing encompasses a range of 
processes, as it were. There is a difference between my seeing and my seeing something 
as..., but they are inter-linked-we interpret what we see, rather than the experience of 
seeing, which in turn is incorrectly ascribed an interpretation: see Wittgenstein RPP I 
§20. 
Page 221 
Part 5: Fahrenheit 451 
Canto 1: Ten Trenches Deen 
'Fahrenheit 451': Francois Truffaut's (1966) film about a state-sanctioned book-burning 
fireman who discovers the wonders of reading. Based on Ray Bradbury's novel (1953). 
451 degrees Fahrenheit is the temperature of burning paper. 
'Ten Trenches Deep': Wonderstuff song title on the Unbearable EP (The Far Out Recording 
Company, 1987). 
Page 222 
'metempsychosis /and [... ] bilocation': Pythagorean concepts: Pythagoras saw the soul as a harmonizing principle [... j as a fallen, polluted divinity incarcerated within the body, as in a tomb, and destined to a cycle of 
reincarnations (metempsychosis) from which it can obtain release through ritual 
purgation [... ) Pythagoras was also said to have adopted the idea, current in Scythia and Thrace under the title of Orphism, of a process of bilocation, 
according to which the soul could be temporarily detached from the body. 
(Grant 1989: 277) 
See Z §127. 
Page 224 
'Plato sits, / head [... ] can't be turned': Based on the Cave allegory in Plato's The Republic, Book VII. 
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Page 225 
`those trapped in eikasia': See Melling 1987: 106; "the term for the cognitive state 
corresponding to our apprehension of shadows and reflections, is sometimes translated 
'imagination'; it means rather 'illusion', or 'conjecture', and it would not be misleading 
to translate it as 'fuddle'., ' 
of flick'ring shadows cast by hell's licking flames': See Melling 1987: 112-3. 
'a poker-like finger towards Orpheus': Allusion to Wittgenstein's encounter with Karl 
Popper on 25 October 1946 in Cambridge, see Edmonds and Eidinow, 2001. 
'Reading the Socratic [... ] waste of time! ': CV 21e: MS 11155 
Wenn man die Sokratischen Dialoge liest, so hat man das Gefühl: welche 
fürchterliche Zeitvergeudung! Wozu diese Argumente die nichts beweisen & 
nichts klären. 
Page 227 
'Saint Augustinus [... ] say than discovering': Z §457 and Augustine Confessions, Book XII, 
Chapter 1. 
'We are travelling [... ] that is language': PI §203 "Die Sprache ist ein Labyrinth von 
Wegen". 
Page 230 
`switching from analyst to analysand': The two people involved in any practice of 
psychoanalysis "(psych = fiction of)" (Lacan 1998: vii). 
Page 238 
Canto 2: Of Vision and Death. 
'Of Vision and Death': Nietzschean style title. "We [McLuhan and Powers] concluded that 
video-related technologies might produce a form of psychological death for all mankind 
by separating it permanently from the natural order, the book of nature, through 
Narcissus-like self-involvement, a conclusion reached by McLuhan operating on three 
analytical levels at once: the perceptual, the historical and the analogic" (McLuhan and 
Powers 1989: xiii). They also state: 
Video-related technologies are the critical instruments of such change [disembodied, collective]. The ultimate interactive nature of some video-related 
technologies will produce the dominant right-hemisphere social patterns of the 
next century [this century! ]. For example, the new telecommunication multi- 
carrier corporation, dedicated solely to moving all kinds of data at the speed of light, will continually generate tailor-made products and services for individual 
consumers who have pre-signaled their preferences through an ongoing data base. Users will simultaneously become producers and consumers. 
(McLuhan and Powers 1989: 83) 
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Previously McLuhan had written: 
Beaudelaire's [sic] Hypocrite lecteur, mon semblable, mon frere is itself an image that 
compresses the entire process in question. It is the recognition that there is no 
more division between the poet and his audience, between producer and 
consumer. The reader puts on the audience as his corporate or tribal mask. The 
audience creates the author as the author shapes the awareness of the audience. 
(McLuhan 1970: 138) 
[Last line of Baudelaire's 'Au Lecteur' ('To the 
Reader'): "hypocrite reader, - my alias, - my 
twin" (1982: 6). ] 
Nicholas Mirzoeff opens his book "Modem life takes place onscreen" (1999: 1); and it 
could be said that by shutting our eyes, turning off the visual, for a few moments we 
are playing at being dead, or perhaps antenatal. What's the difference? Life onscreen is 
death and life at the same time: we exist and we don't exist. This is not virtual reality, 
but call us virtual if you want. Is this what the virtual is: being and non-being? We are 
in a place and a non-place, to borrow a phrase from Marc Auge, who writes: "If a place 
can be defined as relational, historical and concerned with identity, then a space which 
cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity will be a non- 
place" (1995: 77-8). To talk of a virtual identity is to ascribe ourselves with a definition 
based on... what? All identity is in some ways virtual, or rather the inverse of virtual: it 
has the appearance of something, but is nothing. A televisual self, for example, is part of 
a complex of selves. 
A body on a screen. 
A human body on a screen. 
A human being on a screen. 
A body moving on a screen. 
A human body moving on a screen. 
A human being moving on a screen. 
Where is the body on the screen? 
Where is the human body on the screen? 
Where is the human being; on the screen? 
Is the body on the screen? 
Is the body in the screen? 
Is the body behind the screen? 
Is the human being on the screen? 
Is the human being in the screen? 
Is the human being behind the screen? 
What happens to my personality when I perform (on stage, on screen)? What do I do to 
the 'proper self? Do I leave behind the normal me? The normal me: shy, quiet, cautious, 
stubborn, thoughtful. The normal me: gregarious, extrovert, loud, talkative, impulsive. 
The normal me: lazy, introspective, kind, tidy, reserved. The normal me: miserable, 
disorganised, slow, decisive, earnest. The normal me: the me when I'm with him. The 
normal me: the me when I'm with her. The normal me: the me when I'm with him. The 
normal me: the me when I'm with her. 
"What is the normal me? " 
The real me - the Real Ich? The Id? Or the Ego? 
Grant Gillett writes that "even if we reject an immaterial (Cartesian) essence of 'self', we 
can identify the concept-using subject-a transcendental unity of apperception-at the 
centre of an individual mind" (1992: 202). The person in a hyperworld is the centre of 
their own world: this is the (I), the 'self'. It is from this vantage point that all the different forms of interpretation take place. To talk of the self of a person is a 
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grammatical construction. 'Self is an invention dependent on who I'm with, where I 
am, what 'self' I want to present, what motivates me in a particular situation. There is 
no 'proper self'. My self does not exist separate to me, my personality is not easily 
qualifiable (or quantifiable): 
it is fractal; 
fluid; 
fictional. 
As a boy I would spend hours in the town's natural history museum -a prime example of 
Victorianism - with its mahogany cabinets and stuffed animals in life-like poses and 
mock environments. The snarling snow-leopard. The somnambulant bear. The extinct 
white rhino. All glassy-eyed and vacuous. Animals that would never have been still in 
life, now frozen and cast as cartoons, parodying themselves. Amid the bones and fossils, 
fleece, feathers and fur, I would wander, my imagination working at great speed to inject 
life and character into these now devitalised husks filled with horse hair and straw. The 
only living exhibits were the fish in the dark corridor space between the fossil and tooth 
room and the whale skeleton and woolly mammoth room (which also contained a 
working model of an early mechanical lift, I seem to recall). There was an ecl, and other 
freshwater fishes, all lit by aquamarine strips of light in the virescent water. My favourite 
was the all-wise and all-knowing catfish, which for all intents and purposes could have 
been dead and mounted, the amount he - she? It? - it moved (or rather, didn't move). 
With its whiskers and beady eyes peering through the green green glass of home, it 
seemed as old as the hills, or at least as old as the museum itself. It had thousands of tales 
to tell, if it could have talked. It had seen thousands of faces, not that it could remember. 
It had a world the size of a television, and it resembled a test card, but to the right viewer, 
it was an endless run of epic films, fairy stories, soap operas and fly-on-the-wall 
documentaries. Despite not moving itself very much, it moved me. What a waste. It had 
given up. Had it once been a lively young catfish, darting through reeds after its food? Or 
had it always been in the tank? How had it been caught? Was it bred specially for the 
museum? Did it know who or what I was? Did it know who or what it was? Was it lonely? 
Or had it no need for company? As a romantic, I empathised with the catfish. I saw 
myself reflected back at me -I was there in the tank; I was the fish. No. It was just my 
image on the mirror-glass of the aquarium. 
On the day of my seventh birthday, Jacques Lacan wrote 
A certificate tells me that I was born. I repudiate this certificate: I am not a poet, 
but a poem. A poem that is being written, even if it looks like a subject. 
(1998: viii) 
I have two birth certificates. Was I born twice? 
'the Gorgon's gaze [... ] the looking glass': The rear-view mirror is a backwards looking act. It takes us forwards but at a cost. We are always one step behind the current, the 
present is seen in terms more appropriate to the past. 
McLuhan claims that culture works like a rear-view minor, because new media 
render previous ones obsolete while taking, them as their content [... However, ] Levinson is therefore claiming, that the written word is not obsolete, but has been 
transfigured in the new medium. 
(Horrocks 2000: 53 and 55) 
'the backwards glance': See Lacan's 'What is a Picture? ' on 
painting; the moment of seeing, the "terminal moment distinguish between a gesture and an act" (Lacan 1998: 114). 
glance. 
the painter and the act of 
[... ] which enables us to 
These notes are a backward 
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'changes our perception / alters sense ratios': McLuhan writes 
The division of faculties which results from the technological dilation or 
externalization of one or another sense is so pervasive a feature of the past 
century that today we have become conscious, for the first time in history, of how 
these mutations of culture are initiated. Those who experience the first onset of a 
new technology, whether it be alphabet or radio, respond most emphatically 
because the new sense ratios set up at once by the technological dilation of eye or 
ear, present men with a surprising new world, which evokes a vigorous new 
"closure, " or novel pattern of interplay, among all of the senses together. 
(1962: 22-3) 
See also McLuhan 1962: 265 and McLuhan 1967: 41 
Page 240 
Part 6: Futureworld 
Canto 1: The Time Machine: An In(ter)vention. 
'Futureworld': Film directed by Richard T. Heffron (1976), a superficial sequel to WestwoTld 
(1973), with the same conceit: robots help humans to live out their fantasies, until the 
robots get different ideas. 
'The Time Machine: An In(ter)vention': A play on the full title of H. G. Wells' 1895 novel. 
'a 'conviction' which is worn like a mask': See Nietzsche 1990: 38. 
'the exhausted want rest, relaxation, peace, calm': Nietzsche 1968: 374. 
Page 241 
'Instantly is not [... ] in the present': See Toffler 1971 and Gleick 2000. In the age of the 
"sound-bite mentality" (Gleick 2000: 97; after Steiner) few people want to have to read 
or watch anything longer than the equivalent of a paragraph or two. Attention spans 
are severely tested by protracted works of art and writing. The photographic image is a 
'sound bite'. The painting is a 'sound bite'. But they allow for a quick visual processing, 
on the one hand, and an extended interpretation on the other. A movement phrase is a 
'sound bite'. A dance piece through its totality is never seen as a whole, only as a series 
of 'sound bites'. The book read from cover to cover is still broken down into sections, 
marked by pauses, turning pages, breaks in attention and focus, straying thoughts, 
shifts in bodily position, sensations of temperature, pressure, irritation; the text (the 
reading, the watching, the hearing of the text) is bound up in the experiential qualities 
of the moment. We develop strategies to remove the effort of reading. We are children 
of Generation IndeX. We consume fat free texts; skim reading. 
Page 242 
'Simulacra become the real. New forms of stimulation % 
The very definition of the real becomes: that of which it is possible to give an 
equivalent reproduction [... ] At the limit of this process of reproductibility, the real 
is not only what can be reproduced, but that which is always already reproduced. The hyperreal. 
And so: end of the real, and end of art, by total absorption one into the 
other? No: hyperrealism is the limit of art, and of the real, by respective 
exchange, on the level of the simulacrum, of the privileges and the prejudices 
which are their basis. The hyperreal transcends representation [... ] only because 
it is entirely in simulation [... ] Analogous to the distancing characteristic of the 
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dream, that makes us say that we are only dreaming; but this is only the game of 
censure and of perpetuation of the dream. Hyperrealism is made an integral part 
of a coded reality that it perpetuates, and for which it changes nothing. 
(Baudrillard 1992: 186) 
As in dreams, in hyperreality "so complicated, so irregular is the mode of 
representation that it can barely be called representation anymore" (Wittgenstein CV 
51e: MS 127 84r). 
'Global Amusement Arcade [... ] Time is dead': Inspired by McLuhan's idea of the Global 
Village: 
Ours is a brand-new world of allatonceness. 'Time' has ceased, 'space' has 
vanished. We now live in a global village.. .a simultaneous 
happening. 
(McLuhan and Fiore 1967: 63) 
Also see McLuhan and Powers 1989. 
Page 243 
Canto 2: Die unendliche Geschichte. 
'Die unendliche Geschichte': German for 'the neverending story'. This thesis is a 
neverending thesis. It continues beyond its pages and cover, with each new reading. 
The writing has reached an end by force of necessity. But even as the line is drawn at 
the final printing and binding and submission, it is with a sense of incompleteness. 
'like the meaning of a word [... ] each of us': See Wittgenstein PR §§57-8. 
'a role in [... ] never become it': Cf. CV 58e: MS 132 46 
[A hero looks death in the face, real death, not just a picture of death. Behaving 
decently in a crisis does not mean being able to act the part of a hero well, as in 
the theatre, it means rather being able to look death itself in the eye. ] For an actor 
may play a multitude of roles, but in the end it is after all he himself, the human 
being, who has to die. 
[[... ] Denn der Schauspieler kann eine Menge Rollen spielen, aber am Ende muß 
er doch selbst als Mensch sterben. ] 
'trying to become': 
'What do we ask? ' Wendy asks. 
'Ask whatever challenges dead and thoughtless beliefs. Ask: When did we become 
human beings and stop being whatever it was we were before this? Ask: What was the 
specific change that made us human? [... ] Ask: Having become human, what is it that 
we are now doing or creating that will transform us into whatever it is that we are slated 
to next become? ' 
(Coupland 1998: 269-70; italics in original) 
Ted Polhemus in his discussion of 'Social Bodies' writes that, "we are faced with social 
change so rapid that the physical body cannot catch up so that consonance might be 
retained (or regained) and so that we might look to our bodies as a model or image by 
which we as individuals might contribute to the maintenance of our social 
system" (Benthall and Polhemus 1975: 31; cf. Stelarc's assertion that "The body's 
metabolism can't cope with the speed, power, and precision of technology" (cited in 
Ayers 1998: 7)). 
To what extent will our relationships with machines and computers affect the fundamental nature of the human body in the world? How will future experiences be 
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different from ours? In what ways will they be mediated and processed? Will a change 
in the senses cause us to make new forms of art and find new ways to s(t)imulate 
ourselves? Will the concept of the individual become blurred as the systems for 
interconnectivity increase and improve? Where will one person start and another end? 
We tend to think of ourselves as having boundaries, define ourselves by our 
borders. Physics tells us otherwise, insists we have no edges, speaks of our 
molecules as always in motion, constant atomic interchange, no way to 
distinguish a proton of yours from a proton of mine when we're making love, 
holding hands, passing by. 
(Coleman 1997: 1) 
Oliver Morton writes about Kevin Warwick's experimentation with microchip implants 
enabling us to interact with receiver chips in our environment, for example, to open 
doors, turn on lights and computers. Morton implies that they could also be used to 
transmit between people: 
A new form of noise-free communication beckons, an unmediated communion of 
minds, a window to the truth of the soul. Perhaps. 
(1999: 51) 
It could be used to help paralysis victims to feel what movement should feel like, but 
Morton is more interested in its potential to be used as a mind-reading device. He 
writes: 
Making sense of the physical sensations of our bodies-giving them meanings- 
requires a great deal of mental interpretation, and it seems pretty debatable 
whether we could interpret other people's bodily sensations with the precision 
needed to communicate any subtleties. You might get over this by developing 
special codes to carry content; but once coding becomes necessary, nervous- 
system-to-nervous-system telepathy is reduced to a complicated sign language. 
(1999: 51) 
Morton goes on to discuss, very briefly, the implications on acting and in deceiving 
other people, by asking "What if [... ] actors were able to feel how their muscles worked in genuine displays of emotion while not being distracted or confused by any attempt to 
portray the emotion itself? " This would make it easier to mimic lying, he argues. 
Compare this with Shoemaker 1976 and Wittgenstein, who writes that we could imagine a 
wireless connection between the two bodies which made one person feel pain in his head when the other had exposed his to the cold air. One might in this case 
argue that the pains are mine because they are felt in my head; but suppose I and 
someone else had a part of our bodies in common, say a hand. Imagine the nerves 
and tendons of my arm and A's connected to this hand by an operation. Now imagine the hand stung by a wasp. Both of us cry, contort our faces, give the 
same description of the pain, etc. Now are we to say we have the same pain or different ones? 
(BB 54) 
The philosophical investigations, the descriptions (rather than explanations; see Wittgenstein PR §1) of two people being linked together might (or often) neglect the problem that they are couched in (a) language with its complex of biases and foundations, metaphors and fictions, grammars and rules. Any 'talk' of emotions, feelings, sensations, experience while based in a 'primary' source of knowledge: perception (see Hacker 1997), must acknowledge the grammar from which it is made. 
299 
'linguistic means of expression are useless for expressing 'becoming": Nietzsche WP §627. 
See Shand: 
Nietzsche's view is that the world is a never-ending flux or becoming with no 
intrinsic order. The world comprises power-quanta whose entire being consists in 
the drive or tendency to prevail over other power-quanta. Power-quanta differ 
from one another entirely quantitatively, not qualitatively, and they should not 
be thought of as things; their entire being consists of their activity, which is their 
attempt to overcome and incorporate in themselves other power-quanta. Each 
power-quantum is the sum of its effects; it is what it does. Thus the world is a 
constant flux of struggle, but it is not a struggle between 'things', it merely 
involves a constant variation of power-quanta. We too are part of this flux. 
Human beings are nothing more than complex constellations of power-quanta. 
(1994: 195) 
'there is no [... ] deed is everything': paraphrase of Nietzsche On the Genealogy of Morals, 
'Good and Evil''Good and Bad' § 13. 
Page 244 
Conclusion: The Omega Man 
Canto 1 and Only: First and Last and Always. 
'The Omega Man': A film (directed by Boris Sagal, 1971) based on Richard Matheson's 
novel I Am Legend (1954; also filmed as The Last Man on Earth, 1964). This leads us back 
to Alpha, and the idea of the Eternal God (see The Bible Revelation 1: 8 "I am Alpha and 
Omega, the beginning and the ending")-the most basic reason or meaning; most 
important part - in Lacan's construction "Objet petit a" - the little other, the lost object, 
the lack, a void (see Lacan 1977)-the relationship is INVERSED: 
Object 0Q Omega Death 
autre aa alpha Human Experience/Life 
'asynchronous communication': asynchronous An adjective describing an operation 
performed at any time and in the background, independent of other 
simultaneous processes. In communications, asynchronous messages can be 
started at any time and are marked with start and stop bits. Telephone 
communication is synchronous; voicemail is asynchronous. 
(Hale 1996: 39) 
'synecdoche': Naming the part for the whole, e. g. 'body' for person. Cf. Wittgenstein "A 
whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar" (PI 222e) and Vygotsky: Consciousness is reflected in a word as the sun in a drop of water. A word relates 
to consciousness as a living cell to a whole organism, as an atom relates to the 
universe. A word is a microcosm of human consciousness. 
(1986: 256) 
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`From first to last, I dance': 
But words can 
fail us too. 
Without 
words I falter 
and 
fall. 
They are not always 
the best way 
to say what we 
want to 
say. 
Sometimes you 
cannot understand what 
I'm saying,, or trying to 
say-I cannot always find 
the right words. 
Why is that? 
Perhaps I choose not to speak 
'Better than what? 
thetermination, there is no 
because a quiet death is better. 
- After the end, 
better or best. IT IS ALL THE SAME! 
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Postscript: "Dance at the edge of language. " 
As I prepare to print my final submission I cannot help but reflect on the journey of 
discovery that I have been on in the last three years and three months. It has left me 
here in my thirty-third year looking at the world - my place in it and the way in which 
I want to live - from a new vantage point. It is as though I once believed that the 
earth was flat and have discovered that it is something different-not a finite expanse 
off which I will fall if I sail towards the edge, but an infinite, limitless form-without- 
form (not the `not quite spherical' planet) which is constructed through a 
combination of experience (personal `perception', the physical sciences) and the 
words we use to shape (describe, explain, narrate, make sense of - from Latin 
sensus, from sentire to feel) these experiences. 
This thesis is the `tip of the iceberg' of my experience; experience translated for the 
reader into a condensed form so that it might be re-experienced. The frustrations of 
research and writing; the elation at making connections between one piece of 
writing - one text - and another; the slow-dawning realisation that "rather than 
merely describing experience, metaphor is the grounding of and for experience. So, 
as we choose different `poetical' metaphors and achieve new understanding, so it is 
revealed that metaphor is at the root of understanding". 
The reader may well be confused at times by the elliptical nature of this thesis, but it 
is possibly in the ellipsis, the limen, where understanding comes. It is the crossing of 
the threshold between not-understanding and understanding 
If movements could be transferred from one human being to another using 
technology, the dialogue might be something like the reading of this thesis. But then 
again, it might not. 
As you leave this thesis, this book, I would like to (re)mind you of the words Dante 
(Inferno, Canto III) utters to Virgil on reading the words on the lintel of the gate of 
Hell: 
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«Maestro, il senso for me'e duro». 
"Master, the sense is hard for me to understand. " 
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